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Abstract
Communication systems nowadays are not only required to deliver a reliable data
transmission, but they also need to provide various secrecy requirements. Establishing
a secure communication is not an easy task, specially over wireless channels whose
open nature allows anyone to have access to the transmitted signals. In order to over-
come this exposure problem, high-level cryptographic techniques have been used to
encrypt the transmitted information. These techniques are very efficient as long as
only limited computational power is available at the eavesdropping nodes. Thus, with
the rapid improvement in the fields of number theory and digital design, these tech-
niques are becoming obsolete. In the recent years, physical layer secrecy also known as
information theoretic security has rose as a prominent alternative technique to achieve
secure communication instead of the classical cryptographic techniques.
The basic concepts of information theoretic security were outlined by Shannon in [1].
Afterwards, Wyner formulated the problem of secure communication over the degraded
wiretap channel in [2]. Wyner defined an information theoretic quantity known as weak
secrecy and used it to measure the ignorance of the eavesdropper about the transmitted
information. He then proposed the concept of wiretap random codes and showed that
they can achieve the secrecy capacity of the degraded wiretap channel under the weak
secrecy constraint. Many researchers followed Wyner’s line of work and extended his
investigation to more complex and real life communication scenarios. However, most
of these works suffered from two main limitations: Most of the results established in
these works are only valid under the weak secrecy constraint, despite of its inadequacy
compared to the recently introduced secrecy measures such as strong secrecy and ef-
fective secrecy. This is because the extension of wiretap random codes to complex
communication scenarios under the constraints of strong secrecy or effective secrecy
is a very challenging task. The second limitation is that the majority of these works
investigated wiretap channels that only suffer from passive eavesdropping attacks and
totally ignored channels under active jamming attacks.
In the first part of this thesis, we investigate secure communication over multi-user
wiretap channels under the strong secrecy constraint. We start our investigation by
showing that although the multi-user setup is more challenging in general, it exploits
an additional dimension for secrecy measures. In particular, multi-user wiretap chan-
nels can either be investigated under a conservative secrecy measure known as joint
secrecy, where the different users do not trust each other; or a more relaxed one known
as individual secrecy which is based on mutual trust among different users. We then
focus our investigation over two classes of multi-user wiretap channels. The first class
is the two-receiver wiretap broadcast channel with degraded message sets and message
cognition. For this class, we derive a state of the art strong secrecy coding scheme
iii
iv
that combines the concepts of Marton coding, wiretap random encoding and indirect
decoding for both the joint and individual secrecy measures. We further showed that
our coding scheme establishes the secrecy capacity of less-noisy channels. Our result
is the first one to prove the optimality of indirect decoding for a secrecy scenario. The
second class that we investigate is the degraded multi-receiver wiretap broadcast chan-
nel. For this class, we establish both the joint and individual secrecy capacity under
the strong secrecy constraints. For both classes we showed that individual secrecy can
utilize the concept of mutual trust to achieve a larger capacity region compared to the
joint secrecy measure.
In the second part of this thesis, we consider a communication scenario in which the
channel undergoes two simultaneous attacks: passive eavesdropping and active jam-
ming. We start our investigation by pointing out that this scenario is equivalent to
problem of secure communication over wiretap channel with imperfect channel state
information. We then limit our investigation to the class of arbitrarily varying wiretap
channels in which the channel state varies from one channel use to the other due to the
manipulation induced by the active jammer. In previous literature, two main coding
schemes (deterministic and correlated random) have been used to establish a reliable
and secure communication over AVWCs. However, both coding schemes suffer from
various drawbacks making them unable to achieve a positive secrecy rate for some sce-
narios. In order to overcome some of these drawbacks, we offer an alternative coding
scheme based on the principle of list decoding. We then derive a full characterization
for the list secrecy capacity of arbitrarily varying wiretap channels and establish some
interesting results for the continuity and additivity behavior of the capacity function.
Finally, we try to bring the two parts of the thesis together by investigating a commu-
nication scenario in which public and confidential messages are transmitted over an
arbitrarily varying wiretap channel.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
No one can deny the impact induced by the advances in the field of communication
and information technologies on the life of human beings. It dates back to the year
1870 when Alexander Graham Bell invented the first telephone. Within a few decades,
telephone lines have grown to be used by millions of people across the globe. Phones
enabled people to connect with each other wherever they are. The technology improved
gradually until we reached the first wireless cellular network in 1979. Mobile networks
did not only allow verbal communication between people, but it also allowed them to
exchange data and multimedia content and all of that is on the move [3]. Parallel to
the development of mobile networks, communication systems took a huge leap with
the development of the internet of things (IoT), which enabled the interconnection of
smart devices over the internet. Humanity nowadays is at the verse of a new evolu-
tion in the field of communication which is the Tactile Internet. The International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) defines the Tactile Internet as an internet network
that combines ultra low latency with extremely high availability, reliability and se-
curity [4]. It is believed that the Tactile Internet will have a revolutionary effects on
different aspects of our lives such as education, healthcare and energy. This is because,
It will add a new dimension to the human-to-machine interaction by enabling tactile
and haptic sensations.
The previous historical overview shows that it has become very crucial for communi-
cation systems to be able to provide a reliable and secure information transmission. In
fact, there exists a various security issues in communication networks nowadays such
as confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation [5]. Each of these is-
sues considers a certain secrecy requirement for a given communication scenario. The
main focus of this thesis is the investigation of the confidentiality of a transmission
within a given communication scenario. Thus, whenever the term secure communica-
tion is mentioned, it will be in the context of confidentiality, unless stated otherwise.
In principal, a secure communication between two nodes in a network must fulfill two
requirements simultaneously:
1. Reliability: This requirement assures that the transmitted messages are guar-
anteed to reach their destination complete and uncorrupted [6].
2. Secrecy: This requirement assures that malicious nodes are not able to interpret
the transmitted information [7].
These two requirements simply imply that only legitimate receiving nodes can success-
fully decode the messages transmitted over the network.
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Communication systems are built based on a layered approach, where each layer is
used to deliver a certain task. In current technologies, secure communication is estab-
lished by separating the reliability and secrecy requirements. In particular, reliability
is integrated on the lower layers, while secrecy is considered as a part of the upper
layers [8]. This is because most of the techniques used to establish secrecy in cur-
rent communication systems are based on the classical computational cryptographic
algorithms for Encryption and Decryption. This implies that secrecy in these tech-
niques completely ignore the physical characteristics of the channel. Moreover, these
techniques are only secure, if the eavesdropper is of limited computational complexity
or has limited resources. These two observation have raised a very important ques-
tion in the last decade about the possibility to deploy both the reliability and secrecy
requirements on the physical layer of a communication system [9]. This question is
related to another question that was raised in the seventies about the capability of
achieving secrecy by only exploiting the physical characteristics of the channel such as
the randomness of the channel.
The answer to the previous question can be interpreted from the concept of physical
layer security introduced by Shannon in [1]. Shannon showed that secure communi-
cation can be achieved by using a secret key shared between the transmitter and the
receiver, as long as the entropy of this key is greater than or equal to the entropy of
the message to be transmitted. Although Shannon’s work inspired most of the clas-
sical cryptographic techniques known nowadays, it has also lit the first spark to the
usage of the physical properties of the channel to achieve secrecy. It was then Wyner
in [2], who laid the actual foundations of physical layer security. Wyner introduced
the model of the degraded wiretap channel that consists of three nodes: a transmitter,
a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper, where the eavesdropper observes a noisy
version of the legitimate receiver observation. Wyner showed that for such channel,
secure transmission is still achievable in the absence of a secret key by exploiting the
noisiness of the channel. He also introduced the term secrecy capacity and defined
it as the maximum rate at which information can be sent from the transmitter to the
legitimate receiver, while keeping it secret from the eavesdropper.
Wyner’s work was revolutionary because he was able to show that the secrecy require-
ment is guaranteed regardless of the computational capabilities of the eavesdropper. He
also built on Shannon’s work and formulated an information theoretic quantity known
as weak secrecy that can be used to measure the level of ignorance of the eaves-
dropper about the confidential information transmitted over the network. Through
the years, researchers aimed to extend Wyner’s work by considering more complex
and practical communication scenarios under various secrecy requirements. In this
thesis, we investigate two popular and very interesting extensions for Wyner’s work.
In particular, we investigate the problem of secure communication over two classes of
wiretap channels: The first is the wiretap channel with multiple legitimate receivers,
while the second is the wiretap channel with active jammers.
In the seventies and eighties most of the work that built upon Wyner’s work only
considered a secure communication scenario over a channel with two receiving nodes
only (a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper), cf [10, 11]. During this period of
3time, such limitation was understandable, specially because the concept of wiretap
channels was relatively new. However, with the rapid growth in communication sys-
tems and in particular wireless systems that contains a lot of potential users, it has
become more crucial to investigate secure communication scenarios that involves mul-
tiple receiving nodes. In order to address this issue, two extensions for the wiretap
channel were introduced in [12]. The first extension considered a wiretap channel with
two legitimate receivers and an eavesdropper, while the second extension considered a
wiretap channel with one legitimate receiver and two eavesdroppers. In this thesis, our
investigation focuses on the first extension, which is motivated by the the following
reasons: This model is of high practical significance because it simulates the problem
of secure communication over broadcast channels. This relation to broadcast channels
allows us to investigate real life communication scenarios where public and confidential
messages are transmitted together. One of the most interesting features of this model
is that it can be investigated with respect to a relatively new secrecy criterion known
as individual secrecy.
The notation of individual secrecy originates from the concept of mutual trust be-
tween the different legitimate receivers. This differs from the conservative notation of
secrecy known as joint secrecy, which was used in most works that addressed secure
communication over broadcast channels. The differences between these two secrecy
criteria motivates us to examine the implications of using each criterion. More pre-
cisely, we study the distinctive coding schemes that can be used for each criterion and
the effect of both secrecy criteria on the secrecy capacity of the investigated scenarios.
In doing so, we develop some new coding schemes that can adapt to different secrecy
constraints. Moreover, we develop our investigation under the strict secrecy measure
known as strong secrecy instead of the weak secrecy measure which have been used
in most of previous literature. Our investigation allows us to achieve a better under-
standing to the problem of secure communication over multi-receiver wiretap channels.
It also enables us to know the limits and the capabilities of the different coding tech-
niques.
Beside the multi-receiver wiretap channel, we consider another extension to Wyner’s
work by examining secure communication over a class of channels known as the ar-
bitrary varying wiretap channel (AVWC). This line of work is motivated by the
fact that communication systems can suffer from two basic classes of attacks: passive
attacks and active attacks. In an active attack, a malicious node aims to disrupts the
communication by manipulating the physical characteristics of the channel. Alterna-
tively, a passive attack simulates a scenario in which a malicious node only eavesdrop on
the transmitted information. Although the model of AVWCs was introduced in [13] to
simulate a wiretap channel with an imperfect channel state information, it was shown
in [14] that AVWCs can be used to model communication scenarios over wiretap chan-
nels with active jammers.
Secure communication over AVWCs has captured a lot of attention recently because it
simulates a very general and real life communication scenario. However, it was shown
that constructing a secure coding scheme for this class of channels is very challenging.
Different form the normal wiretap channel, the coding difficulties for AVWCs are due
to the reliability requirement and not the secrecy one. This is because the impact of
active jamming on the communication link between the transmitter and the legitimate
receiver can be catastrophic making the establishment of reliable communication us-
ing classical coding schemes impossible. In this thesis, we try to solve this issue by
providing an alternative coding scheme that can overcome the major drawbacks of the
conventional coding schemes for AVWCs.
The investigation of secure communication over wiretap channels is a very challenging
task. In this thesis, we try to address some of these difficulties and discuss various
techniques that can be used to solve them. We believe that the results established in
this thesis have solved some of the major issues of the investigated scenarios. We also
hope that this work can allow a general reader to achieve a better understanding to
the problem of secure communication over wiretap channels.
Text Organization
This thesis is structured as follows: in the second chapter, a brief review for the prob-
lem of secure communication over wiretap channels is provided. In Chapter 3, we focus
our attention to a class of wiretap channels with two legitimate receivers known as the
two-receiver wiretap channel with degraded message sets and message cognition. For
this class of channels, we investigate a secure communication scenario under the joint
and individual secrecy criteria. For both criteria, we derive a general achievable rate
region that combines various state of the art coding techniques. In Chapter 4, we drop
the message cognition assumption and extend our investigation to a wiretap channel
with k legitimate receivers. We establish the joint and individual secrecy capacity for
the class of degraded channels. In Chapter 5, we consider the problem of secure com-
munication over AVWCs. We present a full characterization for the secrecy capacity
of AVWCs under list decoding. Our result implies that list decoding can overcome
the drawbacks of other conventional coding schemes. Finally, we provide a conclusion
to summarize the most important results of the thesis, then give a short outlook on
possible future work.
Notation
In this thesis, random variables are denoted by capital letters and their realizations
by the corresponding lower case letters, while bold letters are used to denote matrices.
Additionally, calligraphic letters are used to denote sets, while fraktur letters are used
to denote a set of sets.
N set of natural numbersJa, bK represent the set of natural numbers between a and b
R set of real numbers
R+ set of non-negative real numbers
Rn set of length-n vectors over R, where n ∈ N
Xn denotes the sequence of random variables (X1, . . . ,X
n)
Xi denotes the i
th random variable in the sequence Xn, for i ∈ J1, nK
X˜i denotes the sequence of random variables (Xi, . . . ,X
n)
PX denotes a probability distribution over the random variable X
T n (PX) denotes the -strongly typical set of length n with respect to PX
P[θ] denotes the probability of the event θ
PX(x) denotes the probability P[X = x]
P(X ) denotes the set of all possible probability distributions on X
Pn0 (X ) denotes the set of types for all sequences xn ∈ X n
E[θ] denotes the expectation of the event θ
H[X] denotes the Shannon’s entropy of the random variable X
I[X; Y] denotes the mutual information between X and Y
X− Y − Z denotes a Markov chain over X, Y and Z in this order
X  0 implies that X is a positive semi-definite matrix
X  0 implies that X is a positive definite matrix
|X| denotes the determinant of the matrix X
|X | denotes the cardinality of the set X
DKL(PX‖QX) denotes the Kullback-Leibler divergence between PX and QX
‖PX −QX‖ denotes the total variation distance between PX and QX
Abbreviations
Through out this thesis, the following acronyms are used.
LHS Left Hand Side
RHS Right Hand Side
DM Discrete Memoryless
DMC Discrete Memoryless Channel
DWC Degraded Wiretap Channel
WC Wiretap Channel
KWC Wiretap Channel with Key
BC Broadcast Channel
WBC Wiretap Broadcast Channel
DMS Discrete Memoryless Source
AEP Asymptotic Equipartition Property
SISO Single Input Single Output
MIMO Multiple Input Multiple Output
CSI Channel State Information
MMSE Minimum Mean Square Error
MAWC Multiple Access Wiretap Channel
WRC Wiretap Random Coding
SKC Secret Key Encoding
GWBC Gaussian Wiretap Broadcast Channel
AVC Arbitrarily Varying Channel
AVWC Arbitrarily Varying Wiretap Channel
CAVWC Compound Arbitrarily Varying Wiretap Channel
CQC Classical Quantum Channel

Chapter 2
Secure Communication Over
Wiretap Channels
This chapter reviews the problem of secure communication over wiretap channels where
perfect channel state information (CSI) is available at all channel nodes. First, the
concept of information theoretic security is introduced and the problem of measur-
ing secrecy is addressed. Next, the mathematical techniques used to analyze coding
schemes for wiretap channels are briefly discussed. Finally, an overview over the results
established for secure communication over the two-receiver wiretap broadcast channel
is presented.
2.1 Information Theoretic Security
Communication systems nowadays are required to provide both a reliable and secure
data transmission. The problem of reliable communication over the different layers of
the networking architecture have been extensively studied over the last few decades.
On the other hand, the problem of secure communication was mainly considered on
the higher layers. That is why most of the techniques used to establish secure commu-
nication in the current communication systems are based on classical computational
cryptographic algorithms. Although these techniques have been very useful in the past,
they are becoming more insecure recently [8]. This because most of these techniques
are based on the assumption of limited computational power at the eavesdropping
nodes. Thus, with the recent advances in number theory and the improvements in the
digital design field, this assumption is no longer valid.
Information theoretic security also known as physical layer secrecy has captured a lot of
attention over the last few years [5]. In particular, it seems to be a a good replacement
for the conventional cryptographic techniques because it does not impose any assump-
tions on the computational power of the eavesdroppers. One of the main features of
information theoretic security is that it derives very precise expressions for the amount
of information leaked to the eavesdropper in terms of information theoretic quantities
and as a function of the communication channel [9]. This feature gives the physical
layer security a huge advantage over the conventional cryptographic techniques which
do not have a precise metric to measure their strengths where a cryptographic protocol
is said to be secure based on its ability to overcome a group of attacks.
7
8 Chapter 2  Secure Communication Over Wiretap Channels
In this section, a brief overview about the field of information theoretic security is
presented. It starts by introducing Shannon’s original work in [1] on secure commu-
nication. It then highlights the model of the degraded wiretap channel introduced by
Wyner in [2] and the more general form investigated by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner in [10].
Finally, the dilemma of evaluating the secrecy of a communication in terms of infor-
mation theoretic measures is addressed.
2.1.1 Shannon’s Ciphering System
Shannon was the first one to investigate the problem of secure communication from
an information theoretic perspective in [1]. He considered a communication scenario
that consists of a transmitter (Alice), a legitimate receiver (Bob) and an eavesdropper
(Eve), where Alice communicates with Bob over a noiseless channel which is overheard
by Eve as illustrated in Fig. 2.1. Now, given a confidential message m ∈ M, Alice
should be able to inform Bob about m, while keeping Eve completely ignorant. This
ignorance reflects the secrecy level of the communication link between Alice and Bob.
Encoder
K
Decoder
Eavesdropper
M X Mˆ
I(M;X) = 0
Figure 2.1: Shannon’s ciphering system
Shannon used the conditional entropy H(M|X) to evaluate the secrecy of the trans-
mission, where M is a random variable distributed over the confidential message set
M, while X is a random variable that represents the information transmitted over the
channel and observed by the eavesdropper. The term H(M|X) is currently known as
the eavesdropper’s equivocation and has been widely used as a reliable secrecy mea-
sure. This is because the equivocation represents the uncertainty of Eve about the
confidential message M after intercepting the transmitted signal X [15].
Shannon showed that secure communication in terms of prefect secrecy – H(M|X) =
H(M) – can only be achieved using a secret key shared between the transmitter and the
legitimate receiver, while keeping the key hidden from the eavesdropper. Shannon’s
coding scheme is based on the concept of one time pad as follows: Given a confidential
message m ∈M and a shared secret key k ∈ K, Alice uses an encoder E :M×K → X
to produce the codeword x = m ⊗ k. At the legitimate receiver, Bob uses x and k
along with the decoder ϕ : X ×K →M to extract the confidential message m = x⊗k.
Now, even if Eve knows the structure of the encoder E and the decoder ϕ, it can not
extract any information about m using only x .
Although Shannon’s investigation showed that secrecy can be achieved with low com-
plexity, it suffers from some limitations [16]. One of the major issues is that Shannon
showed that in order to achieve perfect secrecy, the entropy of the shared secret key
must be greater than or equal to the entropy of the confidential message as follows:
H(K) ≥ H(M). (2.1)
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This implies that in order to establish secure communication based on Shannon’s
model, the transmitter must generate and store secret keys whose length is equivalent
to the length of the confidential messages. It also indicates that the transmitter needs
to find a secure channel over which it can share the key with the legitimate receivers.
Not only that but each of the generated keys can only be used once. Another limitation
is that Shannon constructed his model for a noiseless channel between the transmitter
and the legitimate receiver while in reality noise is always there. However, this as-
sumption have become acceptable over the years, due to the development of powerful
algorithms that can establish a reliable communication over noisy channels with an
arbitrary small decoding error probability [17,18].
2.1.2 Degraded Wiretap Channel
Roughly speaking, secure communication involves two main tasks: reliability and se-
crecy. Reliability implies that the legitimate receivers are capable of decoding the
transmitted message without errors. While secrecy assures that no one aside from
the legitimate receivers can acquire any information about the transmitted message
by eavesdropping on the communication link. Shannon separated these two tasks in
his model as he assumed a noiseless channel where both the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper observe the exact signal sent by the transmitter. This assumption
deprived Shannon from using the noisiness of the channel as a supporting factor to
induce secrecy and was the main reason that Shannon argued that without a shared
secret key, secure communication can not be established [19].
In order to understand how the presence of noise can be advantageous for the establish-
ment of secure communication, Wyner introduced the model of the degraded wiretap
channel in [2] which is illustrated in Fig. 2.2. Differently from Shannon, Wyner con-
sidered a discrete memoryless channel (DMC) in which the transmitter encodes the
confidential message m ∈M in to a codeword xn ∈ X n of length n, which is then sent
to the legitimate receiver over a noisy channel W : X → P(Y) such that the receiver
observes the noisy codeword yn. Additionally, the eavesdropper observes the codeword
zn through a DMC V : Y → P(Z). This implies that the eavesdropper’s observation
is a degraded (noisier) version of the legitimate receiver observation [20].
Encoder
DM-DWC
Q = (W,V )
WnY|X(y
n|xn)
V nZ|Y(z
n|yn)
Legitimate
Receiver
Eavesdropper
xn y
n
zn
MˆM
yn
1
n I(M; Z
n)→ 0
as n→∞
Figure 2.2: Discrete memoryless degraded wiretap channel
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Moreover, Wyner used a new secrecy constraint known as the weak secrecy criterion
rather than using the perfect secrecy constraint introduced by Shannon. Instead of
having the eavesdropper’s equivocation to be exactly equal to the entropy of the confi-
dential message, Wyner introduced a new quantity called the eavesdropper’s equivoca-
tion rate given by 1
n
H(M|Zn) and requested this quantity to be arbitrarily close to the
entropy rate of the confidential message 1
n
H(M) for sufficiently large codeword length
n. Wyner’s target was to investigate the existence of a coding scheme that satisfies
the weak secrecy constraint and assures at the same time that the probability of error
at the legitimate receiver is arbitrary small for sufficiently large n.
Wyner was not only able to prove the existence of such coding scheme, but he also
managed to prove that the codes that apply such coding scheme can achieve the max-
imum transmission rate possible under the defined reliability and secrecy constraints.
Wyner called this maximum rate the secrecy capacity and presented the following
coding theorem:
Theorem 2.1. [2] The secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless degraded wiretap
channel W : X → P(Y) and V : Y → P(Z) is given by the following expression:
C(W,V ) = max
PX
[I(X; Y)− I(X; Z)]. (2.2)
where the maximum is taken over all possible input distributions PX.
The previous theorem confirms Shannon’s argument that secure communication cannot
be achieved over noiseless channels without secret keys. This is because if Y = Z
which implies that both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper obtain the same
observation, then the secrecy capacity vanishes. Although Theorem 2.1 was established
by Wyner for degraded wiretap channels, it was shown in [10] that it holds for less noisy
and more capable wiretap channels [21] as well. The achievability proof of the previous
coding theorem is based on the class of codes introduced by Wyner known as wiretap
random codes. In Section 2.2, the construction and the secrecy analysis of such
codes are introduced. Furthermore, a weak converse based on Fano’s inequality [22] is
derived for a more general case in Section 2.3.
2.1.3 General Wiretap Channel with Public and Confidential
Services
Wyner’s investigation of the degraded wiretap channel raised a lot of questions regard-
ing secure communication over noisy channels. Wyner restricted his investigation to
the scenario where the eavesdropper’s observation is a degraded version of the legiti-
mate receiver’s observation. Thus, it was not clear whether secure communication is
still achievable over a general wiretap channel where the legitimate receiver does not
have a statistical advantage over the eavesdropper. Moreover, Wyner dealt with the
eavesdropper as an intruder to the system that should be kept completely ignorant
about the transmitted information. However, in some communication scenarios, the
eavesdropper is a legitimate part of the system that should have access to some of
the transmitted information while keeping him ignorant about other information [23].
These two problems encouraged Csisza´r and Ko¨rner to investigate the problem of pub-
lic and confidential communication over the general wiretap channel in [10].
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Csisza´r and Ko¨rner considered a DMC (W,V ) given by W : X → P(Y) and V : X →
P(Z) that consists of one transmitter and two receivers as illustrated in Fig. 2.3.
The transmitter aims to send two messages simultaneously: a common public message
mp ∈Mp and a confidential message mc ∈Mc by encoding them into the codeword xn.
The first receiver observes the noisy codeword yn and use it to decode both the public
and confidential messages. The other receiver observes the noisy codeword zn and use
it only to decode the public message. The coding scheme should simultaneously assure
that the second receiver can not infer any information about the confidential message.
Encoder
DM-WC
Q = (W,V )
WnY|X(y
n|xn)
V nZ|Y(z
n|yn)
legitimate
receiver
Eavesdropper
xn
yn
zn
Mp,Mc
Mˆp, Mˆc
1
n I(Mc; Z
n)→ 0
M˜p
Figure 2.3: Wiretap channel with public and confidential messages
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner managed to show that for sufficiently large n, there exists a cod-
ing scheme that satisfies the weak secrecy constraint, i.e. 1
n
H(Mc|Zn) ≈ 1nH(Mc),
while assuring an arbitrary small decoding error probability for (Mp,Mc) at the first
receiver and for Mp at the second receiver. They also showed that the constructed
coding scheme establishes the public-secrecy capacity of the channel and presented
the following coding theorem:
Theorem 2.2. [10] The public-secrecy capacity region of the discrete memoryless
wiretap channel (W,V ) is given by the union over the set of all rate pairs (Rp, Rc) ∈ R2+
that satisfy:
Rp ≤ min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)] (2.3)
Rc ≤ I(V; Y|U)− I(V; Z|U), (2.4)
where the union is taken over all probability distributions PUVX on the random variables
(U,V,X), such that U− V − X− (Y,Z) forms a Markov chain. Further it suffices to
have |U| ≤ |X |+ 3 and |V| ≤ |X |2 + 4|X |+ 3.
The previous result implies that secure communication over the general wiretap chan-
nel is possible as long as there exists at least one joint distribution PUVX such that
I(V; Y|U) > I(V; Z|U). If such distribution does not exist, then the eavesdropper’s
channel is less noisy than the legitimate receiver’s channel which consequently implies
that the secrecy capacity is zero [16]. If the public message is ignored, the following
corollary follows:
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Corollary 2.1. [5] The secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless wiretap channel
(W,V ) is given by the following expression:
C(W,V ) = max
PUX
[I(U; Y)− I(U; Z)], (2.5)
where the maximum is taken over all possible joint distributions PUX and it suffices to
have |U| ≤ |X |+ 1.
It is important to point out that the secrecy capacity of the general wiretap channel is
defined in terms of the auxiliary random variable U originated from the prefix channel
Q : U → X and not in terms of X directly. This is not the case for the degraded
wiretap channel where the secrecy capacity is defined in terms of the random variable
that represents the channel input X as shown in Theorem 2.1.
2.1.4 The Dilemma of How to Measure Secrecy
One of the main issues in secure communication is how to evaluate the ignorance of
the eavesdropper about a transmitted confidential message [24]. Some cryptographic
techniques evaluate the secrecy of a transmission by the ability of the eavesdropper to
decode the confidential message. Thus as long as the decoding error probability of the
confidential message at the eavesdropper is bounded away from zero then the commu-
nication is secure [25]. However, this evaluation depends on the computational power
and the decoding capabilities of the eavesdropper [26]. It also implies that although
the eavesdropper is not able to decode the whole message, he might be able to extract
some information about the transmission.
In [1] Shannon suggested using an information theoretic measure known as the eaves-
dropper’s equivocation and is given by H(M|Zn). This conditional entropy is an esti-
mate for the eavesdropper’s uncertainty about the confidential message M given it’s
observation Zn. Shannon requested a very strict secrecy condition known as perfect
secrecy where the eavesdropper’s equivocation must be equivalent to the entropy of
the confidential message. Over the years, the equivocation has been replaced by an-
other information theoretic measure known as the information leakage. This measure
is given by the mutual information between the confidential message and the eaves-
dropper observation. Thus, the perfect secrecy constraint can be formulated as follows:
I(M; Zn) = 0. (2.6)
The previous condition implies that eavesdropper’s observation Zn is statistically inde-
pendent of the confidential message M. This means that the perfect secrecy constraint
in (2.6) forces the decoding error probability at the eavesdropper to be close to one,
regardless of its decoding capabilities [27].
Although perfect secrecy appears to be a convenient measure to evaluate the secrecy of
a transmission, it has been really difficult to find coding schemes that fulfill it. In [2],
Wyner suggested the usage of a more practical secrecy constraint known as the weak
secrecy criterion. This criterion requires that the rate of information leaked to the
eavesdropper about the confidential message vanishes as n approaches infinity. This
requirement can be formulated as follows:
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(M; Zn) = 0. (2.7)
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The weak secrecy notation has become a very popular measure for evaluating secrecy,
specially because one can easily follow Wyner’s technique introduced in [2] to construct
wiretap random codes that fulfill the weak secrecy constraint. However, one can argue
that the weak secrecy criterion is an untrustworthy measure for secure communication.
This is because the weak secrecy constraint in (2.7) does not necessarily imply that
the information leakage decays with n, but it only assures that the information leakage
grows at most sub-linearly with n. This means that under the strong secrecy criterion,
the eavesdropper might be able to extract some information about the confidential
message as highlighted in [16, Example 3.3].
The previous discussion advocates the need a secrecy measure which can overcome the
practical issues of perfect secrecy and at the same time is more strict than the weak
secrecy criterion. From a mathematical point of view, this secrecy measure should
have an asymptotic statistical independence between the confidential message M and
the eavesdropper’s observations Zn. This leads to the strong secrecy criterion which is
formulated as follows:
lim
n→∞
I(M; Zn) = 0. (2.8)
Differently from weak secrecy, the strong secrecy constraint strictly implies that the
amount of information about the confidential message M leaked to the eavesdropper
decays as n goes to infinity. In some literature, the strong secrecy criterion is defined
using various distance measures between the joint distribution PMZn and the product
of its marginals PM · PZn . Among the most used distance measure are the Kullback-
Leibler divergence as in [28] and the total variation distance as in [29].
Similar to the perfect secrecy, the strong and weak secrecy constraints are not only
information theoretic measures but they also have an operational meaning. This op-
erational meaning is related to the decoding error probability at the eavesdropper.
Although both measures guarantee a high probability of decoding error at the eaves-
dropper, they differ in the speed at which this probability converges to one. Using
Fano’s inequality, one can show that the rate of convergence of the error probability
under the weak secrecy criterion is O(1). On the other hand, it has been shown in [30],
that the strong secrecy criterion provides an exponential rate of convergence.
Recently a new secrecy measure known as effective secrecy was introduced in [31]. Ef-
fective secrecy does not only investigate the ability of the eavesdropper to extract infor-
mation about the confidential message, but it also consider an additional operational
meaning for secrecy called stealth. Stealth determines the ability of the eavesdropper
to detect the presence of meaningful communication. The mathematical formulation
of effective secrecy is expressed using the Kullback-Leibler divergence as follows:
lim
n→∞
DKL(PMZn‖PMQnZ) = 0, (2.9)
where PMZn is the joint distribution on the random variables M and Z
n, PM is the
marginal distribution of PMZn on M, while Q
n
Z is the distribution expected to be ob-
served by the eavesdropper when the transmitter is sending useless information. In
order to understand the implication of the effective secrecy requirement in (2.9), we
expand the divergence as follows:
DKL(PMZn‖PMQnZ) = I(M; Zn) +DKL(PZn‖QnZ). (2.10)
14 Chapter 2  Secure Communication Over Wiretap Channels
The previous expansion captures the essence of effective secrecy as follows: In addi-
tion to fulfilling the strong secrecy obligation, effective secrecy enforce an additional
constraint due to the second term in (2.10). This constraint provides what is called
stealth communication as it reflects hiding the presence of useful communication from
the eavesdropper.
2.2 Secrecy Analysis for Wiretap Random Codes
In this section, the concept of wiretap random codes is introduced by highlighting
its basic definition and a simple way to construct this class of codes for the general
discrete memoryless wiretap channel (DMWC). In addition, the main techniques used
to carry out the secrecy analysis for such codes under the different secrecy constraints
are investigated.
2.2.1 Code Concept and Construction
Consider a DM-WC that consists of a transmitter, a legitimate receiver and an eaves-
dropper a shown in Fig. 2.3, where only a confidential message M is transmitted over
the channel instead of the public-confidential pair (Mp,Mc). The channel is defined by
the stochastic matrix Q : X → P(Y ×Z), where X , Y and Z are finite discrete input
and output alphabets at the transmitter, the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
respectively. It can also be defined in terms of two independent DMCs: the legitimate
channel W : X → P(Y) and the eavesdropper channel V : X → P(Z). For a block
code of length n, an input sequence xn ∈ X n, and output sequences yn ∈ Yn and
zn ∈ Zn, we have
W nY|X(y
n|xn) =
n∏
i=1
WY|X(yi|xi) and V nZ|X(zn|xn) =
n∏
i=1
VZ|X(zi|xi) (2.11)
Definition 2.1. A (2nR, n) wiretap random code C for the general DM-WC Q =
(W,V ) consists of: a confidential message set M = J1, 2nRK, a stochastic encoder at
the transmitter
E :M→ P(X n) (2.12)
which maps a confidential message m ∈ M to a codeword xn(m) ∈ X n according
to the conditional probability E(xn|m), and a deterministic decoder at the legitimate
receiver
ϕ : Yn →M∪ {?} (2.13)
that transforms the channel observation at the legitimate receiver yn ∈ Yn to a certain
confidential message mˆ ∈M or an error message.
We assume that the code C is known to the transmitter, the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper. It was shown that deterministic encoder in which each confidential
message m ∈ M is mapped to a fixed codeword xn ∈ X n is usually insufficient to es-
tablish secure communication [32]. This is not the case for decoding where a stochastic
decoder can only reduce the rate of reliable communication, while having no effect on
secrecy [16, Remark 3.3].
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Definition 2.1 implies that the main difference between wiretap random codes and clas-
sical deterministic codes is the encoding process. This because Eq. (2.12) implies that
for every confidential message m, there exists a group of valid codewords, such that
when m is to be transmitted, the encoder selects one of these codewords based on the
conditional distribution EXn|M=m and transmits it. In order to construct such encoder,
Wyner suggested using a normal deterministic encoder a long with a randomization
message set Mr = J1, 2nRrK as follows: Given a confidential message m ∈ M, the
encoder chooses a randomization message mr ∈ Mr uniformly at random then uses
the deterministic encoder Ed : M×Mr → X n to produce the codeword xn(m,mr)
and transmits it.
The previous encoding technique leads to a slight modification to the decoding function
in (2.13). Instead of directly mapping the channel observation yn to the corresponding
confidential message, the legitimate receiver uses a decoder ϕ : Yn → M × Mr
to decode both the confidential the randomization messages. Based on the channel
coding theorem, the described coding scheme is successful with high probability as
long as
R +Rr ≤ I(X; Y). (2.14)
The previous equation implies that instead of using the full rate of the channel between
the transmitter and the legitimate receiver to transmit only the confidential message,
part of this rate is used to transmit the randomization message. This means that the
maximum rate available for the confidential message is I(X; Y)−Rr.
Wyner showed that Rr needs to be roughly I(X; Z) which is the full rate of the channel
between the transmitter and the eavesdropper cf. Theorem 2.1. An intuitive explana-
tion for the value of Rr is based on the following arguments:
• Rr is the rate of the randomization message which was introduced to realize a
stochastic encoder E in (2.12) by utilizing a deterministic encoder Ed.
• The aim of the stochastic encoder is to confuse the eavesdropper and make
sure that it cannot extract any information about the confidential message by
assigning different codewords for the same confidential message.
• A possible way to induce this confusion is to jam all the resources available at
the eavesdropper – the full rate of its channel – by the randomization message.
Thus,
Rr ≈ I(X; Z). (2.15)
Although the previous explanation seems to be logical, it is not enough to establish
a coding theorem. It is also not clear which secrecy measure is satisfied by fulfilling
the constraint in (2.15). That is why, a step by step mathematical analysis that starts
with a certain secrecy measure and ends up with a constraint on the randomization
rate Rr is always needed. This analysis is usually known as the secrecy analysis of the
coding scheme.
2.2.2 Virtual Receiver Technique
The virtual receiver method is one of the most famous techniques used to carry out the
secrecy analysis of wiretap random codes under the weak secrecy criterion. Although
this technique is very popular, one can not identify the first time it was introduced.
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Nevertheless, one can show that the secrecy analysis carried out by Wyner in [2],
Massey in [33], in addition to Csisza´r and Ko¨rner in [10] might all be interpreted as
an application of the virtual receiver technique.
The main idea of this technique is to assume the existence of a virtual receiver that
observes the same channel output of the eavesdropper Zn while having access to the
confidential message M through an error free link. With M as a side information and
given Zn, this virtual receiver aims to decode the randomization message Mr reliably.
Afterwords, a series of transformation is applied to the weak secrecy constraint to
establish a relation between it and the decoding error probability of Mr at the virtual
receiver. In order to present the exact steps of the secrecy analysis, it is important to
introduce the underlying coding scheme:
• Codebook C: Fix an input distribution PX and use it to generate the codewords
xn(m,mr) for m ∈ M and mr ∈ Mr by generating the symbols xi(m,mr) for
i ∈ J1, nK independently according to PX. It is important to point out that the
constructed codebook C is just a possible realization of the random variable C
that represents all possible codebooks.
• Encoding: Given a confidential message m ∈ M, the encoder chooses a ran-
domization message mr ∈ Mr uniformly at random then transmits the corre-
sponding codeword xn(m,mr).
• Legitimate Receiver Decoding: Given the received sequence yn, it founds
the unique message pair (mˆ, mˆr) ∈ M × Mr such that (xn(mˆ, mˆr), yn) ∈
T n (PXWY|X).
• Virtual Receiver Decoding: Given the received sequence zn and the trans-
mitted confidential message m, it founds the unique message m˜r ∈Mr such that
(xn(m, m˜r), z
n) ∈ T n (PXVZ|X).
• Reliability Analysis: For a codebook C, one can define the average decoding
error probability as follows:
P¯e(C) , P[(M,Mr) 6= (Mˆ, Mˆr) or Mr 6= M˜r], (2.16)
where M and Mr are uniformly distributed random variable over the message
sets M and Mr respectively, while Mˆ, Mˆr and M˜r are the random variables
that represents the output of the decoders at the legitimate receiver and the
virtual receiver respectively. According to the standard joint-typicality decoding
arguments [34,35], E[P¯e(C)] ≤ fn() where limn→∞ fn() = 0, if
R +Rr ≤ I(X; Y)− δ1() and Rr ≤ I(X; Z)− δ2(). (2.17)
Concerning the “Secrecy Analysis”, it is enough to show that under the rate con-
straints in (2.17), the following holds:
lim
n→∞
1
n
E
[
I(M; Zn|C)] = 0. (2.18)
This because based on the selection lemma (Lemma A.4), if the previous condition
is true then there exists a certain codebook realization C for which the weak secrecy
constraint in (2.7) is satisfied. The expectation in (2.18) can be further simplified as:
E
[
I(M; Zn|C)] = E[I(MMr; Zn|C)− I(Mr; Zn|MC)]
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(a)
= E
[
I(Xn; Zn|C)−H(Mr|MC) +H(Mr|MZnC)
]
(b)
≤ E[I(Xn; Zn)−H(Mr) +H(Mr|MZnC)]
(c)
= I(Xn; Zn)−H(Mr) + E
[
H(Mr|M˜rC)
]
(2.19)
where (a) follows from the codebook structure which implies that Xn is fully identified
by M and Mr; (b) follows because C−Xn−Zn forms a Markov chain and the fact that
Mr is independent of M and C; while (c) follows by taking the terms independent of
C out of the expectation and applying the decoding function at the virtual receiver.
The three terms in (2.19) can be further bounded as follows:
I(Xn; Zn) = nI(X; Z) (2.20a)
H(Mr) = nRr (2.20b)
E
[
H(Mr|M˜rC)
] ≤ 1 + E[nRr P¯e(C)], (2.20c)
where Eq. (2.20a) follows because (Xn,Zn) is i.i.d. according to PXVZ|X; Eq. (2.20b)
follows because Mr is uniformly distributed over the setMr; while Eq. (2.20c) follows
from a relaxed version of Fano’s inequality (Lemma A.2). Using the rate constraint in
(2.17) with equality along with the fact that E[P¯e(C)] ≤ fn(), it follows that
lim
n→∞
1
n
E
[
I(M; Zn|C)] ≤ lim
n→∞
δ2() +
1
n
+Rr · fn()
= δ2(). (2.21)
In the construction of the code  can be chosen to be relatively small, for example
 = n−
1
3 cf. Theorem A.5, such that limn→∞ δ1(), δ2(), fn() = 0. This implies that
using a randomization rate Rr as given by (2.17) fulfills the weak secrecy constraint
in (2.7) and this completes the secrecy analysis of the wiretap random code C under
the weak secrecy constraint using the virtual receiver technique.
2.2.3 Variational Distance Measure
This section investigates the secrecy analysis of wiretap random code under the strong
secrecy criterion. In general, two main concepts have been used to show that a certain
coding scheme meets the strong secrecy criterion given in (2.8) [36]. The first concept
is based on applying additional transformation to a weak secrecy coding scheme with
the aim of strengthening the secrecy measure. One of the most popular techniques
that apply this concept is the secret-key agreement technique introduced in [37]. The
second concept is to apply powerful mathematical tools that can establish the strong
secrecy results directly without deriving the weak secrecy results first. Among the
techniques that apply the second concept are the graph-coloring technique presented
in [38], the information-spectrum methods addressed in [39, 40] and the resolvability
approach investigated in [28, 41]. This section considers a technique that applies the
second concept and is based on Devetak’s approach introduced in [42] and was used
for various communication scenarios over wiretap channels cf. [29, 30].
Before presenting the exact steps of the secrecy analysis, it is essential to point out the
main features of the coding scheme. Consider a coding scheme like the one introduced
in the previous section but with two main exceptions:
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• Codebook and Encoding: A sequence xn generated by the input distribution
PX is included in the codebook, if and only if x
n belongs to the typical set
T n1 (PX). This leads to a new input distribution as follows:
P˜Xn(x
n) =
{
PnX(x
n)
PnX(T
n
1
(PX))
if xn ∈ T n1 (PX)
0 otherwise.
(2.22)
Now, use P˜Xn(x
n) to generate the codewords xn(m,mr) for (m,mr) ∈M×Mr.
Further, the encoder works exactly as the one in the previous section.
• Decoding and Reliability: No virtual receiver is considered and the decoder
at the legitimate receiver works as the one in the previous section but with a new
constant for the typicality set 2 ≥ 1. Thus, for a code C, the average decoding
error probability is given by:
P¯e(C) , P[(M,Mr) 6= (Mˆ, Mˆr)]. (2.23)
Based on the standard joint-typicality decoding arguments [34,35], one can show
that E[P¯e(C)] ≤ fn(1, 2), where limn→∞ fn(1, 2) = 0, if
R +Rr ≤ I(X; Y)− δ(1, 2). (2.24)
The “Secrecy Analysis” of the modified coding scheme is based on a very interesting
property. This property is that under a certain constraint on Rr, there exists a measure
σ on the eavesdropper observation set Zn such that:∥∥PZn|M − σ∥∥ ≤ 2−nβ, (2.25)
where β > 0 and PZn|M is the distribution induced by the codebook on Zn conditioned
on the confidential message M. To find the required constraint on the randomization
rate that proves the validity of Eq. (2.25), the following definitions are needed:
∀zn ∈ Zn σ˜(zn) , E
[
V nZn|Xn(z
n|Xn(m,mr))× 1T n2 (PXVZ|X|Xn(m,mr))(z
n)
]
(2.26a)
∀βn > 0, F ,
{
zn ∈ Zn : zn ∈ T n3 (PZ) and σ˜(zn) ≥ βn|T n3 (PZ)|−1
}
, (2.26b)
where 3 > 2 and PZ is the marginal distribution of PXVZ|X on Z. Additionally,
for any set A ⊂ Zn, the indicator function 1A is defined as follows: 1A(zn) = 1, if
zn ∈ A, otherwise 1A(zn) = 0. Further, the definitions in (2.26) are used to describe
the measure σ as follows:
∀zn ∈ Zn σ(zn) , E
[
V˜ nZ|X(z
n|Xn(m,mr))
]
(2.27)
, E
[
V nZ|X(z
n|Xn(m,mr))× 1T n2
(
PXVZ|X|Xn(m,mr)
)(zn)× 1F(zn)]
(2.28)
= σ˜(zn)× 1F(zn). (2.29)
Now, based on the structure of the underlying coding scheme and the definition in
(2.28), one can use the triangle inequality to bound the total variation distance in
(2.25) for every confidential message m ∈M as follows:∥∥∥PZn|M(·|m)− σ(·)∥∥∥ ≤
∥∥∥∥∥ 1|Mr|∑mr V˜ nZ|X(·|xn(m,mr))− σ(·)
∥∥∥∥∥
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+
∥∥∥∥∥ 1|Mr|∑mr V nZ|X(·|xn(m,mr))× 1T n2 (PXVZ|X|xn(m,mr))(·)
(
1− 1F(·)
)∥∥∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥∥∥PZn|M(·|m)− 1|Mr|∑mr V nZ|X
( · |xn(m,mr))× 1T n2 (PXVZ|X|xn(m,mr))(·)
∥∥∥∥∥
(2.30)
Denote the three terms summed up in the RHS of the previous equation by A1, A2 and
A3 respectively. In order to bound A1, one can apply the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound
given in Lemma A.3 to the i.d.d. random variables V˜ nZ|X(z
n|Xn(m,mr)) as follows:
P
[
1
|Mr|
∑
mr
V˜nZ|X(z
n|Xn(m,mr)) /∈ [(1± βn)σ(zn)]
]
(a)
≤ 2 exp
(
−|Mr| · β
2
nσ(z
n)
2b ln 2
)
(b)
≤ 2 exp
(
−|Mr| · β
2
n2
n(H(Z|X)−δ(2))σ(zn)
2 ln 2
)
(c)
≤ 2 exp
(
−|Mr| · β
2
n2
n(H(Z|X)−δ(2))βn2−n(H(Z)+δ(3))
2 ln 2
)
(d)
= 2 exp
(
−2
n(Rr−I(X;Z)−δ(2,3)−3β)
2 ln 2
)
, (2.31)
where (a) follows from the definition of σ(zn) in (2.27), (b) follows from the properties
of typical sequences which implies that V˜ nZ|X(z
n|Xn(m,mr)) ∈ [0, 2−n(H(Z|X)−δ(2))], (c)
follows form the definition of F in (2.26b) and the fact that |T n3 (PZ)| ≤ 2n(H(Z)+δ(3));
while (d) follows from the definition ofMr and by letting βn = 2−nβ. It follows directly
that as n approaches infinity, Eq. (2.31) approaches zero doubly-exponential, if
Rr ≥ I(X; Z) + δ(2, 3) + 4β. (2.32)
This implies that under the previous constraint, there exists a codebook realization C,
such that A1 ≤ βn. On the other hand, one can notice that A3 can be upper-bounded
by the probability of the atypical set of Z conditioned on X. Moreover, A2 can be
bounded by the probability of the complement of the intersection of the conditional
typical set of Z given X and the new defined set F . This implies that:
A3 ≤ δn(1, 2), and A2 ≤ 2βn + δn(1, 2), (2.33)
where δn(1, 2) is as defined in Theorem A.6. A detailed analysis for the calculation
of the previous bounds is given in [29, Section IV]. Based on the properties of the
total variation distance and the fact that M is uniformly distributed over the set M,
it follows directly that:∥∥PMZn − PMPZ∥∥ ≤ 2 · ∥∥PZn|M − σ∥∥
≤ 2(A1 + A2 + A3) ≤ 2−nγ, (2.34)
for some γ > 0. Finally, by applying the selection lemma (Lemma A.4) along with
Lemma A.6, one can show that there exists a code realization C with the rate con-
straints in (2.24) and (2.32), such that:
lim
n→∞
P¯e(C) = 0 and lim
n→∞
I(M; Zn|C) = 0. (2.35)
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This completes the strong secrecy analysis of the constructed wiretap random code.
The previous analysis showed that strengthening the secrecy constraint from the weak
secrecy to the strong one comes at no cost with respect to the secrecy capacity of
the general wiretap channel. This is because both criteria require nearly the same
amount of randomization which is equivalent to the full rate of the eavesdropper chan-
nel I(X; Z).
2.2.4 Information Divergence Approximation
One of the most universal problems in information theory is the approximation of a
product distribution. In particular, for a target distribution QXn , what is the mini-
mum rate required to generate a distribution PXn such that d(PXn ,QXn) is small, for
for some distance measure d(·, ·). This problem was first considered by Wyner in [43],
where he identified the smallest rate required to approximate a product distribution
with respect to the normalized information divergence (Kullback-Leibler divergence).
Han and Verdu´ proved in [44] that the rate derived by Wyner is necessary and suffi-
cient to approximate a marginal distribution of a given joint distribution with respect
to the total variation distance. These results was used to construct resolvability codes
capable of establishing secure communication over wiretap channels cf. [40,45]. In [46],
Hou and Kramer showed that Wyner’s result can be extended to the unnormalized
information divergence and use this result to derive the secrecy capacity for wiretap
channel under the newly introduced secrecy measure known as effective secrecy [31].
The previous discussion implies that the effective secrecy capacity of the general wire-
tap channel is equivalent to both the strong and weak secrecy capacities. This is
because the smallest rate required to approximate a target distribution at the eaves-
dropper can be interpreted as the minimum randomization rate required to confuse the
eavesdropper. Additionally, one can notice that the distance measure used by Wyner
in [43] is strongly related to the weak secrecy constraint in (2.7), while the distance
measure used by Han and Verdu´ in [44] is somehow related to the strong secrecy con-
straint in (2.8) as highlighted by Lemma A.6. In order to prove this equivalence, the
following coding scheme is demonstrated.
Consider a coding scheme like the one introduced in Section 2.2.2, but without the
virtual receiver. Since the encoding and decoding functions are identical to the one in
Section 2.2.2, it follows directly that E[P¯e(C)] = E
[
P[(M,Mr) 6= (Mˆ, Mˆr)|C]
]
≤ fn()
where limn→∞ fn() = 0, if
R +Rr ≤ I(X; Y)− δ(). (2.36)
Before deriving the step by step “Secrecy Analysis”, one needs to highlight some
important features for the coding scheme. For a fixed codebook realization C generated
using the input distribution PX, the encoding function induces a new distribution over
the codewords as follows:
∀xn(m,mr) ∈ C QXn(xn(m,mr)) = 1|M||Mr| . (2.37)
Obviously, QXn differs from P
n
X. This implies that one can define two distributions
over the eavesdropper’s observation set Zn. The first is the marginal distribution of
Section 2.2  Secrecy Analysis for Wiretap Random Codes 21
the joint distribution QMZn induced by the code on the confidential message M and
the eavesdropper’s observation Zn and is given by:
QMZn(m, z
n) =
1
|M|
∑
mr
1
|Mr|V
n
Z|X(z
n|xn(m,mr)). (2.38)
The second distribution is the one expected to be observed by the eavesdropper when
no useful information is transmitted and is given by:
PnZ(z
n) =
∑
xn
PnXZ(x
n, zn)
,
∑
xn
PnX(x
n)V nZ|X(z
n|xn). (2.39)
Based on Eq. (2.38) and Eq. (2.39), one can show the existence of a codebook C that
fulfills the effective secrecy constraint in (2.9), if the following holds:
lim
n→∞
E[DKL(QMZn‖QMPnZ)] = 0, (2.40)
where QM is the marginal distribution of QMZn on the confidential message M and
the expectation is taken over the random variable C. Using the resolvability proof
technique developed in [45, Lemma 11], one can show that Eq. (2.40) holds under a
certain condition on the randomization rate Rr as follows:
EC[DKL(QMZn‖QMPnZ)] = EC
[∑
m
∑
zn
QMZn(m, z
n) log
QMZn(m, z
n)
QM(m) · PnZ(zn)
]
(a)
= EC
[∑
m
∑
zn
1
|M|
∑
mr
1
|Mr|V
n
Z|X(z
n|Xn(m,mr)) log
∑|Mr|
l=1 V
n
Z|X(z
n|Xn(m, l))
|Mr| · PnZ(zn)
]
=
1
|M||Mr|
∑
m
∑
mr
EC
[∑
zn
V nZ|X(z
n|Xn(m,mr)) log
∑|Mr|
l=1 V
n
Z|X(Z
n|Xn(m, l))
|Mr| · PnZ(Zn)
]
(b)
=
1
|M||Mr|
∑
m
∑
mr
ECˆ,Zn
[
EC˜
[
log
(∑|Mr|
l=1 V
n
Z|X(Z
n|Xn(m, l))
|Mr| · PnZ(Zn)
)]]
(c)
≤ 1|M||Mr|
∑
m
∑
mr
ECˆ,Zn
[
log
(
EC˜
[∑|Mr|
l=1 V
n
Z|X(Z
n|Xn(m, l))
|Mr| · PnZ(Zn)
])]
=
1
|M||Mr|
∑
m
∑
mr
ECˆ,Zn
[
log
(
V nZ|X(Z
n|Xn(m,mr))
|Mr| · PnZ(Zn)
+
|Mr|∑
l 6=mr∑
xn(m,l)
PnXZ(x
n(m, l),Zn)
|Mr| · PnZ(Zn)
)]
(d)
=
1
|M||Mr|
∑
m
∑
mr
ECˆ,Zn
[
log
(
V nZ|X(Z
n|Xn(m,mr))
|Mr| · PnZ(Zn)
+
|Mr| − 1
|Mr|
)]
≤ 1|M||Mr|
∑
m
∑
mr
ECˆ,Zn
[
log
(
V nZ|X(Z
n|Xn(m,mr))
|Mr| · PnZ(Zn)
+ 1
)]
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=
1
|M||Mr|
∑
m
∑
mr
∑
xn(m,mr)
∑
zn
PnXZ(x
n(m,mr), z
n) log
(
V nZ|X(z
n|xn(m,mr))
|Mr| · PnZ(zn)
+ 1
)
(e)
=
∑
xn
∑
zn
PnXZ(x
n, zn) log
(
V nZ|X(z
n|xn)
|Mr| · PnZ(zn)
+ 1
)
. (2.41)
(a) follows due to the definition of QMZn(m, z
n) in (2.38) and the fact that QM is a
uniform distribution over M. (b) follows by splitting the expectation over the code-
book random variable C for a given (m,mr) into two expectations: an inner expec-
tation taken over a new random variable C˜ given by the codewords Xn(m, l) for all
l ∈ Mr\{mr} and an outer expectation taken over the random variables Cˆ given
by the codewords Xn(m,mr). Additionally, it follows that ECˆ,Zn [f(Xn(m,mr),Zn)] ,∑
xn(m,mr)
∑
zn P
n
XZ(x
n(m,mr), z
n)f(xn(m,mr), z
n). (c) follows by applying Jensen’s
inequality [47] to the expectation over C˜ and the fact that the logarithm is a concave
function. Finally (d) follows from (2.39), while (e) follows from the independence of
the inner sum on the realization of the messages (m,mr). The summation in (2.41)
can be divided into a summation over the jointly typical sequences (AT ) and a summa-
tion over the atypical ones (AT c). Each of these two summations can be individually
bounded as follows:
AT c
(a)
≤
∑
(xn,zn)/∈T n (PXZ)
PnXZ(x
n, zn) log
(
1
µnZ
+ 1
)
(b)
≤ δn() · n · log
(
1
µZ
+ 1
)
, (2.42)
where (a) follows because for all zn ∈ Zn, it holds that PnZ(zn) ≥ µnZ given that
µZ , minc∈supp(PZ) PZ(c); while (b) follows from the properties of atypical sequences
as highlighted in Theorem A.5. On the other hand, the summation over the jointly
typical sequences can be bounded as:
AT
(a)
≤
∑
(xn,zn)∈T n (PXZ)
PnXZ(x
n, zn) log
(
2−n(1−)H(Z|X)
|Mr| · 2−n(1+)H(Z) + 1
)
≤ log
(
2−n[Rr−I(X;Z)−2δ˜()] + 1
)
≤ log(e) · 2−n[Rr−I(X;Z)−2δ˜()], (2.43)
where (a) follows from the consistency of joint typicality along with the properties of
typical sequences in Theorem A.5 and conditionally typical sequences in Theorem A.6.
Eq. (2.42) and Eq. (2.43) imply that the effective secrecy constraint in (2.40) holds,
as long as
Rr ≥ I(X; Z) + 3δ˜(). (2.44)
Finally, by applying the selection lemma (Lemma A.4), one can show that there ex-
ists a code realization C with the rate constraints in (2.36) and (2.44), that satisfies
the required reliability and secrecy constraints. This result shows that even effective
secrecy comes at no cost for the secrecy capacity of the general wiretap channel.
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2.3 Secrecy Capacity for Wiretap Channels with
Shared Key
In this section, secure communication scenario that combines the concept of Shannon’s
ciphering system and the general wiretap channel is investigated. The investigation of
this scenario aims to highlight the basic coding schemes for secure communication and
the various ways of combining them. It also serves as a good introduction for the more
complex models investigated in this thesis. The previous communication scenario was
first introduced in [48,49] with the aim of investigating the rate-distortion problem of
wiretap channels with shared secret key. It also appeared as a consequence of studying
the problem of secure communication over wiretap channels with secure feedback link
in [50–52]. The first secrecy capacity result was established in [48] but only for the
degraded and less noisy wiretap channels.
2.3.1 Channel Model and Coding Theorem
Consider a general wiretap channel similar to the one in Fig. 2.3, but with an additional
feature which is the existence of a secret key shared between the transmitter and the
legitimate receiver, while being concealed from the eavesdropper as shown in Fig. 2.4.
The shared secret key K is uniformly distributed over the finite discrete alphabet K.
The task is to develop a reliable and secure coding scheme that can be used to transmit
K
Encoder
DM-KWC
Q = (W,V )
WnY|X(y
n|xn)
V nZ|Y(z
n|yn)
Legitimate
Receiver
Eavesdropper
xn
yn
zn
M
Mˆ
I(M; Zn)→ 0
as n→∞
Figure 2.4: Wiretap channel with shared secret key
a confidential message M uniformly distributed over a finite and discrete alphabetM
over the wiretap channel (W,V ).
Definition 2.2. A (2nR, n) code C for the wiretap channel with shared secret key
consists of: a confidential message set M = J1, 2nRK, a secret key set K = J1, 2nRkK, a
stochastic encoder at the transmitter
E :M×K → P(X n) (2.45)
which maps a confidential message m ∈ M along with a realization of the secret
key k ∈ K to a codeword xn(m, k) ∈ X n according to the conditional probability
E(xn|m, k), and a deterministic decoder at the legitimate receiver
ϕ : Yn ×K →M (2.46)
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that transforms the channel observation at the legitimate receiver yn ∈ Yn along with
the key realization k to a certain confidential message.
The code C is known to the transmitter, the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper.
It is also assumed that perfect channel state information (CSI) is available at the three
nodes. This implies that the three nodes know the channel statistics a head of time.
In order to measure the secrecy performance of the code the strong secrecy criterion
in (2.8) is investigated. Moreover, the average decoding error probability is used to
evaluate the reliability performance of C as follows:
P¯e(C) = P[M 6= Mˆ|C] = 1|M|
∑
m
Pe(m|C)
=
1
|M||K|
∑
m
∑
k
∑
xn
∑
yn:ϕ(yn,k)6=m
W n(yn|xn)E(xn|m, k), (2.47)
where M is a random variable that represents the confidential message given to the
encoder, while Mˆ is a random variable that represents the output of the decoder.
Indeed, one can use an alternative secrecy measure like the ones introduced in Section
2.1.4 or a different reliability measure such as the maximum decoding error probability
given by:
P˜e(C) = max
m
Pe(m|C). (2.48)
However, throughout this thesis the average error probability and the strong secrecy
criterion will be the main reliability and secrecy measures considered.
Definition 2.3. A non negative number R ∈ R+ is a strong secrecy achievable rate
for the wiretap channel (W,V ) with shared secret key, if for all η, λ, τ > 0 there is an
n(η, λ, τ) ∈ N such that for all n > n(η, λ, τ) there exists a sequence of codes {C}n
that satisfies the following constraints:
1
n
log |M| ≥ R− η (2.49a)
P¯e(C) ≤ λ (2.49b)
I(M; Zn|C) ≤ τ (2.49c)
The strong secrecy capacity C(W,V ) is given by the supremum of all achievable strong
secrecy rates R.
Theorem 2.3. The strong secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless wiretap channel
(W,V ) with shared secret key K of rate Rk is given by the following expression:
C(W,V ) = max
PUVX
min
[[
I(V; Y|U)− I(V; Z|U)]+ +Rk, I(V; Y)], (2.50)
where the maximum is taken over all possible input distributions PUVX defined over the
random variables U,V,X such that U− V − X forms a Markov chain. Moreover, [a]+
is defined as the maximum between 0 and a. Further, it suffices to have |U| ≤ |X |+ 1
and |V| ≤ |X |2 + 3|X |+ 2.
The previous coding theorem was first established in [53] but only under the weak
secrecy constraint. However, based on the results of the previous section one can eas-
ily shows that strengthening the secrecy requirement to strong secrecy or the effective
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secrecy criterion comes at no cost. Additionally, it was shown that the previous coding
theorem is also valid for the maximum error probability reliability constraint. This
because for DMCs, where perfect CSI is available, strengthening the reliability con-
straint from the average to the maximum decoding error probability has no effect on
the capacity [54,55].
2.3.2 Achievability Proof
In this section, the proof of the direct part of Theorem 2.3 which is also known as
the achievability proof is presented. The proof is based on the combination of the
two fundamental coding schemes for secure communication: secret key encoding and
wiretap random coding. Now, for a given wiretap channel (W,V ) and a fixed input
distribution PUVX = PUV · PX|V, there exist three coding scenarios:
Scenario 1: If I(V; Y|U) ≤ I(V; Z|U), then one needs to prove the achievability of
any rate that satisfies the following:
R ≤ min[Rk, I(V; Y)]. (2.51)
This is done by using the secret key encoding scheme as follows:
1. Codebook Generation C1: Let R = Rk, then construct a new message set M⊗ =J1, 2nR⊗K by xoring the corresponding elements of M and K, i.e. m⊗ = m⊗ k. Next,
generate the codewords vn(m⊗) for m⊗ ∈M⊗ by generating the symbols vi(m⊗) with
i ∈ J1, nK independently at random according to PV.
2. Encoding E1: Given the confidential message m ∈ M and the key k ∈ K, the
encoder selects the codeword vn(m⊗ k) then generates a codeword xn independently
at random according to
∏n
i=1 PX|V(·|vi(m⊗ k)) and transmits it.
3. Decoding ϕ1: Upon receiving y
n, the decoder determines a unique codeword vn(mˆ⊗)
which is jointly typical with yn. It then uses mˆ⊗ and its knowledge of the key to produce
an estimate for the confidential message as follows: mˆ = mˆ⊗ ⊗ k.
4. Reliability Analysis: In order to show that this coding scheme satisfies the reliability
constraint in (2.49b), it is enough to prove that:
P[M⊗ 6= Mˆ⊗|C1] ≤ λn, (2.52)
where limn→∞ λn = 0. According to the channel coding theorem (Theorem A.3) and
the standard joint-typicality decoding arguments [34], the constraint in (2.52) holds if:
R = R⊗ ≤ I(V; Y)− δ(), (2.53)
where  > 0 is a constant used in the typicality decoding. Additionally, the equality
of R and R⊗ follows from the codebook generation. As highlighted in the previous
section, one can choose  in a way such that limn→∞ δ() = 0.
5. Secrecy Analysis: Since the secret key encoding scheme is based on the principle
of one time pad (Shannon’s ciphering system), then in order to fulfill the secrecy
constraint in (2.49c), it is enough to have:
H(M) ≤ H(K) =⇒ R ≤ Rk, (2.54)
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where the later follows because both M and K are uniformly distributed on their re-
spective sets. In fact the condition in (2.54) does not only fulfill the strong secrecy
criterion but it also assures perfect secrecy.
Now, by combining Eq. (2.53) and Eq. (2.54) then taking the limit as n→∞, which
implies that δ() = 0, it follows that any rate R that satisfies the constraint in (2.51)
is achievable.
Scenario 2: If I(V; Y|U) ≥ I(V; Z|U) and Rk − I(V; Z|U) ≤ I(U; Y), then one needs
to prove the achievability of any rate that satisfies the following:
R ≤ I(V; Y|U)− I(V; Z|U) +Rk. (2.55)
This follows due to Eq. (2.50) and the fact that I(V; Y) = I(V; Y|U) + I(U; Y). The
achievability proof of this condition is based on the wiretap random encoding scheme
as follows:
1. Codebook Generation C2: Let Mr = J1, 2nRrK be a new message set and let Mr be
a random variable uniformly distributed over this set. Randomly generate a sequence
un by generating the symbols ui with i ∈ J1, nK independently at random according to
PU. Next, construct the codewords v
n(m, k,mr) for m ∈ M, k ∈ K and mr ∈ Mr by
generating the symbols vi(m, k,mr) independently at random according to PV|U(·|ui).
2. Encoding E2: Given the confidential message m ∈ M and the key k ∈ K, the
encoder selects a message mr uniformly at random then generates a codeword x
n
independently at random according to
∏n
i=1 PX|V(·|vi(m, k,mr)) and transmits it.
3. Decoding ϕ2: Upon receiving y
n, the decoder uses it along with the shared key k to
determine a unique codeword vn(mˆ, k, mˆr) which is jointly typical with y
n conditioned
on the sequence un.
4. Reliability Analysis: In order to show that this coding scheme satisfies the reliability
constraint in (2.49b), it is enough to prove that:
P[(M,Mr) 6= (Mˆ, Mˆr)|C2] ≤ λn, (2.56)
where limn→∞ λn = 0. According to the channel coding theorem and the standard
joint-typicality decoding arguments, the constraint in (2.56) holds if:
R +Rr ≤ I(V; Y|U)− δ(1, 2), (2.57)
where  > 0 is a constant used during the typicality decoding. Additionally, one can
assure that limn→∞ δ() = 0.
5. Secrecy Analysis: Based on the strong secrecy and the effective secrecy analysis of
wiretap random codes presented in the previous section, one can show that the secrecy
constraint in (2.49c) is fulfilled as long as:
Rk +Rr ≥ I(V; Z|U) + δ˜(τn), (2.58)
where limn→∞ δ˜(τn) = 0. It worth mentioning that Eq. (2.58) implies that Rk is con-
sidered as a part of the randomization rate used to confuse the eavesdropper.
Now, by combining Eq. (2.57) and Eq. (2.58) then taking the limit as n → ∞, it
follows directly that any rate R that satisfies the constraint in (2.55) is achievable.
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Scenario 3: If I(V; Y|U) ≥ I(V; Z|U) and Rk − I(V; Z|U) ≥ I(U; Y), then one needs
to prove the achievability of any rate that satisfies the following:
R ≤ I(V; Y). (2.59)
This follows due to Eq. (2.50) and the fact that I(V; Y) = I(V; Y|U) + I(U; Y). The
achievability proof of this condition is based on combining the two techniques: secret
key encoding and wiretap random encoding scheme along with concept of rate splitting
and superposition encoding as follows:
1. Rate Splitting: Divide the confidential message set and the secret key set into two
parts as follows: M = M1 ×M2 and K = K1 × K2. Each of the new constructed
message sets can be written as J1, 2nRaK, where a is an indicator that identifies each
set. Additionally, one needs to make sure that this division satisfies the following rate
constraint: R1 = Rk1 .
2. Codebook Generation C3: Construct a new message set M⊗ = J1, 2nR⊗K, where
R⊗ = R1. The construction of this message set is done by xoring the elements of
M1 and K1. Moreover, Let Mr = J1, 2nRrK be a randomization message set with
Mr be a uniformly distributed random variable over it. Next, randomly generate the
cloud center codewords un(m⊗) for m⊗ ∈M⊗ by generating the symbols ui(m⊗) with
i ∈ J1, nK independently at random according to PU. For each cloud center codeword
un(m⊗), generate the satellite codewords vn(m⊗,m2, k2,mr) for m2 ∈ M2, k2 ∈ K2
and mr ∈Mr by generating the symbols vi(m⊗,m2, k2,mr) independently at random
according to PV|U(·|ui(m⊗)).
3. Encoding E3: Given the confidential message m = (m1,m2) ∈ M and the key
k = (k1, k2) ∈ K, the encoder selects a message mr uniformly at random then generates
a codeword xn independently at random according to
∏n
i=1 PX|V(·|vi(m⊗,m2, k2,mr)),
where m⊗ = m1 ⊗ k1 then it transmits xn.
4. Decoding ϕ3: Upon receiving y
n, the decoder uses it along with the shared key
k = (k1, k2) to determine a unique pair of codewords
(
un(mˆ⊗), vn(mˆ⊗, mˆ2, k2, mˆr)
which is jointly typical with yn. Next, it uses the estimated mˆ⊗ and k1 to produce the
message mˆ1 = mˆ⊗ ⊗ k1.
5. Reliability Analysis: In order to show that this coding scheme satisfies the reliability
constraint in (2.49b), it is enough to prove that:
P[(M⊗,M2,Mr) 6= (Mˆ⊗, Mˆ2, Mˆr)|C3] ≤ λn, (2.60)
where limn→∞ λn = 0. According to the channel coding theorem, the principle of
superposition encoding [56] and the standard joint-typicality decoding arguments, the
constraint in (2.60) holds if:
R1 = Rk1 = R⊗ ≤ I(U; Y)− δ1() (2.61a)
R2 +Rr ≤ I(V; Y|U)− δ2(), (2.61b)
where  > 0 is a constant used during the typicality decoding. Additionally, one can
assure that limn→∞ δ1(), δ2() = 0.
6. Secrecy Analysis: Due to the splitting of the confidential message set into two parts,
the secrecy constraint in (2.49c) can be redefined under this coding scheme as follows:
I(M; Zn|C3) = I(M1; Zn|C3) + I(M2; Zn|M1C3) ≤ τn (2.62)
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Based on the secrecy analysis of the secret key encoding scheme, the first term in (2.62)
vanishes, as long as:
H(M1) ≤ H(K1) =⇒ R1 ≤ Rk1 , (2.63)
On the other hand, based on the strong secrecy and effective secrecy analysis of wiretap
random codes presented in the previous section, the second term in (2.62) is less than
τn, if:
Rk2 +Rr ≥ I(V; Z|U) + δ˜(τn), (2.64)
where limn→∞ δ˜(τn) = 0. This implies that the rate constraints in (2.63) and (2.64)
assures the fulfillment of the secrecy constraint in (2.62).
Now, by combining Eq. (2.61), Eq. (2.63) and Eq. (2.64) followed by applying the
Fourier-Motzkin elimination procedure [57] then taking the limit as n→∞, it follows
directly that any rate R that satisfies the constraint in (2.59) is achievable.
It is important to point out that the achievability proof of Theorem 2.3 presented in [53]
is a little bit different from the one discussed here. In [53], the authors used some of
the properties of the mutual information to transform the capacity expression in (2.50)
into an equivalent expression. Then, they prove the achievability of the equivalent
expression using only wiretap random codes. Although their technique is totally valid,
it does not bring the different secrecy coding schemes to the light. Alternatively,
the presented achievability proof shows that for a fixed input distribution, a given
secret key and the CSI, one can select the optimal coding scheme that achieves the
secrecy capacity. This coding scheme might be only secret key encoding like the first
scenario or only wiretap encoding as in the second scenario or a combination of the two
techniques as in the third scenario. This phenomena is of high importance because it
clarifies the strengths of each coding scheme. Additionally, the presented achievability
proof emphasizes the importance of having a perfect CSI available at the transmitter
because the selection of the optimal coding scheme depends on this information.
2.3.3 Converse Proof
In this section, the proof of the converse part of Theorem 2.3 is presented. The aim of
the converse proof is to show that the rate in (2.50) is in fact the maximum possible
rate that can be achieved under the required reliability and secrecy constraints. In
particular, there are two classes of converse proofs: a weak converse and a strong con-
verse. The main difference between weak and strong converse is the rate at which the
reliability and secrecy constraints are violated if the rate exceeds the capacity [6, 58].
In this thesis, only weak converses are investigated and presented.
Now, let R be an achievable strong secrecy rate for the wiretap channel with shared
secret key (W,V ) and let λ, τ > 0. For n sufficiently large, assume that there exists a
(2nR, n) code C such that:
nR ≤ H(M|C), P¯e(C) ≤ λn = 2−nλ, I(M; Zn|C) ≤ τn = 2−nτ . (2.65)
Based on Fano’s inequality (Lemma A.2) and the fact that the decoding function of
the code C at the legitimate receiver is not only supplied by the observations Yn but
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with the secret key K as well, it follows that
H(M|YnKC) ≤ H2(P¯e(C)) + nR · P¯e(C) = Γ(λn), (2.66)
where one can easily show that limn→∞ Γ(λn) = 0. In order to simplify the notation,
the conditioning on the code is ignored in next steps. Thus, it follows immediately by
combining the constraints in (2.65) and (2.66) that
nR ≤ H(M)−H(M|YnK)− I(M; Zn) + Γ(λn, τn)
(a)
= H(M|K)−H(M|YnK)− I(M; Zn) + Γ(λn, τn)
(b)
= I(M; Yn|K)− I(M; Zn|K) + I(K; Zn|M) + Γ(λn, τn)
(c)
≤ I(M; Yn|K)− I(M; Zn|K) +H(K|M) + Γ(λn, τn)
(d)
= I(M; Yn|K)− I(M; Zn|K) + nRk + Γ(λn, τn)
≤ [I(M; Yn|K)− I(M; Zn|K)]+ + nRk + Γ(λn, τn), (2.67)
where Γ(λn, τn) = Γ(λn) + τn. (a) follows from the properties of the entropy along
with the fact that M and K are independent. (b) follows from the chain rule of the
mutual information. (c) follows from the relation between the mutual information
and entropy. (d) follow because K is uniformly distributed over the set K. Moreover,
one can use Eq. (2.66) to derive another upper-bound on R by ignoring the secrecy
constraint in (2.65) as follows:
nR ≤ I(M; Yn|K) + Γ(λn)
(a)
≤ I(MK; Yn) + Γ(λn), (2.68)
where (a) follows from the chain rule of the mutual information and the fact that
I(K; Yn) ≥ 0. At the moment, let K , U and (M,K) , V. Hence, by merging the two
upper-bounds in Eq. (2.67) and Eq. (2.68) after dividing the RHS of each of them by
n and taking the limit as n approaches infinity, the following bound is established:
R ≤ max
PUV
max
PXn|UV
lim
n→∞
1
n
min
[
[I(V; Yn|U)− I(V; Zn|U)]+ + nRk, I(V; Yn)
]
, (2.69)
where the convergence of the limit is guaranteed by the Fekete’s lemma [59]. The
previous bound is known as a Multi-letter upper-bound because it is given in terms of
the n-dimensional random variables Yn and Zn. One can notice that the multi-letter
bound in (2.69) matches the rate region in (2.50) applied to the n-fold product of
the wiretap channel with secret key (W n, V n). This implies that the bound in (2.69)
defines a multi-letter description for the secrecy capacity of the channel. The prob-
lem of multi-letter descriptions is that they might not be efficiently computable if the
limit does not converge, that is why a single-letter description for the capacity is al-
ways more desirable. Nevertheless, it has been shown that multi-letter descriptions are
extremely valuable as they can establish many important features for the capacity [60].
In order to prove the single-letter converse for the capacity expression in (2.50), the fol-
lowing random variables need to be introduced: For i ∈ J1, nK, let Ui , (K,Yi−1, Z˜i+1)
and Vi , (M,Ui), where for a given sequence An, the following convention holds:
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Ai , (A1, . . . ,Ai) and A˜i , (Ai, . . . ,An). Now, consider the bound in (2.67), it can
be reformulated as follows:
R ≤ 1
n
[I(M; Yn|K)− I(M; Zn|K)]+ +Rk + Γ˜(λn, τn)
(a)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(M; Yi|KYi−1)− I(M; Zi|KZ˜i+1)
]+
+Rk + Γ˜(λn, τn)
(b)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(M; Yi|KYi−1Z˜i+1))− I(M; Zi|KYi−1Z˜i+1)
]+
+Rk + Γ˜(λn, τn)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(Vi; Yi|Ui)− I(Vi; Zi|Ui)]+ +Rk + Γ˜(λn, τn), (2.70)
where Γ˜(λn, τn) =
1
n
Γ(λn, τn). (a) follows from the mutual information chain rule;
while (b) follows due to the Csisza´r and Ko¨rner sum identity [10, Lemma 7]. Using
the same technique, one can rewrite the bound in (2.68) as follows:
R ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(MK; Yi|Yi−1) + Γ˜(λn)
(a)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Vi; Yi) + Γ˜(λn), (2.71)
where ˜Γ(λn) =
1
n
Γ(λn) and (a) follows due to the chain rule of the mutual information.
Finally, by merging Eq. (2.70) and Eq. (2.71), followed by introducing a time sharing
random variable T independent of all others and uniformly distributed over J1, nK,
then taking the limit as n approaches infinity such that Γ˜(λn) and Γ˜(λn, τn) vanishes,
the following bound is established:
R ≤ max
PUVX
min
[
[I(V; Y|U)− I(V; Z|U)]+ +Rk, I(V; Y)
]
, (2.72)
where U = (UT,T), V = VT, Y = YT and Z = ZT. Since the previous bound matches
the acheivable bound established in the previous section, the converse proof of Theo-
rem 2.3 is complete.
2.4 Two-Receiver Wiretap Broadcast Channels
This section considers the problem of secure communication over the discrete memo-
ryless broadcast channel (DM-BC) with two legitimate receivers and an eavesdropper.
At first, the channel model is introduced in addition to the motivation behind this
model. Next, different communication scenarios over this channel model are presented
along with the most important results established for each scenario. Moreover, the
main coding techniques used to establish these results are investigated briefly. Finally,
the model of the corresponding Gaussian channel is discussed.
2.4.1 Motivation and Channel Model
The investigation of complicated secure communication scenarios over the wiretap
channel have captured a lot of attention in the last few years. This investigation was
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inspired by the work of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner in [10] which considered the transmission of
public and confidential messages over the two-receiver DM-BC. This is because it gen-
eralized Wyner’s model of secure communication over the degraded wiretap channel
to a more real life scenario. Since then, a lot of effort have been directed to extend the
results in [10] for various communication services (public and confidential) [61–63] and
with respect to different secrecy setups [29]. Nevertheless, most of these extensions
only considered a channel with two receiving nodes only (a legitimate receiver and an
eavesdropper). This was a little bit unsatisfying; because with the rapid growth of
networks, it has become crucial to examine how common and confidential services can
be integrated over multi-receiver channels. In this section, the first step is taken in this
direction by investigating secure communication over a DM-BC with two legitimate
receivers and an eavesdropper.
Let X , Y1, Y2 and Z be discrete input and output alphabets for the DM-WBC (Q)
with two legitimate receivers and an eavesdropper given by the transition matrix Q :
X → P(Y1,Y2,Z). Thus, for the input and output sequences xn ∈ X n, yn1 ∈ Yn1 ,
yn2 ∈ Yn2 and zn ∈ Zn of length n, the DMC is given by:
QnY1Y2Z|X(y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n|xn) =
n∏
i=1
QY1Y2Z|X(y1i , y2i , zi|xi). (2.73)
In general, the receiving nodes are not supposed to cooperate during decoding. This
implies that one can interpret (Q) as three independent DMCs from the transmit-
ter to the first and second legitimate receivers as well as the eavesdropper as follows:
W 1 : X → P(Y1), W 2 : X → P(Y2) and V : X → P(Z). It is important to highlight
that the investigation of secure communication over this channel model is done under
the assumption of the availability of perfect CSI for the three DMCs (W 1,W 2, V ) at
the transmitter. Throughout the rest of the thesis, this channel model will be called as
the two-receiver discrete memoryless wiretap broadcast channel (DM-WBC), where it
is assumed that the word wiretap directly brings an additional receiver (eavesdropper)
to the system.
In this thesis, two main secrecy scenarios will be considered over the two-receiver DM-
WBC: The first scenario considers the transmission of a common confidential message
to both legitimate receivers, while the second consider an individual confidential mes-
sage for each legitimate receiver. For both scenarios, the integration of public services
along with the confidential ones is considered as well. The main task of investigating
these scenarios is to derive outer and inner bounds on the capacity region. While try-
ing to achieve this target, researches found out that the straightforward extension of
the single-user coding schemes is only optimal for some special multi-user channels [12]
where for the general case more complex coding schemes are needed. Moreover, the
reliability and secrecy analysis of the multi-user coding schemes are far more compli-
cated than the single-user ones. Furthermore, in order to derive upper-bounds that
assures the optimality of these coding schemes, new converse techniques are required.
In the following subsections, the two mentioned communication scenarios are briefly
introduced along with their connections to the non-secrecy domain and the most im-
portant results established for each model in literature. Moreover, the basic concepts
of the achievablity coding schemes used to derive these results are introduced. In
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particular, the encoding-decoding mechanism for each scheme is addressed including a
shorten version of the corresponding reliability and secrecy analysis. It is important to
highlight that most of the results presented in literature for the two-receiver DM-WBC
were established under the weak secrecy criterion.
2.4.2 Public-Confidential Degraded Message Sets
In this section, a communication scenario that investigates the transmission of a com-
mon public message M0 and a confidential message M1 over a DM-WBC with two
legitimate receivers and an eavesdropper as shown in Fig. 2.5 is considered. The com-
mon public message needs to be decoded by the three receiving nodes: both legitimate
receivers and the eavesdropper as well. On the other hand, the confidential message
needs to be only decoded by the two legitimate receivers while keeping it secret from
the eavesdropper. This scenario can be interpreted as an extension of the Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner’s wiretap channel introduced in [10], where an additional legitimate receiver is
introduced to the system.
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Figure 2.5: Two-receiver DM-WBC with public and confidential messages
The communication scenario modeled in Fig. 2.5 reflects a real life communication
setup over DM-BCs in which public and confidential services need to be integrated
together. The eavesdropper in this setup is not an intruding receiving node, but it
is part of the system and some of the information transmitted over the channel are
in fact addressed to it. In fact, having the eavesdropper to be part of the system
is more convenient specially under the assumption that perfect CSI for all receiving
nodes (legitimate and eavesdropper) is available at the transmitter. This model was
first investigated in [64] under the following reliability and secrecy constraints:
lim
n→∞
P
[
(M0,M1) 6= (Mˆ0, Mˆ1) or (M0,M1) 6= (M˜0, M˜1) or M0 6= Mˇ0|C
]
= 0 (2.74)
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(M1; Zn|C) = 0. (2.75)
Eq. (2.75) implies that the investigation of this model in [64] and the extended version
in [12] only considered the weak secrecy measure.
Non-Secrecy Connection: The communication scenario in Fig. 2.5 can be linked
to the non-secrecy communication model of the DM-BC with degraded message sets
which was initially introduced by Ko¨rner and Marton in [65]. In this work the trans-
mission of two degraded message sets over a DM-BC with two receivers was considered.
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It was shown that superposition encoding is optimal in the sense that it establishes
the transmission capacity for the general DM-BC. In [66,67], the investigation was ex-
tended to the three-receiver DM-BC with two degraded message sets, where a common
message is transmitted to all three receivers, while a private message is transmitted
to only two of them. Unfortunately, the transmission capacity of this model is still
an open problem. However, it was shown that the straightforward extension of the
Ko¨rner and Marton inner bound given by [68, Bound 1] is optimal for many special
cases. Moreover, it was shown in [68] that the concept of indirect decoding intro-
duced by Nair and El Gamal in [69] does not yield any region better than Ko¨rner and
Marton’s inner-bound. It is important to highlight here that the Csisza´r and Ko¨rner’s
encoding scheme introduced in [10] is in fact an adaptation of the Ko¨rner and Marton’s
coding scheme introduced in [65] to the secrecy domain.
Important Results: Since the transmission capacity of the corresponding non-secrecy
model is still unknown, one should expect that the secrecy capacity of the communica-
tion scenario in Fig. 2.5 is still unknown as well. Nevertheless, various acheivable re-
gions have been suggested, among them is the straightforward extension of the Csisza´r
and Ko¨rner’s inner-bound given by the following theorem:
Theorem 2.4. [12] An achievable weak secrecy rate region for transmitting a common
public message and a confidential message over the DM-WBC with two legitimate
receivers and an eavesdropper is given by the set of all rate pairs (R0, R1) ∈ R2+ that
satisfy
R0 ≤ I(U; Z)
R1 ≤ min
[
I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U), I(X; Y2|U)− I(X; Z|U)
]
, (2.76)
for random variables with joint probability distribution PUX = PUPX|U, such that U−
X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain. Moreover, if both legitimate receivers are less
noisy than the eavesdropper, i.e. Y1  Z and Y2  Z, the established region is in fact
the secrecy capacity region.
Although for the non-secrecy scenario indirect decoding does not have any advantage
over the extended version of the Ko¨rner and Marton’s inner-bound, the situation is
different for the secrecy scenario. In [64], Chia and El Gamal presented a counter
example that illustrated the superiority of indirect decoding over the extended version
of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner’s inner-bound. They suggested a more general acheivable region,
which is presented in the following theorem:
Theorem 2.5. [12] An achievable weak secrecy rate region for transmitting a common
public message and a confidential message over the DM-WBC with two legitimate
receivers and an eavesdropper is given by the set of all rate pairs (R0, R1) ∈ R2+ that
satisfy
R0 ≤ I(U; Z)
R1 ≤ min
[
I(V0V1; Y1|U)− I(V0V1; Z|U), I(V0V2; Y2|U)− I(V0V2; Z|U)
]
R0 +R1 ≤ min
[
I(V0V1; Y1)− I(V0V1; Z|U), I(V0V2; Y2)− I(V0V2; Z|U)
]
R0 + 2R1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1) + I(V0V2; Y2|U)− 2I(V0; Z|U)− I(V1; V2|V0)
R0 + 2R1 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2) + I(V0V1; Y1|U)− 2I(V0; Z|U)− I(V1; V2|V0) (2.77)
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for random variables with joint probability distribution PUV0V1V2X = PUPV0|UPV1V2|V0
PX|V0V1V2 such that V0 − (V1,V2)− X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain. Moreover,
the probability distribution must satisfy the following constraint:
I(V1V2; Z|V0) ≤ I(V1; Z|V0) + I(V2; Z|V0)− I(V1; V2|V0). (2.78)
The previous region was established based on a coding scheme that combines superpo-
sition encoding [65], Marton coding [70], indirect decoding [71] along with the concept
of wiretap random codes [2,10]. Some of these coding techniques will be addressed in
more details in the next sections. One can also shows that the rate region given in
Theorem 2.4 follows as a special case from the one given in Theorem 2.5.
Common Confidential Message: Consider a simpler version of the communication
scenario in Fig. 2.5, where only the common confidential message M1 is to be trans-
mitted over the channel. Thus, the reliability constraint in Eq. (2.74) changes to:
lim
n→∞
P
[
M1 6= Mˆ1 or M1 6= M˜1|C
]
= 0, (2.79)
while the secrecy constraint in Eq. (2.75) remains unchanged. This simpler scenario
can be viewed as an extended version of the secrecy scenario introduced by Wyner
in [2] to the DM-WBC with two legitimate receivers and an external eavesdropper.
Since the common message secure broadcasting is a special case of the communication
scenario in Fig. 2.5, where M0 = ∅, the results established in Theorem 2.5 and
Theorem 2.4 can be easily extended to this setup by setting the random variable as
follows: U = ∅. Moreover, the following corollary is presented to spot the light on the
usage of the concept of indirect decoding for secure communication.
Corollary 2.2. [12] An achievable weak secrecy rate region for transmitting a com-
mon confidential message over the DM-WBC with two legitimate receivers and an
eavesdropper is given by the set of all rates R ∈ R+ that satisfy
R ≤ min [I(X; Y1)− I(X; Z), I(V; Y2)− I(V; Z)], (2.80)
for random variables with joint probability distribution PVX = PVPX|V, such that V−
X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain.
The problem of secure broadcasting of a common message over a DM-WBC with
two legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper is very important because it illustrates an
important relation between the secrecy and non-secrecy domain. One can observe that
this problem is just the secrecy adaptation of the public common message broadcasting
over a two-receiver DM-BC introduced in [72]. The transmission capacity of a common
public message over the multi-receiver DM-BC was established in [72]. Nevertheless,
the secrecy capacity of the common confidential message problem even for the two-
receiver DM-WBC is still an unsolved problem. This result is somehow surprising,
however it highlights the fact that establishing the secrecy capacity for communication
scenarios over two-receiver DM-WBC is a very difficult task.
2.4.3 Secure Broadcasting of Individual Message Sets
This section investigates the secure transmission of two confidential messages M1 and
M2 over a DM-WBC with two legitimate receivers and an eavesdropper as shown
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in Fig. 2.6. Each legitimate receiver is only interested in one message, while both
message need to be kept secret from the eavesdropper. This secrecy scenario was first
considered in [73,74] under the following reliability and secrecy constraints:
lim
n→∞
P
[
M1 6= Mˆ1 or M2 6= M˜2|C
]
= 0 (2.81)
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(M1M2; Zn|C) = 0. (2.82)
The investigation was then extended to the multi-receiver degraded DM-WBC in
[75, 76]. Some earlier work also considered a version of the problem over parallel
WBCs in [77] and fading WBCs in [77,78].
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Figure 2.6: Two-receiver DM-WBC with two individual confidential messages
Non-Secrecy Connection: Obviously, this secrecy model is a direct extension of
the classical two-receiver DM-BC with two individual public messages [20]. Although
this broadcasting problem have been addressed in many literature cf. [56] and ref-
erences therein, its transmission capacity is still unknown. The best acheivable rate
region is based on a coding scheme that combines the basics of superposition encoding
introduced in [79] and the principles of Marton encoding proposed in [70] as follows:
Theorem 2.6. [35, Proposition 8.1] An achievable rate region for transmitting two
individual public messages over the DM-BC with two receivers is given by the set of
all rate pair (R1, R2) that satisfy
R1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1)
R2 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1) + I(V2; Y2|V0)− I(V1; V2|V0)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|V0) + I(V0V2; Y2)− I(V1; V2|V0) (2.83)
for random variables with joint probability distribution PV0V1V2X = PV0PV1V2|V0 PX|V0V1V2
such that V0 − (V1,V2)− X− (Y1,Y2) forms a Markov chain.
This previous rate region is tight for all classes of DM-BCs for which the transmission
capacity is known such as the degraded DM-BC [80,81], the less noisy DM-BC [21,82],
the more capable DM-BC [83] and many other channels cf. [56]. It was argued in [35]
that a rate region established using Marton coding only is not optimal in general and
a superposition variable is usually need to assure the optimality.
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3. Important Results: Since the capacity of transmitting two public individual mes-
sages over the DM-BC is still an open problem, one should expect that deriving a
secrecy capacity result for the DM-WBC is much harder. Although this is true, re-
searchers suggested various achievable rate regions such as the one introduced in [73]
and is given by the following theorem:
Theorem 2.7. An achievable weak secrecy rate region for transmitting a two indi-
vidual confidential messages over the DM-WBC with two legitimate receivers and an
eavesdropper is given by the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ that satisfy
R1 ≤ I(V1; Y1)− I(V1; Z)
R2 ≤ I(V2; Y2)− I(V2; Z)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1; Y1) + I(V2; Y2)− I(V1V2; Z)− I(V1; V2), (2.84)
for random variables with joint probability distribution PV1V2X = PV1V2PX|V1V2 such
that (V1,V2)− X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain.
The previous region follows by extending the concept of wiretap random codes to
Marton coding. The work in [73] did not only provide the previous achievable rate
region, but it proved the following secrecy capacity result:
Theorem 2.8. The weak secrecy capacity region for transmitting two individual con-
fidential message over the full degraded DM-WBC with two legitimate receivers and an
eavesdropper, where full degraded implies that X− Y1 − Y2 − Z forms a Markov chain
is given by the convex hull of the closure of all rate pairs (R1, R2) that satisfy:
R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U)
R2 ≤ I(U; Y2)− I(U; Z), (2.85)
for random variables with joint probability distribution PUX = PUPX|U such that U−
X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain.
The previous region shows that superposition wiretap random codes are optimal for
the degraded two-receiver DM-WBC and Marton coding is not needed. This result was
extended to the multi-receiver degraded DM-WBC in [75,76]. It is important to high-
light here that the secrecy capacity region in Theorem 2.8 can not be derived from the
achievable region given in Theorem 2.7. This because as illustrated by Theorem 2.6,
Marton-coding are only optimal for the two-receiver DM-BC if they are constructed
with a superposition variable.
Extended Scenario: In [84] a communication scenario that combined the transmis-
sion of degraded message sets along with public individual message sets and confiden-
tial individual messages sets over a DM-WBC with two legitimate receivers and an
eavesdropper was investigated. A general achievable region was established along with
the capacity region for two special scenarios of the degraded two-receiver DM-WBC.
The first scenario is when no confidential message is intended to the first legitimate
receiver (stronger receiver), while the second scenario is when no public message is
intended for the second legitimate receiver. Surprisingly, the secrecy capacity was not
established for the general scenario, even under the degradedness assumption.
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2.4.4 Superposition Wiretap Random Codes
Superposition encoding is a famous coding technique in which the transmitted infor-
mation is structured in overlapping layers [85]. The concept of superposition appears
to be very suitable for the transmission of degraded message sets where there exists
some sort of order for the decoding requirements of each receiver [65]. Moreover, su-
perposition can also be useful for the scenarios in which there exists an order for the
decoding capabilities of each receiver such as degraded and less noisy channels [80,82].
The work of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner in [10] was the first one to combine the concept of
superposition encoding with wiretap random codes. However, this work only applied
the wiretap random codes on the upper layer of the superposition codes only. It was
shown in [75] that it can be extended to the various layers of superposition codes. In
order to highlight this result, the achievability proof of Theorem 2.8 is presented.
1. Codebook Generation C: Fix an input distribution PUX, then let Mr1 = J1, 2nRr1 K
and Mr2 = J1, 2nRr2 K be two randomization message sets. Next, generate the cloud
centers codewords un(m2,mr2), for m2 ∈ M2 and mr2 ∈ Mr2 by generating the sym-
bols ui(m2,mr2) with i ∈ J1, nK independently at random according to PU. Finally,
for every codeword un(m2,mr2) construct the satellite codewords x
n(m2,mr2 ,m1,mr1)
for m1 ∈M1 and mr1 ∈Mr1 by generating the symbols xi(m2,mr2 ,m1,mr1) indepen-
dently at random according to PX|U(·|ui(m2,mr2)).
2. Encoding E: Given the confidential messages pair (m1,m2) ∈ M1 ×M2, the en-
coder selects two randomization messages mr1 and mr2 uniformly at random from the
sets Mr1 and Mr2 respectively. After that, it transmits the corresponding satellite
codeword xn(m2,mr2 ,m1,mr1).
3. First Legitimate Receiver Decoder ϕ1: Upon receiving y
n
1 , the decoder determines a
unique messages quadruple (mˆ2, mˆr2 , mˆ1, mˆr1) such that:(
un(mˆ2, mˆr2), x
n(mˆ2, mˆr2 , mˆ1, mˆr1), y
n
1
)
∈ T n
(
PUXW
1
Y1|X
)
.
The previous decoding strategy implies that the first legitimate receiver does not only
decode its intended message m1, but it also decodes the other confidential message m2.
Not to mention that, it decodes both randomization messages mr1 and mr2 as well.
4. Second Legitimate Receiver Decoder ϕ2: This receiver is only interested in the sec-
ond confidential message and consequently it aims to find the corresponding cloud
center codeword. Thus, upon receiving yn2 , the decoder determines a unique pair
(m˜2, m˜r2) such that for W
2
Y2|U =
∑
xW
2
Y2|XPX|U, it holds that:(
un(m˜2, m˜r2), y
n
2
)
∈ T n
(
PUW
2
Y2|U
)
.
5. Reliability Analysis: Based on the definitions of the decoders at the two legitimate
receivers, one can evaluate the reliability performance of this coding scheme using the
following average error probability:
P¯e(C) = P
[
(M1,M2,Mr1 ,Mr2) 6= (Mˆ1, Mˆ2, Mˆr1 , Mˆr2) or (M2,Mr2) 6= (M˜2, M˜r2)|C
]
.
(2.86)
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In order to fulfill the reliability constraint in (2.81), it is enough to show that P¯e(C) ≤
λn ,where limn→∞ λn = 0. Now, based on the channel coding theorem, the principle
of superposition encoding and the standard joint-typicality decoding arguments, one
can show that the bound on the average error probability holds, if
R2 +Rr2 ≤ I(U; Y1)− δ1() (2.87a)
R1 +Rr1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− δ1() (2.87b)
R2 +Rr2 ≤ I(U; Y2)− δ2(). (2.87c)
Moreover, the typicality constant  can be selected in a way such that δ1(), δ2() →
0 as n → ∞. Furthermore, the bound in (2.87a) can be neglected because it is
already included in (2.87c) due to the fact that the channel is fully degraded, i.e.
U− X− Y1 − Y2 − Z forms a Markov chain which implies that I(U; Y1) ≥ I(U; Y2).
6. Virtual Receiver Decoder ϕ3: This receiver is introduced to facilitate the secrecy
analysis of this coding scheme. The idea is to extend the virtual receiver ’s technique
presented in section 2.2.2 to the superposition encoding principle as follows: Given zn
and the transmitted confidential messages (m1,m2), the decoder determines a unique
randomization messages pair (mˇr1 , mˇr2) such that:(
un(m2, mˇr2), x
n(m2, mˇr2 ,m1, mˇr1), z
n
)
∈ T n
(
PUXVZ|X
)
.
7. Secrecy Analysis: The first step in the secrecy analysis is to derive the required rate
constraints that assure a vanishing average error probability at the virtual receiver’s
decoder. Let this error probability be defined as follows:
P¯
VR
e (C) = P
[
(Mr1 ,Mr2) 6= (Mˇr1 , Mˇr2)|C
]
(2.88)
Using the standard joint-typicality decoding arguments, one can show that P¯
VR
e (C) ≤
τn ,where limn→∞ τn = 0 if:
Rr2 ≤ I(U; Z)− δ3() (2.89a)
Rr1 ≤ I(X; Z|U)− δ3(), (2.89b)
where again  can be selected in a way such that limn→∞ δ3() = 0. Now, based on the
structure of the codebook, the information leakage of the two confidential messages
can be reformulated as follows:
I(M1M2; Zn|C) = I(M1M2Mr1Mr2 ; Zn|C)− I(Mr1Mr2 ; Zn|M1M2C)
(a)
= I(Xn; Zn|C)−H(Mr1Mr2|M1M2C) +H(Mr1Mr2|M1M2ZnC)
(b)
= nI(X; Z)− n(Rr1 +Rr2) +H(Mr1Mr2|Mˇr1Mˇr2C)
(c)
≤ 2nδ3() + 1 + nτn(Rr1 +Rr2). (2.90)
(a) follows due to the codebook structure which indicates that Xn is fully identified
by the random variables M1,M2,Mr1 and Mr2 ; (b) follows because Mr1 and Mr2 are
uniformly distributed over their corresponding sets along with the definition of the
virtual receiver decoder and the fact that(Xn,Zn) is i.i.d. according to PXVZ|X; while
(c) follows due to a relaxed version of Fano’s inequality [22] in addition to apply-
ing the rate constraints in (2.89a) and (2.89b) with equality, keeping in mind that
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I(X; Z) = I(U; Z) + I(X; Z|U). Recalling the weak secrecy constraint in (2.82) yields
the following:
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(M1M2; Zn|C) ≤ lim
n→∞
2δ3() +
1
n
+ τn(Rr1 +Rr2) = 0. (2.91)
This implies that the previous coding scheme along with the rate constraints in (2.89)
fulfill of the weak secrecy measure in (2.82).
Finally, by applying the Fourier-Motzkin elimination procedure [57] to the rate con-
straints in (2.87) and (2.89) followed by taking the limit as n→∞, it follows directly
that any rate pair (R1, R2) that satisfies the constraints in (2.85) is achievable.
2.4.5 Marton-Coding Wiretap Random Codes
As highlighted in the previous section, superposition encoding is based on some hierar-
chy regarding the decoding requirements or the decoding capabilities of the receivers.
This implies that for the general two-receiver DM-BC where an individual message
is transmitted to each receiver, superposition might not be a suitable encoding tech-
nique. This idea encouraged Katalin Marton to introduce a new coding scheme for
the general DM-BC, which is now known as Marton-Coding [70]. This coding scheme
is based on a combination of the coding techniques used in [79, 86] together with the
random coding technique used to prove source coding theorems in rate-distortion the-
ory [87]. In [88] El-Gamal and Meulen presented a simpler proof for the concept of
Marton-Coding. Further, El-Gamal argued in [35] that Marton codes with a superpo-
sition variable given by Theorem 2.6 is the best inner bound to the capacity region of
the DM-BC.
In [73] the principle of Marton-Coding was combined with the concept of wiretap ran-
dom codes to derive an achievable region for the general two-receiver DM-WBC. This
section investigates this new class of codes by presenting a detailed proof for Theo-
rem 2.7 as follows:
1. Codebook Generation C: Fix an input distribution PV1V2X, then letMr1 = J1, 2nRr1 K
and Mr2 = J1, 2nRr2 K be two randomization message sets. Moreover, let Mt1 =J1, 2nRt1 K and Mt2 = J1, 2nRt2 K be two additional message sets needed for the Marton
encoding. Next, generate the codewords vn1 (m1,mr1 ,mt1) for m1 ∈ M1, mr1 ∈ Mr1
and mt1 ∈ Mt1 by generating the symbols v1i(m1,mr1 ,mt1) with i ∈ J1, nK inde-
pendently at random according to PV1 . At the same time, generate the codewords
vn2 (m2,mr2 ,mt2) for m2 ∈ M2, mr2 ∈ Mr2 and mt2 ∈ Mt2 by generating the symbols
v2i(m2,mr2 ,mt2) independently at random according to PV2 .
2. Encoding E: Given the confidential messages pair (m1,m2) ∈ M1 ×M2, the en-
coder selects two randomization messages mr1 and mr2 uniformly at random from the
sets Mr1 and Mr2 respectively. Then, it searches for a message pair (mt1 ,mt2) such
that: (
vn1 (m1,mr1 ,mt1), v
n
2 (m2,mr2 ,mt2)
)
∈ T n
(
PV1V2
)
.
Based on the properties of typical sequences cf. Theorem A.7, with a probability that
approaches one as n approaches infinity, the encoder succeeds in finding a typical pair
as long as:
Rt1 +Rt2 ≥ I(V1; V2) + δt(), (2.92)
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where  can be selected in away such that limn→∞ δt() = 0. In case more than
one jointly typical pair exist, the encoder chooses one of them uniformly at random.
Finally, for the selected codewords pair (vn1 , v
n
2 ), the encoder generates a sequence x
n
independently at random according to
∏n
i=1 PX|V1V2(·|v1iv2i) and transmits it.
3. First Legitimate Receiver Decoder ϕ1: Upon receiving y
n
1 , the decoder determines a
unique messages triple (mˆ1, mˆr1 , mˆt1) such that for W
1
Y1|V1 =
∑
x,v2
W 1Y1|XPX|V1V2, it
holds that: (
vn1 (mˆ1, mˆr1 , mˆt1), y
n
1
)
∈ T n
(
PV1W
1
Y1|V1
)
.
4. Second Legitimate Receiver Decoder ϕ2: Upon receiving y
n
2 , the decoder determines
a unique messages triple (m˜2, m˜r2 , m˜t2) such that for W
2
Y2|V2 =
∑
x,v1
W 2Y2|XPX|V1V2, it
holds that: (
vn2 (m˜2, m˜r2 , m˜t2), y
n
2
)
∈ T n
(
PV2W
2
Y2|V2
)
. (2.93)
5. Reliability Analysis: Based on the definitions of the decoders at the two legitimate
receivers and the encoding mechanism, one can evaluate the reliability performance of
this coding scheme using the following average error probability:
P¯e(C) = P
[
(M1,Mr1 ,Mt1) 6= (Mˆ1, Mˆr1 , Mˆt1) or (M2,Mr2 ,Mt2) 6= (M˜2, M˜r2 , M˜t2)|C
]
.
(2.94)
One can observe that if P¯e(C) ≤ λn, where limn→∞ λn = 0, then the reliability con-
straint in (2.81) follows directly. Now, using the reliability analysis of Marton codes
presented in [88] along with the standard joint-typicality decoding arguments, one can
show that P¯e(C) ≤ λn holds, if
R1 +Rr1 +Rt1 ≤ I(V1; Y1)− δ1() (2.95a)
R2 +Rr2 +Rt2 ≤ I(V2; Y2)− δ2() (2.95b)
As highlighted before, the typicality constant  can be selected in a way such that
limn→∞ δ1(), δ2() = 0.
6. Virtual Receiver Decoder ϕ3: This decoder is introduced as a necessary part for the
secrecy analysis. It works as follows: Given zn and the transmitted confidential mes-
sages (m1,m2), the decoder determines a unique messages quadruple (mˇr1 , mˇr2 , mˇt1 , mˇt2)
such that for VZ|V1V2 =
∑
x VZ|XPX|V1V2 , it holds that:(
vn1 (mˇ1, mˇr1), v
n
2 (mˇ2, mˇr2), z
n
)
∈ T n
(
PV1V2VZ|V1V2
)
.
7. Secrecy Analysis: As usual, the first step in the secrecy analysis using the virtual
receiver technique is to derive the bounds on the rates, such that the probability of
error at the virtual receiver’s decoder vanishes. Thus, one needs to define the following
average error probability:
P¯
VR
e (C) = P
[
(Mr1 ,Mr2 ,Mt1 ,Mt2) 6= (Mˇr1 , Mˇr2 , Mˇt1 , Mˇt2)|C
]
(2.96)
Based on the standard joint-typicality decoding arguments and the ides used to prove
[12, Lemma 1], it follows that P¯
VR
e (C) ≤ τn, where limn→∞ τn = 0, as long as
Rr1 +Rt1 ≤ I(V1; ZV2)− δ3() (2.97a)
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Rr2 +Rt2 ≤ I(V2; ZV1)− δ3() (2.97b)
Rr1 +Rr2 +Rt1 +Rt2 ≤ I(V1V2; Z) + I(V1; V2)− δ3(), (2.97c)
where again  can be selected in a way such that limn→∞ δ3() = 0. Now, based on the
structure of the codebook and the encoding procedure, the information leakage of the
two confidential messages can be reformulated as follows:
I(M1M2; Zn|C) = I(M1M2Mr1Mr2 ; Zn|C)− I(Mr1Mr2 ; Zn|M1M2C)
(a)
≤ I(Vn1 Vn2 ; Zn|C)−H(Mr1Mr2 |M1M2C) +H(Mr1Mr2|M1M2ZnC)
(b)
≤ nI(V1V2; Z) + nγn − n(Rr1 +Rr2) +H(Mr1Mr2|Mˇr1Mˇr2C)
(c)
≤ nδ3() + nδt() + nγn + 1 + nτn(Rr1 +Rr2). (2.98)
(a) follows due to the codebook structure; (b) follows by using the properties of DMCs
as shown in [73, Section III], where limn→∞ γn = 0; while (c) follows from Fano’s in-
equality in addition to applying the rate constraints in (2.92) and (2.97c) with equality.
The previous analysis implies that the previous coding scheme fulfills the weak secrecy
constraint in (2.82) as follows:
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(M1M2; Zn|C) ≤ lim
n→∞
δ3() + δt() + γn +
1
n
+ τn(Rr1 +Rr2) = 0. (2.99)
One should notice that the rate constraints in (2.92) and (2.97c) with equality directly
implies that I(V1; V2|Z) = 0. This, indicates that the rate constraints in (2.97a) and
(2.97b) can be expressed as follows:
Rr1 +Rt1 ≤ I(V1; Z)− δ3() (2.100a)
Rr2 +Rt2 ≤ I(V2; Z)− δ3() (2.100b)
Now, by applying the Fourier-Motzkin elimination procedure to the rate constraints in
(2.95), (2.100), along with using Eq. (2.92) and Eq. (2.97c) with equality, then taking
the limit as n → ∞, it follows directly that any rate pair (R1, R2) that satisfies the
constraints in (2.84) is achievable.
2.4.6 Indirect Decoding for Wiretap Random Codes
Unlike superposition encoding and Marton-Coding, indirect decoding is a technique
that can be used by the decoders at the receiving ends and not during encoding. The
principle of indirect decoding was introduced by Nair and El-Gamal in [71]. They
considered a three-receiver DM-BC with two degraded message sets such that a com-
mon message is sent to all three receivers, while a private message is sent to only
one receiver. They showed that for this scenario indirect decoding establishes an in-
ner bound which is strictly larger than the straightforward extension of Ko¨rner and
Marton inner bound [65]. In [12], El-Gamal and Chia extended the usage of indirect
decoding to the problem of transmitting a confidential message over a two-receiver
DM-WBC. They showed that for such scenario indirect decoding is better than the
the straightforward extension of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner inner bound in [10]. In order to
investigate the deployment of indirect decoding in wiretap random codes, a detailed
proof for Corollary 2.2 is presented as follows:
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1. Codebook Generation C: Fix an input distribution PVX then let Mr1 = J1, 2nRr1 K
and Mr2 = J1, 2nRr2 K be two randomization message sets. Next, construct the code-
words vn(m,mr1) for m ∈ M and mr1 ∈ Mr1 by generating the symbols vi(m,mr1)
with i ∈ J1, nK independently at random according to PV. Finally, for every codeword
vn(m,mr1) construct the codewords x
n(m,mr1 ,mr2) where mr2 ∈ Mr2 by generating
the symbols xi(m,mr1 ,mr2) independently at random according to PX|V(·|vi(m,mr1)).
2. Encoding E: Given the confidential message m ∈ M, the encoder selects two ran-
domization messages mr1 and mr2 uniformly at random from the sets Mr1 and Mr2
respectively. Then, it transmits the codeword xn(m,mr1 ,mr2).
3. First Legitimate Receiver Decoder ϕ1: This decoder demonstrates the main concept
behind indirect decoding as follows: Instead of decoding the confidential message m
and the first randomization message mr1 directly from the corresponding codeword v
n,
it decodes them indirectly from the codeword xn in such a way: Upon receiving yn1 ,
the decoder determines a unique pair (mˆ, mˆr1) such that:(
vn(mˆ, mˆr1), x
n(mˆ, mˆr1 ,mr2), y
n
1
)
∈ T n
(
PVXW
1
Y1|X
)
,
for some mr2 ∈Mr2 . This definition captures the fact that this decoder does not aim
to decode mr2 and is only interested in decoding m and mr1 .
4. Second Legitimate Receiver Decoder ϕ2: This decoder on the other hand decodes m
and mr1 directly from the corresponding codeword v
n as follows: Upon receiving yn2 ,
the decoder determines a unique pair (m˜, m˜r1) such that for W
2
Y2|V =
∑
xW
2
Y2|XPX|V,
it holds that: (
vn(m˜, m˜r1), y
n
2
)
∈ T n
(
PVW
2
Y2|V
)
.
5. Reliability Analysis: Based on the decoding mechanism at the two legitimate re-
ceivers and the encoding function, the reliability performance of this coding scheme
can be evaluated using the following average error probability:
P¯e(C) = P
[
(M,Mr1) 6= (Mˆ, Mˆr1) or (M,Mr1) 6= (M˜, M˜r1)|C
]
. (2.101)
One can notice that if P¯e(C) ≤ λn, where limn→∞ λn = 0, then the reliability constraint
in (2.79) is satisfied. Using the standard joint-typicality decoding arguments along
with the reliability analysis of the indirect decoding used in [12, Section IV-A], one
can show that P¯e(C) vanishes as n approaches infinity, if
R +Rr1 +Rr2 ≤ I(X; Y1)− δ1() (2.102a)
R +Rr1 ≤ I(V; Y2)− δ2() (2.102b)
6. Virtual Receiver Decoder ϕ3: Given z
n and the transmitted confidential message m,
the decoder determines a unique randomization messages pair (mˇr1 , mˇr2) such that:(
vn(m, mˇr1), x
n(m, mˇr1 , mˇr2), z
n
)
∈ T n (PVXVZ|X).
7. Secrecy Analysis: The first step in the secrecy analysis is to derive the upper-bounds
on the randomization rates for which the following average decoding error probability
vanishes:
P¯
VR
e (C) = P
[
(Mr1 ,Mr2) 6= (Mˇr1 , Mˇr2)|C
]
(2.103)
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One can observe that from the prospective of the virtual receiver, the encoding scheme
can be interpreted as a superposition encoding as follows: The first randomization mes-
sage mr1 is encoded in the cloud center codeword v
n, while the second randomization
message is encoded in the satellite codeword xn. This implies that using the standard
joint-typicality arguments along with the reliability analysis of superposition codes
cf. [16], one can show that P¯
VR
e (C) ≤ τn, where limn→∞ τn = 0 as long as:
Rr1 ≤ I(V; Z)− δ3() (2.104a)
Rr2 ≤ I(X; Z|V)− δ3(). (2.104b)
On the other hand, based on the codebook generation and the encoding mechanism,
the information leakage of the confidential message to the eavesdropper can be bounded
as follows:
I(M; Zn|C) ≤ 2nδ3() + 1 + nτn(Rr1 +Rr2). (2.105)
The previous bound follows using similar steps like the ones used to establish the
bound in (2.90) by letting M = (M1,M2) in addition to using the rate constraints in
(2.104) with equality. Since  can be selected in a way such that limn→∞ δ3() = 0, the
previous bound directly implies that the weak secrecy measure in (2.75) is satisfied.
Now, by applying the Fourier-Motzkin elimination procedure to the reliability con-
straints in (2.81) and the secrecy rate constraints in (2.104) with equality followed by
taking the limit as n → ∞, one can show that any confidential rate R that satisfies
the bound in (2.80) is achievable.
2.4.7 Gaussian Wiretap Broadcast Channels
The additive Gaussian white noise channel is a DMC in which the channel output Y is
simply the addition of the channel input X and a scalar noise N, where N is a zero-mean
Gaussian random variable with variance σ independent from the channel input X [89].
The channel capacity of a Gaussian channel is finite only if the noise variance is non-
zero and the channel input has a finite power constraint, otherwise Gaussian channels
have an infinite capacity [90]. Gaussian channels are a very common model for various
communication scenarios in real life specially wireless communication. There are two
main classes of Gaussian channels: The first is known as the scalar Gaussian channel
in which the transmitter as well as the receiver have one antenna; This class is also
known as the Gaussian single-input single-output (SISO) channel. The second class is
the Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channel and is characterized by
the presence of multiple antennas at the transmitting and receiving nodes.
In [11], secure communication over the Gaussian SISO wiretap channel was investi-
gated. The authors managed to establish the secrecy capacity as follows: The achiev-
ability follows by letting the channel input X that describes the secrecy capacity of the
degraded wiretap channel in [2, Theorem 2] to be a Gaussian random variable with
variance P , where P is the total power available at the transmitter. On the other hand,
the converse follows by using the entropy-power inequality [91, 92] to prove the opti-
mality of Gaussian signalling. Now, consider the two-receiver Gaussian SISO-WBC
given by:
Y1 = X + N1, Y2 = X + N2, Z = X + Nz. (2.106)
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N1, N2 and Nz are zero-mean Gaussian random variables, whose variances are given
by σ21, σ
2
2 and σ
2
z respectively. Moreover, the channel input X is subject to a power
constraint such that E[X2] ≤ P . The secrecy capacity region of the previous channel
under the weak secrecy constraint in (2.82) is given by the following theorem:
Theorem 2.9. The weak secrecy capacity region of the two-receiver Gaussian SISO-
WBC is given by the union of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ that satisfy
R2 ≤ f
(
α¯P
αP + σ22
)
− f
(
α¯P
αP + σ2z
)
(2.107a)
R1 ≤ f
(
αP
σ21
)
− f
(
αP
σ2z
)
(2.107b)
where the union is taken over all values of α ∈ [0, 1], such that α¯ = 1−α and P is the
maximal power available at the transmitter. Moreover, the function f(a) is defined as
follows: f(a) , 1
2
log(1 + a).
The previous capacity region was established in [93, 94] for the multi-receiver Gaus-
sian SISO-WBC and not only for the two-receiver case. The prove is based on the fact
that the Gaussian SISO-WBC is a special case of degraded DM-WBC along with the
optimality of Gaussian signaling for the class of Gaussian channels. The sketch of the
proof is given in the next few lines.
1. Achievability: follows as a special case from Theorem 2.8 by selecting (U,X) to be
jointly Gaussian, where X = U + V can be viewed as the summation of two indepen-
dent zero-mean Gaussian random variables U and V, with respective variances α¯P and
αP .
2. The converse: follows by showing that Gaussian signalling for this channel is opti-
mal. This step was a little bit challenging because the converse techniques used in [95]
and [96] for the two-receiver Gaussian SISO-BC cannot be extended in easily to the
wiretap case. This is because the entropy-power inequality [91, 92] which is the main
tool of these techniques is not sufficient alone to solve the optimization problem in
the presence of the eavesdropper. In [94] Ekrem and Ulukus suggested two possible
solutions to overcome this issue: The first solution utilizes the relation between the
minimum-mean-square-error (MMSE) and the mutual information [97, 98], while the
second one is based on the relation between Fisher information and the differential en-
tropy established via the De Bruijn identity [91,92]. These two solution are somehow
the same because the MMSE and fisher information have a one-to-one relation in the
sense that one of them determines the other one [99]. On the other hand the converse
proof suggested in [93] used a subsequent variation of the entropy-power inequality
known as the Costa’s entropy-power inequality [100].
In [94], Ekrem and Ulukus did not only establish the secrecy capacity of the two-
receiver Gaussian SISO-WBC, but they extended their results to the general two-
receiver Gaussian MIMO-WBC as well. In order to establish the capacity region of
this channel, they consider two special cases of Gaussian MIMO-WBC at first. The
first class is known as the two-receiver degraded Gaussian MIMO-WBC and is given
by:
Y1 = X + N1, Y2 = X + N2, Z = X + Nz, (2.108)
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where X, Y1, N1, Y2, N2, Z and NZ are column vectors of length m, where m is the
number of antennas available at the transmitter and each receiver. The channel input
X is subject to a covariance constraint E[XX>]  S, where S  0. N1, N2, and NZ
are zero-mean Gaussian random vectors, whose covariance matrices are given by Σ1,
Σ2 and ΣZ , such that
0 ≺ Σ1  Σ2  ΣZ . (2.109)
The previous semi-definite ordering of the noise covariance matrices implies that
X−Y1 −Y2 − Z forms a Markov chain. This means that the two-receiver degraded
Gaussian MIMO-WBC belongs to the class of two-receiver degraded DM-WBCs. The
second class of channels is known as the two-receiver aligned Gaussian MIMO-WBC.
This channel is also characterized by the same number of antennas at the transmitter
and each receive but the noise covariance matrices do not have to satisfy any positive
semi-definite order. The general two-receiver Gaussian MIMO-WBC simply drops the
constraint on the number of antennas in the aligned class.
Ekrem and Ulukus used a very systematic technique to establish the secrecy capacity
of the general two-receiver Gaussian MIMO-WBC as follows: First, they used the
secrecy capacity of the two-receiver degraded DM-WBC given by Theorem 2.8 along
with the converse technique used to prove the optimality of Gaussian signaling for the
two-receiver Gaussian SISO-WBC to establish the secrecy capacity of the two-receiver
degraded Gaussian MIMO-WBC as follows:
Theorem 2.10. The weak secrecy capacity region of the two-receiver degraded Gaus-
sian MIMO-WBC is given by the union of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ that satisfy
R2 ≤ 1
2
log
|S + Σ2|
|K1 + Σ2| −
1
2
log
|S + Σz|
|K1 + Σz| (2.110a)
R1 ≤ 1
2
log
|K1 + Σ2|
|Σ1| −
1
2
log
|K1 + Σz|
|Σz| (2.110b)
where the union is taken over all selections of 0  K1  S, and S is a covariance
constraint related to the total available at the transmitter. Moreover, the function |A|
is simply the determinant of the matrix A.
The previous capacity region was also established in [93, 101] using a vector general-
ization of Costa’s entropy-power inequality [100]. The next step in establishing the
secrecy capacity of the general Gaussian MIMO-WBC is to generalize the region in
Theorem 2.10 to the aligned case by using the channel enhancement technique [102]. In
this step, Ekrem and Ulukus showed that dirty-paper coding with stochastic encoding
is the optimal coding scheme. Finally, the secrecy capacity region of the two-receiver
aligned Gaussian MIMO-WBC is extended to the general case using by some limiting
arguments as shown in [102, 103], where again dirty-paper coding with stochastic en-
coding is proved to be optimal. It is worth mentioning that Ekrem and Ulukus manged
to extend their results to the general multi-receiver Gaussian MIMO-WBC in [94].
The integration of public and confidential services over Gaussian MIMO-BC was con-
sidered in [104]. The model considered a communication scenario over a two-receiver
Gaussian MIMO-BC with one common public message and two confidential messages.
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The common message is intended for both receivers, while each of the confidential mes-
sages is intended only for one of the receivers and must be kept secret from the other
one. The capacity region of this model was established in [104, 105] for the general
two-receiver Gaussian MIMO-BC using similar arguments as the one discussed above.
Chapter 3
Wiretap Broadcast Channels with
Degraded Message Sets and
Message Cognition
This chapter investigates the problem of secure communication over a two-receiver
DM-WBC with degraded message sets and message cognition. First, we introduce
our model and discuss different reliability and secrecy requirements. In particular, we
consider two secrecy constraints: a conservative constraint known as the joint secrecy
and a more relaxed one known as the individual secrecy. For these two constraints,
we derive a general achievable rate region that combines two main coding principles:
superposition encoding and Marton-Coding along with the concept of indirect decoding
under the strong secrecy criterion. Finally, we establish the secrecy capacity region
for some classes of the two-receiver less noisy DM-WBC.
3.1 System Model and Secrecy Criteria
In this section, we introduce the problem of secure broadcasting over a two-receiver
DM-WBC with degraded message sets and message cognition. We start by high-
lighting the problem of secure bidirectional relaying [106], which represents a real life
communication scenario for our model. We then present a formal description for our
model along with the required communication tasks. Finally, we discuss two different
secrecy measures known as joint secrecy and individual secrecy. These two measures
will be used to evaluate the secrecy of the communication over our model.
3.1.1 Motivation: Secure Bidirectional Relaying
Consider the problem of two-phase secure bidirectional relaying in a three-node net-
work with an external eavesdropper, as shown in Fig. 3.1. In the first phase, known as
the multiple access phase, node 1 and 2 transmit their messages to the relay while keep-
ing the eavesdropper unable to intercept any information about the transmission. This
problem corresponds to the problem of secure communication over the discrete memo-
ryless multiple access wiretap channel (DM-MAWC) and was investigated in [107–110],
where the latter discusses different secrecy criteria. In the succeeding phase, known
as the broadcasting phase, the relay (node 3) re-encodes the messages and broadcasts
them to the intended nodes, while assuring that the eavesdropper can not interpret the
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transmitted information. This problem is somehow connected to the problem of se-
cure communication over a two-way wiretap channel discussed in [111–113]. It can also
be considered as a secrecy extension to the problem of public two-phase bidirectional
relaying in a three-node network, where a relay node establishes a bidirectional com-
munication between two other nodes using a decode-and-forward protocol [114–117].
R1 2
E
M2 M1
??
(a) Multiple-Access Phase
1
n I(M1M2,Z
n)→ 0
R1 2
E
M1 M2
? ?
(b) Broadcasting Phase
1
n I(M1M2,Z
n)→ 0
M2 M1
Figure 3.1: Secure bidirectional relaying in three-nodes network
Our main focus in this chapter will be the broadcasting phase which was first studied
in [116] without any secrecy constraint. It was shown that the transmission capacity
region is given by the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ that satisfy the following:
R1 ≤ I(X; Y1) and R2 ≤ I(X; Y2) (3.1)
The previous capacity region follows directly from the capacity result of public broad-
casting of a common message over a two-receiver DM-BC due to the equivalence of
these two problems. This equivalence arises from the fact that each receiver is cog-
nizant of its own message from the multiple access phase and can use it as an additional
side information for decoding. Thus, a combined message set M1 ×M2 can be in-
terpreted as a common message from the prospective of each receiver. In literature,
the bidirectional broadcasting phase is also known as the DM-BC with receiver side
information [116], or the DM-BC with full message cognition [118].
Secrecy was first introduced to the setup of bidirectional broadcasting in [119] under
the following reliability and secrecy constraints:
lim
n→∞
P
[
M1 6= Mˆ1 or M2 6= M˜2|C
]
= 0 (3.2)
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(M1M2; Zn|C) = 0. (3.3)
Two achievable rate regions were established: The first region is based on the concept
of wiretap random codes and it follows from the straightforward extension of the
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner’s inner-bound. This region is given by the set of all rate pairs
(R1, R2) ∈ R2+ that satisfy:
Ri ≤ I(V; Yi)− I(V; Z) i = 1, 2 (3.4)
On the other hand, the second region is established using the concept of secret key
encoding and is given by the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ that satisfy:
R1 = R2 ≤ min [I(X; Y1), I(X; Y2)] . (3.5)
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The main idea behind the previous rate region is that the transmitter (relay) uses the
fact that each receiver knows its own transmitted message. Thus, each message can
be interpreted as a shared secret key for the other one. Beside the two achievable
regions, an upper-bound on the secrecy capacity was established in [119]. However,
the technique used for this derivation was not correct.
The achievable rate region in Eq. 3.5 has raised a very interesting question. This
is because, although the eavesdropper can not extract any information about the
confidential messages M1 and M2, one can easily show that the coding scheme used to
establish this region does not fulfill the secrecy constraint in (3.3). In fact, it satisfies
a more tolerant secrecy requirement given by the following:
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(M1; Zn|C) = 0 and lim
n→∞
1
n
I(M2; Zn|C) = 0. (3.6)
This observation raised many questions regarding the differences between the secrecy
criterion in (3.3) and the one in (3.6). Additionally, it showed that although the prob-
lem of common message broadcasting and bidirectional broadcasting are equivalent,
their corresponding secrecy scenarios are not. Moreover, this observation gave us a
huge motivation to investigate and study the different secrecy constraints that can
appear for the multi-receiver DM-WBC, and how these secrecy constraints can lead
to different secrecy capacity regions.
3.1.2 A Comprehensive Channel Model
In this chapter, we consider the broadcasting phase of the secure bidirectional relaying
in a three-node network with an external eavesdropper, however with an additional
feature. The relay does not only transmit the individual confidential messages received
in the multiple access phase, but it also transmits an additional common confidential
message to both legitimate receivers and a common public message for all three receiv-
ing nodes: the two legitimate receivers and the eavesdropper 1. This channel model
combines the problem of public-confidential degraded message sets discussed in Section
2.4.2 along with the broadcasting phase of the secure bidirectional relaying problem.
That is why we come up with the name: The two-receiver DM-WBC with degraded
message sets and message cognition.
Let X , Y1, Y2 and Z be finite discrete input and output sets. Then, for input and
output sequences xn ∈ X n, yn1 ∈ Yn1 , yn2 ∈ Yn2 and zn ∈ Zn of length n, the two-
receiver DM-WBC: Q = (W 1,W 2, V ) is given by the probability transition matrix in
(2.73). As indicated by Fig. 3.2, Our model considers four different messages sets.
The first set is denoted by Mc = J1, 2nRcK and it contains the common messages for
all three receivers. The second set is denoted byM0 = J1, 2nR0K and contains the con-
fidential common messages for the first and second legitimate receivers. The last two
sets contain the individual confidential messages M1 = J1, 2nR1K and M2 = J1, 2nR2K.
Further, we assume a full message cognition at Y1 and Y2, such that Y1 is cognizant
of the entire message M2 and Y2 of the entire message M1.
1Although the third receiver (Z) is part of our model and not an external user, we will refer to it in
the rest of this chapter as an eavesdropper. From this point, we will sometimes refer to the different
receivers by their respective channel outputs interchangeably.
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DM-WBC
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Receiver 1, ϕ1
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Mˆc, Mˆ0, Mˆ1
M˜c, M˜0, M˜2
Mˇc
M0,M1,M2
Secret
Figure 3.2: Two-receiver DM-WBC with degraded message sets and message cog-
nition
It is important to point out that our model generalizes different works on the two-
receiver DM-WBC and the three-receiver DM-BC as follows :
• If we let M1 = M2 = ∅, our model reduces to the problem of transmitting
public and confidential degraded message sets over the two-receiver DM-WBC
investigated in [12].
• If we let Mc = M0 = ∅, our model reduces to the broadcasting phase of the
secure bidirectional relaying problem in a three-node network with an external
eavesdropper investigated in [12].
• If we neglected the secrecy requirements by assuming the confidential messages
to be public one, our model reduces to the problem of three-receiver DM-BC
with degraded message sets and full message cognition investigated in [118].
• If we let M1 = M2 = ∅ and assumed that M0 is a public message set instead
of a confidential one, our model reduces to the famous problem of three-receiver
DM-BC with two degraded message sets investigated in [68].
Definition 3.1. A (2nRc , 2nR0 , 2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) code C for the two-receiver DM-WBC
with degraded message sets and message cognition consists of: four independent mes-
sage sets Mc, M0, M1 and M2; a stochastic encoding function at the relay node
E :Mc ×M0 ×M1 ×M2 → P(X n),
which maps a common message mc ∈Mc, a confidential message triple (m0,m1,m2) ∈
M0×M1×M2 into a codeword xn(mc,m0,m1,m2) ∈ X n according to the conditional
probability E(xn|mc,m0,m1,m2), and three deterministic decoders, one for each node
ϕ1 : Yn1 ×M2 →Mc ×M0 ×M1 ∪ {?}
ϕ2 : Yn2 ×M1 →Mc ×M0 ×M2 ∪ {?}
ϕ3 : Zn →Mc ∪ {?}
which maps each channel observation at the respective node along with the available
side information into the corresponding required messages or an error message (?).
The previous definition considers a standard block code C of arbitrary but fixed length
n. It is fair to assume that C is known to the transmitter, the two legitimate receivers
and the eavesdropper. Additionally, we assume that Mc, M0, M1 and M2 are indepen-
dent and uniformly-distributed random variables over their respective message sets.
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We also assume that perfect channel state information (CSI) is available at all nodes.
This implies that the transmitter knows the channel statistics a head of time.
Now, in order to make sure that a code C is suitable for our model, we need to define
some reliability and secrecy constraints to evaluate the performance of C. In the next
few lines, we consider only the reliability constraint, whereas the secrecy constraint
is addressed in detail in the next subsection. Consider the average decoding error
probability of the code C given by:
P¯e(C) , P
[
(Mˆc, Mˆ0, Mˆ1) 6= (Mc,M0,M1) or (M˜c, M˜0, M˜2) 6= (Mc,M0,M2)
or Mˇc 6= Mc
]
, (3.7)
where (Mˆc, Mˆ0, Mˆ1), (M˜c, M˜0, M˜2) and Mˇc are the estimated messages at Y1, Y2 and
Z, respectively. Our target is to develop an achievablity coding scheme based on the
previous code definition such that P¯e(C) is arbitrary small. It is important to mention
here that since we assume the availability of perfect CSI at the transmitter, then all
the achievability results established under the average error probability constraint in
Eq. (3.7) are also valid for the maximum decoding error probability requirement [54].
3.1.3 Secrecy Criteria: Joint Versus Individual
Consider a multiple access wiretap channel that consists of two transmitters, a le-
gitimate receiver and an eavesdropper. Each transmitter aims to send an individual
confidential message to the legitimate receiver while keeping the eavesdropper ignorant
about it. During the investigation of this problem in [110], it was argued that one can
measure the ignorance of the eavesdropper about the confidential messages using two
secrecy criteria: The first criterion considers the information leakage of each message
to the eavesdropper separately, while the second one considers the mutual information
leakage of both messages to the eavesdropper.
Aside from the previous scenario, most of the work on secure communication over
DM-WBCs has only considered the concept of mutual information leakage to evaluate
the ignorance of the eavesdropper about the confidential messages. Using the mutual
information leakage might be convincing for the scenarios where only a common con-
fidential message is transmitted over a DM-WBC. However, for the DM-WBCs where
the legitimate receivers are interested in different confidential messages, it might be
more interesting to consider other secrecy criteria. In fact, one needs to understand the
practical implications of each secrecy criterion, and how to construct coding schemes
that satisfy the constraints of each criterion. It is even more important to investigate
whether changing the secrecy criterion affects the secrecy capacity region or not.
Now, back to our channel model given in Fig. 3.2, we need to construct a code C
that can transmit the three confidential messages M0, M1 and M2 to the respective
legitimate receivers, while keeping the eavesdropper completely ignorant about those
messages. In order to measure the level of ignorance of the eavesdropper, or in other
words to evaluate the secrecy performance of C, we consider two secrecy criteria as
follows:
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1. Joint Secrecy: This criterion requires the information leakage of the confidential
messages intended for one legitimate receiver given the confidential messages intended
only for the other legitimate receiver to be small. For our model, this requirement can
be expressed as follows:
I(M0M1; Zn|M2) ≤ τ1n and I(M0M2; Zn|M1) ≤ τ2n,
where lim
n→∞
τ1n, τ2n = 0. (3.8)
This criterion indicates that if –by some genie-aided way– the eavesdropper managed
to acquire the individual confidential message of one legitimate receiver, the secrecy of
the confidential messages intended for the other legitimate receiver will not be affected.
This implies that the secrecy of the confidential messages of each legitimate receiver
is assured, even if the other legitimate receiver is compromised. The joint secrecy can
also be interpreted as a secrecy criterion in which the legitimate receivers do not trust
each other such that each receiver requires its confidential messages to be protected
independently from the confidential messages of the other ones.
2. Individual Secrecy: This criterion requires the information leaked to the eaves-
dropper about the confidential messages intended for each legitimate receiver to be
small. For our model, this requirement can be expressed as follows:
I(M0M1; Zn) ≤ τ1n and I(M0M2; Zn) ≤ τ2n,
where lim
n→∞
τ1n, τ2n = 0. (3.9)
The previous definition implies that the individual secrecy simply ignores the condi-
tioning imposed by the joint secrecy criterion. Since, the confidential messages are
assumed to be independent which implies that I(M0M1; Zn) ≤ I(M0M1; Zn|M2), it fol-
lows directly that the individual secrecy criterion is not strict as the joint criterion. In
fact, the individual secrecy criterion is based on some sort of mutual trust between the
legitimate receivers. This mutual trust is reflected in the coding schemes that adhere
to the individual secrecy requirements.
It is important to point out that in previous literature cf. [84], the joint secrecy criterion
is defined based on the concept of requesting the mutual information leakage of all
confidential messages to the eavesdropper to be small. For our model, this can be
expressed as follows:
I(M0M1M2; Zn) ≤ τn where lim
n→∞
τn = 0. (3.10)
Although the previous requirement seems a little bit different from the one in Eq.
(3.8), one can easily show that for some τn ≥ τ1n+ τ2n both constraints are equivalent.
We start by showing that the constraints in (3.8) directly lead to the one in (3.10):
I(M0M1M2; Zn) = I(M0M1; Zn|M2) + I(M2; Zn)
(a)
≤ I(M0M1; Zn|M2) + I(M2; Zn|M1)
(b)
≤ I(M0M1; Zn|M2) + I(M0M2; Zn|M1)
≤ τ1n + τ2n ≤ τn,
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where (a) follows because M1 and M2 are independent which implies that I(M2; Zn) ≤
I(M2; Zn|M1); while (b) follows because I(M2; Zn|M1) ≤ I(M0M2; Zn|M1).
On the other hand, if Eq. (3.10) holds, it follows directly that I(M0M1; Zn|M2) ≤ τn
and I(M0M2; Zn|M1) ≤ τn, which means that the constraints in (3.10) are true. How-
ever, we find it more convenient to define the requirements of the joint secrecy criterion
using Eq. (3.8), because this definition allows us to identify the immunity of the joint
secrecy criterion to compromised receivers. It also captures the main difference be-
tween joint secrecy and individual secrecy.
Before, we move to the next section, we need to highlight a very important point.
Most of the previous work that investigated secure communication over multi-receiver
DM-WBC has only considered the joint secrecy criterion with respect to the weak
secrecy measure cf. Section 2.1.4. However, in this chapter, we focus on constructing
coding schemes for the two-receiver DM-WBC that adhere to the notation of strong
secrecy, as illustrated by the joint secrecy constraints in (3.8) and the individual secrecy
constraints in (3.9). The results established in this chapter were published in [120–122].
In a parallel and independent work, secure communication over the two-receiver DM-
WBC with receiver side information was investigated under the individual secrecy
criterion, but only with respect to the weak secrecy measure cf. [123–126].
3.1.4 Individual Secrecy in Shannon’s Ciphering System
In the previous section, we introduced the individual secrecy criterion, and addressed
how it differs from the conservative joint secrecy criterion. However, we only consid-
ered one of two possible notations used to address individual secrecy. In this section,
we introduce the other notation and illustrate through an example why we prefer the
notation introduced earlier in Eq. (3.9).
Consider a secrecy criterion that requires the sum of the information leakages of each
confidential message to the eavesdropper to be small. By applying this definition to
our model, we reach the following expression:
I(M0; Zn) + I(M1; Zn) + I(M2; Zn) ≤ τn where lim
n→∞
τn = 0. (3.11)
The previous constraint is a direct extension of the concept of individual secrecy in-
troduced in [110] for the multiple access wiretap channel. Nevertheless, the previous
constraint is only equivalent to the individual secrecy constraint in (3.9) if and only if
M0 = ∅, but in general they are not the same. In particular, one can show that the
constraint in (3.9) is stronger than this one. This is because Eq. (3.9) directly implies
Eq. (3.11), while the opposite is not true.
The difference between these two constraints lies in the interpretation of the individu-
ality as follows: The constraint in (3.9) considers individuality from the perspective of
transmission flows, where as long as the confidential messages are intended to the same
legitimate receiver, they can be considered as one information entity. On the other
hand, the constraint in (3.11) addresses the individuality according to the description
of the given confidential messages sets. In the following lines, we use Shannon’s ci-
phering system to show why addressing individual secrecy with respect to different
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messages might be misleading, and that it is more consistent to interpret individuality
with respect to different transmission flows.
Encoder
K
Decoder
Eavesdropper
M
M1,M2
X Mˆ
Mˆ1, Mˆ2
M Secret
M1,M2 Secret
Figure 3.3: Individual secrecy for Shannon’s ciphering system
We consider the scenario given by Fig. 3.3. Shannon studied this model under the
following secrecy constraint:
I(M; X) = 0. (3.12)
He proved that this requirement is achieved if H(M) ≤ H(K), where K is a random
variable that represents the secret key shared between the transmitter and the receiver.
Assuming that we have a secret key such that H(K) = 1
2
H(M), we can construct the
following coding strategy. First, we divide M into two messages M1 and M2, such that
H(M1) = H(M2) = H(K). We then construct a new secret key K˜ by concatenating K
and M1. Now the encoder outputs X = M⊗ K˜, which is equivalent to the concate-
nation of M1 ⊗K and M2 ⊗M1. The decoder works in the following order; it first
extracts Mˆ1 from the first part of X by xoring it with the shared secret key K, then it
use Mˆ1 to extract Mˆ2 from the second part of X.
Using this technique, we can overcome the problem of short secret keys, however we
need to understand its drawbacks. Aside form the problem of error progression that
arises form using the estimated Mˆ1 to decode M2, this technique does not fulfill the
secrecy constraint in (3.12). However, it fulfills the following secrecy constraint:
I(M1; X) + I(M2; X) = 0. (3.13)
In general, we can extend this coding technique for keys with smaller entropy by di-
viding the message M into smaller messages of the same entropy as the given key such
that M =
∏L
i=1 Mi. We can show that, the previous technique grants a certain secrecy
level, at which the sum of the information leakage of the small messages to the eaves-
dropper is small.
The difference between the two secrecy criteria in the previous example is related to
how to address the secrecy of information transmitted to a single user; whether it
should be protected as a one big entity, or it can be divided into smaller parts, where
each part is protected separately. This issue is identical to the problem of identifying
the individual secrecy and whether individuality means different users (transmission
flows) or different messages. That is why, we preferred the individual secrecy constraint
in (3.9) because it assures that the whole information transmitted to a certain user is
protected as one big entity. In our opinion, this is a more consistent and meaningful
notation.
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3.2 Joint-Strong Secrecy for Wiretap Marton Codes
In this section, we investigate secure communication over the two-receiver DM-WBC
with degraded message sets and message cognition in Fig. 3.2 under the joint-strong
secrecy criterion. In this investigation, we establish one of the main results of this thesis
which is a general achievable rate region that combines two main coding principles:
superposition encoding and Marton-Coding along with the concept of indirect decoding
under the joint-strong secrecy criterion. Our result is among the first ones to establish a
full Marton-Coding secrecy rate region that satisfies the joint-strong secrecy criterion.
3.2.1 A Universal Achievable Rate Region
In order to present our main result, we first need a formal definition for the achievable
rate region of the communication scenario in Fig. 3.2 under the joint-strong secrecy
criterion. Thus, we present the following definition:
Definition 3.2. A rate quadruple (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ is a joint-strong secrecy
achievable rate quadruple for the two-receiver DM-WBC, i.e. Q = (W 1,W 2, V ), if
for all ηi > 0 where i ∈ {c, 0, 1, 2}, λ > 0 and τj > 0 where j ∈ {1, 2}, there is an
n(ηi, λ, τj) ∈ N such that for all n > n(ηi, λ, τj) there exists a sequence of codes {C}n
according to Definition 3.1 that satisfies the following constraints:
1
n
log |Mi| ≥ Ri − ηi for i ∈ {c, 0, 1, 2} (3.14a)
P¯e(C) ≤ λ (3.14b)
I(M0M1; Zn|M2C) ≤ τ1 and I(M0M2; Zn|M1C) ≤ τ2, (3.14c)
where P¯e(C) is given by Eq. (3.7). The joint-strong secrecy capacity region CJ(Q) is
given by the set of all achievable joint-strong secrecy rate quadruples (Rc, R0, R1, R2).
In order to show that a rate quadruple (Rc, R0, R1, R2) is achievable under the joint-
strong secrecy criterion, it is enough to show that there exists a random coding scheme
with random variable C such that:
1
n
log |Mi| = Ri (3.15a)
lim
n→∞
E[P¯e(C)] = 0 (3.15b)
lim
n→∞
E[I(M0M1M2; Zn|C)] = 0, (3.15c)
where i ∈ {c, 0, 1, 2}. The validity of the previous argument follows from Definition 3.2,
the selection lemma (Lemma A.4) in addition to the equivalency of the joint secrecy
constraints in (3.8) and (3.10). We now present the main result of this section:
Theorem 3.1. An achievable joint-strong secrecy rate region for the two-receiver DM-
WBC with degraded message sets and message cognition is given by the set of all rate
quadruples (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ that satisfy
Rc ≤ min
[
I(U; Z|T), I(U; Y1|T), I(U; Y2|T)
]
(3.16a)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|U T)− I(V0V1; Z|U T) (3.16b)
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R0 +R2 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2|U T)− I(V0V2; Z|U T) (3.16c)
2R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|U T) + I(V0V2; Y2|U T)− I(V1; V2|V0 T)
−I(V0V1V2; Z|U T)− I(V0; Z|U T) (3.16d)
for random variables with joint probability distribution QT QU|T QV0V1V2|U QX|V0V1V2
QY1Y2Z|X, such that T− U− (V0,V1,V2)− X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain.
The previous rate region is similar to the achievable rate region established in [12,
Theorem 2] for the two-receiver DM-WBC with public-confidential degraded message
sets under the weak secrecy measure. In fact, one can show that if R1 = R2 = 0
and T = ∅, the two rate regions are identical. The equality of the two regions arises
from the fact that both regions are based on the same coding principles: superposition
encoding, Marton-Coding and indirect decoding. In particular, this equality implies
a very important result: Strengthening the secrecy criterion from weak to strong for
the two-receiver DM-WBC comes at no cost with respect to any achievable rate region
derived using these coding techniques. Next, we present two achievable rate regions
that play an important role in establishing Theorem 3.1.
Proposition 3.1. An achievable joint-strong secrecy rate region for the two-receiver
DM-WBC with degraded message sets and message cognition is given by the set of all
rate quadruples (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ that satisfy
Rc ≤ min
[
I(U; Z), I(U; Y1), I(U; Y2)
]
(3.17a)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|U)− I(V0V1; Z|U) (3.17b)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2|U)− I(V0; Z|U)− I(V2; V1Z|V0) (3.17c)
for random variables with joint distribution QU QV0V1V2|U QX|V0V1V2 QY1Y2Z|X, such
that: U− (V0,V1,V2)− X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain.
The previous proposition serves as the main pillar for the proof of Theorem 3.1. Thus,
it is important to point out how the rate region in (3.17) and the one in (3.16) are
related.
• Both rate regions are defined with respect to the same joint distribution on the
random variables (U,V0,V1,V2,X,Y1,Y2,Z). The only difference is that for
the rate region in (3.16), this joint distribution is generated conditioned on the
probability distribution QT of the time sharing random variable T.
• If we let T = ∅, we find that both rate regions in (3.16) and (3.17) have the same
bounds on the rates intended to the first legitimate receiver, i.e. (R0 + R1) cf.
(3.16b) and (3.17b).
• If we let T = ∅, we find that the bounds on the rates intended to the second
legitimate receiver, i.e. (R0 +R2) in (3.17c) are tighter than the ones in (3.16c).
The previous statement follows because:
I(V0; Z|U) + I(V2; V1Z|V0) = I(V0; Z|U) + I(V2; Z|V0) + I(V2; V1|V0Z)
(a)
= I(V0V2; Z|U) + I(V2; V1|V0Z)
(b)
≥ I(V0V2; Z|U),
where (a) follows from the chain rule of the mutual information and the defini-
tion of the joint distribution on (U,V0,V2,Z), while (b) follows from the non-
negativity of the mutual information.
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• In spite of the previous two points, one can actually show that at T = ∅, both
rate regions in (3.17) and (3.16) have the same bounds on the sum rates intended
to both legitimate receivers, i.e. (2R0 +R1 +R2). This is because
I(V0V1; Z|U) + I(V2; V1Z|V0) = I(V0V1; Z|U) + I(V2; V1|V0) + I(V2; Z|V0V1)
(a)
= I(V0V1V2; Z|U) + I(V2; V1|V0),
where (a) follows from the chain rule of the mutual information and the definition
of the joint distribution on (U,V0,V1,V2,Z).
The previous comparison implies that rate region given in (3.17) is a sub-region of the
full rate region in (3.16). In particular, one can argue that the rate region in (3.17)
is only optimal for the first legitimate receiver because it has the same bounds as the
one in (3.16) on the rates intended to this receiver.
Proposition 3.1 implies that there exists a random coding scheme that can be used to
generate a code C1 according to Definition 3.1, such that the rates of C1 are bounded
according to (3.17) and C1 satisfies the reliability and secrecy constraints given by
(3.14b) and (3.14c) respectively. This directly suggests the existence of an alternative
coding scheme that can be used to generate a code C2 according to Definition 3.1 which
satisfies the reliability and secrecy constraints given by (3.14b) and (3.14c) respectively,
while its rates are bounded according to the next proposition.
Proposition 3.2. An achievable joint-strong secrecy rate region for the two-receiver
DM-WBC with degraded message sets and message cognition is given by the set of all
rate quadruples (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ that satisfy
Rc ≤ min
[
I(U; Z), I(U; Y1), I(U; Y2)
]
(3.18a)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|U)− I(V0; Z|U)− I(V1; V2Z|V0) (3.18b)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2|U)− I(V0V2; Z|U) (3.18c)
for random variables with joint distribution QU QV0V1V2|U QX|V0V1V2 QY1Y2Z|X, such
that: U− (V0,V1,V2)− X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain.
It is obvious that Proposition 3.2 is a direct consequence for Proposition 3.1 since it
follows by interchanging the roles of the first and the second legitimate receivers. This
implies that the four remarks on the relation between the rate regions in (3.16) and
(3.17) can also be used in a way to describe the relation between the rate regions in
(3.16) and (3.18) by interchanging the statements on the first and second legitimate
receivers. We also need to keep in mind that the following is true:
I(V0; Z|U) + I(V1; V2Z|V0) ≥ I(V0V1; Z|U)
I(V0V2; Z|U) + I(V1; V2Z|V0) = I(V0V1V2; Z|U) + I(V1; V2|V0)
Thus, it follows that the rate region in (3.18) is also a sub-region of the full rate region
in (3.16). In fact, it has the same bounds on the rates intended to the second legitimate
receiver as the full region in (3.16).
In previous literature, two approaches have been used to prove the achievability of a
rate region that utilizes the principle of Marton-Coding. The first approach is a direct
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technique in which the full Marton-Coding rate region is derived directly from the
reliability analysis of the coding scheme. This approach was introduced by El-Gamal
and Meulen in [88] and has been extended to different secrecy scenarios as in [12,84].
The second approach built upon the original work of Marton in [70]. This approach
uses an indirect technique in which the achievability of two smaller rate regions is
established at first. Then, by using the principle of time sharing between these two
regions, the achievability of the full Marton-Coding rate region can be derived.
In this thesis, we follow Marton’s original approach to prove Theorem 3.1 instead of
El-Gamal and Meulen’s approach. This is because Marton’s approach is more suitable
for our strong secrecy analysis techniques. Our proof will adhere to the following
algorithm: We start by presenting a detailed proof for Proposition 3.1. This directly
implies the validity of Proposition 3.2 as well. We then use the concept of rate splitting
and time sharing to combine the two rate regions in Proposition 3.1 and 3.2 leading
to the achievability of the full rate region of Theorem 3.1.
3.2.2 Coding Scheme: Encoding and Decoding
The main aim of this section is to introduce the coding scheme required to establish
the achievability of the rate region given in Proposition 3.1. We mainly address the
technique used to generate our codebook and how the encoder and the three decoders
defined in Definition 3.1 work. Our coding scheme and in particular our encoder is
inspired by the likelihood encoder introduced in [127]
Let n ∈ N be an arbitrary but fixed code block length and  > 0 be an arbitrary
constant. Moreover, let QUV0V1V2X ∈ P(U ×V0×V1×V2×X ) be a fixed input proba-
bility distribution, and recall the probability transition matrix QY1Y2Z|X given in (2.73)
that defines the two-receiver DM-WBC. Furthermore, we assume that quantities of the
form 2nR, where R ∈ R+ are integers.
1. Message Sets: We consider the following sets: the set of common messagesMc =J1, 2nRcK, the set of confidential common messages M0 = J1, 2nR0K, two sets of con-
fidential individual messages M1 = J1, 2nR1K and M2 = J1, 2nR2K Three sets of ran-
domization messages Mr = J1, 2nRrK, Mr1 = J1, 2nRr1 K and Mr2 = J1, 2nRr2 K, and an
additional message setMt = J1, 2nRtK needed for Marton-coding. Additionally, we use
M = M0 ×M1 ×M2 to abbreviate the set of all confidential messages, such that
M = J1, 2nRK, where R = R0 +R1 +R2.
2. Random Codebook C: Let Cc , {Un(mc)} for mc ∈ Mc be a random public
common message codebook that consists of 2nRc i.i.d. random codewords Un(mc),
where each codeword is constructed by generating the symbols Ui(mc) with i ∈ J1, nK
independently according to QU. A realization of Cc is denoted by Cc , {un(mc)}.
For a fixed public message codebook Cc and for every mc ∈ Mc, let C0(mc) ,
{Vn0 (mc,m,mr)} where m ∈ M and mr ∈ Mr be a random codebook for the con-
fidential messages that consists of 2n(R+Rr) conditionally independent random code-
words Vn0 (mc,m,mr), where each codeword is constructed by generating the symbols
V0i(mc,m,mr) independently at random according to QV0|U(·|ui(mc)). A realization
of C0(mc) is denoted by C0(mc) , {vn0 (mc,m,mr)}.
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For a fixed confidential messages codebook C0(mc) and for every m ∈M and mr ∈Mr,
let C1(mc,m,mr) , {Vn1 (mc,m,mr,mr1)} be a confidential random codebook that
consists of 2nRr1 conditionally independent random codewords Vn1 (mc,m,mr,mr1),
where each codeword is constructed by generating the symbols V1i(mc,m,mr,mr1)
independently at random according to QV1|V0(·|v0i(mc,m,mr)).
Similarly, for a fixed confidential messages codebook C0(mc) and for every m ∈ M
and mr ∈ Mr, let C2(mc,m,mr) , {Vn2 (mc,m,mr,mr2 ,mt)} be a confidential ran-
dom codebook that consists of 2n(Rr2+Rt) conditionally independent random codewords
Vn2 (mc,m,mr,mr2 ,mt), where each codeword is constructed by generating the symbols
V2i(mc,m,mr,mr2 ,mt) independently at random according to QV2|V0(·|v0i(mc,m,mr)).
The total random codebook is denoted by C = {Cc,C0,C1,C2}, while C = {Cc, C0, C1, C2}
denotes one possible realization of this codebook selected from the total set of code-
books given by C. The probability of generating a certain realization C ∈ C is given
by:
G(C) =
∏
(m2c ,m
2,m2r,mr2 ,mt)∈Mc×M×Mr×Mr2×Mt
QnV2|V0
(
vn2 (m
2
c ,m
2,m2r,mr2 ,mt)|vn0 (m2c ,m2,m2r)
)
∏
(m1c ,m
1,m1r,mr1 )∈Mc×M×Mr×Mr1
QnV1|V0
(
vn1 (m
1
c ,m
1,m1r,mr1)|vn0 (m1c ,m1,m1r)
)
∏
(m0c ,m,mr)∈Mc×M×Mr
QnV0|U
(
vn0 (m
0
c ,m,mr)|un(m0c)
) ∏
mc∈Mc
QnU
(
un(mc)
)
(3.19)
3. Encoder E: For a fixed codebook realization C, given a message pair (mc,m),
where m = (m0,m1,m2), the transmitter chooses three randomization messages mr,
mr1 and mr2 uniformly at random from the setsMr,Mr1 andMr2 respectively. Then,
it chooses an index mt ∈Mt based on the following likelihood encoder:
E(LE)
(
mt|mr2 , vn0 (mc,m,mr), vn1 (mc,m,mr,mr1)
)
=
QnV1|V0,V2
(
vn1 (mc,m,mr,mr1)|vn0 (mc,m,mr), vn2 (mc,m,mr,mr2 ,mt)
)∑
j∈Mt Q
n
V1|V0,V2
(
vn1 (mc,m,mr,mr1)|vn0 (mc,m,mr), vn2 (mc,m,mr,mr2 , j)
) .
(3.20)
Finally, for the selected triple vn0 (mc,m,mr), v
n
1 (mc,m,mr,mr1) and v
n
2 (mc,m,mr,
mr2 ,mt), the encoder generates a codeword x
n independently at random according
to the conditional distribution
∏n
i=1 Q
n
X|V0,V1,V2
( · |vn0 (mc,m,mr), vn1 (mc,m,mr,mr1),
vn2 (mc,m,mr,mr2 ,mt)
)
and transmits it.
4. First Legitimate Decoder ϕ1: Given y
n
1 and its own message m2, the decoder
searches for the unique quadruple (mˆc, mˆ0, mˆ1, mˆr) ∈Mc×M0×M1×Mr; for which
there exists an index mˆr1 ∈Mr1 such that:(
un(mˆc), v
n
0 (mˆc, mˆ, mˆr), v
n
1 (mˆc, mˆ, mˆr, mˆr1), y
n
1
)
∈ T n (QUV0V1Y1),
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where mˆ = (mˆ0, mˆ1,m2). If such unique quadruple exists, the decoder outputs the
triple (mˆc, mˆ0, mˆ1). Otherwise, the decoder outputs an error message (?) . It is impor-
tant to point out that this decoder does not aim to determine the unique message mr1
that was transmitted. Nevertheless, the decoding role includes the typicality of the
sequence vn1 (mˆc, mˆ, mˆr, mˆr1), this is because the previous decoder inherits the concept
of indirect decoding.
5. Second Legitimate Decoder ϕ2: Given y
n
2 and its own message m1, the decoder
searches for the unique quadruple (m˜c, m˜0, m˜2, m˜r) ∈Mc×M0×M2×Mr; for which
there exist two indices (m˜r2 , m˜t) ∈Mr2 ×Mt such that:(
un(m˜c), v
n
0 (m˜c, m˜, m˜r), v
n
2 (m˜c, m˜, m˜r, m˜r2 , m˜t), y
n
2
)
∈ T n (QUV0V2Y2),
where m˜ = (m˜0,m1, m˜2). If such unique quadruple exists, the decoder outputs the
triple (m˜c, m˜0, m˜2). If not, it outputs the error message (?). The previous decoding
role implies that this decoder also applies the concept of indirect decoding by includ-
ing the sequence vn2 (m˜c, m˜, m˜r, m˜r2 , m˜t) in the typicality condition although it is not
interested in finding the unique pair (mr2 ,mt) that was transmitted.
6. Third Eavesdropper Decoder ϕ3: Given z
n, the decoder searches for the unique
message mˇc ∈Mc such that: (
un(mˇc), z
n
) ∈ T n (QUZ)
If this unique message exists, the decoder outputs it. Otherwise, the decoder outputs
the error message (?).
7. Induced Joint Distribution: The encoding function E along with the decod-
ing functions (ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3) defined with respect to the codebook C ∈ C compose a
(2nRc , 2nR0 , 2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) code2 of Definition 3.1. For every codebook C, the following
joint probability distribution is induced:
PC
(
mc,m,mr,mr1 ,mr2 , u
n, vn0 , v
n
1 ,mt, v
n
2 , x
n, yn1 , y
n
2 , z
n, mˆc, mˆ0, mˆ1, m˜c, m˜0, m˜2, mˇc
)
= 2−n(Rc+R+Rr+Rr1+Rr2 )1{un=un(mc)}1{vn0 =vn0 (mc,m,mr)}1{vn1 =vn1 (mc,m,mr,mr1 )}
× E(LE)(mt|mr2 , vn0 (mc,m,mr), vn1 (mc,m,mr,mr1))1{vn2 =vn2 (mc,m,mr,mr2 ,mt)}
×QnX|V0V1V2(xn|vn0 , vn1 , vn2 )QnY1Y2Z|X(yn1 , yn2 , zn|xn)1{(mˆc,mˆ0,mˆ1)=ϕ1(yn1 ,m2)}
× 1{(m˜c,m˜0,m˜2)=ϕ2(yn2 ,m1)}1{mˇc=ϕ3(zn)} (3.21)
Additionally, if we take the random codebook generation process into our considera-
tion, we end up with the subsequent distribution:
P = G(C) · PC, (3.22)
where G(C) is the probability of obtaining a certain codebook C given by (3.19). In
the upcoming sections, we present the reliability and secrecy analysis of our coding
2 We slightly abuse the notation by using C to denote both the codebook and the whole code
which includes the codebook itself along with the encoding and decoding functions. We favor this
notation for its simplicity and remind the reader that the codebook uniquely defines the code.
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scheme. In this analysis, the expectation expression EC[·] will come up regularly. It is
important to point out that such expression is calculated with respect to the distribu-
tion P given by (3.22).
8. Fourier-Motzkin Elimination: In order to derive the achievable rate region that
corresponds to our coding scheme, we need to derive the necessary rate bounds. The
reliability and secrecy analysis presented in the next two subsections show that our
coding scheme satisfies the requirements in (3.15b) and (3.15c), as long as:
Rc ≤ I(U; Z) + δ3()
R0 +R1 +Rr +Rr1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|U) + δ1()
R0 +R2 +Rr +Rr2 +Rt ≤ I(V0V2; Y2|U) + δ2()
Rc +R0 +R1 +Rr +Rr1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1) + δ1()
Rc +R0 +R2 +Rr +Rr2 +Rt ≤ I(V0V2; Y2) + δ2()
Rt ≥ I(V1; V2|V0) + δ0(, β)
Rr2 +Rt ≥ I(V2; V1Z|V0) + δ4(, γ)
Rr1 ≥ I(V1; Z|V0) + δ4(, γ)
Rr ≥ I(V0; Z|U) + δ4(, γ), (3.23)
where , β and γ can be selected in a way such that as n approaches infinity, the
corresponding δ-functions approaches zero. Now, if we apply the Fourier-Motzkin
elimination procedure [57], then take the limit as n → ∞, we prove the achievability
of any rate quadruple (Rc, R0, R1, R2) satisfying the constraints in (3.17).
3.2.3 Encoding and Decoding Error Analysis
In this section, we present the detailed reliability analysis required to derive some of the
rate constraints given by (3.23). Before we present our analysis, we need to introduce
some necessary definitions. Given the sequences un ∈ Un, vn0 ∈ Vn0 and vn1 ∈ Vn1 , let
C˜2(v
n
0 ) , {V˜n2 (vn0 ,mr2 ,mt)} be a collection of i.i.d. random codewords of length n
generated according to QnV2|V0(·|vn0 ), for every mr2 ∈Mr2 and mt ∈Mt. Additionally,
let C˜2 , C˜2(v0) be a random codebook generated for all vn0 ∈ Vn0 . This implies that
the probability of obtaining a certain codebook realization C˜2 ∈ C˜2 is given by:
G(C˜2) =
∏
vn0 ∈Vn0
∏
(mr2 ,mt)∈Mr2×Mt
QnV2|V0(v˜
n
2 (v
n
0 ,mr2 ,mt)|vn0 ). (3.24)
For the given sequences: (un, vn0 , v
n
1 ) and a certain codebook realization C˜2(v20), a
codeword v˜n2 (v
n
0 ,mr2 ,mt) ∈ Vn2 is selected as follows: First a message mr2 is chosen
uniformly at random fromMr2 , then an index mt ∈Mt is drawn randomly according
to the following likelihood encoder:
E˜LE(mt|mr2 , vn0 , vn1 ) =
QnV1|V0,V2
(
vn1 |vn0 , v˜n2 (vn0 ,mr2 ,mt)
)∑
j∈Mt Q
n
V1|V0,V2
(
vn1 |vn0 , v˜n2 (vn0 ,mr2 , j)
) . (3.25)
For a fixed codebook realization C˜2, this encoding scheme defines a probability distri-
bution on the random variables (Mr2 ,Mt, V˜
n
2 ) conditioned on the sequences (u
n, vn0 , v
n
1 )
as follows:
P˜C˜2(mr2 ,mt, v˜
n
2 , |un, vn0 , vn1 ) = 2−nRr2 E˜LE(mt|mr2 , vn0 , vn1 )1{v˜n2 =v˜n2 (vn0 ,mr2 ,mt)}. (3.26)
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Furthermore, assume that the sequences (un, vn0 , v
n
1 ) are generated by the input distri-
bution QnUV0V1 and that the codeword v˜
n
2 (v
n
0 ,mr2 ,mt) ∈ C˜2(vn0 ) chosen by the previous
encoding scheme is transmitted over the DMC QZ|V0V1V2 given by:
QZ|V0V1V2(z|v0, v1, v2) ,
∑
x∈X
∑
y1∈Y1
∑
y2∈Y2
QX|V0V1V2(x|v0, v1, v2)QY1Y2Z|X(y1, y2, z|x).
(3.27)
Then, for a certain codebook C˜2 we can define P˜C˜2 as the distribution induced by the
whole system as follows:
P˜C˜2(un, vn0 , v
n
1 ,mr2 ,mt, v˜
n
2 , z
n) = QnUV0V1(u
n, vn0 , v
n
1 )2
−nRr2 E˜LE(mt|mr2 , vn0 , vn1 )
× 1{v˜n2 =v˜n2 (vn0 ,mr2 ,mt)}QnZ|V0V1V2(zn|vn0 , vn1 , vn2 ). (3.28)
Moreover, if we consider the generation process of the random codebook C˜2, we can de-
fine a probability distribution over the random variables (C˜,Un,Vn0 ,V
n
1 ,Mr2 ,Mt, V˜
n
2 ,Z
n)
as follows: P˜ , G(C˜2) · P˜C˜2 , where G(C˜2) is the probability of generating a certain
codebook C˜2 given by (3.24), while P˜C˜2 is given by (3.28). Beside P˜, we will need an-
other probability distribution on the random variables (C˜,Un,Vn0 ,V
n
1 ,Mr2 ,Mt, V˜
n
2 ,Z
n)
defined as follows: Γ = G(C˜2) · ΓC˜2 , where ΓC˜2 is given by:
ΓC˜2(un, vn0 ,mr2 ,mt, v˜
n
2 , v
n
1 , z
n) = QnUV0(u
n, vn0 )2
−n(Rr2+Rt)1{v˜n2 =v˜n2 (vn0 ,mr2 ,mt)}
×QnV1|V0V2(vn1 |vn0 , v˜n2 )QnZ|V0V1V2(zn|vn0 , vn1 , vn2 ). (3.29)
We will refer to ΓC˜2 as the ideal code distribution, because one can argue that the
process of producing the sequences (un, vn0 , v
n
1 , v˜
n
2 ) according to Γ
C˜2 is identical to gen-
erating these sequences using the joint input distribution QnUV0V1V2 . At first (u
n, vn0 )
are generated using QnUV0 , then a sequence v˜
n
2 is selected uniformly at random from
the codebook C˜2(vn0 ) which is constructed using QnV2|V0(·|vn0 ), finally a sequence vn1 is
generated conditioned on vn0 and the selected sequence v˜
n
2 using Q
n
V1|V0V2 . It is impor-
tant to highlight that the two distributions P˜ and Γ will play an important role not
only in our reliability analysis, but in our secrecy analysis as well.
We are now ready to proceed with our reliability analysis, where we show that the
coding scheme defined in Section 3.2.2 and denoted by the random code C satisfies
the reliability constraint in (3.15b). We start by defining the average decoding error
probability for a given code realization C ∈ C as follows:
P¯e(C) ,P
[
(Mˆc, Mˆ0, Mˆ1, Mˆr) 6= (Mc,M0,M1,Mr) or (M˜c, M˜0, M˜2, M˜r) 6=
(Mc,M0,M2,Mr) or Mˇc 6= Mc
]
. (3.30)
We then observe that the previous error probability is greater than or equal to the
one in (3.7), i.e. P¯e(C) ≥ P¯e(C). Our target is to derive the rate constraints under
which EC[P¯e(C)] approaches zero as n approaches infinity. Due to the symmetricity
of the code with respect to the uniformly distributed variables (Mc,M,Mr,Mr1 ,Mr2),
we may restrict our analysis to the case where (Mc,M,Mr,Mr1 ,Mr2) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1),
where M = (M0,M1,M2). Thus, while calculating the probability of any event A with
respect to P, we use the following notation:
P1P(A) = PP(A|Mc = 1,M = 1,Mr = 1,Mr1 = 1,Mr2 = 1). (3.31)
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Due to the structure of our encoding function and the fact that the decoders at the
three receivers are based on the arguments of joint typicality, we need to consider two
classes of errors:
1- Encoding Error: This type of error occurs if the codeword vn2 chosen by the
likelihood encoder and the codewords (un, vn0 , v
n
1 ) selected uniformly at random are
not jointly typical. With this in mind, we define the following event:
E =
{(
Un(Mc),V
n
0 (Mc,M,Mr),V
n
1 (Mc,M,Mr,Mr1),V
n
2 (Mc,M,Mr,Mr2 ,Mt)
)
/∈ T n¯,inp
}
,
where T n¯,inp , T n¯ (QUV0V1V2) and ¯ ∈ (0, ), where  is the typicality constant used
by the decoding functions. Based on the symmetricity argument, it follows that
EC[PP(E)] = EC[P1P(E)]. Thus, we only consider the latter expression as follows:
EC
[
P1P(E)
]
= EC
[
PP
((
Un(1),Vn0 (1, 1, 1),V
n
1 (1, 1, 1, 1),V
n
2 (1, 1, 1, 1,Mt)
)
/∈ T n¯,inp
)]
= EC
[ ∑
mt,u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯
n
1 ,v¯
n
2
1{(u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯n1 ,v¯n2 )/∈T n¯,inp}1{(Un(1),Vn0 (1,1,1),Vn1 (1,1,1,1))=(u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯n1 )}
× ELE(mt|1, v¯n0 , v¯n1 )1{Vn2 (1,1,1,1,mt)=v¯n2}
]
(a)
= ECc,0,1
[ ∑
mt,u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯
n
1 ,v¯
n
2
1{(u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯n1 ,v¯n2 )/∈T n¯,inp}1{(Un(1),Vn0 (1,1,1),Vn1 (1,1,1,1))=(u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯n1 )}
× EC2|Cc,0,1
[
ELE(mt|1, v¯n0 , v¯n1 )1{Vn2 (1,1,1,1,mt)=v¯n2}
]]
, (3.32)
where Cc,0,1 , {Cc,C0,C1}. Step (a) follows from the law of total expectation [128] by
dividing the expectation over C into an outer expectation over Cc,0,1 and an inner one
over C2 conditioned on Cc,0,1. For a fixed (mt, u¯
n, v¯n0 , v¯
n
1 , v¯
n
2 ) and a certain codebook
realization C ∈ C, we redefine the likelihood encoder as follows:
ELE(mt|1, v¯n0 , v¯n1 ) =
{
0 if u¯n 6= un(1) or v¯n0 6= vn0 (1, 1, 1) or v¯n1 6= vn1 (1, 1, 1, 1)
as given by Eq. (3.20) otherwise.
(3.33)
Due to the second indicator function in (3.32), the previous formulation does not affect
the calculation of the expression in (3.32). This because the indicator function implies
that the inner expectation only contributes to the total term when the sequences
(u¯n, v¯n0 , v¯
n
1 ) are identical to the codewords
(
un(1), vn0 (1, 1, 1), v
n
1 (1, 1, 1, 1)
)
selected by
a certain codebook realization Cc,0,1. Thus, we have
EC2|Cc,0,1=Cc,0,1
[
ELE(mt|1, v¯n0 , v¯n1 )1{Vn2 (1,1,1,1,mt)=v¯n2}
]
(a)
= EC2|Cc,0,1=Cc,0,1
×
[
1{(
un(1),vn0 (1,1,1),v
n
1 (1,1,1,1)
)
=(u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯
n
1 )
}ELE(mt|1, v¯n0 , v¯n1 )1{Vn2 (1,1,1,1,mt)=v¯n2}]
(b)
≤ EC2|Un(1)=u¯n,Vn0 (1,1,1)=v¯n0 ,Vn1 (1,1,1,1)=v¯n1
[
ELE
(
mt|1, v¯n0 , v¯n1
)
1{Vn2 (1,1,1,1,mt)=v¯n2}
∣∣C2(1, 1, 1)]
(c)
= EC˜2
[
P˜C˜2
(
mt, v¯
n
2 |1, u¯n, v¯n0 , v¯n1
)]
(3.34)
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where C˜2 is the random codebook introduced in the beginning of this section and
P˜C˜2 is its corresponding induced probability given by (3.26). Step (a) follows from
(3.33); (b) follows by removing the indicator function and because the expression in
the expectation only depends on the codewords Un(1), Vn0 (1, 1, 1) and V
n
1 (1, 1, 1, 1)
in addition to the codebook C2(1, 1, 1) and not on the entire codebook C; while (c)
follows from the definition of P˜C˜2 in (3.26). Now, by substituting Eq. (3.34) in Eq.
(3.32), we have
EC
[
P1P(E)
]
= ECc,0,1
[ ∑
mt,u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯
n
1 ,v¯
n
2
1{(u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯n1 ,v¯n2 )/∈T n¯,inp}
× 1{(
Un(1),Vn0 (1,1,1),V
n
1 (1,1,1,1)
)
=(u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯
n
1 )
}EC˜2
[
P˜C˜2
(
mt, v¯
n
2 |1, u¯n, v¯n0 , v¯n1
)]]
(a)
= EC˜2
[ ∑
mt,u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯
n
1 ,v¯
n
2
1{(u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯n1 ,v¯n2 )/∈T n¯,inp} P˜
C˜2
(
mt, v¯
n
2 |1, u¯n, v¯n0 , v¯n1
)
× ECc,0,1
[
1{(
Un(1),Vn0 (1,1,1),V
n
1 (1,1,1,1)
)
=(u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯
n
1 )
}
]]
(b)
= EC˜2
[ ∑
mt,u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯
n
1 ,v¯
n
2
1{(u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯n1 ,v¯n2 )/∈T n¯,inp} P˜
C˜2
(
mt, v¯
n
2 |1, u¯n, v¯n0 , v¯n1
)
QnUV0V1(u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯n1 )
]
(c)
= EC˜2
[
PP˜
((
Un,Vn0 ,V
n
1 , V˜
n
2 (V
n
0 , 1,Mt)
)
/∈ T n¯,inp|C˜2
)]
, (3.35)
where (a) follows because C˜2 and Cc,0,1 are independent; (b) is due to the following
property of the indicator function: EP[1A] = PP(A) [129] and the fact that the random
codebook Cc,0,1 was generated using the input distribution QUV0V1 ; while (c) follows
from the definition of P˜ and the established notation PP˜. In order to evaluate the
expression in (3.35), we need to carry out some further steps. First, we recall the
probability distribution Γ introduced in (3.29). Based on the weak law of large numbers
[130] and the properties of strongly typical sequences in Theorem A.5, for every mr2 ∈
Mr2 , we have:
EC˜2
[
PΓ
((
Un,Vn0 ,V
n
1 , V˜
n
2 (V
n
0 ,mr2 ,Mt)
)
/∈ T n¯,inp|C˜2
)]
≤ δinpn (), (3.36)
where δinpn () = 2 · |U| · |V0| · |V1| · |V2| · e−2n
2µ2inp . (3.37)
The value µinp is given by the minimum probability over the whole support of the input
distribution QUV0V1V2 . One can easily show that δ
inp
n () approaches zero exponentially
fast as n approaches infinity.
Next, we highlight an important property for the total variation distance introduced
in [131, Property 1]: Let γ, η be two probability measures on a measurable space (H,L)
and f : H → R be a measurable function bounded by b ∈ R. It follows that:
|Eγf − Eηf | ≤ b · ‖γ − η‖. (3.38)
In order to use the previous property, we let fn : Un × Vn0 × Vn1 × Vn2 → R be defined
as follows fn(u
n, vn0 , v
n
1 , v˜
n
2 ) , 1{(un,vn0 ,vn1 ,v˜n2 )/∈T n¯,inp} and observe that fn is bounded by
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b = 1. Moreover, we use the property of the expectation of an indicator function:
EP[1A] = PP(A). Based on these two arguments, we have
EC
[
P1P(E)
]
= EC˜2
[
EP˜
[
fn
(
Un,Vn0 ,V
n
1 , V˜
n
2 (V
n
0 , 1,Mt)
)∣∣C˜2]]
≤ EC˜2
[
EΓ
[
fn
(
Un,Vn0 ,V
n
1 , V˜
n
2 (V
n
0 , 1,Mt)
)∣∣C˜2]]
+ EC˜2
[∣∣∣∣EP˜[fn(Un,Vn0 ,Vn1 , V˜n2 (Vn0 , 1,Mt))∣∣C˜2]
− EΓ
[
fn
(
Un,Vn0 ,V
n
1 , V˜
n
2 (V
n
0 , 1,Mt)
)∣∣C˜2]∣∣∣∣
]
(a)
≤ δinpn () + EC˜2
[∥∥∥P˜UnVn0Vn1 V˜n2 |C˜2 − ΓUnVn0 Vn1 V˜n2 |C˜2∥∥∥]
≤ δinpn () + EC˜2
[∥∥∥P˜UnVn0 Vn1 V˜n2 Zn|C˜2 − ΓUnVn0 Vn1 V˜n2 Zn|C˜2∥∥∥] , (3.39)
where (a) follows by letting mr2 = 1 in (3.36), along with applying the property of
total variation distance in (3.38). It is important to point out here that the last step
where we include the random variable Zn in calculating the total variation distance is
not actually needed for the encoding error analysis. However, we include it because it
is a crucial part for our secrecy analysis.
We are now one step away from finalizing our encoding error analysis as we only need
to bound the total variation distance in (3.39). In order to do so, we need the following
relations:
ΓC˜2Mt|Mr2UnVn0 Vn1 = E˜
LE
Mt|Mr2Vn0 Vn1 = P˜
C˜2
Mt|Mr2UnVn0 Vn1 (3.40a)
ΓC˜2
V˜n2 |MtMr2UnVn0 Vn1
= 1{V˜n2 =v˜n2 (Vn0 ,Mr2 ,Mt)} = P˜
C˜2
V˜n2 |MtMr2UnVn0 Vn1
(3.40b)
ΓC˜2
Zn|V˜n2 MtMr2UnVn0 Vn1
= QnZ|V0V1V2 = P˜
C˜2
Zn|V˜n2 MtMr2UnVn0 Vn1
(3.40c)
The relations in (3.40b) and (3.40c) follow directly from the definitions of ΓC˜2 in (3.29)
and P˜C˜2 in (3.26). On the other hand, the relation in (3.40a) follows because for every
(un, vn0 , v
n
1 ,mr2 ,mt) ∈ Un × Vn0 × Vn0 ×Mr2 ×Mt, we have
ΓC˜2(mt|mr2 , un, vn0 , vn1 ) =
ΓC˜2(mt,mr2 , u
n, vn0 , v
n
1 )
ΓC˜2(mt, un, vn0 , v
n
1 )
=
∑
v˜n2
QnUV0(u
n, vn0 )2
−n(Rr2+Rt)1{v˜n2 =v˜n2 (vn0 ,mr2 ,mt)} ×QnV1|V0V2(vn1 |vn0 , v˜n2 )∑
v˜n2 ,j∈Mt Q
n
UV0
(un, vn0 )2
−n(Rr2+Rt)1{v˜n2 =v˜n2 (vn0 ,mr2 ,j)} ×QnV1|V0V2(vn1 |vn0 , v˜n2 )
=
QnV1|V0,V2
(
vn1 |vn0 , v˜n2 (vn0 ,mr2 ,mt)
)∑
j∈Mt Q
n
V1|V0,V2
(
vn1 |vn0 , v˜n2 (vn0 ,mr2 , j)
)
(a)
= E˜LE(mt|mr2 , vn0 , vn1 )
(b)
= P˜C˜2(mt|mr2 , un, vn0 , vn1 ),
where (a) follows from the definition of the likelihood encoder cf. Eq. (3.25) and (b)
follows from (3.26). We now turn to the total variation distance expression in (3.39),
and observe that it can be reformulated as follows:
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EC˜2
[∥∥∥P˜UnVn0 Vn1 V˜n2 Zn|C˜2 − ΓUnVn0 Vn1 V˜n2 Zn|C˜2∥∥∥
]
≤ EC˜2
[∥∥∥P˜UnVn0 Vn1 Mr2MtV˜n2 Zn|C˜2 − ΓUnVn0 Vn1 Mr2MtV˜n2 Zn|C˜2∥∥∥
]
(a)
= EC˜2
[∥∥∥P˜UnVn0 Vn1 MtV˜n2 Zn|Mr2 ,C˜2 − ΓUnVn0 Vn1 MtV˜n2 Zn|Mr2 ,C˜2∥∥∥
]
(b)
= EC˜2
[∥∥∥P˜UnVn0 Vn1 |Mr2 ,C˜2 − ΓUnVn0 Vn1 |Mr2 ,C˜2∥∥∥
]
(c)
= EC˜2
[∥∥∥QnUV0V1 − ΓUnVn0 Vn1 |Mr2=1,C˜2∥∥∥
]
(3.41)
where (a) follows because for every mr2 ∈ Mr2 and C˜2 ∈ C˜2, we have ΓC˜2(mr2) =
P˜C˜2(mr2) = 2
−nRr2 ; (b) follows due to the relations established in (3.40); while (c)
follows from the definition of P˜C˜2 in (3.28), along with the symmetricity of ΓC˜2 with
respect to Mr2 . Now, for β > 0 and 0 < ¯ < , we define the following δ-functions:
δinpn (¯, ) = 2 · |U| · |V0| · |V1| · |V2| · exp
(
− 2n
( − ¯
1 + ¯
)2
µ2inp
)
(3.42)
δ0(, β) =  log
(|U| · |V0| · |V1| · |V2|)+ 5β (3.43)
δn(, β) =
(
1− nδinpn ()
) · (5δinpn (¯, ) + 7 · 2−nβ) (3.44)
Based on the result established in [132, Corollary VII.5] and the analysis technique
used in Section 2.2.3, one can show that:
if Rt ≥ I(V1; V2|V0) + δ0(, β), (3.45)
then EC˜2
[∥∥∥QnUV0V1 − ΓUnVn0 Vn1 |Mr2=1,C˜2∥∥∥] ≤ δn(, β). (3.46)
Based on the previous analysis, we can argue that as long as the rate constraint in
(3.45) is satisfied, the following holds:
lim
n→∞
EC[PP(E)] ≤ lim
n→∞
δinpn () + δn(, β) = 0 (3.47)
This implies that the rate constraint in (3.45) assures that the sequences generated and
selected by our coding scheme are jointly typical with a probability approaching one as
n approaches infinity. This is a very interesting result because in the proof of [12, The-
orem 2], a coding scheme was used where the codebook generation method and the
decoding functions are nearly identical to ours, but with a completely different encod-
ing technique. In particular, the encoding function in [12] works as follows: Given the
messages (mc,m,mr,mr1 ,mr2), the encoder searches for an index mt ∈Mt, such that
the corresponding triple vn0 (mc,m,mr), v
n
1 (mc,m,mr,mr1), and v
n
2 (mc,m,mr,mr2 ,mt)
are jointly typical. Based on the typicality result in Theorem A.7, the encoder succeeds
in finding such index with a probability that goes to 1 exponentially fast, if
Rt > I(V1; V2|V0). (3.48)
Surprisingly, the constraint in (3.45) required by our coding scheme is identical to
the one in (3.48) which was derived in [12], despite the fact that each coding scheme
utilizes a different encoding technique.
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2- Decoding Errors: This type of errors occur if the decoders decide on a set of
messages different from the ones which were originally transmitted. This will happen
if the transmitted messages do not fulfill the decoding rule or if a set of messages
different from the transmitted one satisfies the decoding rule. With this in mind, we
define the following events:
D1(mc,m,mr,mr1) =
{(
Un(mc),V
n
0 (mc,m,mr),V
n
1 (. . . ,mr1),Y
n
1
) ∈ T n,1}
D2(mc,m,mr,mr2 ,Mt) =
{(
Un(mc),V
n
0 (mc,m,mr),V
n
2 (. . . ,mr2 ,Mt),Y
n
2
) ∈ T n,2}
D3(mc) =
{(
Un(mc),Z
n
) ∈ T n (QUZ)} , (3.49)
where T n,1 = T n (QUV0V1Y1) and T n,2 = T n (QUV0V2Y2). Based on the definitions of the
decoding functions, the expectation of the average decdoing error probability in (3.30)
over the codebook ensemble can be bounded as follows:
EC
[
P¯e(C)
] (a)
= EC
[
P1P
(
E ∪
{⋃
mr1
D1(1, 1, 1,mr1)
}c
∪
{⋃
mr2
D2(1, 1, 1,mr2 ,Mt)
}c
∪
∪ Dc3(1) ∪
{ ⋃
mc 6=1
Dc3(mc)
}{ ⋃
(mc,m,mr) 6=(1,1,1)
mr1
D1(mc,m,mr,mr1)
}
∪
{ ⋃
(mc,m,mr)6=(1,1,1)
mr2
D2(mc,m,mr,mr2 ,Mt)
})]
(b)
≤ EC
[
P1P
(E)+ P1P(Ec ∩ Dc1(1, 1, 1, 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
P 1e0
+P1P
(Ec ∩ Dc2(1, 1, 1, 1,Mt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
P 2e0
+P1P
(Ec ∩ Dc3(1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
P 3e0
+ P1P
( ⋃
(mc,m,mr)6=(1,1,1),
mr1
D1(mc,m,mr,mr1)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P 1e3
+P1P
( ⋃
(m,mr) 6=(1,1),
mr1
D1(1,m,mr,mr1)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P 1e2
+ P1P
( ⋃
mc 6=1
D1(mc, 1, 1, 1)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P 1e1
+P1P
( ⋃
(mc,m,mr)6=(1,1,1),
mr1 ,mt
D2(mc,m,mr,mr2 ,mt)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P 2e3
+ P1P
( ⋃
(m,mr)6=(1,1),
mr1 ,mt
D2(mc,m,mr,mr2 ,mt)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P 2e2
+P1P
( ⋃
mc 6=1
D2(mc, 1, 1, 1,Mt)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P 2e1
+ P1P
( ⋃
mc 6=1
D3(mc)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P 3e1
]
, (3.50)
where (a) follows due to the symmetricity of the code with respect to the messages
Mc, M, Mr, Mr1 and Mr2 , while (b) follows from Boole’s inequality known as the union
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bound cf. [133]. Next, we derive the necessary rates constraints such that the the
average decoding error probability given by (3.50) vanishes as n approaches infinity.
Thus, we have limn→∞ EC
[
P¯e(C)
] ≤ limn→∞ EC[P¯e(C)] = 0. We proceed as follows:
1. Based on our encoding analysis, it follows that limn→∞ EC
[
P1P(E)
]
= 0 as long
as the rate constraint in (3.45) holds.
2. Based on the properties of conditionally typical sequences given in Theorem
A.6, it follows that limn→∞ EC
[
P 1e0 +P
2
e0
+P 3e0
]
= 0. In particular, for 0 < ˆ < 
each of these terms can be upper-bounded by the following function:
δQn (ˆ, ) = 2 · |U| · |V0| · |V1| · |V2| · |Y1| · |Y2| · |Z| exp
(
−2n
( − ˆ
1 + ˆ
)2
µ2Q
)
, (3.51)
where µQ is the minimum probability of an event over the support of the joint
distribution QUV0V1V2Y1Y2Z.
3. Based on the properties of jointly typical sequences given in Theorem A.7,
EC
[
P 1e3
]
can be bounded as follows:
EC
[
P 1e3
] ≤∑
mr1
∑
(mc,m,mr)6=(1,1,1)
2−n
(
I(V0V1;Y1)−δ1()
)
(3.52)
where δ1() = 2 log
(|U| · |V0| · |V1| · |Y1|). The previous bound follows be-
cause for any (mc,m,mr) 6= (1, 1, 1) and mr1 ∈ Mr1 , the corresponding code-
words Un(mc), V
n
0 (mc,m,mr) and V
n
1 (mc,m,mr,mr1) are independent of the
observation at the first legitimate receiver Yn1 . Since M2 is available as a side
information at the first legitimate receiver, Eq. (3.52) directly implies that
limn→∞ EC
[
P 1e3
]
= 0, as long as:
Rc +R0 +R1 +Rr +Rr1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1)− δ1(). (3.53)
4. Based on similar arguments, EC
[
P 2e3
]
can be bounded as follows:
EC
[
P 2e3
] ≤ ∑
mr2 ,mt
∑
(mc,m,mr) 6=(1,1,1)
2−n
(
I(V0V2;Y1)−δ2()
)
, (3.54)
where δ2() = 2 log
(|U| · |V0| · |V2| · |Y2|). Similarly, since M1 is available as a
side information at the second legitimate receiver, Eq. (3.54) directly implies
that limn→∞ EC
[
P 2e3
]
= 0, as long as:
Rc +R0 +R2 +Rr +Rr2 +Rt ≤ I(V0V2; Y2)− δ2(). (3.55)
5. Based on the conditional version of the results presented in Theorem A.7,
EC
[
P 1e2
]
can be bounded as follows:
EC
[
P 1e2
] ≤∑
mr1
∑
(m,mr)6=(1,1)
2−n
(
I(V0V1;Y1|U)−δ1()
)
, (3.56)
The previous bound follows because for any mc = 1, (m,mr) 6= (1, 1) and
mr1 ∈ Mr1 , the corresponding codewords Vn0 (1,m,mr) and Vn1 (1,m,mr,mr1)
are independent of Yn1 while both of them are generated conditioned on the
codeword Un(1). This implies that limn→∞ EC
[
P 1e2
]
= 0, as long as:
R0 +R1 +Rr +Rr1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|U)− δ1(). (3.57)
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Applying the same arguments to the second legitimate receiver directly implies
that limn→∞ EC
[
P 2e2
]
= 0, as long as:
R0 +R2 +Rr +Rr2 +Rt ≤ I(V0V2; Y2|U)− δ2(). (3.58)
6. Finally, using a similar argument to the one used to bound P 1e3 in (3.52), we
can show that limn→∞ EC
[
P 1e1 + P
2
e1
+ P 3e1
]
= 0 as long as:
Rc ≤ min
(
I(V0V1; Y1)− δ1(), I(V0V2; Y2)− δ2(), I(U; Z)− δ3()
)
(a)
≤ I(U; Z)− δ3(). (3.59)
where δ3() = 2 log
(|U| · |Z|), while (a) follows from (3.53) and (3.55). The
previous analysis shows that under the rate constraints in (3.45), (3.53), (3.55),
(3.57), (3.58) and (3.59), our coding scheme satisfies the reliability constraint
in (3.15b).
3.2.4 Strong Secrecy Analysis
In this section, we present a detailed strong secrecy analysis for our coding scheme. In
particular, we derive the rest of the rate bounds given in (3.23). These rate bounds
assure that our random code C defined in Section 3.2.2 satisfies the joint-strong secrecy
constraint in (3.15c). We start by arguing that for τ > 0, it is enough to show that:
EC [I(M; Zn|C)]
(a)
≤ EC [I(M; Zn|McC)] ≤ 2−nτ/2, (3.60)
where (a) follows because M and Mc are independent. Based on the relation between
the mutual information and the total variation distance given in Lemma A.6, one can
show that the bound in (3.60) holds, if:
EC
[∥∥PMZn|Mc,C − PM|Mc,C × PZn|Mc,C∥∥] ≤ 2 · 2−nτ , (3.61)
where P is the whole distribution on the random code C given by (3.22). Moreover,
since M is uniformly-distributed over the set M and is independent of the common
message Mc and the random codebook C, Eq. (3.61) holds, if:
EC
[∥∥PZn|Mc,M,C − PˇZn|Mc,C∥∥] ≤ 2−nτ , (3.62)
where PˇZn|Mc,C is the probability distribution observed by the eavesdropper when the
common message Mc is the only useful information transmitted over the channel using
the random code C. The definition of such distribution follows from Pˇ = G(C) · PˇC,
where G(C) is as defined in (3.19), while PˇC is defined as follows:
PˇC
(
mc, u
n, zn
)
= 2−nRc 1{un=un(mc)}Q
n
Z|U(z
n|un), (3.63)
The previous definition implies that PˇC is only a function in the common message
codebook Cc, while being independent of C0,1,2. Moreover, QnZ|U can be interpreted as
the DMC from Un to Zn given by:
QnZ|U(z
n|un) ,
∑
vn0 ∈Vn0
∑
vn1 ∈Vn1
∑
vn2 ∈Vn2
QnV0|U(v
n
0 |un)QnZ|V0V1V2(zn|vn0 , vn1 , vn2 ). (3.64)
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Before we proceed with our secrecy analysis, we need to introduce some useful ran-
dom codes and their induced joint distributions. Our first random code is defined as
follows: Given two random sequences un ∈ Un and vn0 ∈ Vn0 generated according to
the input distribution QnUV0 , let C¨1(v
n
0 ) , {V¨n1 (vn0 ,mr1)} be a collection of i.i.d. ran-
dom codewords of length n generated according to QnV1|V0(·|vn0 ), for every mr1 ∈Mr1 .
Additionally, let C¨1 , C¨1(vn0 ) be a random codebook generated for all vn0 ∈ Vn0 . This
implies that the probability of obtaining a certain codebook realization C¨1 ∈ C¨1 is:
G(C¨1) =
∏
vn0 ∈Vn0
∏
mr1∈Mr1
QnV1|V0(v¨
n
1 (v
n
0 ,mr1)|vn0 ). (3.65)
The encoding function works as follows: For a fixed codebook realization C¨1 and given
the sequences (un, vn0 ), we choose an index mr1 uniformly at random from the setMr1
and transmit the corresponding codeword v¨n1 (v
n
0 ,mr1) ∈ Vn1 over the DMC QnZ|V0V1 :
QnZ|V0V1(z
n|vn0 , vn1 ) ,
∑
vn2 ∈Vn2
QnV2|V0V1(v
n
2 |vn0 , vn1 )QnZ|V0V1V2(zn|vn0 , vn1 , vn2 ). (3.66)
The codebook generation process along with the encoding scheme and the DMC in
(3.66) induce a joint probability distribution over the random variables
(
C¨1,U
n,Vn0 ,Mr1 ,
V¨n1 ,Z
n
)
as follows: Γ¨ , G(C¨1) · Γ¨C¨1 , where Γ¨C¨1 is given by:
Γ¨C¨
(
un, vn0 ,mr1 , v¨
n
1 , z
n
)
= QnUV0(u
n, vn0 )2
−nRr1 1{v¨n1 =v¨n1 (vn0 ,mr1 )}Q
n
Z|V0V1(z
n|vn0 , v¨n1 ).
(3.67)
In contrast to Γ¨, we define a probability distribution related to the random code C as
follows: P¨ , G(C) · P¨C, where P¨C is given by:
P¨C
(
mc,m,mr,u
n, vn0 ,mr1 , v
n
1 , z
n
)
= 2−n(Rc+R+Rr)1{
un=un(mc)
}1{
vn0 =v
n
0 (mc,m,mr)
}
× 2−nRr1 1{
vn1 =v
n
1 (mc,m,mr,mr1 )
}QnZ|V0V1(zn|vn0 , vn1 ). (3.68)
We need to point out that although we define P¨ over the whole random codebook C, the
distribution P¨C depends only on the codebooks Cc,0,1, while being independent of C2.
We also need to specify that P¨C can be interpreted as the multiplication of the marginal
distribution of PC in (3.22) over the random variables
(
Mc,M,Mr,Mr1 ,U
n,Vn0 ,V
n
1
)
and
the DMC QnZ|V0V1 .
Next, we consider another random code defined as follows: Given a random sequence
un ∈ Un generated by QnU, let Cˆ0(un) , {Vˆn0 (un,m,mr)} be a collection of i.i.d.
random codewords of length n generated according to QnV0|U(·|un), for every m ∈ M
and mr ∈Mr. Additionally, let Cˆ0 , Cˆ0(un) be a random codebook generated for all
un ∈ Un. This implies that the probability of obtaining a certain codebook realization
Cˆ0 ∈ Cˆ0 is:
G(Cˆ0) =
∏
un∈Un
∏
(m,mr)∈M×Mr
QnV0|U(vˆ
n
0 (u
n,m,mr)|un). (3.69)
The encoding function works as follows: For a fixed codebook realization Cˆ0 and given
pair (un,m), we choose an indexmr uniformly at random from the setMr and transmit
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the corresponding codeword vˆn0 (u
n,m,mr) ∈ Vn0 over the DMC QnZ|V0 :
QnZ|V0(z
n|vn0 ) ,
∑
vn1 ∈Vn1
QnV1|V0(v
n
1 |vn0 )QnZ|V0,V1(zn|vn0 , vn1 ). (3.70)
The codebook generation process along with the encoding scheme and the DMC in
(3.70) induce a joint probability distribution over the random variables
(
Cˆ0,U
n,M,Mr,
Vˆn0 ,Z
n
)
as follows: Γˆ , G(Cˆ0) · ΓˆCˆ0 , where ΓˆCˆ0 is given by:
ΓˆCˆ
(
un,m,mr, vˆ
n
0 , z
n
)
= QnU(u
n)2−n(R+Rr)1{vˆn0 =vˆn0 (un,m,mr)}Q
n
Z|V0(z
n|vˆn0 ). (3.71)
Similar to P¨, we define a probability distribution Pˆ that resembles Γˆ, but with respect
to the random code C as follows: Pˆ , G(C) · P¨C, where PˆC is given by:
PˆC
(
mc,m,mr, u
n, vn0 , z
n
)
= 2−n(Rc+R+Rr)1{un=un(mc),vn0 =vn0 (mc,m,mr)}Q
n
Z|V0(z
n|vn0 ).
(3.72)
One should notice that, although we define Pˆ over the whole random codebook C,
the distribution PˆC only depends on the codebooks Cc,0 and is independent of C1,2.
Additionally, PˆC can be interpreted as the multiplication of the marginal distribution
of PC in (3.22) over the random variables
(
Mc,M,Mr,U
n,Vn0 ,V
n
1 ) and the DMC Q
n
Z|V0 .
Now, we are ready to proceed with our secrecy analysis. Let us denote the total
variation distance in (3.62) by L. Based on the triangle inequality and the three
distributions defined in (3.63), (3.68) and (3.72), it follows that:
EC
[L] ≤ EC[∥∥PZn|Mc,M,C − P¨Zn|Mc,M,C∥∥+ ∥∥P¨Zn|Mc,M,C − PˆZn|Mc,M,C∥∥
+
∥∥PˆZn|Mc,M,C − PˇZn|Mc,C∥∥]
(a)
= EC
[∥∥PZn|Mc=1,M=1,C − P¨Zn|Mc=1,M=1,C∥∥+ ∥∥P¨Zn|Mc=1,M=1,C − PˆZn|Mc=1,M=1,C∥∥
+
∥∥PˆZn|Mc=1,M=1,C − PˇZn|Mc=1,C∥∥], (3.73)
where (a) follows due to the symmetricity of the distributions PC, P¨C and PˆC with
respect to the messages Mc and M, in addition to the symmetricity of Pˇ
C with respect
to Mc. We denote the three total variation distances summed up in the RHS of Eq.
(3.73) by L1, L2 and L3 respectively. We then start by L1 and observe that EC[L1]
can be bounded as follows:
EC[L1] ≤ EC
[∥∥PMrMr1UnVn0 Vn1 Zn|Mc=1,M=1,C − P¨MrMr1UnVn0 Vn1 Zn|M=1,Mc=1,C∥∥]
(a)
= EC
[ ∑
mr,mr1
2−n(Rr+Rr1 )
∑
u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯
n
1
1{Un(1)=u¯n}1{Vn0 (1,1,mr)=v¯n0}1{Vn1 (1,1,mr,mr1 )=v¯n1}
×
∥∥∥PZn|Mc=1,M=1,Mr=mr,Mr1=mr1 ,Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,Vn1 =v¯n1 ,C −QnZ|V0V1(·|v¯n0 , v¯n1 )∥∥∥]
(b)
= EC
[ ∑
u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯
n
1
1{Un(1)=u¯n}1{Vn0 (1,1,1)=v¯n0}1{Vn1 (1,1,1,1)=v¯n1}
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×
∥∥∥PZn|Mc=1,M=1,Mr=1,Mr1=1,Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,Vn1 =v¯n1 ,C −QnZ|V0V1(·|v¯n0 , v¯n1 )∥∥∥]
(c)
= ECc,0,1
[ ∑
u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯
n
1
1{Un(1)=u¯n}1{Vn0 (1,1,1)=v¯n0}1{Vn1 (1,1,1,1)=v¯n1} EC2|Cc,0,1
[
×
∥∥∥PZn|Mc=1,M=1,Mr=1,Mr1=1,Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,Vn1 =v¯n1 ,C −QnZ|V0V1(·|v¯n0 , v¯n1 )∥∥∥]
]
,
(3.74)
where (a) follows from the definition of PC in (3.21) and the definition of P¨C in (3.68);
(b) follows due to the symmetricity of PC with respect to the messages Mr and Mr1 ;
while (c) follows from the law of total expectation [128] by dividing the expectation
as in (3.32). Next, we observe that for the sequences (u¯n, v¯n0 , v¯
n
1 ) and a fixed codebook
C ∈ C, the probability distribution PCZn|Mc=1,M=1,Mr=1,Mr1=1,Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,Vn1 =v¯n1 is well-
defined only if the following condition holds:
(
u¯n = un(1) and v¯n0 = v
n
0 (1, 1, 1) and
v¯n1 = v
n
1 (1, 1, 1, 1)
)
. Thus, for the case where
(
u¯n 6= un(1) or v¯n0 6= vn0 (1, 1, 1) or
v¯n1 6= vn2 (1, 1, 1, 1)
)
, we assume the following:
PCZn|Mc=1,M=1,Mr=1,Mr1=1,Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,Vn1 =v¯n1 = Q
n
Z|V0V1(·|v¯0n, v¯n1 ). (3.75)
This assumption does not affect the calculation of EC[L1] because the indicator func-
tions in (3.74) assure that the inner expectation only contributes to the total term when
the sequences (u¯n, v¯n0 , v¯
n
1 ) are identical to the codewords
(
un(1), vn0 (1, 1, 1), v
n
1 (1, 1, 1, 1)
)
chosen by a certain codebook realization C. With this in mind, we investigate the in-
ner expectation in (3.74), for a given codebook realization Cc,0,1 and fixed sequences
(u¯n, v¯n0 , v¯
n
1 ). Thus, we have:
EC2|Cc,0,1=Cc,0,1
[∥∥∥PZn|Mc=1,M=1,Mr=1,Mr1=1,Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,Vn1 =v¯n1 ,C −QnZ|V0V1(·|v¯n0 , v¯n1 )∥∥∥]
= EC2|Cc,0,1=Cc,0,1
[∥∥∥PZn|M=1,Mc=1,Mr=1,Mr1=1,Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,Vn1 =v¯n1 ,C −QnZ|V0V1(·|v¯n0 , v¯n1 )∥∥∥
×
(
1{(
un(1),vn0 (1,1,1),v
n
1 (1,1,1,1)
)
=(u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯
n
1 )
} + 1{(
un(1),vn0 (1,1,1),v
n
1 (1,1,1,1)
)
6=(u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯n1 )
})]
(a)
= EC2|Un(1)=un(1),Vn0 (1,1,1)=vn0 (1,1,1),Vn1 (1,1,1,1)=vn1 (1,1,1,1)
[
1{(
un(1),vn0 (1,1,1),v
n
1 (1,1,1,1)
)
=(u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯
n
1 )
}
×
∥∥∥PZn|Mc=1,M=1,Mr=1,Mr1=1,Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,Vn1 =v¯n1 ,C2(1,1,1) −QnZ|V0V1(·|v¯n0 , v¯n1 )∥∥∥]
(b)
≤ EC˜2
[∥∥∥P˜Zn|Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,Vn1 =v¯n1 ,C˜2 −QnZ|V0V1(·|v¯n0 , v¯n1 )∥∥∥
]
, (3.76)
where C˜2 is the random codebook introduced in Section 3.2.3 and P˜
C˜2 is its induced
joint probability given by (3.26). Step (a) follows from (3.75) and the fact that the
expectation of the total variation distance depends only on the codewords Un(1),
Vn0 (1, 1, 1) and V
n
1 (1, 1, 1, 1) along with the corresponding codebook C2(1, 1, 1) and
not on the entire codebook C; (b) follows by removing the indicator function and
because when vn0 (1, 1, 1) = v¯
n
0 and C2(1, 1, 1) = C˜2(v¯n0 ), the two conditional distributions
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P˜Zn|Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,Vn1 =v¯n1 ,C˜2=C˜2(v¯n0 ) and PZn|Mc=1,M=1,...,Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,Vn1 =v¯n1 ,C2(1,1,1)=C2(1,1,1) are
equivalent. Finally, by substituting Eq. (3.76) in Eq. (3.74), we get
EC[L1]
(a)
≤ EC˜2
[ ∑
u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯
n
1
ECc,0,1
[
1{Un(1)=u¯n}1{Vn0 (1,1,1)=v¯n0}1{Vn1 (1,1,1,1)=v¯n1}
]
×
∥∥∥P˜Zn|Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,Vn1 =v¯n1 ,C˜2 −QnZ|V0V1(·|v¯n0 , v¯n1 )∥∥∥
]
(b)
= EC˜2
[ ∑
u¯n,v¯n0 ,v¯
n
1
QnUV0V1(u¯
n, v¯n0 , v¯
n
1 )
∥∥∥P˜Zn|Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,Vn1 =v¯n1 ,C˜2 −QnZ|V0V1(·|v¯n0 , v¯n1 )∥∥∥
]
(c)
= EC˜2
[∥∥∥P˜UnVn0 Vn1 Zn|C˜2 −QnUV0V1Z∥∥∥
]
≤ EC˜2
[∥∥∥P˜UnVn0 Vn1 Zn|C˜2 − ΓUnVn0 Vn1 Zn|C˜2∥∥∥
]
+ EC˜2
[∥∥∥ΓUnVn0 Vn1 Zn|C˜2 −QnUV0V1Z∥∥∥
]
,
(3.77)
where (a) follows because C˜2 and Cc,0,1 are independent; (b) follows from the properties
of the indicator function and the fact that the random codebook Cc,0,1 was generated
using the input distribution QUV0V1 ; while (c) follows from the definition of P˜
C˜2 in
(3.28). Based on the result established in Section 3.2.3, in particular Eqs. (3.41) and
(3.46), we have
EC˜2
[∥∥∥P˜UnVn0 Vn1 Zn|C˜2 − ΓUnVn0 Vn1 Zn|C˜2∥∥∥
]
≤ EC˜2
[∥∥∥P˜UnVn0 Vn1 V˜n2 Zn|C˜2 − ΓUnVn0 Vn1 V˜n2 Zn|C˜2∥∥∥
]
≤ δn(, β), (3.78)
as long as the rate constraint in (3.45) is fulfilled. For γ > 0 and 0 < ˜ < , let us
define the following δ-functions:
δZn(˜, ) = 2 · |U| · |V0| · |V1| · |V2| · |Z| exp
(
− 2n
( − ˜
1 + ˜
)2
µ2inp,Z
)
(3.79)
δ4(, γ) = 2 log
(|U| · |V0| · |V1| · |V2| · |Z|)+ 5γ (3.80)
δZn(, γ) =
(
1− nδinpn ()
) · (5δZn(˜, ) + 7 · 2−nγ), (3.81)
where µinp,Z is the minimum probability of an event for the joint distribution QUV0V1V2Z.
Based on the result established in [132, Corollary VII.5] and the analysis technique
used in Section 2.2.3, one can show that:
if Rr2 +Rt ≥ I(V2; V1Z|V0) + δ4(, γ), (3.82)
then EC˜2
[∥∥∥ΓUnVn0 Vn1 Zn|C˜2 −QnUV0V1Z∥∥∥
]
≤ δn(, γ). (3.83)
This implies that the rate constraints in (3.45) and (3.82) assure that EC[L1] ap-
proaches zero as n approaches infinity. We now turn to L2 and observe that EC[L2]
can be bounded as follows:
EC[L2]
(a)
≤ ECc,0,1
[∥∥∥P¨MrUnVn0 Zn|Mc=1,M=1,Cc,0,1 − PˆMrUnVn0 Zn|M=1,Mc=1,Cc,0,1∥∥∥]
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(b)
= ECc,0,1
[ ∑
u¯n,v¯n0
1{Un(1)=u¯n}1{Vn0 (1,1,1)=v¯n0}
×
∥∥∥P¨Zn|Mc=1,M=1,Mr=1,Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,Cc,0,1 −QnZ|V0(·|v¯n0 )∥∥∥]
(c)
= ECc,0
[ ∑
u¯n,v¯n0
1{Un(1)=u¯n}1{Vn0 (1,1,1)=v¯n0} EC1|Cc,0
[
×
∥∥∥P¨Zn|Mc=1,M=1,Mr=1,Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,Cc,0,1 −QnZ|V0(·|v¯n0 )∥∥∥]
]
, (3.84)
where (a) follows because the two distributions P¨C in (3.68) and PˆC in (3.72) are
independent of the codebook C2; (b) follows from the definition of P¨C and PˆC along
with the symmetricity of P¨C with respect to Mr1 ; while (c) follows from the law of
total expectation. Next, for the sequences (u¯n, v¯n0 , v¯
n
1 ) and a fixed codebook C ∈ C, we
assume that:
P¨CZn|Mc=1,M=1,Mr=1,Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 = Q
n
Z|V0(·|v¯n0 ), (3.85)
if
(
u¯n 6= un(1) or v¯n0 6= vn0 (1, 1, 1)
)
. This assumption is based on some arguments
similar to the ones used to validate the assumption in (3.75). With this in mind, we
investigate the inner expectation in (3.84), for a given codebook realization Cc,0 and
fixed sequences (u¯n, v¯n0 ) as follows:
EC1|Cc,0=Cc,0
[∥∥∥P¨Zn|Mc=1,M=1,Mr=1,Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,Cc,0,1 −QnZ|V0(·|v¯n0 )∥∥∥]
(a)
= EC1|Un(1)=un(1),Vn0 (1,1,1)=vn0 (1,1,1)
[
1{(
un(1),vn0 (1,1,1)
)
=(u¯n,v¯n0 )
}
×
∥∥∥P¨Zn|Mc=1,M=1,Mr=1,Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,C1(1,1,1) −QnZ|V0(·|v¯n0 )∥∥∥]
(b)
≤ EC¨1
[∥∥∥Γ¨Zn|Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,C¨1 −QnZ|V0(·|v¯n0 )∥∥∥
]
, (3.86)
where (a) follows from (3.85) and the fact that the expectation depends only on the
codewords Un(1) and Vn0 (1, 1, 1) along with the corresponding codebook C1(1, 1, 1)
and not on the entire codebook Cc,0,1; (b) follows because when v
n
0 (1, 1, 1) = v¯
n
0 and
C1(1, 1, 1) = C¨1(v¯n0 ), the two distributions P¨Zn|Mc=1,M=1,Mr=1,Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,C1(1,1,1)=C2(1,1,1)
and Γ¨Zn|Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,C¨1=C¨1(v¯n0 ) are equivalent. Finally, by substituting Eq. (3.86) in Eq.
(3.84), we get
EC[L2]
(a)
≤ EC¨1
[ ∑
u¯n,v¯n0
QnUV0(u¯
n, v¯n0 )
∥∥∥Γ¨Zn|Un=u¯n,Vn0 =v¯n0 ,C¨1 −QnZ|V0(·|v¯n0 )∥∥∥
]
(b)
= EC¨1
[∥∥∥Γ¨UnVn0 Zn|C¨1 −QnUV0Z∥∥∥
]
(3.87)
where (a) follows because C¨1 and Cc,0 are independent and the fact that the random
codebook Cc,0 was generated using the input distribution QUV0 ; while (b) follows from
the definition of Γ¨C¨1 in (3.67). Finally, based on the result established in [132, Corollary
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VII.5] and the analysis technique used in Section 2.2.3, one can show that:
if Rr1 ≥ I(V1; Z|V0) + δ4(, γ), (3.88)
then EC¨1
[∥∥∥Γ¨UnVn0 Zn|C¨1 −QnUV0Z∥∥∥
]
≤ δn(, γ). (3.89)
This implies that the rate constraint in (3.88) assures that EC[L2] approaches zero as
n approaches infinity. Now, it only remains to bound EC[L3]. Based on the arguments
used to bound EC[L2], we can show that:
EC[L3]
(a)
≤ ECc,0
[∥∥∥PˆUnZn|Mc=1,M=1,Cc,0 − PˇUnZn|Mc=1,Cc,0∥∥∥]
(b)
= ECc
[∑
u¯n
1{Un(1)=u¯n} EC0|Cc
[∥∥∥PˆZn|Mc=1,M=1,Un=u¯n,Cc,0 −QnZ|U(·|u¯n)∥∥∥]
]
,
(3.90)
where (a) follows because the two distributions PˆC in (3.72) and PˇC in (3.63) are
independent of the codebooks C1,2; while (b) follows from the law of total expectation.
Next, for a given sequence u¯n and a fixed codebook C ∈ C, we assume that:
PˆCZn|Mc=1,M=1,Un=u¯n = Q
n
Z|U(·|u¯n), (3.91)
if u¯n 6= un(1). The validity of this assumption is based on arguments similar to the
ones used to establish (3.75). With this in mind, we can further bound EC[L3] as
follows:
EC[L3]
(a)
≤ ECc
[∑
u¯n
1{Un(1)=u¯n} EC0|Un(1)
[∥∥∥PˆZn|Mc=1,M=1,Un=u¯n,C0(1) −QnZ|U(·|u¯n)∥∥∥]
]
(b)
= ECc
[∑
u¯n
1{Un(1)=u¯n} ECˆ0
[∥∥∥ΓˆZn|M=1,Un=u¯n,Cˆ0 −QnZ|U(·|u¯n)∥∥∥]
]
(c)
= ECˆ0
[∥∥∥ΓˆUnZn|M=1,Cˆ0 −QnUZ∥∥∥], (3.92)
where (a) and (b) follow using similar arguments to the ones used to establish (3.86)
along with Eq. (3.91); while (c) follows from the definition of ΓˆCˆ0 in (3.71). Again
using [132, Corollary VII.5] and the analysis in Section 2.2.3, we can show that:
if Rr ≥ I(V0; Z|U) + δ4(, γ), (3.93)
then ECˆ0
[∥∥∥ΓˆUnZn|M=1,Cˆ0 −QnUZ∥∥∥] ≤ δn(, γ). (3.94)
The previous secrecy analysis implies that if the constraints on the rate quadruple
(Rr, Rr1 , Rr2 , Rt) given by (3.45), (3.82), (3.88) and (3.93) are satisfied, then it follows
from (3.78), (3.83), (3.89) and (3.94) that:
EC[L] ≤ δn(, β) + 3δn(, γ) ≤ 2−nτ , (3.95)
for some τ > 0. This implies that under these rate constraints, our coding scheme
satisfies the joint-strong secrecy criterion given in (3.15c). It is important to point out
that the strong-secrecy analysis presented in this section is inspired by the concepts
and results established in [127].
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3.2.5 Time Sharing and Rate Splitting
In this section, we show how the coding scheme used to establish the achievability of
the rate regions in Proposition 3.1 and consequently Proposition 3.2 directly implies
that the full rate region given by Theorem 3.1 is also achievable. Our proof is based
on the principles of rate splitting and time sharing [134] as follows:
Fix an input distribution QTUV0V1V2 and let pi ∈ [0, 1] be a time sharing parameter.
Further, let n = n1 + n2 ∈ N be an arbitrary but fixed code block length such that
n1 = pi · n and n2 = (1− pi) · n. It is worth mentioning that we assume pi · n to be an
integer. If not, it is understood as bpi · nc so that (1 − pi)n is n − bpi · nc. Next, we
construct the following coding scheme.
(2nRc , 2nR0 , 2nR1 , 2nR2 , n)
code C of Definition 3.1
E : (mc,m0,m1,m2)→ xn
ϕ1 : y
n
1 ,m2 → mˆc, mˆ0, mˆ1
ϕ2 : y
n
2 ,m1 → m˜c, m˜0, m˜2
ϕ3 : z
n → mˇc
(2n1Rc1 , 2n1R0˜1 , 2n1R1˜ , 2n1R21 , n1)
code C1 of Definition 3.1
n1R1˜ = n1R11 + nRa
E1 : (mc1,m0˜1,m1˜,m21)→ xn1
ϕ11 : y
n1
1 ,m21 → mˆc1, mˆ0˜1, mˆ1˜
ϕ21 : y
n1
2 , m˜1˜ → m˜c1, m˜0˜1, m˜21
ϕ31 : z
n1 → mˇc1
(2n2Rc2 , 2n2R0˜2 , 2n2R12 , 2n2R2˜ , n2)
code C2 of Definition 3.1
n2R2˜ = n2R22 + nRa
E2 : (mc2,m0˜2,m12,m2˜)→ xn2
ϕ12 : y
n2
1 , mˆ2˜ → mˆc2, mˆ0˜2, mˆ12
ϕ22 : y
n2
2 ,m12 → m˜c2, m˜0˜2, m˜2˜
ϕ32 : z
n2 → mˇc2
(mc1,m0˜1,m11,m21,ma)
n1 = pi · n
I(M0˜1M1˜M21; Zn1) ≤ τn1
(mc2,m0˜2,m12,m22,ma)
n2 = (1− pi) · n
I(M0˜2M12M2˜; Zn2) ≤ τn2
xn1 xn2
xn = (xn1 , xn2)
mˆ1˜ = (mˆ11, mˆa)
mˆ2˜ = (m22, mˆa)
m˜2˜ = (m˜22, m˜a)
m˜1˜ = (m11, m˜a)
Figure 3.4: Rate Splitting and Time Sharing for the Two-receiver DM-WBC
1. Combined Code C: We start by dividing the common confidential message set
M0 = J1, 2nR0K into two parts: M0˜ = J1, 2nR0˜K and Ma = J1, 2nRaK. This division
directly implies that:
R0 = R0˜ +Ra. (3.96)
We further divide each message set Mj = J1, 2nRjK for j ∈ {c, 0˜, 1, 2} into two parts:
Mj1 = J1, 2n1Rj1K and Mj2 = J1, 2n2Rj2K. This division directly implies that
Rj = pi ·Rj1 + (1− pi) ·Rj2. (3.97)
Next, we generate a time sharing sequence tn(pi) by generating the symbols ti(pi) with
i ∈ J1, nK independently according to QT. For the messages sets Mj1, Ma and the
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code block length n1, define a code C1 of Definition 3.1 that adheres to the coding
scheme introduced in Section 3.2.2 with some slight modifications:
1. We use the message m1˜ ∈M1˜ =M11×Ma to denote the individual confidential
message intended for the first legitimate receiver.
2. We use the message m˜1˜ = (m11, m˜a) ∈ M1˜ to denote the side information
available at the second legitimate receiver, where m˜a is an estimation for the
actual message ma.
3. We use the conditional distribution QUV0V1V2|T to generate the corresponding
codebook.
Similarly, use the message setsMj2,Ma and the code block length n2 to define a code
C2 of Definition 3.1. The construction of C2 follows the same scheme used to construct
C1 but after interchanging the subscripts 1 and 2 during the codebook generation as
well as the encoding and decoding processes, cf. Fig. 3.4. Finally, for the original
message setsMc,M0,M1 andM1 along with the code block length n, we define the
combined code C as the concatenation of the two codes C1 and C2.
2. Encoding: Given the message quadruple (mc,m0,m1,m2) ∈ Mc ×M0 ×M1 ×
M2, the encoder works as follows: First, it finds the corresponding two quadru-
ples: (mc1,m01,m1˜,m21) ∈ Mc1 × M01 × M1˜ × M21 and (mc2,m02,m12,m2˜) ∈
Mc2 ×M02 ×M12 ×M2˜. The first quadruple is then passed to the encoder of C1
producing the codeword xn1 , while the second quadruple is passed to the encoder of C2
producing the codeword xn2 . The codeword xn is then constructed by concatenating
the two codewords xn1 and xn2 , cf. Fig. 3.4. Finally, the encoder transmits xn.
3. Decoding: At the first legitimate receiver, given the sequence yn1 and its own
message m2 = (m21,m22), the first legitimate decoder works as follows: First, it
searches for a unique value pˆi such that:(
tn(pˆi), yn1
) ∈ T n (QTY1). (3.98)
It then uses pˆi to split yn1 into two parts y
nˆ1
1 and y
n−nˆ1
1 , where nˆ1 = pˆi · n. The first
part ynˆ11 along with m21 are fed to ϕ11, which produces the triple (mˆc1, mˆ0˜1, mˆ1˜) ∈
Mc1 × M0˜1 × M1˜. Afterwords, yn−nˆ11 along with mˆ2˜ = (m22, mˆa) are fed to ϕ12
which produces the triple (mˆc2, mˆ0˜2, mˆ12) ∈ Mc2 ×M0˜2 ×M12. Finally, the triple
(mˆc, mˆ0, mˆ1) ∈ Mc ×M0 ×M1 is constructed using the two triples produced by ϕ11
and ϕ12.
At the second legitimate receiver, the decoding process follows the same concept.
First, a unique value p˜i that satisfy a typicality condition similar to the one in (3.98)
is estimated. p˜i is then used to split the received sequence yn2 into two parts y
n˜1
2
and yn−n˜12 . Differently from the first legitimate receiver, we first feed y
n−n˜1
2 along
with the side information m12 to ϕ22, which produces the triple (m˜c2, m˜0˜2, m˜2˜) ∈
Mc2×M0˜2×M2˜. We then feed yn˜12 along with m˜1˜ = (m11, m˜a) to ϕ21, which outputs
the triple (m˜c1, m˜0˜1, m˜21) ∈ Mc1 ×M0˜1 ×M21. Finally, we construct (m˜c, m˜0, m˜2) ∈
Mc ×M0 ×M2 using the two estimated triples.
The same concept is used to define the decoding procedure at the eavesdropper using
the received sequence zn as follows: First it searches for a unique value pˇi that satisfy
a typicality condition similar to the one in (3.98). It then uses pˇi to split zn into two
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parts. Each part is then fed to the eavesdropper decoders for ϕ31 and ϕ32 producing
the message mˇc = (mˇc1, mˇc2) ∈Mc.
4. Reliability and Secrecy Analysis: Using the union bound [133] along with the
mechanism of our encoding and decoding functions, the reliability constraint in (3.14b)
with respect to the code C can be bounded as follows:
P¯e(C) ≤ P
[
(Πˆ 6= Π) or (Π˜ 6= Π) or (Πˇ 6= Π)
]
+ P¯e(C1) + P¯e(C2). (3.99)
Based on the convention used to define our messages sets and under the assumption
that pi · n ∈ N, it follows that:
Rpi ≤ log n+ 1
n
(3.100)
where Rpi corresponds to the rate that carries the time sharing parameter pi. The
previous inequality implies that limn→∞Rpi = 0, which consequently means that the
three receivers can decode the time sharing parameter (pi) correctly. Hence, we have
lim
n→∞
P
[
(Πˆ 6= Π) or (Π˜ 6= Π) or (Πˇ 6= Π)
]
= 0. (3.101)
Thus, we only need to consider the decoding errors of C1 and C2. Similarly, the joint-
strong secrecy requirement with respect to the code C can be bounded as follows:
I(M0M1M2; Zn|C)
(a)
≤ I(M0M1M2; Zn|CT)
(b)
≤ I(M01M1˜M21; Zn1|C1) + I(M02M12M2˜; Zn2|C2), (3.102)
where (a) follows because the messages M0, M1 and M2 are independent of the time
sharing random variable T; while (b) follows because Zn1 only depends on the code-
word Xn1 generated by the code C1 given the messages M01, M1˜ and M21. The same
statement holds for Zn2 , C2 and the messages (M02,M12,M2˜).
Based on the results established Section 3.2.3 and Section 3.2.4, C1 satisfies the relia-
bility constraint in (3.15b) and the joint-strong secrecy constraint in (3.15c), as long
as the following holds:
Rc1 ≤ min
[
I(U; Z|T), I(U; Y1|T), I(U; Y2|T)
]
R0˜1 +R1˜ ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|UT)− I(V0V1; Z|UT)
R0˜1 +R21 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2|UT)− I(V0; Z|UT)− I(V2; V1Z|V0T), (3.103)
where R1˜ = R11 +
1
pi
Ra, cf. Fig 3.4. On the other hand, Proposition 3.2 implies that C2
also satisfies the reliability constraint in (3.15b) and the joint-strong secrecy constraint
in (3.15c), as long as the following holds:
Rc2 ≤ min
[
I(U; Z|T), I(U; Y1|T), I(U; Y2|T)
]
R0˜2 +R12 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|UT)− I(V0; Z|UT)− I(V1; V2Z|V0T)
R0˜2 +R2˜ ≤ I(V0V2; Y2|UT)− I(V0V2; Z|UT), (3.104)
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where R2˜ = R22 +
1
1−piRa, cf. Fig. 3.4. In order to finalize our prove, we need to
highlight two more relations that are based on the way we defined are messages sets.
Those two relations are:
R1 +Ra = piR1˜ + (1− pi)R12 and R2 +Ra = piR21 + (1− pi)R2˜ (3.105)
Now, if we apply the Fourier-Motzkin elimination procedure [57] to the rate constraints
in (3.103) and (3.104) along with the rate splitting equations in (3.96), (3.97) and
(3.105), then solve for the rate quadruple (Rc, R0, R1, R2), we can show that the code
C satisfies the reliability constraint in (3.15b) and the joint-strong secrecy constraint
in (3.15c), as long as the following holds:
Rc ≤ min
[
I(U; Z|T), I(U; Y1|T), I(U; Y2|T)
]
R0 +R1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|U T)− I(V0V1; Z|U T)− (1− pi) · I(V1; V2|V0ZT)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2|U T)− I(V0V2; Z|U T)− pi · I(V1; V2|V0ZT)
2R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|U T) + I(V0V2; Y2|U T)− I(V1; V2|V0 T)
−I(V0V1V2; Z|U T)− I(V0; Z|U T) (3.106)
This means that the previous rate region is achievable for all values of the time sharing
parameter pi ∈ [0, 1]. This result directly implies the validity of Theorem 3.1 because
for any rate quadruple (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ that satisfies the rate constraints given by
Theorem 3.1 in Eq. (3.16), there exists a certain pi such that the given rate quadruple
is included in the rate region defined by the bounds in Eq. (3.106). This completes
our achievability proof.
3.3 Individual-Strong Secrecy Rate Regions
In this section, we investigate secure communication over the two-receiver DM-WBC
with degraded message sets and message cognition given by Fig. 3.2 under the
individual-strong secrecy criterion. We start by investigating different individual se-
crecy coding schemes for a special case of our model that corresponds to the broad-
casting phase of the bidirectional relaying problem in Fig. 3.1. We then establish a
general achievable individual secrecy rate region for our full model. Our general rate
region combines the principles of superposition encoding and one time pad for Shan-
non’s cipher system, along with the strongly secure Marton-Coding scheme introduced
in Section 3.2.2. Finally, we present an additional rate region which is only achievable
for a special class of the two-receiver DM-WBC.
3.3.1 Individual Secrecy Coding Techniques
Consider a special case of our communication model in Fig. 3.2, where the common
message set Mc and the common confidential message set M0 are empty sets, i.e.
Mc = M0 = ∅. This implies that our model simplifies to the broadcasting phase
of the bidirectional relaying problem given in Fig. 3.1. We will call this model the
two-receiver DM-WBC with receiver side information. Our aim is to investigate secure
communication over this model under the individual secrecy criterion. We start by
presenting the following definition:
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Definition 3.3. A (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) code C for the two-receiver DM-WBC with receiver
side information consists of: two independent message sets M1 and M2, a stochastic
encoding function at the transmitter
E :M1 ×M2 → P(X n)
which maps a confidential message pair (m1,m2) ∈ M1 ×M2 into a random code-
word xn(m1,m2) ∈ X n according to the conditional probability E(xn|m1,m2) and two
deterministic decoders, one for each legitimate receiver
ϕ1 : Yn1 ×M2 →M1 ∪ {?}
ϕ2 : Yn2 ×M1 →M2 ∪ {?}
which maps each channel observation at the respective node along with the available
side information into the corresponding required messages or an error message {?}.
The previous code definition is simply a special case of our original code given by
Definition 3.1. In order to evaluate the reliability and secrecy performance of the code
C, we consider the following measures:
P¯e(C) , P
[
(Mˆ1) 6= (M1) or (M˜2) 6= (M2)
]
, (3.107)
Li(C) , I(M1; Zn|C) + I(M2; Zn|C). (3.108)
Our target is to construct a coding scheme which assures that the previous two mea-
sures vanish as the code block length n approaches infinity. The secrecy constraint
in (3.108) adheres to the individual secrecy criterion. This implies that any coding
scheme that utilizes the concept of mutual trust between the legitimate receivers can
be used. In particular, each message can be used as a secret key for the other one.
The previous problem is closely related to the problem of secure communication over
wiretap channel with shared secret key investigated in Section 2.3. This relation im-
plies that the coding schemes used to establish Theorem 2.3 can be modified to derive
an individual-strong secrecy achievable rate region for the two-receiver DM-WBC with
receiver side information. With this in mind, we present the following coding schemes
and their corresponding achievable rate regions:
1. Secret Key Encoding: This scheme utilizes only the techniques of Shannon’s
ciphering system introduced in [1]. It was used by mistake in [119] as a coding scheme
that fulfills the joint secrecy criterion. The achievable rate region for this scheme R1
is given by the set of rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ that satisfy the following:
R1 = R2 ≤ min
[
I(X; Y1), I(X; Y2)
]
. (3.109)
1. Codebook Generation C: Fix an input distribution PX and let R1 = R2. Construct
a new message set M⊗ = J1, 2nR⊗K by xoring the corresponding elements of M1 and
M2. Next, generate the codewords xn(m⊗) for m⊗ ∈ M⊗ by generating the symbols
xi(m⊗) with i ∈ J1, nK independently at random according to PX.
2. Encoding E: Given the confidential message pair (m1,m2) ∈M1×M2, the encoder
selects the codeword xn(m1 ⊗m2) and transmits it.
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3. First Legitimate Decoder ϕ1: Upon receiving y
n
1 , the decoder determines a unique
codeword xn(mˆ⊗) which is jointly typical to yn1 . It then uses mˆ⊗ and the available side
information m2 to produce mˆ1 = mˆ⊗ ⊗m2.
4. Second Legitimate Decoder ϕ2: Upon receiving y
n
2 , the decoder determines a unique
codeword xn(m˜⊗) which is jointly typical to yn2 . It then uses m˜⊗ and the available side
information m1 to produce m˜2 = m˜⊗ ⊗m1.
5. Reliability Analysis: In order to evaluate this coding scheme with respect to the
reliability measure in (3.107), it is enough to prove that:
lim
n→∞
P
[
M⊗ 6= Mˆ⊗ or M⊗ 6= M˜⊗
]
= 0. (3.110)
Based on the standard joint-typicality decoding arguments, the reliability constraint
in (3.110) holds, as long as:
R1 = R2 = R⊗ ≤ min
[
I(X; Y1), I(X; Y2)
]− δ(), (3.111)
where  > 0 is the constant used in the typicality decoding. Additionally, the equality
of R1, R2 and R⊗ follows due to the codebook generation. Moreover,  can be chosen
in a way such that limn→∞ δ() = 0.
6. Secrecy Analysis: In order to evaluate the secrecy performance of this coding scheme
with respect to the secrecy measure in (3.108), we start by considering the information
leakage of the first confidential message to the eavesdropper as follows:
I(M1; Zn|C) ≤ H(M1)−H(M1|ZnC)
(a)
≤ H(M1)−H(M1|M⊗) (b)= 0, (3.112)
where (a) follows because for a fixed code C, M⊗ − Xn − Zn forms a Markov chain;
while (b) follows from the principles of one time pad, which implies that M1 and M⊗
are independent as long as H(M1) = H(M2). The previous equality is true because
both M1 and M2 are uniformly distributed on their respective sets, along with the fact
that R1 = R2. Repeating the same steps for I(M2; Zn|C) implies that:
Li(C) = 0, as long as R1 = R2. (3.113)
This implies that this coding scheme does not only fulfill the individual-strong secrecy
criterion but it also assures perfect secrecy. Finally, by combining Eq. (3.111) and Eq.
(3.113) then taking the limit as n → ∞, which implies that δ() = 0, it follows that
any rate pair (R1, R2) that satisfies the constraint in (3.109) is achievable.
2. WRC Superimposed on SKC: This scheme combines the principles of secret key
encoding (SKC) [1] and wiretap random coding (WRC) [2] in addition to superposition
encoding and rate splitting. It can be interpreted as an adaptation of the coding scheme
used to prove Scenario 3 of Theorem 2.3. The achievable rate region for this scheme
R2 is given by the set of rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ that satisfy the following:
R1 ≤
[
I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U)
]+
+ min
[
R2, I(U; Y1), I(U; Y2)
]
R2 ≤
[
I(X; Y2|U)− I(X; Z|U)
]+
+ min
[
R1, I(U; Y1), I(U; Y2)
]
, (3.114)
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1. Rate Splitting: Divide the two confidential message sets into two parts as follows:
M1 =M11×M12 andM2 =M21×M22. Each of the new constructed message sets
can be written as J1, 2nRaK, where a is an indicator that identifies each set. Additionally,
we construct a new message set M⊗ = J1, 2nR⊗K, where R⊗ = R11 = R21 by xoring
the elements of M11 and M21. In the rate splitting process, we made sure that the
following rate constraints are satisfied:
R1 = R11 +R12 R2 = R21 +R22
R11 = R21 = R⊗ ≤ min[R1, R2]. (3.115)
2. Codebook Generation C: LetMr = J1, 2nRrK be a randomization message set, where
Mr is a uniformly distributed random variable over it. Next, fix an input distribution
PUX and randomly generate the cloud center codewords u
n(m⊗) for m⊗ ∈ M⊗ by
generating the symbols ui(m⊗) with i ∈ J1, nK independently at random according
to PU. For each cloud center codeword u
n(m⊗), generate the satellite codewords
xn(m⊗,m12,m22,mr) for m12 ∈ M12, m22 ∈ M22 and mr ∈ Mr by generating the
symbols xi(m⊗,m12,m22,mr) independently at random according to PX|U(·|ui(m⊗)).
3. Encoding E: Given the confidential message pair (m1,m2) ∈ M1 × M2, where
m1 = (m11,m12) and m2 = (m21,m22), the encoder selects a message mr uniformly
at random then transmits the corresponding codeword xn(m⊗,m12,m22,mr), where
m⊗ = m11 ⊗m21.
4. First Legitimate Decoder ϕ1: Upon receiving y
n
1 , the decoder uses it along with the
available side information m2 = (m21,m22) to determine a unique pair of codewords(
un(mˆ⊗), xn(mˆ⊗, mˆ12,m22, mˆr)
)
, which is jointly typical to yn1 . Next, it uses the
estimated mˆ⊗ and m21 to produce the message mˆ11 = mˆ⊗ ⊗m21. Finally, it outputs
mˆ1 = (mˆ11, mˆ12).
5. Second Legitimate Decoder ϕ2: Upon receiving y
n
2 , the decoder uses it along with the
available side information m1 = (m11,m12) to determine a unique pair of codewords(
un(m˜⊗), xn(m˜⊗, m12, m˜22, m˜r)
)
, which is jointly typical to yn2 . Next, it uses the
estimated m˜⊗ and m11 to produce the message m˜21 = m˜⊗ ⊗m11. Finally, it outputs
m˜2 = (m˜21, m˜22).
6. Reliability Analysis: In order to evaluate this coding scheme with respect to the
reliability measure in (3.107), it is enough to prove that:
lim
n→∞
P
[
(M⊗,M12,Mr) 6= (Mˆ⊗, Mˆ12, Mˆr) or (M⊗,M22,Mr) 6= (M˜⊗, M˜22, M˜r)
]
= 0.
(3.116)
Based on the principle of superposition encoding and the standard joint-typicality
decoding arguments, Eq. (3.116) holds as long as:
R11 = R21 = R⊗ ≤ min[I(U; Y1), I(U; Y2)
]− δ0() (3.117a)
R12 +Rr ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− δ1() (3.117b)
R22 +Rr ≤ I(X; Y2|U)− δ2() (3.117c)
where  > 0 is the constant used during the typicality decoding. Additionally, the
equality of R11, R21 and R⊗ follows due to the codebook generation. Moreover,  can
be chosen in a way such that limn→∞ δ0(), δ1(), δ2() = 0.
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7. Secrecy Analysis: Due to the splitting of each confidential message set into two
parts, the secrecy measure in (3.108) can be reformulated with respect to this coding
scheme as follows:
Li(C) (a)= I(M12; Zn|C) + I(M11; Zn|M12C) + I(M22; Zn|C) + I(M21; Zn|M22C)
(b)
≤ I(M11; Zn|M12C) + I(M21; Zn|M22C) + I(M12M22; Zn|C)
(c)
≤ I(M11; Zn|M12C) + I(M21; Zn|M22C) + I(M12M22; Zn|M⊗C), (3.118)
where (a) follows from the mutual information chain rule; while (b) and (c) follow from
the independence of the messages. The first term in (3.118) can be bounded as follows:
I(M11; Zn|M12C) ≤ H(M11)−H(M11|ZnM12C)
(a)
≤ H(M11)−H(M11|M⊗M12M22Mr) (b)= 0, (3.119)
where (a) follows because for a certain code C, (M⊗,M12,M22,Mr)−Xn − Zn forms a
Markov chain; while (b) follows based on the secrecy analysis of the secret key encoding
scheme, as long as:
H(M11) = H(M21) =⇒ R11 = R21. (3.120)
Using the same argument, we can show that the second term in (3.118) also vanishes
as long as the condition in (3.120) is satisfied. On the other hand, based on the strong
secrecy analysis of wiretap random codes presented in the Section 2.2, the third term
in (3.118) decays exponentially in n, if:
Rr ≥ I(X; Z|U) + δ˜(, τ), (3.121)
where τ > 0. Additionally, τ can be selected in a way such that limn→∞ δ˜(, τ) = 0.
This implies that the rate constraints in (3.120) and (3.121) assure that
lim
n→∞
Li(C) = 0. (3.122)
Finally, by combining Eqs. (3.115), (3.117), (3.120) and (3.121), followed by applying
the Fourier-Motzkin elimination procedure [57], then taking the limit as n → ∞, it
follows directly that any rate pair (R1, R2) that satisfies the constraints in (3.114) is
achievable.
3. SK Randomization Index for WRC: This scheme also combines the ideas
of secret key encoding and wiretap random coding (WRC) along with concept of rate
splitting, but from a different perspective. It can be related in some sense to the coding
scheme used to prove Scenario 2 of Theorem 2.3. The achievable rate region for this
scheme R3 is given by the set of rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ that satisfy the following:
R1 ≤ min
[
I(X; Y1)− I(X; Z) +R2, I(X; Y1)
]
R2 ≤ min
[
I(X; Y2)− I(X; Z) +R1, I(X; Y2)
]
. (3.123)
The previous rate region is only valid under the following condition: I(X; Y1) ≥ I(X; Z)
and I(X; Y2) ≥ I(X; Z). This implies that this coding scheme is only valid for input
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distributions PX that promote the legitimate receivers to have a statistical advantage
over the eavesdropper.
1. Codebook Generation C: We start by applying the same rate splitting procedure in-
troduced for the previous coding scheme, such that the rate constraints in (3.115) are
fulfilled. We also let Mr = J1, 2nRrK be a randomization message set, where Mr is a
uniformly distributed random variable over it. Next, fix an input distribution PX and
randomly generate the codewords xn(m12,m22,mr,m⊗) for m12 ∈ M12, m22 ∈ M22,
mr ∈ Mr and m⊗ ∈ M⊗ by generating the symbols xi(m12,m22,mr,m⊗) indepen-
dently at random according to PX.
2. Encoding E: Given the confidential message pair (m1,m2) ∈ M1 × M2, where
m1 = (m11,m12) and m2 = (m21,m22), the encoder selects a message mr uniformly at
random, then transmits the corresponding codeword xn(m12,m22,mr,m⊗).
3. First Legitimate Decoder ϕ1: Upon receiving y
n
1 , the decoder uses it along with
the available side information m2 = (m21,m22) to determine a unique codeword
xn(mˆ12,m22, mˆr, mˆ⊗) which is jointly typical to yn1 . Next, it produces the message
mˆ11 = mˆ⊗ ⊗m21. Finally, it outputs mˆ1 = (mˆ11, mˆ12).
4. Second Legitimate Decoder ϕ2: Upon receiving y
n
2 , the decoder uses it along with
the available side information m1 = (m11,m12) to determine a unique codeword
xn(m12, m˜22, m˜r, m˜⊗) which is jointly typical with yn2 . Next, it produces the mes-
sage m˜21 = m˜⊗ ⊗m11. Finally, it outputs m˜2 = (m˜21, m˜22).
5. Reliability Analysis: In order to evaluate this coding scheme with respect to the
reliability measure in (3.107), it is enough to prove that the bound in (3.116) holds.
Using the standard joint-typicality decoding arguments, we have:
R12 +Rr +R⊗ ≤ I(X; Y1)− δ1() (3.124a)
R22 +Rr +R⊗ ≤ I(X; Y2)− δ2(). (3.124b)
6. Secrecy Analysis: We start by reformulating the secrecy measure in (3.108) with
respect to this coding scheme as follows:
Li(C) ≤ I(M11; Zn|M12C) + I(M21; Zn|M22C) + I(M12M22; Zn|C) (3.125)
The previous bound follows based on the same argument used to establish the one in
(3.118). Based on the principles of secret key encoding, one can show that the first and
second terms in Eq. (3.125) vanish as long as the condition in (3.120) holds. On the
other hand, based on the strong secrecy analysis of wiretap random codes presented
in the Section 2.2, the third term in (3.125) decays exponentially in n, if:
Rr +R⊗ ≥ I(X; Z) + δ˜(, τ). (3.126)
Finally, by combining the bounds in (3.115), (3.120), (3.124) and (3.126) followed by
applying the Fourier-Motzkin elimination procedure, then taking the limit as n→∞,
we prove that any rate pair (R1, R2) that satisfies the constraints in (3.123) is achiev-
able.
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Before we proceed to the next section, we need to highlight some important points
regarding the three discussed coding schemes:
• The rate region in (3.109) established using the first coding scheme follows as a
special case from the rate region in (3.114) established using the second coding
scheme by letting U = X. This implies that R1 ⊂ R2.
• Despite the similarities between the second and third coding scheme, the rate
region in (3.123) can not be derived as a special case of the one in (3.114). In
fact, if the two legitimate receivers are more capable than the eavesdropper, one
can show that R2 ⊂ R3.
• Although the second coding scheme can be used for any input distribution and
any channel, it is not optimal in general. On the other hand, the third cod-
ing scheme can –in fact– establish bigger rate regions, but only under certain
conditions for the input distribution and the channel.
• Although the first coding scheme allows one of the legitimate receivers to reach
its maximum achievable transfer rate, it limits the achievable rate of the other
legitimate receiver –which might have a better channel– to the rate of the weaker
receiver. Differently, the third coding scheme allows both legitimate receivers to
reach their maximum transfer rate, but under the condition that their channels
are better than the eavesdropper’s channel. The second coding scheme is an
intermediate solution between these two.
• The condition on the input distribution and the channel in the third coding
scheme arises from the decoding procedure. This is because according to the
definitions of the decoders, each legitimate receiver does not only decode its
intended message, but it has to decode the randomization index as well.
3.3.2 A Universal Individual-Strong Secrecy Coding Scheme
We now investigate secure communication for our full model in Fig. 3.2 under the
individual-strong secrecy criterion. We start our investigation by modifying Definition
3.2 as follows:
Definition 3.4. A rate quadruple (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ is an individual-strong secrecy
achievable rate quadruple for the two-receiver DM-WBC, i.e. Q = (W 1,W 2, V ), if for
all ηi > 0 where i ∈ {c, 0, 1, 2}, λ > 0 and τj > 0 where j ∈ {1, 2}, there is an
n(ηi, λ, τj) ∈ N, such that for all n > n(ηi, λ, τj) there exists a sequence of codes {C}n
according to Definition 3.1 that satisfies the following constraints:
1
n
log |Mi| ≥ Ri − ηi for i ∈ {c, 0, 1, 2} (3.127a)
P¯e(C) ≤ λ (3.127b)
I(M0M1; Zn|C) ≤ τ1 and I(M0M2; Zn|C) ≤ τ2, (3.127c)
where P¯e(C) is given by Eq. (3.7). The individual-strong secrecy capacity region
CI(Q) is given by the set of all achievable individual-strong secrecy rate quadruples
(Rc, R0, R1, R2).
In order to show that a rate quadruple (Rc, R0, R1, R2) is achievable under the individual-
strong secrecy criterion, it is enough to show that there exists a random coding scheme
with random variable C such that:
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1
n
log |Mi| = Ri (3.128a)
lim
n→∞
E[P¯e(C)] = 0 (3.128b)
lim
n→∞
E[I(M0M1; Zn|C) + I(M0M2; Zn|C)] = 0, (3.128c)
where i ∈ {c, 0, 1, 2}. The validity of the previous argument follows from Definition 3.4
in addition to the selection lemma. We now present our general individual-strong
secrecy achievable rate region as follows:
Theorem 3.2. An achievable individual-strong secrecy rate region for the two-receiver
DM-WBC with degraded message sets and message cognition is given by the set of all
rate quadruples (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ that satisfy
Rc ≤ min
[
I(U; Z|T), I(U; Y1|T), I(U; Y2|T)
]
R0 +R1 ≤
[
I(V0V1; Y1|V⊗ T)− I(V0V1; Z|V⊗ T)
]+
+R⊗
R0 +R2 ≤
[
I(V0V2; Y2|V⊗ T)− I(V0V2; Z|V⊗ T)
]+
+R⊗
2R0 +R1 +R2 ≤
[
I(V0V1; Y1|V⊗ T) + I(V0V2; Y2|V⊗ T)−I(V1; V2|V0 T)
−I(V0V1V2; Z|V⊗ T)− I(V0; Z|V⊗ T)
]+
+ 2R⊗ (3.129)
where R⊗ ≤ min
[
R1, R2, I(V⊗; Y1|U T), I(V⊗; Y2|U T)
]
,
for random variables with joint probability distribution QT QU|T QV⊗|U QV0V1V2|V⊗
QX|V0V1V2 QY1Y2Z|X, such that T− U− V⊗ − (V0,V1,V2)− X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a
Markov chain.
The previous theorem is based on a coding scheme that combines the principles of
superposition encoding, rate splitting, secret key encoding and wiretap Marton coding
along with the concept of time sharing. The combination between the secret key en-
coding and the wiretap Marton coding follows the second coding scheme introduced in
Section 3.3.1. In particular, the secret key encoded part of the individual confidential
messages is encoded in a separate layer upon which the wiretap Marton coding is su-
perimposed, where the wiretap Marton code is used to encode the common confidential
message and the remaining parts of the individual confidential messages.
In order to prove Theorem 3.2, we will use the same algorithm used to prove Theorem
3.1. Thus, we start by presenting the following proposition:
Proposition 3.3. An achievable individual-strong secrecy rate region for the two-
receiver DM-WBC with degraded message sets and message cognition is given by the
set of all rate quadruples (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ that satisfy
Rc ≤ min
[
I(U; Z), I(U; Y1), I(U; Y2)
]
R0 +R1 ≤
[
I(V0V1; Y1|V⊗)− I(V0V1; Z|V⊗)
]+
+R⊗
R0 +R2 ≤
[
I(V0V2; Y2|V⊗)− I(V0; Z|V⊗)− I(V2; V1Z|V0)
]+
+R⊗
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where R⊗ ≤ min
[
R1, R2, I(V⊗; Y1|U), I(V⊗; Y2|U)
]
(3.130)
for random variables with joint probability distribution QU QV⊗|U QV0V1V2|V⊗ QX|V0V1V2
QY1Y2Z|X, such that U− V⊗ − (V0,V1,V2)− X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain.
The previous proposition plays a major role in the proof of Theorem 3.2 similar to the
role played by Proposition 3.1 in proving Theorem 3.1. This is because the validity of
Proposition 3.3 directly implies the validity of the following result:
Proposition 3.4. An achievable individual strong secrecy rate region for the wiretap
BC with degraded message sets and message cognition is given by the set of all rate
quadruples (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ that satisfy
Rc ≤ min
[
I(U; Z), I(U; Y1), I(U; Y2)
]
R0 +R1 ≤
[
I(V0V1; Y1|V⊗)− I(V0; Z|V⊗)− I(V1; V2Z|V0)
]+
+R⊗
R0 +R2 ≤
[
I(V0V2; Y2|V⊗)− I(V0V2; Z|V⊗)
]+
+R⊗
where R⊗ ≤ min
[
R1, R2, I(V⊗; Y1|U), I(V⊗; Y2|U)
]
(3.131)
for random variables with joint probability distribution QU QV⊗|U QV0V1V2|V⊗ QX|V0V1V2
QY1Y2Z|X, such that U− V⊗ − (V0,V1,V2)− X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain.
Finally, if we use the rate splitting and time sharing scheme introduced in Section
3.2.5 to combine the rate regions established by Proposition 3.3 and Proposition 3.4,
we can prove the achievability of any rate quadruple (Rc, R0, R1, R2) that satisfies the
rate constraints in (3.129). Thus, we only need to provide a proof for Proposition 3.3.
Let n ∈ N be an arbitrary but fixed code block length and  > 0 be an arbitrary
constant. Moreover, let QUV⊗V0V1V2X ∈ P(U × V⊗ × V0 × V1 × V2 × X ) be a fixed
input probability distribution, and recall the probability transition matrix QY1Y2Z|X
given in (2.73), that defines the two-receiver DM-WBC. Furthermore, we assume that
quantities of the form 2nR, where R ∈ R+ are integers.
1. Message Sets: We consider the following sets: Mc, M0, M1, M2, Mr, Mr1 ,
Mr2 andMt, which are defined exactly as in the coding scheme introduced in Section
3.2.2. Further, we divide each confidential individual messages set into two sets as
follows: M1 = M11 × M12 and M2 = M21 × M22, where Mab = J1, 2nRabK, for
a, b ∈ {1, 2}. In this division, we force M11 and M21 to be of the same size and use
them to construct a new setM⊗ = J1, 2nR⊗K by xoring the corresponding elements of
both sets. Additionally, we use M = M0 ×M12 ×M22 to abbreviate the set of the
remaining confidential messages. It is important to note that the message structure
forces the following condition:
R⊗ = R11 = R21 ≤ min
[
R1, R2
]
. (3.132)
We can highlight here thatM11 andM21 can be interpreted as the part of the confiden-
tial messages, that will be protected against eavesdropping using secret key encoding.
On the other hand,M will be the part of the confidential messages protected by wire-
tap random coding.
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2. Random Codebook C: Let Cc , {Un(mc)} for mc ∈ Mc be a random pub-
lic common message codebook as defined in Section 3.2.2. For a fixed public message
codebook Cc and for every mc ∈Mc, let C⊗(mc) , {Vn⊗(mc,m⊗)} where m⊗ ∈M⊗ be
a random codebook for the xored message that consists of 2nR⊗ conditionally indepen-
dent random codewords Vn⊗(mc,m⊗), where each codeword is constructed by generat-
ing the symbols V⊗i(mc,m⊗) independently at random according to QV⊗|U(·|ui(mc)).
A realization of C⊗(mc) is denoted by C⊗(mc) , {vn⊗(mc,m⊗)}.
For a fixed xored message codebook C⊗(mc) and for every m⊗ ∈M⊗, let C0(mc,m⊗) ,
{Vn0 (mc,m⊗,m,mr)} wherem ∈M andmr ∈Mr be a random codebook for the confi-
dential messages that consists of 2n(R+Rr) conditionally independent random codewords
Vn0 (mc,m⊗, m,mr), where each codeword is constructed by generating the symbols
V0i(mc,m⊗,m,mr) independently at random according to QV0|V⊗(·|v⊗i(mc,m⊗)). A
realization of C0(mc,m⊗) is denoted by C0(mc,m⊗) , {vn0 (mc,m⊗,m,mr)}.
For a fixed confidential messages codebook C0(mc,m⊗) and for every m ∈M and mr ∈
Mr, let C1(mc,m⊗,m,mr) , {Vn1 (mc,m⊗,m,mr,mr1)} and C2(mc,m⊗,m,mr) ,
{Vn2 (mc,m⊗,m,mr, mr2 ,mt)} be two confidential random codebooks that consist of
2nRr1 and 2n(Rr2+Rt) conditionally independent random codewords respectively.
The total random codebook is denoted by C = {Cc,C⊗,C0,C1,C2}, while C = {Cc, C⊗,
C0, C1, C2} denotes one possible realization of this codebook selected from the total set
of codebooks given by C. The probability of generating a certain realization C ∈ C is
given by:
G(C) =
∏
(m2c ,m
2
⊗,m
2,m2r,mr2 ,mt)∈
Mc×M⊗×M×Mr×Mr2×Mt
QnV2|V0
(
vn2 (m
2
c ,m
2
⊗,m
2,m2r,mr2 ,mt)|vn0 (m2c ,m2⊗,m2,m2r)
)
∏
(m1c ,m
1
⊗,m
1,m1r,mr1 )∈
Mc×M⊗×M×Mr×Mr1
QnV1|V0
(
vn1 (m
1
c ,m
1
⊗,m
1,m1r,mr1)|vn0 (m1c ,m1⊗,m1,m1r)
)
∏
(m0c ,m
0
⊗,m,mr)∈
Mc×M⊗×M×Mr
QnV0|U
(
vn0 (m
0
c ,m
0
⊗,m,mr)|un(m0c)
) ∏
mc∈Mc
QnU
(
un(mc)
)
∏
(m⊗c ,m⊗)∈Mc×M⊗
QnV0|V⊗
(
vn⊗(m
⊗
c ,m⊗)|un(m⊗c )
)
(3.133)
3. Encoder E: For a fixed codebook realization C, given a message triple (mc,m⊗,m),
where m⊗ = m11 ⊗ m21 and m = (m0,m12,m22), the encoder chooses three ran-
domization messages mr, mr1 and mr2 uniformly at random from the sets Mr, Mr1
and Mr2 respectively. Then, it chooses an index mt ∈ Mt using a likelihood en-
coder similar to the one in (3.20). Finally, for the selected triple vn0 (mc,m⊗,m,mr),
vn1 (mc,m⊗,m,mr,mr1), and v
n
2 (mc,m⊗,m,mr,mr2 ,mt), the encoder generates a code-
word xn independently at random according to
∏n
i=1 Q
n
X|V0,V1,V2
( · |vn0 (mc,m⊗,m,mr),
vn1 (mc,m⊗,m,mr, mr1), v
n
2 (mc,m⊗,m,mr,mr2 ,mt)
)
and transmits it.
4. First Legitimate Decoder ϕ1: Given y
n
1 and its own message m2 = (m21,m22),
the decoder searches for the unique pentadruple (mˆc, mˆ⊗, mˆ0, mˆ12, mˆr) ∈Mc×M⊗×
M0 ×M12 ×Mr; for which there exists an index mˆr1 ∈Mr1 such that:
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(
un(mˆc), v
n
⊗(mˆc, mˆ⊗), v
n
0 (mˆc, mˆ⊗, mˆ, mˆr), v
n
1 (mˆc, . . . , mˆr1), y
n
1
)
∈ T n (QUV⊗V0V1Y1),
where mˆ = (mˆ0, mˆ12,m22). If such unique pentadruple exists, the decoder uses mˆ⊗ and
m21 to produce the message mˆ11 = mˆ⊗⊗m21, then it outputs the triple (mˆc, mˆ0, mˆ1),
where mˆ1 = (mˆ11, mˆ12). Otherwise, the decoder outputs the error message (?). Similar
to the first legitimate receiver introduced in Section 3.2.2, this decoder also applies
the principle of indirect decoding by including the sequence vn1 (mˆc, mˆ⊗, mˆ, mˆr, mˆr1) in
the decoding rule despite the fact that it does not aim to find the unique message mr1
that was transmitted.
5. Second Legitimate Decoder ϕ2: Given y
n
2 and its own message m1, the decoder
searches for the unique pentadruple (m˜c, m˜⊗, m˜0, m˜22, m˜r) ∈Mc×M⊗×M0×M22×
Mr; for which there exist two indices (m˜r2 , m˜t) ∈Mr2 ×Mt such that:(
un(m˜c), v
n
⊗(m˜c, m˜⊗), v
n
0 (m˜c, m˜⊗, m˜, m˜r), v
n
2 (m˜c, . . . , m˜r2 , m˜t), y
n
2
)
∈ T n (QUV⊗V0V2Y2),
where m˜ = (m˜0,m12, m˜22). If such unique pentadruple exists, the decoder uses m˜⊗ and
m11 to deduce the message m˜21 = m˜⊗ ⊗m11, then it outputs the triple (m˜c, m˜0, m˜2)
where m˜2 = (m˜21, m˜22). If such unique pentadruple does not exist, the decoder out-
puts the error message (?). Again, one should note that this decoder also applies the
concept of indirect decoding, as it is not interested in finding the unique pair (mr2 ,mt)
that was transmitted.
6. Third Eavesdropper Decoder ϕ3: Given z
n, the decoder uses the same decod-
ing function introduced in Section 3.2.2.
7. Induced Joint Distribution: For every codebook C ∈ C, the previous coding
scheme induces the following joint probability distribution:
PC
(
mc, . . . ,mr1 ,mr2 , u
n, vn⊗, v
n
0 , v
n
1 ,mt, v
n
2 , x
n, yn1 , y
n
2 , z
n, mˆc, mˆ0, mˆ1, m˜c, m˜0, m˜2, mˇc
)
= 2−n(Rc+R⊗+R+Rr+Rr1+Rr2 )1{un=un(mc)}1{vn⊗=vn⊗(mc,m⊗)}1{vn0 =vn0 (mc,m⊗,m,mr)}
× 1{vn1 =vn1 (mc,m⊗,m,mr,mr1 )}1{vn2 =vn2 (mc,m⊗,m,mr,mr2 ,mt)}1{(mˆc,mˆ0,mˆ1)=ϕ1(yn1 )}
× E(LE)(mt|mr2 , vn0 (mc,m⊗,m,mr), vn1 (mc,m⊗,m,mr,mr1))1{mˇc=ϕ3(zn)}
×QnX|V0V1V2(xn|vn0 , vn1 , vn2 )QnY1Y2Z|X(yn1 , yn2 , zn|xn)1{(m˜c,m˜0,m˜2)=ϕ2(yn2 )} (3.134)
Additionally, if we take the random codebook generation process into our considera-
tion, we end up with the subsequent distribution: P = G(C) · PC, where G(C) is the
probability of obtaining a certain codebook C given by (3.133).
8. Reliability Analysis: In this paragraph, we derive the rate constraints under
which the reliability constraint in (3.128b) is satisfied. We start by defining the average
decoding error probability for a given code realization C ∈ C as follows:
P¯e(C) , P
[
Mˇc 6= Mc or (Mˆc, Mˆ⊗, Mˆ0, Mˆ11, Mˆr) 6= (Mc,M⊗,M0,M11,Mr) or
(M˜c, M˜⊗, M˜0, M˜22, M˜r) 6= (Mc,M⊗,M0,M22,Mr)
]
. (3.135)
We then observe that P¯e(C) ≥ P¯e(C) in (3.7). This implies that in order to show that
our coding scheme satisfies the reliability constraint in (3.128b), it is enough to show
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that EC[P¯e(C)] approaches zero as n approaches infinity. Similar to the reliability
analysis presented in Section 3.2.3, we need to consider two types of errors. The first
is the encoding error E , which occurs if the sequence vn2 selected by the likelihood
encoder is not jointly typical to the other codewords. Following the exact steps used
in Section 3.2.3, we can show that for a typicality constant  and a constant β > 0,
limn→∞ EC
[
P(E)] = 0, as long as:
Rt ≥ I(V1; V2|V0) + δ´0(, β), (3.136)
for δ´0(, β) =  log
(|U| · |V⊗| · |V0| · |V1| · |V2|)+ 5β, (3.137)
The second class of errors is the decoding error D, which arises if any of the de-
coders failed to find a unique set of messages that satisfies the corresponding de-
coding rule. Again, following the same technique used in Section 3.2.3, keeping in
mind the new superposition order used in the codebook generation, we can show that
limn→∞ EC
[
P(D|Ec)] = 0, as long as:
Rc ≤ min
[
I(U; Y1)− δ´1(),I(U; Y2)− δ´2(), I(U; Z)− δ3()
]
R⊗ ≤ min
[
I(V⊗; Y1|U)− δ´1(), I(V⊗; Y2|U)− δ´2()
]
R0 +R11 +Rr +Rr1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|V⊗)− δ´1()
R0 +R22 +Rr +Rr2 +Rt ≤ I(V0V2; Y2|V⊗)− δ´2(). (3.138)
where δ´1() and δ´2() are defined by modifying the definitions of δ1() and δ2()
in the same way δ´0(, β) is a modified version of δ0(, β) cf. (3.43) and (3.137).
The rate constraints in (3.136) and (3.138) directly imply that limn→∞ EC
[
P¯e(C)
] ≤
limn→∞ EC
[
P¯e(C)
]
= 0. This implies that under these rate constraints our coding
scheme fulfills the reliability constraint in (3.128b).
9. Secrecy Analysis: Because of the new message sets structure, the random variable
M1 is now identified as the product of two independent and uniformly distributed
random variables M11 and M12. Thus, for any code realization C, we have
I(M0M1; Zn|C) = I(M0M11M12; Zn|C)
= I(M0M12; Zn|C) + I(M11; Zn|M0M12C) (3.139)
The term I(M11; Zn|M0M12C) represents the information leakage of the confidential
message M11 to the eavesdropper given M0 and M12. This confidential message is
protected against eavesdropping using secret key encoding. We can show that for
every C ∈ C, this term vanishes as follows:
I(M11; Zn|M0M12C)
(a)
≤ H(M11)−H(M11|ZnM0M12C)
(b)
≤ H(M11)−H(M11|McM⊗M0M12M22MrMr1Mr2Mt)
= H(M11)−H(M11|M⊗) (c)= 0, (3.140)
where (a) follows from the independence of the messages; (b) follows because for every
code C, the following Markov chain holds (Mc,M⊗,M0,M12,M22,Mr,Mr1 ,Mr2 ,Mt) −
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Xn−Zn; while (c) follows due to the principles of secret key encoding, and the fact that
H(M11) = H(M21), where this equality holds because both M11 and M21 are uniformly
distributed over two sets with the same size cf.(3.132). Using the same arguments, we
can show that:
I(M12; Zn|M0M22C) = 0, (3.141)
where the product of two independent and uniformly distributed random variables
M21 and M22 defines M2. Now, for a fixed code C, let Li(C) , I(M0M1; Zn|C) +
I(M0M2; Zn|C). Then, it follows that:
Li(C) (a)= I(M0M12; Zn|C) + I(M0M22; Zn|C)
(b)
≤ 2 · I(M0M12M22; Zn|C)
(c)
≤ 2 · I(M; Zn|M⊗McC), (3.142)
where (a) follows from (3.140) and (3.141), (b) follows from the chain rule of the mutual
information; while (c) follows due to the independence of the messages and by letting
M , (M0,M12,M22). Eq. (3.142) implies that in order to show that our coding scheme
satisfies the individual-strong secrecy constraint in (3.128c), it is enough to show that:
lim
n→∞
E
[
I(M; Zn|M⊗McC)
]
= 0. (3.143)
Now, we need to highlight that the wiretap Marton code C0,1,2 used for our individual
secrecy coding scheme is identical to the one used for our joint secrecy coding scheme,
with the exception that in the individual secrecy coding scheme C0,1,2 is constructed
conditioned on Vn⊗ instead of U
n. This implies that using the strong secrecy analysis
presented in Section 3.2.4, we can show that Eq. (3.143) holds as long as:
Rt ≥ I(V1; V2|V0) + δ´0(, β)
Rr2 +Rt ≥ I(V2; V1Z|V0) + δ´4(, γ)
Rr1 ≥ I(V1; Z|V0) + δ´4(, γ)
Rr ≥ I(V0; Z|V⊗) + δ´4(, γ), (3.144)
where γ > 0 and δ´4(, γ) is defined by modifying the definition of δ4(, γ) in (3.80)
following the same way used to modify δ0(, β) leading to δ´0(, β).
10. Fourier-Motzkin Elimination: In order to finalize our achievability proof, we
need to highlight that , β and γ can be selected in a way such that as n approaches
infinity, the corresponding δ´-functions approaches zero. Finally, if we take the limit
as n → ∞, then use the Fourier-Motzkin elimination procedure [57] on the rate con-
straints in (3.132), (3.136), (3.138) and (3.144) while solving for (Rc, R0, R1, R2), we
prove the achievability of any rate quadruple (Rc, R0, R1, R2) satisfying the constraints
in (3.130). This establish the achievability of the individual-strong secrecy rate region
given by Proposition 3.3.
3.3.3 Receivers With Statistical Advantage
In section 3.3.1, we showed that there are two techniques to combine secret key encod-
ing and wiretap encoding. The first technique was adopted by the coding scheme used
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to prove Theorem 3.2 along with Proposition 3.3 and 3.4. In this technique, secret key
encoding and wiretap encoding are brought together using superposition. Although
this technique is valid for any channel, it is not the best solution to use for channels
where the two legitimate receivers have a statistical advantage over the eavesdropper
such as more capable channels. For these class of channels, it is better to use the
second technique where secret key encoding and wiretap encoding are put together in
the same layer. We now present the following result:
Theorem 3.3. An achievable individual-strong secrecy rate region for the two-receiver
DM-WBC with degraded message sets and message cognition, where the two legitimate
receivers Y1 and Y2 are more capable than the eavesdropper Z is given by the set of all
rate quadruples (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ that satisfy
Rc ≤ min
[
I(U; Y1), I(U; Y2), I(U; Z)
]
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U) + min
[
R1, R2, I(X; Z|U)
]
R0 +R2 ≤ I(X; Y2|U)− I(X; Z|U) + min
[
R1, R2, I(X; Z|U)
]
(3.145)
for random variables with joint probability distribution QU QX|U QY1Y2Z|X, such that
U− X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain.
Before we present the proof of the previous theorem, we need to point out that the
previous region is only achievable under the more capable assumption, or more pre-
cisely, for a probability distribution QUXY1Y2Z such that: I(X; Y1|U) ≥ I(X; Z|U) and
I(X; Y2|U) ≥ I(X; Z|U). We now proceed with our proof by presenting the following
coding scheme:
Let n ∈ N be an arbitrary but fixed code block length and  > 0 be an arbitrary
constant. Moreover, let QUX ∈ P(U × X ) be a fixed input probability distribution
and recall the probability transition matrix QY1Y2Z|X given in (2.73) that defines the
two-receiver DM-WBC. Furthermore, we consider the message sets Mc, M, M⊗ and
Mr, defined exactly as in the coding scheme used to prove Proposition 3.3. Thus, our
new coding scheme inherits the rate constraint in (3.132).
1. Random Codebook C: Let Cc , {Un(mc)} for mc ∈ Mc be a random public
common message codebook as defined in Section 3.2.2. For a fixed public message code-
book Cc and for every mc ∈ Mc, let Cs(mc) , {Xn(mc,m,mr,m⊗)} where m ∈ M,
mr ∈Mr and m⊗ ∈M⊗ be a random codebook for the confidential messages that con-
sists of 2n(R+Rr+R⊗) conditionally independent random codewords Xn(mc,m,mr,m⊗),
where each codeword is constructed by generating the symbols Xi(mc,m,mr,m⊗) in-
dependently at random according to QX|U(·|ui(mc)). A realization of Cs(mc) is denoted
by Cs(mc) , {xn(mc,m,mr,m⊗)}.
The total random codebook is denoted by C = {Cc,Cs}, while C = {Cc, Cs} denotes
one possible realization of this codebook selected from the total set of codebooks given
by C. The probability of generating a certain realization C ∈ C is given by:
G(C) =
∏
(m0c ,m,mr,m⊗)∈Mc×M⊗×M×Mr
QnX|U
(
xn(m0c ,m,mr,m⊗)|un(m0c)
) ∏
mc∈Mc
QnU
(
un(mc)
)
(3.146)
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2. Encoder E: For a fixed codebook realization C, given a message triple (mc,m,m⊗),
the encoder first chooses a randomization message mr uniformly at random from the
setMr. It then finds the corresponding codeword xn(mc,m,mrm⊗) and transmits it.
3. First Legitimate Decoder ϕ1: Given y
n
1 and its own message m2 = (m21,m22),
the decoder searches for the unique pentadruple (mˆc, mˆ0, mˆ12, mˆr, mˆ⊗) ∈Mc ×M0 ×
M12 ×Mr ×M⊗, such that:(
un(mˆc), x
n
0 (mˆc, mˆ, mˆr, mˆ⊗), y
n
1
)
∈ T n (QUXY1),
where mˆ = (mˆ0, mˆ12,m22). If such unique pentadruple exists, the decoder uses mˆ⊗ and
m21 to produce the message mˆ11 = mˆ⊗ ⊗m21 then it outputs the triple (mˆc, mˆ0, mˆ1),
where mˆ1 = (mˆ11, mˆ12). Otherwise, the decoder outputs the error message (?).
4. Second Legitimate Decoder ϕ2: Given y
n
2 and its own messagem1 = (m11,m12),
the decoder searches for the unique pentadruple (m˜c, m˜0, m˜22, m˜r, m˜⊗) ∈Mc ×M0 ×
M22 ×Mr ×M⊗; such that:(
un(m˜c), x
n(m˜c, m˜, m˜r, m˜⊗), yn2 ) ∈ T n (QUXY2
)
,
where m˜ = (m˜0,m12, m˜22). If such unique pentadruple exists, the decoder uses m˜⊗
and m11 to deduce the message m˜21 = m˜⊗⊗m11 then it outputs the triple (m˜c, m˜0, m˜2)
where m˜2 = (m˜21, m˜22). If such unique pentadruple does not exist, the decoder out-
puts the error message (?).
5. Third Eavesdropper Decoder ϕ3: Given z
n, the decoder uses the same decod-
ing function introduced in Section 3.2.2.
6. Induced Joint Distribution: For every codebook C ∈ C, the previous coding
scheme induces the following joint probability distribution:
PC
(
mc,m⊗,m,mr, un, xn, yn1 , y
n
2 , z
n, mˆc, mˆ0, mˆ1, m˜c, m˜0, m˜2, mˇc
)
= 2−n(Rc+R+Rr+R⊗)
× 1{un=un(mc)}1{xn=xn(mc,m,mr,m⊗)}QnY1Y2Z|X(yn1 , yn2 , zn|xn)
× 1{(mˆc,mˆ0,mˆ1)=ϕ1(yn1 )}1{(m˜c,m˜0,m˜2)=ϕ2(yn2 )}1{mˇc=ϕ3(zn)} (3.147)
Additionally, if we take the random codebook generation process into our considera-
tion, we end up with: P = G(C) · PC, where G(C) is given by (3.146).
7. Reliability Analysis: We start by using the average decoding error probability
given by (3.135) for a fixed code realization C ∈ C. Based on our encoding function,
any satellite codeword xn is jointly typical to its corresponding cloud center code-
word un, with probability that goes to one as n approaches infinity. This implies that
limn→∞ EC
[
P(E)] = 0, where E denotes an encoding error. On the other hand, fol-
lowing the same decoding error analysis technique used in Section 3.2.3, we can show
that limn→∞ EC
[
P(D|Ec)] = 0 as long as:
Rc ≤ min
[
I(U; Y1)− δ`1(), I(U; Y2)− δ`2(), I(U; Z)− δ3()
]
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R0 +R11 +Rr +R⊗ ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− δ`1()
R0 +R22 +Rr +R⊗ ≤ I(X; Y2|U)− δ`2(). (3.148)
where δ`1() = 2 log
(|U| · |X | · |Y1|) and δ`2() = 2 log (|U| · |X | · |Y2|). The rate con-
straints in (3.148) directly implies that limn→∞ EC
[
P¯e(C)
] ≤ limn→∞ EC[P¯e(C)] = 0.
Thus, under these rate constraints, our coding scheme fulfills the reliability constraint
in (3.128b).
8. Secrecy Analysis: The first part of the secrecy analysis presented for the coding
scheme in Section 3.3.2 implies that in order to show that our coding scheme satisfies
the individual-strong secrecy constraint in (3.128c), it is enough to show that:
lim
n→∞
E
[
I(M; Zn|McC)
]
= 0, (3.149)
where we modified the upper-bound in (3.142) just by conditioning on the common
message Mc. Based on the first steps of the strong secrecy analysis in Section 3.2.4,
Eq. (3.149) holds if:
lim
n→∞
EC
[∥∥PZn|Mc,M,C − PˇZn|Mc,C∥∥] = 0, (3.150)
where PˇZn|Mc,C is given by (3.63). Moreover, based on the definition of P
C in (3.147)
and the steps used to bound L3 in Section 3.2.4, Eq. (3.150) holds as long as:
Rr +R⊗ ≥ I(X; Z|U) + δ`4(, γ), (3.151)
where γ > 0 and δ`4(, γ) = 2 log
(|U| · |X | · |Z|) + 5γ. Thus, under the rate con-
straints in (3.132) and (3.151), our coding scheme fulfills the individual-strong secrecy
constraint in (3.128c).
9. Fourier-Motzkin Elimination: In order to finalize our achievability proof, we
need to highlight that  and γ can be selected in a way, such that as n approaches
infinity, the corresponding δ`-functions approach zero. Finally, if we take the limit as
n → ∞, then use the Fourier-Motzkin elimination procedure on the rate constraints
in (3.132), (3.148) and (3.151) while solving for (Rc, R0, R1, R2), we prove the achiev-
ability of any rate quadruple (Rc, R0, R1, R2) satisfying the constraints in (3.145).
3.4 Secrecy Capacity Regions and Outer Bounds
In this section, we investigate some of the outer-bounds and capacity regions that
can be established for the secure communication problem given by Fig. 3.2, under
both the joint and individual strong secrecy criteria. We start by establishing some
general multi-letter and single-letter upper bounds. We then establish the joint and
individual secrecy capacity regions for various setups of less noisy channels. Finally,
we establish the joint secrecy capacity region for a class of two-receiver DM-WBC
with one degraded relation and one less-noisy relation. In particular, one of the two
legitimate receivers is degraded with respect to the other one and at the same time
the stronger legitimate receiver is less noisy than the eavesdropper. Moreover, the
relation between the weaker legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper is arbitrary. For
this class of two-receiver DM-WBC, we show that the principle of indirect decoding
is optimal. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result to demonstrate the
optimality of indirect decoding for a secure communication scenario.
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3.4.1 Multi-Letter and Single-Letter Outer Bounds
Let (Rc, R0, R1, R2) be an achievable joint-strong secrecy rate quadruple for the two-
receiver DM-WBC with degraded message sets and message cognition given by Q in
(2.73). Further, let λ, τ > 0, and assume that for a sufficiently large n ∈ N, there
exists a (2nRc , 2nR0 , 2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) code C of Definition 3.1, such that:
nRj = H(Mj|C), for j ∈ {c, 0, 1, 2} (3.152a)
P¯e(C) ≤ λn = 2−nλ (3.152b)
I(M0M1M2; Zn|C) ≤ τn = 2−nτ , (3.152c)
where P¯e(C) is given by (3.7). In order to simplify the notation, the conditioning on
the code C will be ignored in the upcoming steps. Based on Fano’s inequality [22] and
the fact that the decoding functions of the code C at the two legitimate receiver are
not only supplied by the corresponding observations Yn1 and Y
n
2 , but also by their own
transmitted messages M2 and M1 respectively, then it follows that:
H(McM0M1|Yn1 M2), H(McM0M2|Yn2 M1), H(Mc|Zn) ≤ Γ(λn) (3.153)
where Γ(λn) = H2(P¯e(C)) + n(Rc +R0 +R1 +R2) · P¯e(C). One can easily show that
Γ(λn) approaches 0 as n approaches infinity. Using Eq. (3.152a) and Eq. (3.153), we
can derive an upper-bound on the common rate Rc as follows:
nRc ≤ H(Mc)−H(Mc|Zn) + Γ(λn)
= I(Mc; Zn) + Γ(λn). (3.154)
Next, in order to establish some upper-bounds on the confidential rates (R0, R1, R2),
we use Lemma A.7 to modify the joint-strong secrecy constraint in (3.152c) and include
conditioning on the common message Mc as follows:
I(M0M1M2; Zn|Mc) ≤ Γ(λn, τn), (3.155)
where Γ(λn, τn) = Γ(λn) + τn. Now, if we let M , (M0,M1,M2) and combine the rela-
tions in (3.152a), (3.153) and (3.155), we can derive an upper-bound on the confidential
rates (R0 +R1) intended to the first legitimate receiver as follows:
n(R0 +R1) ≤ H(M0M1)−H(M0M1|Yn1 M2Mc)− I(M; Zn|Mc) + 2Γ(λn, τn)
(a)
= H(M0M1|McM2)−H(M0M1|Yn1 M2Mc)− I(M; Zn|Mc) + 2Γ(λn, τn)
= I(M0M1; Yn1 |M2Mc)− I(M; Zn|Mc) + 2Γ(λn, τn)
(b)
≤ I(M; Yn1 |Mc)− I(M; Zn|Mc) + 2Γ(λn, τn), (3.156)
where (a) follows due to the independence of the messages, while (b) follows from the
chain rule of the mutual information. Similarly, we can show that following upper-
bounds also hold:
n(R0 +R2) ≤ I(M; Yn2 |Mc)− I(M; Zn|Mc) + 2Γ(λn, τn) (3.157a)
n(Rc +R0 +R1) ≤ I(McM; Yn1 )− I(M; Zn|Mc) + 2Γ(λn, τn) (3.157b)
n(Rc +R0 +R2) ≤ I(McM; Yn2 )− I(M; Zn|Mc) + 2Γ(λn, τn). (3.157c)
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Now, observe that the term I(McM; Yn1 ) can be expanded using the mutual information
chain rule as I(Mc; Yn1 ) + I(M; Yn1 |Mc). The same observation holds for the term
I(McM; Yn2 ). Based on these two relations, we can subtract the bound in (3.156) from
the one in (3.157b) and the bound in (3.157a) from the one in (3.157c) to obtain the
following:
nRc ≤ min
[
I(Mc; Yn1 ), I(Mc; Yn2 )
]
+ 2Γ(λn, τn) (3.158)
At the moment, let U , Mc and V , (Mc,M). Hence, by merging the upper-
bounds in (3.154), (3.156), (3.157a) and (3.158) after dividing the RHS of all of
them by n, and taking the limit as n approaches infinity, keeping in mind that
limn→∞ Γ(λn),Γ(λn, τn) = 0, the following result is established:
Theorem 3.4. A multi-letter upper-bound for the joint-strong secrecy capacity region
of the two-receiver DM-WBC with degraded messages sets and message cognition is
given by the union over the set of rate quadruple (Rc, R0, R1, R2) that satisfies the
following:
Rc ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
min
[
I(U; Zn), I(U; Yn1 ), I(U; Yn2 )
]
R0 +R1 ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
[
I(V; Yn1 |U)− I(V; Zn|U)
]
R0 +R2 ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
[
I(V; Yn2 |U)− I(V; Zn|U)
]
(3.159)
for all possible choices of random variables (U,V), such that U−V−Xn−(Yn1 ,Yn2 ,Zn)
forms a Markov chain.
It is important to highlight that the convergence of the limits used to describe the rate
region in the previous theorem is guaranteed by the Fekete’s lemma [59]. Now, if we
recall the rate region given by Proposition 3.1 and let V , V0 = V1 = V2, we can
argue that the multi-letter bound in (3.159) matches the rate region in (3.17) applied
to the n-fold product of the two-receiver DM-WBC Qn in (2.73). This implies that
Theorem 3.4 defines a multi-letter description for the joint-strong secrecy capacity re-
gion of the two-receiver DM-WBC with degraded messages sets and message cognition.
We have already mentioned in Section 2.3.3 that a multi-letter description for the
capacity region is not enough and a single-letter characterization is usually preferred.
In order to derive a single-letter bound, we start by introducing the following: For
i ∈ J1, nK, let Ui , (Mc, Z˜i+1), K1i , Yi−11 , K2i , Yi−12 , V1i , (M,Ui,K1i ) and V2i ,
(M,Ui,K
2
i ), where for a given sequence A
n, the following conventions hold: Ai ,
(A1, . . . ,Ai) and A˜
i , (Ai, . . . ,An). The bound in (3.154) can be further formulated
as follows:
Rc ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Mc; Zi|Z˜i+1) + Γn(λn)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Zi) + Γn(λn). (3.160)
where Γn(λn) = 1/n·Γ(λn). Next, we consider the confidential rates (R0+R1) intended
for the first legitimate receiver. From Eq. (3.156), it follows that
R0 +R1 ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(M; Y1i|McYi−11 )− I(M; Zi|McZ˜i+1)
]
+ 2Γn(λn, τn)
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(a)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(M; Y1i|McYi−11 Z˜i+1)− I(M; Zi|McYi−11 Z˜i+1)
]
+ 2Γn(λn, τn)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(V1i ; Y1i|UiK1i )− I(V1i ; Zi|UiK1i )
]
+ 2Γn(λn, τn), (3.161)
where Γn(λn, τn) = 1/n ·Γ(λn, τn). Step (a) follows due to the Csisza´r sum identity [10,
Lemma 7]. Applying the same arguments to Eq. (3.157a), leads to a similar bound on
the confidential rates (R0 +R2) intended for the second legitimate receiver as follows:
R0 +R2 ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(V2i ; Y2i|UiK2i )− I(V2i ; Zi|UiK2i )
]
+ 2Γn(λn, τn). (3.162)
On the other hand, if we consider the sum of the common and the confidential rates
(Rc +R0 +R1) intended for the first legitimate receiver in (3.157b), we obtain
Rc +R0 +R1 ≤ 1
n
[
I(Mc; Yn1 ) + I(M; Yn1 |Mc)− I(M; Zn|Mc)
]
+ 2Γn(λn, τn)
(a)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(Mc; Y1i|Yi−11 ) + I(V1i ; Y1i|UiK1i )− I(V1i ; Zi|UiK1i )
]
+ 2Γn(λn, τn)
(b)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(Ui; Y1i|K1i ) + I(V1i ; Y1i|UiK1i )− I(V1i ; Zi|UiK1i )
]
+ 2Γn(λn, τn)
(c)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(V1i ; Y1i|K1i )− I(V1i ; Zi|UiK1i )
]
+ 2Γn(λn, τn), (3.163)
where (a) follows as in (3.161); while (b) and (c) follow from the properties of mutual
information. Similarly, the same arguments can be used to reformulate the bound on
the sum of common and confidential rates (Rc + R0 + R2) intended for the second
legitimate receiver in (3.157c) as follows:
Rc +R0 +R2 ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(V2i ; Y2i|K2i )− I(V2i ; Zi|UiK2i )
]
+ 2Γn(λn, τn). (3.164)
We now combine the rate constraints established in (3.160) - (3.164) followed by in-
troducing a random variable T uniformly distributed over J1;nK and independent of
all other random variables. We then let U = (UT,T), K
1 = K1T, K
2 = K2T, V
1 = V1T,
V2 = V2T, Y1 = Y1T, Y2 = Y2T and Z = ZT, followed by taking the limit as n → ∞
such that Γn(λn),Γn(λn, τn)→ 0. Accordingly, we reach the following result:
Theorem 3.5. A single-letter upper-bound for the joint-strong secrecy capacity region
of the two-receiver DM-WBC with degraded messages sets and message cognition is
given by the union over the set of rate quadruple (Rc, R0, R1, R2) that satisfies:
Rc ≤ I(U; Z)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|UK1)− I(V1; Z|UK1)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|UK2)− I(V2; Z|UK2)
Rc +R0 +R1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|K1)− I(V1; Z|UK1)
Rc +R0 +R2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|K2)− I(V2; Z|UK2), (3.165)
for all possible choices of random variables (U,K1,K2,V1,V2), such that (U,K1,K2)−
(V1,V2)− X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain.
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Unfortunately, the previous single-letter characterization does not match our general
achievable rate region established in Theorem 3.1. However, this result is expected
since the transmission capacity of the corresponding non-secrecy model [118] is still
unknown as well.
We now turn to the individual secrecy measure and let (Rc, R0, R1, R2) be an achievable
individual-strong secrecy rate quadruple for the two-receiver DM-WBC with degraded
message sets and message cognition Q. Further, let λ, τ > 0, and assume that for a
sufficiently large n ∈ N, there exists a code C of Definition 3.1, such that:
nRj = H(Mj|C), for j ∈ {c, 0, 1, 2} (3.166a)
P¯e(C) ≤ λn = 2−nλ (3.166b)
I(M0M1; Zn|C) + I(M0M2; Zn|C) ≤ τn = 2−nτ . (3.166c)
Since the reliability constraint in (3.166b) is identical to the one in (3.152b), then the
bound in (3.153) is still valid for the individual secrecy criterion. Additionally, since
the rate constraints in (3.166a) are also identical to the ones in (3.152a), then the
upper-bound on Rc established in (3.154) is also valid. Moreover, we can use Lemma
A.7 to modify the individual secrecy constraint in (3.166c) as follows:
I(M0M1; Zn|Mc) + I(M0M2; Zn|Mc) ≤ 2Γ(λn, τn), (3.167)
where Γ(λn, τn) is as defined before. Next, we let Mˆ , (Mc,M0,M2) and M˜ , (Mc,
M0,M1), then using the previous inequality along with Eqs. (3.153) and (3.166a), we
can bound the confidential rates (R0 +R1) as follows:
n(R0 +R1)
(a)
≤ I(M; Yn1 |Mc)−max
[
I(M0M1; Zn|Mc), I(M0M2; Zn|Mc)
]
+ 3Γ(λn, τn)
(b)
= I(M; Yn1 |Mc)− I(M; Zn|Mc) + min
[
I(M1; Zn|Mˆ), I(M2; Zn|M˜)
]
+ 3Γ(λn, τn)
(c)
≤ I(M; Yn1 |Mc)− I(M; Zn|Mc) + min
[
nR1, nR2
]
+ 3Γ(λn, τn) (3.168)
where (a) follows based on the same arguments used to establish (3.156); (b) follows
due to the chain rule of the mutual information; while (c) follows from Eq. (3.166a)
which implies that nR1 ≥ I(M1; Zn|Mˆ) and nR2 ≥ I(M2; Zn|M˜). Similarly, we can
show that the following bounds hold as well:
n(R0 +R2) ≤ I(M; Yn2 |Mc)− I(M; Zn|Mc) + min
[
nR1, nR2
]
+ 3Γ(λn, τn)
(3.169a)
n(Rc +R0 +R1) ≤ I(McM; Yn1 )− I(M; Zn|Mc) + min
[
nR1, nR2
]
+ 3Γ(λn, τn)
(3.169b)
n(Rc +R0 +R2) ≤ I(McM; Yn2 )− I(M; Zn|Mc) + min
[
nR1, nR2
]
+ 3Γ(λn, τn).
(3.169c)
On the other hand, we need to highlight the standard upper-bounds for reliable com-
munication that follows from the constraints in (3.153) and (3.166a) as follows:
n(R0 +R1) ≤ I(M; Yn1 |Mc) + Γ(λn) (3.170a)
n(R0 +R2) ≤ I(M; Yn2 |Mc) + Γ(λn) (3.170b)
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n(Rc +R0 +R1) ≤ I(McM; Yn1 ) + Γ(λn) (3.170c)
n(Rc +R0 +R2) ≤ I(McM; Yn2 ) + Γ(λn). (3.170d)
We now let U , Mc and V , (Mc,M) and combine the upper-bounds in (3.154),
(3.168), (3.169) and (3.170) after dividing the RHS of all of them by n. We then take
the limit as n approaches infinity, establishing the following result:
Theorem 3.6. A multi-letter upper-bound for the individual-strong secrecy capacity
region of the two-receiver DM-WBC with degraded messages sets and message cognition
is given by the union over the set of rate quadruple (Rc, R0, R1, R2) that satisfies:
Rc ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
I(U; Zn)
R0 +R1 ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
[
I(V; Yn1 |U)− I(V; Zn|U) + min
[
nR1, nR2, I(V; Zn|U)
]]
R0 +R2 ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
[
I(V; Yn2 |U)− I(V; Zn|U) + min
[
nR1, nR2, I(V; Zn|U)
]]
Rc +R0 +R1 ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
[
I(V; Yn1 )− I(V; Zn|U) + min
[
nR1, nR2, I(V; Zn|U)
]]
Rc +R0 +R2 ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
[
I(V; Yn2 )− I(V; Zn|U) + min
[
nR1, nR2, I(V; Zn|U)
]]
,
(3.171)
for all possible choices of random variables (U,V), such that U−V−Xn−(Yn1 ,Yn2 ,Zn)
forms a Markov chain.
Finally, we recall the ideas used to transform the joint secrecy multi-letter outer-bound
in (3.159) to the single letter characterization in (3.165), and apply it to the individual
secrecy multi-letter outer-bound in (3.171), we can establish the following result:
Theorem 3.7. A single-letter upper-bound for the individual-strong secrecy capacity
region of the two-receiver DM-WBC with degraded messages sets and message cognition
is given by the union over the set of rate quadruple (Rc, R0, R1, R2) that satisfies the
following:
Rc ≤ I(U; Z)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|UK1)− I(V1; Z|UK1) + min
[
R1, R2, I(V1; Z|U)
]
R0 +R2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|UK2)− I(V2; Z|UK2) + min
[
R1, R2, I(V2; Z|U)
]
Rc +R0 +R1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|K1)− I(V1; Z|UK1) + min
[
R1, R2, I(V1; Z|U)
]
Rc +R0 +R2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|K2)− I(V2; Z|UK2) + min
[
R1, R2, I(V2; Z|U)
]
, (3.172)
for all possible choices of random variables (U,K1,K2,V1,V2), such that (U,K1,K2)−
(V1,V2)− X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain.
3.4.2 Capacity Regions for Less-Noisy Channels
In Section 3.4.1, we established general upper-bounds for the secrecy capacity region
of our model in Fig. 3.2 under both the joint and individual secrecy criteria. We
noticed that the established single-letter bounds in Theorem 3.5 and 3.7 do not match
the achievable bounds provided in Theorem 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. This observation
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agrees with the results presented in Section 2.4, which indicate that the transmission
and the secrecy capacity of the multi-receiver DM-BC is only known for some special
cases, while the general case remains an open problem.
In this section, we will limit our investigation to the class of less-noisy DM-WBC. In
particular, we will consider the different less-noisy orders among the three receiving
nodes –the two legitimate receivers and the eavesdropper– in our model. Due to the
relation between less-noisy channels and degraded channels, our results are also valid
for the corresponding degraded channel model. We start by considering the most
common scenario for secure communication where the two legitimate receivers are less
noisy than the eavesdropper and present the following joint secrecy result:
Theorem 3.8. Consider a two-receiver DM-WBC with degraded message sets and
message cognition, where the two legitimate receivers are less noisy than the eaves-
dropper, i.e. Y1  Z and Y2  Z. Then, the joint-strong secrecy capacity region is
given by the union over the set of all rate quadruples (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ that satisfy
Rc ≤ I(U; Z)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(X; Y2|U)− I(X; Z|U) (3.173)
for all possible choices of random variables (U,X), such that U− X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms
a Markov chain. Further it suffices to have |U| ≤ |X |+ 3.
The previous theorem shows that the direct extension of the Csisza´r and Ko¨rner’s
inner-bound in [10] is optimal for this less-noisy scenario and the concept of indi-
rect decoding introduced in [12] is not needed. Nevertheless, one can show that the
achievability of the previous capacity region follows directly from the rate regions es-
tablished in Theorem 3.1 as well as Propositions 3.1 and 3.2. In order to confirm this,
we let V0 = V1 = V2 = X and observe that under this assumption the rate region in
Proposition 3.1 simplifies to:
Rc ≤ min
[
I(U; Z), I(U; Y1), I(U; Y2)
]
(3.174a)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U) (3.174b)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(X; Y2|U)− I(X; Z|U)−
I(X; XZ|X) (3.174c)
Due to the properties of the mutual information, it follows that I(X; XZ|X) = 0.
Additionally, under the less-noisy condition Y1  Z and Y2  Z, it follows that:
I(U; Z) ≤ I(U; Y1) and I(U; Z) ≤ I(U; Y2). This implies that the bound in (3.174a)
simplifies to Rc ≤ I(U; Z). This means that the rate region in (3.174) is equivalent to
the one in (3.173).
For the converse proof, one can show that it follows directly from the upper-bound
in Theorem 3.5 as follows: First, we start by using the less-noisy relation between
the receiving nodes to get rid of the bounds on the sum rates (Rc + R0 + R1) and
(Rc +R0 +R2). Next, we consider the bound on (R0 +R1):
R0 +R1
(a)
= I(V1; Y1|U)− I(K1; Y1|U)− I(V1; Z|U) + I(K1; Z|U)
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(b)
≤ I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1; Z|U)
(a)
= I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Y1|V1)− I(X; Z|U) + I(X; Z|V1)
(b)
≤ I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U), (3.175)
where (a) follows because (U,K1)− V1 − X− (Y1,Z) forms a Markov chain; while (b)
follows because Y1  Z. Similarly, we can show that, under the assumption Y2  Z
the bound on (R0 +R2) in (3.165) simplifies to:
R0 +R2 ≤ I(X; Y2|U)− I(X; Z|U), (3.176)
Eq. (3.175) and Eq. (3.176) along with the rate constraint on Rc given in (3.165)
describe a rate region that matches the one given by (3.173). This concludes our con-
verse. In order to finalize our proof, we need to point out that the cardinality bound on
|U| follows from the Fenchel-Bunt strengthening of the usual Carathe´odory’s theorem
cf. [35, Appendix C] and [135].
Next, we investigate the communication model in Fig. 3.2 under the individual-strong
secrecy criterion and the same less-noisy condition. We present the following theorem:
Theorem 3.9. Consider a two-receiver DM-WBC with degraded message sets and
message cognition, where the two legitimate receivers are less noisy than the eaves-
dropper, i.e. Y1  Z and Y2  Z. Then, the individual-strong secrecy capacity region
is given by the union over the set of all rate quadruples (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ that
satisfy
Rc ≤ I(U; Z)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U) + min
[
R1, R2, I(X; Z|U)
]
R0 +R2 ≤ I(X; Y2|U)− I(X; Z|U) + min
[
R1, R2, I(X; Z|U)
]
(3.177)
for all possible choices of random variables (U,X), such that U− X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms
a Markov chain. Further it suffices to have |U| ≤ |X |+ 3.
The previous theorem implies that combining the secret key encoding technique with
the classical wiretap random encoding in the same layer is optimal for this less-noisy
scenario. The achievability proof of the previous theorem follows directly from Theo-
rem 3.3, where under the less noisy condition it follows that:
Rc ≤ min
[
I(U; Y1), I(U; Y2), I(U; Z)
]
= I(U; Z) (3.178)
On the other hand, the converse follows directly from the upper-bound in Theorem 3.7
as follows: First, we ignore the bounds on the sum rates (Rc+R0 +R1) and (Rc+R0 +
R2) in (3.172). Next, we use the implications of the less noisy assumption to reformu-
late the bounds on (R0 +R1) and (R0 +R2), as we did in (3.175), while keeping in mind
that the data processing inequality implies that: I(V1; Z|U), I(V2; Z|U) ≤ I(X; Z|U).
Finally, the cardinality bound on |U| follows based on the same arguments used in the
proof of Theorem 3.8.
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We now turn to another class of less-noisy channels where the eavesdropper is less noisy
than the two legitimate receiver. This class of less-noisy channels is rarely addressed
in secure communication scenario due to the result established in [16, Proposition 3.4],
which states that if the legitimate channel is noisier than the eavesdropper channel
then the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel vanishes. Nevertheless, this class of
less-noisy channels has very interesting features specially under the individual secrecy
criterion. However, for the sake of completeness, we investigate this class of less-noisy
channels under the joints secrecy criterion as well.
Theorem 3.10. Consider a two-receiver DM-WBC with degraded message sets and
message cognition, where the two legitimate receivers are noisier than the eavesdropper,
i.e. Z  Y1 and Z  Y2. Then, the joint-strong secrecy capacity region is given by the
union over the set of all rate quadruples (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ that satisfy
Rc ≤ min
[
I(X; Y1), I(X; Y2)
]
R0 = R1 = R2 = 0. (3.179)
for all possible choices of the random variable X.
Although the result presented in [16, Proposition 3.4] was established for wiretap chan-
nels with a single legitimate receiver, the previous theorem implies that the result is
still valid for wiretap channels with two or more legitimate receivers. The achievability
proof of the previous theorem follows directly from the channel coding theorem [136].
Moreover, the converse proof is based on the following arguments: The bound on Rc
follows from the transmission capacity broadcasting a public common message over
the three-receiver DM-BC [72], which implies that:
Rc ≤ min
[
I(X; Y1), I(X; Y2), I(X; Z)
] (a)
= min
[
I(X; Y1), I(X; Y2)
]
, (3.180)
where (a) follows because Z is less noisy than both Y1 and Y2. On the other hand,
the disintegration of the confidential rates (R0, R1) is a direct implication of Lemma
A.8 and Eq. the (3.156) as follows:
R0 +R1 ≤ 1
n
[
I(M; Yn1 |Mc)− I(M; Zn|Mc)
]
+ 2Γn(λn, τn) ≤ 2Γn(λn, τn), (3.181)
where limn→∞ Γn(λn, τn) = 0. Similarly, one can use Eq. (3.157a) and Lemma A.8 to
show that R0 + R2 = 0. Combining this bound with the ones in (3.180) and (3.181)
completes our converse.
Unlike the joint secrecy criterion, secure communication under the individual secrecy
criterion is possible for the class of channels, where the eavesdropper is less noisy than
the legitimate receivers. This result is illustrated by the following theorem:
Theorem 3.11. Consider a two-receiver DM-WBC with degraded message sets and
message cognition, where the two legitimate receivers are noisier than the eavesdropper,
i.e. Z  Y1 and Z  Y2. Then, the individual-strong secrecy capacity region is given
by the union over the set of all rate quadruples (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ that satisfy
Rc +R1 = Rc +R2 ≤ min
[
I(X; Y1), I(X; Y2)
]
R0 = 0. (3.182)
for all possible choices of the random variable X.
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The previous theorem implies that even under the individual secrecy measure, only
the confidential messages that can be protected using secret key encoding (i.e. M1 and
M2) can be transmitted over a DM-WBC with a less-noisy eavesdropper, while the
rate of the confidential message protected only by wiretap random encoding (i.e. R0)
still vanishes. The achievability of Theorem 3.11 can be derived from the achievable
rate region established by Proposition 3.3 as follows: We start by letting V⊗ = V0 =
V1 = V2 = X, while keeping in mind that Z is less noisy than both Y1 and Y2. Under
these assumptions, the rate region in Eq. (3.130) simplifies to:
Rc ≤ min
[
I(U; Y1), I(U; Y2)
]
R0 +R1 ≤ min
[
R1, R2, I(X; Y1|U), I(X; Y2|U)
]
R0 +R2 ≤ min
[
R1, R2, I(X; Y1|U), I(X; Y2|U)
]
(3.183)
The previous relations indicate that the two individual confidential rates R1 and R2
must be equal. They also imply that the common confidential rate R0 vanishes. Taking
this into consideration, we can argue that the following rate region is also achievable:
Rc ≤ min
[
I(U; Y1), I(U; Y2)
]
R1 = R2 ≤ min
[
I(X; Y1|U), I(X; Y2|U)
]
Rc +R1 = Rc +R2 ≤ min
[
I(X; Y1), I(X; Y2)
]
, (3.184)
where the last bound is a sum rate constraint that follows by combining the condition
of the first and second bounds. Finally, if we substitute U = X in (3.184), we establish
the achievability of the rate region in (3.182).
For the converse, we start by referring to the standard outer-bound for reliable com-
munication established by the channel coding theorem, which implies that:
Rc +R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1)
Rc +R0 +R2 ≤ I(X; Y2). (3.185)
With this in mind, we only need to prove that R0 = 0 and R1 = R2. In order to do so,
we recall Lemma A.8 and apply it to the individual secrecy upper-bound on R0 + R1
in (3.168). We have
R0 +R1 ≤ 1
n
[
I(M; Yn1 |Mc)− I(M; Zn|Mc)
]
+ min
[
R1, R2
]
+ 3Γn(λn, τn)
≤ min [R1, R2]+ 3Γn(λn, τn), (3.186)
where limn→∞ Γn(λn, τn) = 0. The previous bound directly implies that R0 = 0 and
that R1 ≤ R2. Similarly, we can apply Lemma A.8 to the individual secrecy upper-
bound on R0 + R2 in (3.169a) to show that R2 ≤ R1. This directly implies that R1
and R2 are equivalent. Finally, if we combine this result with the standard bounds in
(3.185), our converse is complete.
We now consider our last class of less-noisy channels which is an intermediate scenario
between the previous two extreme cases. In this class, the eavesdropper is less noisy
than one of the legitimate receiver but noisier than the other one. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the following relation holds: Y1  Z  Y2. We present the
following result:
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Theorem 3.12. Consider a two-receiver DM-WBC with degraded message sets and
message cognition, where the eavesdropper is less noisy than one of the legitimate re-
ceiver but noisier than the other one, i.e. Y1  Z  Y2. Then, the joint-strong secrecy
capacity region is given by the union over the set of all rate quadruples (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈
R4+ that satisfy
Rc ≤ I(U; Y2)
R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U)
R0 = R2 = 0, (3.187)
for all possible choices of random variables (U,X), such that U− X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms
a Markov chain. Further it suffices to have |U| ≤ |X |+ 2.
The achievability proof of the previous theorem follows directly from Proposition 3.1.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.8, we start by letting V0 = V1 = V2 = X and observe
that under the less-noisy assumption of Y1  Z  Y2, the rate region in (3.174)
simplifies to the one in (3.187) as follows:
Rc ≤ I(U; Y2)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U)
R0 +R2 ≤ 0 (3.188)
On the other hand, the converse proof follows from the upper-bound established in
Theorem 3.5 along with the properties of less-noisy channels. We start by pointing
out that the vanishment of R0 and R2 follows from the same arguments used in the
converse proof of Theorem 3.10. Thus, the last bound in the outer rate region in
Theorem 3.5 simplifies to:
Rc ≤ I(UK2; Y2)
(a)
≤ I(UK1; Y2), (3.189)
where (a) follows from the definition of the random variables K1 and K2 along with
the les- noisy lemma established in [137, Lemma 1]. Additionally, the outer-bound on
R1 given by Theorem 3.5 can be reformulated as follows:
R1
(a)
= I(X; Y1|UK1)− I(X; Y1|V1)− I(X; Z|UK1) + I(X; Z|V1)
(b)
≤ I(X; Y1|UK1)− I(X; Z|UK1), (3.190)
where (a) follows because (U,K1)− V1 − X− (Y1,Z) forms a Markov chain; while (b)
follows because Y1  Z. Finally, if we combine the bounds in (3.189) and (3.190) then
let U , UK1, our converse is complete.
Unfortunately, the individual secrecy capacity region for this class of less-noisy chan-
nels is still unknown. We could not even establish the capacity for the corresponding
degrading order, i.e. X− Y1 − Z− Y2 forms a Markov chain. The reason for this can
be summarized in the following points: Since Z  Y2, we know that only secret key
encoding can be used to establish the confidential rate R2. On the other hand, we
have Y1  Z which implies that the optimal coding scheme for R1 is to combine secret
key encoding and wiretap random encoding in the same layer. The challenge arises
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because we could not find a coding scheme that can achieve these two requirements at
the same time. Nevertheless, if we consider a simple version of our model, where the
individual confidential messages vanishes, i.e. M1 = M2 = ∅, we can establish the
following result.
Theorem 3.13. Consider a two-receiver DM-WBC with a common public message
and a common confidential message, such that (Y1  Y2). Then, both the joint and
individual strong-secrecy capacity regions are given by the union over the set of all
rates (Rc, R0) ∈ R2+ that satisfy
Rc ≤ min
[
I(U; Y2), I(U; Z)
]
R0 ≤ I(V; Y2|U)− I(V; Z|U) (3.191)
for all possible choices of random variables (U,V,X), such that U− V − X− (Y1,Y2,Z)
forms a Markov chain. Further it suffices to have |U| ≤ |X | + 3 and |V| ≤ |X |2 +
4|X |+ 3.
The achievability follows from the straightforward extension of the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner
result in [10] using the strong secrecy results established in [29]. It also follows di-
rectly from Proposition 3.1 by letting V0 = V1 = V2 = V leading to the following lower
bounds:
Rc ≤ min
[
I(U; Y1), I(U; Y2), I(U; Z)
]
R0 ≤ I(V; Y1|U)− I(V; Z|U)
R0 ≤ I(V; Y2|U)− I(V; Z|U). (3.192)
Since Y1  Y2, it implies that I(U; Y2) ≤ I(U; Y1) and I(V; Y2|U) ≤ I(V; Y1|U). Sub-
stituting these two relations in (3.192) leads to the achievability of the region in (3.191).
On the other hand, the converse follows directly using the standard techniques in [10],
where we only consider the weak legitimate receiver Y2.
3.4.3 Optimality of Indirect Decoding
In [12], Chia and El Gamal showed by an example that indirect decoding leads to a
larger achievable joint secrecy rate region for the two-receiver DM-WBC, as compared
to the direct extension of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner’s inner-bound. However, one can notice
that for all the cases where the joint secrecy capacity region is known, Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner’s inner-bound is –in fact– optimal. This observation encouraged us to investi-
gate whether there exists a specific class of channels, and not just an example where
indirect decoding outperforms the classical Csisza´r and Ko¨rner’s inner-bound. In this
section, we show that this class of channels does exist. In particular, we show that for
this class, indirect decoding is necessary to establish the joint secrecy capacity region
of the two-receiver DM-WBC with degraded message sets and message cognition. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first result to demonstrate the optimality of
indirect decoding for secure communication in this way.
During our search for this class of channels, we were trying to identify the main premise
of indirect decoding. In doing so, we started to raise some questions about the result
in Corollary 2.2. Among these questions was the following: Why should it be optimal
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for the first legitimate receiver to use the random variable X to decode the common
message M, while the second receiver has to use the random variable V instead? In
other words, despite the two receivers being interested in the same information, we
need to prove that it is optimal for them to use different decoding rules. The only
convenient answer for us was that the first legitimate receiver must have some sort of
an advantage over the second one. With some investigation, we managed to find two
possible scenarios that describe such advantage. The first scenario is highlighted by
the following result:
Theorem 3.14. Consider a two-receiver DM-WBC with degraded message sets and
message cognition, where the second legitimate receiver Y2 is degraded form the first
legitimate receiver Y1, i.e. X− Y1 − Y2 forms a Markov chain. In addition, the first
legitimate receiver Y1 is less noisy than the eavesdropper Z, i.e. Y1  Z. Then,
the joint-strong secrecy capacity region is given by the union over the set of all rate
quadruples (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ that satisfy
Rc ≤ I(U; Z)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(V; Y2|U)− I(V; Z|U)
Rc +R0 +R2 ≤ I(V; Y2)− I(V; Z|U) (3.193)
for all possible choices of random variables (U,V,X), such that U− V − X− (Y1,Y2,Z)
forms a Markov chain. Further it suffices to have |U| ≤ |X | + 3 and |V| ≤ |X |2 +
4|X |+ 3.
Before we proceed with the proof of this theorem, we need to highlight some important
points. First, one can notice that the previous theorem describes a class of two-receiver
DM-WBCs, where the first legitimate receiver is much stronger than the second one.
This strength arises from the fact that the second legitimate receiver observation is
a degraded version of the first one. In addition, the first legitimate receiver has a
statistical advantage over the eavesdropper, while the second one does not, i.e. Y1 is
less noisy than Z, while the relation between Y2 and Z is arbitrary. Our analysis shows
that the two previous conditions are necessary to establish the converse proof.
The second point that we need to highlight is how the rate region in (3.193) is –in
fact– an example of indirect decoding and not a simple superposition region. A simple
trick to visualize this point is to let Rc = R1 = R2 = 0 and U = ∅. Under these
assumptions, the rate region in Theorem 3.14 simplifies to the one given by Corollary
2.2, which is an example of indirect decoding. This point will become clearer as we
introduce the achievability proof of the theorem and notice that the messages intended
to the first legitimate receiver (M0,M1) can be decoded from the random variable V.
Nevertheless, the first legitimate receiver decodes them indirectly using the random
variable X.
We are now ready to proceed with our proof. First, we argue that the achievability
is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.1 and can even be established using Proposition
3.1 as well. However, instead of directly using the rate region given by Proposition
3.1, we derive an equivalent rate region using the reliability and secrecy constraints
presented in (3.23) as follows:
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Rc ≤ I(U; Z)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|U)− I(V0V1; Z|U)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2|U)− I(V0; Z|U)− I(V2; V1Z|V0)
Rc +R0 +R1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1)− I(V0V1; Z|U)
Rc +R0 +R2 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2)− I(V0; Z|U)− I(V2; V1Z|V0) (3.194)
The equivalency of the rate regions in (3.17) and (3.194) follows from the fact that both
regions were derived using the same rate constraints given in (3.23). This equivalency
was established in [35] for the general three-receiver DM-BC. Next, we let V2 = ∅,
V0 = V and (V0,V1) = X and observe that under these assumptions the rate region
in Eq. (3.194) simplifies to:
Rc ≤ I(U; Z)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(V; Y2|U)− I(V; Z|U)−(((((((I(V2; V1Z|V0)
Rc +R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1)− I(X; Z|U)
Rc +R0 +R2 ≤ I(V; Y2)− I(V; Z|U)−(((((((I(V2; V1Z|V0). (3.195)
One can show that the bound on the sum rate (Rc +R0 +R1) is redundant due to the
less-noisy relation between Y1 and Z. This implies that the rate region in (3.195) is
equivalent to the one in (3.193). This completes our achievability proof.
For the converse, we start by letting Ui , (Mc,Yi−12 , Z˜i+1), M , (M0,M1,M2) and
Vi , (M,Ui). Applying the same procedure used to bound the common rate Rc in
Eq. (3.160) leads to:
Rc ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(McZ˜i+1; Zi) + Γn(λn)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Zi) + Γn(λn). (3.196)
Next, we notice that the arguments used to establish the bound in (3.162) are still
valid for our scenario. This implies that the confidential rates (R0 + R2) intended for
the second legitimate receiver are bounded as follows:
R0 +R2 ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(Vi; Y2i|Ui)− I(Vi; Zi|Ui)
]
+ Γn(λn, τn). (3.197)
On the other hand, if we consider the sum of the common and confidential rates
(Rc + R0 + R2) intended for the second legitimate receiver and use the bound in
(3.164), we have
Rc +R0 +R2 ≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Vi; Y2i|Yi−12 )− I(Vi; Zi|Ui)
]
+ 2Γn(λn, τn)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Vi; Y2i)− I(Vi; Zi|Ui)
]
+ 2Γn(λn, τn), (3.198)
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where the last inequality follows from the chain rule of mutual information and the
definition of Vi. Finally, we consider the confidential rates (R0 + R1) intended for
the first legitimate receiver. Based on the same arguments that we used to derive the
bound in (3.161), we can show that
R0 +R1 ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(M; Y1i|McYi−11 Z˜i+1)− I(M; Zi|McYi−11 Z˜i+1)
]
+ 2Γn(λn, τn)
(a)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(M; Y1i|McYi−11 Yi−12 Z˜i+1)− I(M; Zi|McYi−11 Yi−12 Z˜i+1)
]
+ 2Γn(λn, τn)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(M; Y1i|UiYi−11 )− I(M; Zi|UiYi−11 )
]
+ 2Γn(λn, τn)
(b)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(Xi; Y1i|Ui)− I(Xi; Zi|Ui)
]
+ 2Γn(λn, τn), (3.199)
where (a) follows because Y2 is degraded from Y1; while (b) follows because Y1 is
less noisy than Z. One can notice that the two properties that define this class of
two-receiver DM-WBC are only needed to establish the upper-bound in (3.199). In
step (a), we needed to introduce the random variable Yi−12 into the two mutual in-
formation terms; that is where the degradedness relation comes into play. On the
other hand, in step (b) we needed to withdraw the term Yi−11 from the condition of
the two mutual information terms, and that is where we needed the less-noisy relation.
We now combine the bounds in (3.196) - (3.199), and introduce a random vari-
able T independent of all others and uniformly distributed over J1;nK, We then let
U = (UT,T), V = VT, X = XT, Y1 = Y1T, Y2 = Y2T and Z = ZT, followed by taking
the limit as n → ∞, such that Γn(λn) and Γn(λn, τn) → 0, while keeping in mind
that U− V − X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain. By doing so, we reach a region
that matches the one in (3.193) and this concludes our converse. What remains is
to highlight that the cardinality bounds on |U| and |V| follow from the Fenchel-Bunt
strengthening of the usual Carathe´odory’s theorem [35, Appendix C].
We have already mentioned in the beginning of this section that there exists two
scenarios where indirect decoding outperforms the classical decoding for our secure
communication model. In Theorem 3.14, we have presented our first scenario, while
the second scenario is introduced in the upcoming theorem:
Theorem 3.15. Consider a two-receiver DM-WBC with degraded message sets and
message cognition, where the second legitimate receiver Y2 is noisier than the first le-
gitimate receiver Y1, i.e. Y1  Y2. In addition, the eavesdropper is degraded from
the first legitimate receiver, X− Y1 − Z forms a Markov chain. Then, the joint-
strong secrecy capacity region is given by the union over the set of all rate quadruples
(Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ that satisfy
Rc ≤ I(U; Z)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(V; Y2|U)− I(V; Z|U)
Rc +R0 +R2 ≤ I(V; Y2)− I(V; Z|U) (3.200)
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for all possible choices of random variables (U,V,X), such that U− V − X− (Y1,Y2,Z)
forms a Markov chain. Further it suffices to have |U| ≤ |X | + 3 and |V| ≤ |X |2 +
4|X |+ 3.
Although the previous theorem describes a class of two-receiver DM-WBCs different
from the one described in Theorem 3.14, both classes have the same capacity region.
In fact, one can notice that the two classes have something in common: The first legit-
imate receiver has a statistical advantage over both the second legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper, while the relation between the second legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper is arbitrary. The superiority of the first legitimate receiver is established
based on two conditions: a degraded relation and a less noisy relation. The results
established in Theorem 3.14 and 3.15 implies that the exact assignment of these two
conditions does not matter.
In order to prove Theorem 3.15, we start by pointing out that the achievability of the
rate region in (3.193) follows directly from the rate region in (3.194) as long as Y1 is
less noisy than Z, as shown in the proof of Theorem 3.14. Since in the scenario de-
scribed by Theorem 3.15, we have a much stronger relation as Z is a degraded version
from Y1, then the achievability proof of Theorem 3.15 follows accordingly.
For the converse proof, we have already pointed out that the upper bounds established
in (3.196), (3.197) and (3.198) are valid for any general two-receiver DM-WBC and do
not require any assumptions on Y2 or Z. Thus, it remains to show that the bound on
R0 +R1 in (3.197) is also valid under the conditions mentioned in Theorem 3.15. We
proceed as follows:
R0 +R1 ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(M; Y1i|McYi−11 Z˜i+1)− I(M; Zi|McYi−11 Z˜i+1)
]
+ 2Γn(λn, τn)
(a)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
H(M|McYi−11 Z˜i+1Zi)−H(M|McYi−11 Z˜i+1Y1iZi)
]
+ 2Γn(λn, τn)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(M; Y1i|McYi−11 Z˜i+1Zi) + 2Γn(λn, τn)
(b)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Y1i|McYi−11 Z˜i+1Zi) + 2Γn(λn, τn)
(c)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Y1i|McYi−12 Z˜i+1Zi) + 2Γn(λn, τn)
(d)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(Xi; Y1i|Ui)− I(Xi; Zi|Ui)
]
+ 2Γn(λn, τn), (3.201)
where (a) follows because Z is degraded from Y1; (b) follows because M−Xi−Yi forms
a Markov chain; (c) follows from the less-noisy lemma established in [137, Lemma 1]
and the fact that Y1  Z; while (d) follows by reversing the first steps while keeping
in mind that Z is degraded from Y1. With this bound, our converse proof is complete.
Again we can see that the degraded and the less-noisy condition play a role in deriving
only the upper-bound on R0 +R1.
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3.5 Discussion
The results established in this chapter allowed us to achieve a better understanding for
the similarities and differences between the joint and individual secrecy criteria. This
helped us in identifying the advantages and disadvantages of each secrecy criterion.
Moreover, our investigation has lead to a better visualization of the communication
model described in Fig. 3.2. Yet, it has raised some further interesting questions.
Thus, we think it is important to highlight the following points:
1. Any coding scheme that satisfies the joint secrecy criterion will also satisfy the
individual one as well. This implies that any achievable joint secrecy rate region is
also an achievable rate region under the individual secrecy criterion. This result is due
to the fact that the individual secrecy is a less conservative secrecy measure, compared
to the joint one.
2. The joint secrecy criterion is a very conservative secrecy measure. Thus, even if
one of the confidential messages is revealed to the eavesdropper in a genie-aided way,
one can still show that the other messages remain protected. In order to examine this
claim, we investigate the following:
I(M0M1; ZnM2) = I(M0M1; M2) + I(M0M1; Zn|M2)
(a)
= I(M0M1; Zn|M2) (b)= τ1n,
where (a) follows because the messages are independent; while (b) follows from the
joint secrecy constraint in (3.8). The previous equation shows that the information
leakage of M0 and M1 to the eavesdropper, when M2 is known is still small.
3. The previous result does not hold under the individual secrecy criterion, which
is based on the mutual trust between the legitimate receivers. This means that if
one of the confidential messages is compromised, this might also affects the secrecy
of the other one. In order to understand this property, let us consider a special case
of our communication model where M0 = ∅ and assume that M2 is revealed to the
eavesdropper. Thus, we have:
I(M1; ZnM2) = H(M1)−H(M1|ZnM2).
Now, if the eavesdropper Z is less noisy than the first legitimate receiver –M1 is only
protected using secret key encoding–, the term H(M1|ZnM2) will vanish. This is be-
cause under the less noisy assumption, the eavesdropper can correctly decode any
information which the first legitimate receiver can decode. This implies that M1 is
fully leaked to the eavesdropper, when M2 is revealed to it. On the other hand, for a
general two-receiver DM-WBC the term H(M1|ZnM2) does not vanish, yet it is smaller
than H(M1). This means that a part of M1 might be leaked to the eavesdropper upon
revealing M2. The size of this part depends on how much the eavesdropper can infer
using its received signal Zn and M2.
4. Although the previous two points imply that joint secrecy might be more prefer-
able than individual secrecy, the capacity regions established in Theorem 3.8 and 3.9
promote individual secrecy over the joint one. This is because those theorems show
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that the individual secrecy criterion provides a larger capacity region compared to the
joint one. In fact, for some cases, the individual secrecy criterion can allow for a non
vanishing achievable secrecy rate, despite a vanishing joint secrecy capacity region,
cf. Theorem 3.10 and 3.11. The difference between the joint and individual capac-
ity regions arises from the fact that individual secrecy allows the usage of secret key
encoding beside the standard random wiretap encoding. That is why, the increase in
the individual secrecy capacity region is somehow related to the size of the individual
messages, which is used for secret key encoding.
5. The previous comparison between the joint and the individual secrecy criteria im-
plies that: The process of choosing among the two secrecy criteria is a simple trade-off
between a powerful secrecy measure and a larger capacity region. In particular, the
choice is based on whether the legitimate receivers trust one another or not.
6. In Section 3.3.1, we pointed out that the individual secrecy coding scheme that works
for all classes of the two-receiver DM-WBC is not optimal for the channels where the
legitimate receivers have a statistical advantage over the eavesdropper. This obser-
vation showed up while arguing that the achievability proof of Theorem 3.9 can not
be derived from the general achievable rate region given in Theorem 3.2 and we need
to use Theorem 3.3 instead. This result raises an important question about whether
there exists a universal individual secrecy coding scheme, which is optimal in the sense
that it establishes the capacity region for all the known cases and is independent of
the channel characteristics or not.
7. Another issue that was raised related to individual secrecy is that whether individ-
ual secrecy is a general useful secrecy notation that can be investigated for different
classes of channels, or it is a unique feature for the DM-WBC with message cognition.
This is a very important question. In fact, it is the main motivation behind the work
presented in the next chapter.
8. In the beginning of this chapter, we claimed that although the problem of common
message broadcasting and individual message broadcasting with message cognition
at the receivers are equivalent, their corresponding secrecy scenarios are not. One
of the reasons that support our claim is that there exists different classes of the two-
receiver DM-WBC, such that the secrecy capacity of the common confidential message
broadcasting problem is known, while the secure individual message broadcasting with
message cognition is still an unsolved issue. Among these channels are the relative less-
noisy channel, i.e. Y1  Y2, cf. Theorem 3.13 and the full more capable channel, i.e.
Y1 m.c Y2 m.c Z.
9. One of the most interesting results that we have established in this chapter is the
optimality of indirect decoding for a class of two-receiver DM-WBC with a strong
legitimate receiver as shown in Theorems 3.14 and 3.15. In those theorems, we argued
that a strong receiver requires a degraded relation and a less noisy relation. Never-
theless, we believe that indirect decoding might be optimal for strong receivers with
more relaxed constraints, for example two less noisy relations. However, despite our
hard efforts, we could not prove this conjecture.
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10. The last point that we would like to discuss is related to our joint-strong secrecy
Marton wiretap coding scheme. We already pointed out that the main difference be-
tween our coding scheme and the weak secrecy coding scheme introduced in [12] is the
encoding function. Nevertheless, both coding schemes resulted in the same constraints
on the randomization rates. Thus, one might wonder, whether it is really necessary to
use the maximum likelihood encoder in (3.20) to assure that our coding scheme fulfills
the strong secrecy measure or the classical Marton-coding scheme suggested by Chia
and El Gamal in [12] can be used instead.
Chapter 4
Multi-Receiver Wiretap Broadcast
Channels
This chapter discusses the problem of secure communication over a multi-receiver DM-
WBC under two different strong secrecy criteria: joint secrecy and individual secrecy.
First, we introduce our channel model and demonstrate the effect of varying the secrecy
criterion on the achievable rate region for the two-receiver case. Next, we limit our
investigation to the degraded multi-receiver DM-WBC and establish the joint and
individual strong secrecy capacity regions. The established capacity regions are then
used to derive the corresponding capacity regions for the Gaussian SISO and degraded
Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver WBC. Furthermore, we present a general achievable
rate region for the two-receiver DM-WBC under both the joint and the individual
strong secrecy criteria.
4.1 Secrecy in Multi-Receiver WBC
In this section, we introduce the problem of secure communication over the multi-
receiver DM-WBC and examine how it differs, depending on the investigated secrecy
criterion. This problem was only considered in previous literature under the joint se-
crecy criterion. That is why, we start this section by showing how individual secrecy is
an interesting secrecy criterion that can be applied to any multi-receiver channel and is
not a unique feature for the two-receiver DM-WBC with message cognition. We then
introduce a communication model that involves the transmission of individual confi-
dential messages over the multi-receiver DM-WBC and investigate the corresponding
joint and individual strong secrecy requirements. Finally, we discuss some of the results
established for secure communication over the two-receiver DM-WBC. These results
illustrate that individual secrecy can provide a larger secrecy capacity region compared
to the joint one.
4.1.1 Individual Secrecy Without Message Cognition
In the previous chapter, we showed that relaxing the secrecy constraint from the joint
secrecy criterion to the individual one can lead to a larger capacity region for two-
receiver DM-WBC with message cognition. The increase in the capacity region arises
from the fact that under the individual secrecy criterion, the confidential message of
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one receiver –which is available as side information at the other receiver– can be inter-
preted as a secret key shared between the transmitter and this receiver. Thus, instead
of only using wiretap random coding to protect the confidential message as in the joint
secrecy case, the individual secrecy criterion allows a combination of wiretap random
encoding and secret key encoding. In this combination the secret key encoded message
is used as a part of the randomization message required for the wiretap random coding,
which consequently leads to a larger capacity region.
The previous discussion advocated that individual secrecy is a unique feature for DM-
WBC with receiver side information (message cognition) and is not a general secrecy
measure. However, this argument contradicts the fact that the notation of individ-
ual secrecy was first introduced in [110] for the DM-MAWC. It goes without saying
that the receiving node in the DM-MAWC does not have any additional side infor-
mation. Nevertheless, one might argue that the individual secrecy notation used for
DM-MAWC is different from the one used for the DM-WBC. Although their argument
is slightly correct, it ignored the fact that both notation are based on the same con-
cept which is the mutual trust. Of course, the nature of the trusting nodes differs from
the DM-MAWC to the DM-WBC: In particular, for the DM-MAWC the mutual trust
is among the transmitting nodes, while for the DM-WBC it is among the receiving
nodes. However, we are convinced that individual secrecy is in fact a universal secrecy
criterion that can be used to investigated for any secure communication scenario.
In addition to our last statement, we need to highlight two important properties for
individual secrecy. The first property is that individual secrecy is only meaningful
for multi-user communication scenarios. This is because for single-user cases, the
individual secrecy criterion and the joint secrecy criterion are equivalent. The second
property is related to the dilemma raised in Section 3.1.4 about the interpretation of
individuality. Thus, we highlight one more time that in our investigation individuality
is addressed with respect to different transmission flows and has nothing to do with
the messages structure. Now, the main challenge is to develop coding schemes that
can utilize the concept of mutual trust granted by the individual secrecy criterion to
achieve bigger rate regions compared to the joint secrecy criterion.
4.1.2 Channel Model and Secrecy Criteria
The multi-receiver DM-WBC consists of a transmitter with an input alphabet X ,
k legitimate receivers with output alphabets Yj, where j ∈ J1; kK and an external
eavesdropper with output alphabet Z. For the input and output sequences xn, ynj
and zn of length n, the multi-receiver DM-WBC is given by the following transition
matrix:
QnY1...YkZ|X(y
n
1 , . . . , y
n
k , z
n|xn) =
n∏
i=1
QY1...YkZ|X(xi, y1i , . . . , yki , zi). (4.1)
Again, we assume that the transmitter and all receivers have perfect channel state
information (CSI) and limit our investigation to this case. we also assume that the
receiving nodes do not cooperate during decoding.
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We consider a communication scenario in which the transmitter transmits k confi-
dential messages, where each legitimate receiver is only interested in decoding his
corresponding message as shown in the following figure:
Encoder
Multi-Receiver
DM-WBC
QnY1...YkZ|X
(yn1 , . . . , y
n
k , z
n|xn)
Receiver 1, ϕ1
Receiver k, ϕk
Eavesdropper
xn
yn1
ynk
zn
M1, . . . ,Mk
Mˆ1
Mˆk
M1, . . . ,Mk
Secret
Figure 4.1: Multi-receiver DM-WBC
Definition 4.1. A (2nR1 , . . . , 2nRk , n) code C for the multi-receiver DM-WBC consists
of: k independent confidential message sets M1, . . . ,MK , a stochastic encoder at the
transmitter
E :M1 × · · · ×Mk → P(X n),
which maps the k confidential messages (m1, . . . ,mk) ∈ M1 × · · · ×Mk into a code-
word xn(m1, . . . ,mk) according to the conditional probability E(x
n|m1, . . . ,mk), and
k decoders, one for each legitimate receiver
ϕj : Ynj →Mj ∪ {?},
for j ∈ J1; kK that maps each channel observation at the respective receiver to the
corresponding required message or an error message {?}.
The previous definition considers a standard block code C of arbitrary but fixed length
n. It is fair to assume that C is known to the transmitter, the k legitimate receivers and
the eavesdropper. We further assume that M1, . . . , Mk are independent and uniformly
distributed random variables over their respective message sets.
In order to evaluate the reliability performance of the code C, we use the average
decoding error probability given by:
P¯e(C) ,P
[
Mˆ1 6= M1 or . . . or Mˆk 6= Mk
]
, (4.2)
where Mˆj is the estimated message at the j
th legitimate receiver. Our target is to
develop a coding scheme that complies with Definition 4.1 such that P¯e(C) is arbitrary
small. Moreover, it follows from [54] that under the assumption of perfect CSI, all the
results established under the average error probability constraint in Eq. (4.2) are also
valid for the maximum decoding error probability requirement.
On the other hand, we need the constructed code C to assure that the k confidential
messages are kept hidden from the eavesdropper. In order to measure the ignorance
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of the eavesdropper about the confidential messages, we use the two secrecy criteria
described in the previous chapter as follows:
1. Joint Secrecy: This criterion requires the leakage of the confidential message of
one user to the eavesdropper given the confidential messages of all other users to be
small. For our model, this requirement can be expressed as follows:
I(Mj; Zn|M1 . . .Mj−1Mj+1 . . .MkC) ≤ τjn, where lim
n→∞
τjn = 0. (4.3)
This criterion guarantees that the information leaked to the eavesdropper from one
user is small even if all the other confidential messages are compromised and known
by the eavesdropper. In most of the previous literature, the joint secrecy criterion is
defined such that, the mutual leakage of all confidential messages to the eavesdropper
is small [73]. This is expressed as follows:
I(M1 . . .Mk; Zn|C) ≤ τn where lim
n→∞
τn = 0. (4.4)
Although this definition is simpler than the one in (4.3), we can show that both def-
initions are equivalent for some τn ≥
∑k
j=1 τjn, using the same arguments introduced
in Section 3.1.3. As we mentioned before that we prefer the definition in (4.3) because
it provides a better understanding to the interpretation of the relation between the
legitimate receivers under the joint secrecy criterion. It also highlights the reason be-
hind the joint secrecy immunity against compromised receivers.
2. Individual Secrecy: This criterion requires the leakage of the confidential message
of each user to the eavesdropper to be small without conditioning on the confidential
messages of the others users. This requirement can be formulated as follows:
I(Mj; Zn|C) ≤ τjn, where lim
n→∞
τjn = 0. (4.5)
Differently from the conservative joint secrecy constraint in (4.3), the individual secrecy
constraint takes the mutual trust between the legitimate receivers into consideration.
This allows the legitimate receivers to cooperate in protecting their messages against
eavesdropping. For τn ≥
∑k
j=1 τjn, the conditions in (4.5) can be combined into one
constraint as follows:
k∑
j=1
I(Mj; Zn|C) ≤ τn. (4.6)
Although the secrecy constraint in (4.6) inherits the message individuality interpreta-
tion for individual secrecy, it still complies with the transmission flow interpretation
as well. This is because in the model in Fig 4.1 we do not have a common confidential
message, which implies that each individual confidential message simulates a separate
information flow. This is different from the communication model investigated in the
previous chapter, cf. Fig. 3.2, where we showed in Section 3.1.4 that the two interpre-
tations for the individuality are not the same.
It is worth mentioning that the joint and individual secrecy constraints in (4.3) and
(4.5) are defined according to the strong secrecy notation, cf. Section 2.1.4.
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Definition 4.2. A rate tuple (R1, . . . , Rk) ∈ Rk+ is a joint-strong secrecy achievable
rate tuple for the multi-receiver DM-WBC, if for all ηj where j ∈ J1; kK, λ > 0 and
τj > 0, there is an n(ηj, λ, τj) ∈ N such that for all n > n(ηj, λ, τj) there exists a
sequence of codes {C}n of Definition 4.1 that satisfies the following constraints:
1
n
log |Mj| ≥ Rj − ηj (4.7a)
P¯e(C) ≤ λ (4.7b)
I(Mj; Zn|M1 . . .Mj−1Mj+1 . . .MkC) ≤ τj, (4.7c)
where P¯e(C) is given by Eq. (4.2). The joint-strong secrecy capacity region CJ(Q) is
given by the set of all achievable joint-strong secrecy rate tuples (R1, . . . , Rk).
In order to show that a rate tuple (R1, . . . , Rk) is achievable under the joint-strong
secrecy criterion, it is enough to show that there exists a random coding scheme with
random variable C such that:
1
n
log |Mj| = Rj (4.8a)
lim
n→∞
E
[
P¯e(C)
]
= 0 (4.8b)
lim
n→∞
E
[
I(M1 . . .Mk; Zn|C)
]
= 0. (4.8c)
The validity of the previous argument follows from the Definition 4.2, the selection
lemma and the equivalency of the joint secrecy constraints in (4.3) and (4.4).
Similarly, we present the following definition for the achievable rates under the indi-
vidual secrecy constraint.
Definition 4.3. A rate tuple (R1, . . . , Rk) ∈ Rk+ is an individual-strong secrecy achiev-
able rate tuple for the multi-receiver DM-WBC, if for all ηj where j ∈ J1; kK, λ > 0
and τj > 0, there is an n(ηj, λ, τj) ∈ N such that for all n > n(ηj, λ, τj) there exists a
sequence of codes {C}n of Definition 4.1 that satisfies the following constraints:
1
n
log |Mj| ≥ Rj − ηj (4.9a)
P¯e(C) ≤ λ (4.9b)
I(Mj; Zn|C) ≤ τj, (4.9c)
where P¯e(C) is given by Eq. (4.2). The individual-strong secrecy capacity CI(Q) is
given by the set of all achievable individual-strong secrecy rate tuples (R1, . . . , Rk).
In order to show that a rate tuple (R1, . . . , Rk) is achievable under the individual-strong
secrecy criterion, it is enough to show that there exists a random coding scheme with
random variable C such that:
1
n
log |Mj| = Rj (4.10a)
lim
n→∞
E
[
P¯e(C)
]
= 0 (4.10b)
lim
n→∞
E
[ k∑
j=1
I(Mi; Zn|C)
]
= 0. (4.10c)
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The validity of the previous argument follows from the Definition 4.3, the selection
lemma and the equivalency of the individual secrecy constraints in (4.5) and (4.6).
The results established in this chapter were published in [138–140]. In a parallel
and independent work, secure communication over the two-receiver DM-WBC was
investigated under the joint secrecy criterion in [141, 142] and the individual secrecy
criterion in [143, 144]. However, both investigations only considered the weak secrecy
measure.
4.1.3 Rate Regions: Joint Vs Individual
In this section, we present some of the rate regions established for the two-receiver
DM-WBC under both the joint and individual strong secrecy criteria. These results
allow us to see how relaxing secrecy constraint from the joint to the individual secrecy
criterion can lead to a larger capacity regions.
Corollary 4.1. Consider a degraded two-receiver DM-WBC, where X− Y1 − Y2 − Z
forms a Markov chain. Then the joint-strong secrecy capacity region is given by the
union over the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+, that satisfy
R2 ≤ I(U; Y2)− I(U; Z) (4.11a)
R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U), (4.11b)
for all possible choices of random variables (U,X), such that U− X− Y1 − Y2 − Z
forms a Markov chain. Further it suffices to have |U| ≤ |X |+ 3.
This region was first established in [73] as mentioned in Section 2.4.3 but under the
joint-weak secrecy criterion. In Section 4.3.2, we provide a detailed achievability proof
for a more general case showing that strengthening the joint secrecy criterion from weak
secrecy to strong secrecy comes at no cost with respect to the secrecy capacity. On
the other hand, the converse follows using the standard techniques and procedures for
degraded DM-BC and is provided for the multi-receiver case in Section 4.2.1. Next, we
present the individual-strong secrecy capacity region for the same channel as follows:
Corollary 4.2. Consider a degraded two-receiver DM-WBC, where X− Y1 − Y2 − Z
forms a Markov chain. The individual-strong secrecy capacity region is given by the
union over the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+, that satisfy
R2 ≤ I(U; Y2)− I(U; Z) (4.12a)
R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U) + I(U; Z) (4.12b)
R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U) +R2 (4.12c)
for all possible choices of random variables (U,X), such that U− X− Y1 − Y2 − Z
forms a Markov chain. Further it suffices to have |U| ≤ |X |+ 3.
The achievability proof combines the techniques of wiretap random coding along with
secret key encoding and will be provided for the multi-receiver case in Section 4.2.2.
It also follows as a special case from the general individual-strong secrecy achievable
rate region which will be established in Section 4.3.3. On the other hand, the converse
follows by adapting the standard techniques and procedures for degraded DM-BC
Section 4.1  Secrecy in Multi-Receiver WBC 119
to the individual secrecy constraint and will be presented for the multi-receiver case
in Section 4.2.1 as well. Now, if we compare the two capacity regions given by the
previous two corollaries, we can notice the following:
• Eq. (4.11a) and Eq. (4.12a) imply that both secrecy measures have the same
bound on the confidential rate intended to the second legitimate receiver (weaker
legitimate receiver).
• The bound on R2 in (4.12a) implies that even under the individual secrecy
criterion, the optimal secrecy encoding scheme for the confidential message M2
intended for Y2 is a simple wiretap random coding.
• The two bounds on R1 in (4.12b) and (4.12c) compared to the one in (4.11b) im-
ply that individual secrecy allows a larger achievable rate for the first legitimate
receiver (stronger legitimate receiver).
• The bound in (4.12c) clearly indicate that the optimal secrecy encoding scheme
for the confidential message M1 intended for Y1 is some sort of combination
between wiretap encoding and secret key encoding, where the secret key encoding
part is somehow related to the confidential message M2 intended for Y2.
• The bound in (4.12b) on the other hand is very interesting as it implies that
under the individual secrecy constraint the first legitimate receiver can achieve a
secrecy rate larger than the one achieved for the public DM-BC without secrecy
constraints, cf. Theorem 2.6. The reason for such behavior is that unlike the
public case where the message intended for the first legitimate receiver is encoded
in the satellite codeword only, we will see that under the individual secrecy the
message intended for the first legitimate receiver is not only encoded in the
satellite codeword but also in the cloud center codeword.
In order to provide a better illustration regarding the effect of relaxing the secrecy
constraint (from joint to individual) on the secrecy capacity, we considered a very
common channel in wireless communication which is the Gaussian SISO-WBC. Since
the Gaussian SISO-WBC is an example for the Degraded DM-WBC, we have the
following results:
Corollary 4.3. The joint-strong secrecy capacity region of the two receiver Gaussian
SISO-WBC is given by the union of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ that satisfy
R2 ≤ f
(
α¯P
αP + σ22
)
− f
(
α¯P
αP + σ2Z
)
(4.13a)
R1 ≤ f
(
αP
σ21
)
− f
(
αP
σ2Z
)
(4.13b)
where the union is taken over all values of α ∈ [0, 1], such that α¯ = 1 − α and the
function f(a) is defined as follows: f(a) , 1
2
log(1 + a).
This region was first established in [93, 94] as highlighted in Section 2.4.7 but under
the joint-weak secrecy criterion. The achievability follows by selecting the random
variables (U,X) in Corollary 4.1 to be jointly Gaussian, where X = U + V can be
viewed as the summation of two independent zero-mean Gaussian random variables U
and V, with respective variances α¯P and αP . On the other hand, the converse follows
due to the optimality of Gaussian signaling.
Corollary 4.4. The individual-strong secrecy capacity region of the two receive Gaus-
sian SISO-WBC is given by the union of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ that satisfy
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R2 ≤ f
(
α¯P
αP + σ22
)
− f
(
α¯P
αP + σ2Z
)
(4.14a)
R1 ≤ f
(
αP
σ21
)
+ f
(
α¯P
αP + σ2Z
)
(4.14b)
R1 ≤ f
(
αP
σ21
)
− f
(
αP
σ2Z
)
+R2 (4.14c)
where the union is taken over all values of α ∈ [0, 1], such that α¯ = 1 − α and the
function f(a) is defined as follows: f(a) , 1
2
log(1 + a).
The achievability and the converse proofs follow by using the same techniques used to
establish the previous corollary. In Section 4.2.4, we will present a detailed proof for
the multi-receiver case. We now use the capacity regions in Corollary 4.3 and 4.4 to
provide a numerical example that illustrates the advantage of individual secrecy over
joint secrecy in terms of the achievable confidential rates.
Consider a two-receiver GWBC with the following parameters: σ21 = 0.05, σ
2
2 = 0.1
and σ2Z = 0.15. Additionally, let the total power achievable at the transmitter be
P = 1. The normalized confidential rates at different values of the superposition pa-
rameter α are plotted in Fig. 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Joint and individual secrecy capacity regions of a two-receiver Gaussian
SISO-WBC.
Although the previous example clearly shows that the individual secrecy criterion can
outperform the joint secrecy criterion in terms of the secrecy capacity region, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that the individual secrecy is vulnerable against compromised
receivers. Thus, as we mentioned in the previous chapter, The process of choosing
among the two secrecy criteria is a simple trade-off between a powerful secrecy mea-
sure and a larger capacity region.
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4.2 Secrecy Capacity Regions for the Degraded Multi-
Receiver WBC
In this section, we limit our investigation to the problem of secure communication over
the class of degraded multi-receiver DM-WBC as shown in Fig. 4.3. In this investiga-
tion, we establish the second main result of this thesis which is the individual-strong
secrecy capacity regions of the degraded, the Gaussian SISO and the degraded Gaus-
sian MIMO multi-receiver WBCs. Moreover, we show that the secrecy capacity region
established in [75] under the joint-weak secrecy criterion for the degraded multi-receiver
DM-WBC is also valid under the joint-strong secrecy criterion.
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Q = (W1,W2, . . . ,Wk, V )
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n
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Figure 4.3: Degraded multi-receiver DM-WBC
Before we present our results, we present a quick review about the degraded multi-
receiver DM-WBC in Fig. 4.3 and its main features. Degraded multi-receiver DM-
WBCs are a special case of the multi-receiver DM-WBC introduced in Section 4.1.2,
where the following relation holds:
X− Y1 − Y2 − · · ·−Yk − Z. (4.15)
The previous Markov chain is the main feature of a degraded multi-receiver DM-WBC.
The most important implication of this Markov chain is that each legitimate receiver
is capable of not only decoding its own message, but also the messages of all the
receivers degraded from it. This property plays an important role in establishing the
individual-strong secrecy capacity region.
4.2.1 Joint Secrecy: From Weak to Strong
In Section 2.2, we discussed the different secrecy measures used for secure communica-
tion over the discrete memoryless wiretap channel. We highlighted that strengthening
the secrecy measure from weak to strong secrecy or even effective secrecy does not
have an effect on the secrecy capacity of the DM-WC. We will show that the previous
statement also holds for the degraded multi-receiver DM-WBC under the joint secrecy
criterion. For this, we present the following result:
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Theorem 4.1. The joint-strong secrecy capacity region of the degraded multi-receiver
DM-WBC is given by the union over the set of all rate tuples (R1, . . . , Rk) ∈ Rk+ which
satisfy
Rj ≤ I(Uj; Yj|Uj+1)− I(Uj; Z|Uj+1), for j ∈ J1, kK, (4.16)
for all possible choices of random variables (U1, . . . ,Uk+1) such that U1 = X, Uk+1 = ∅.
Additionally, the following Markov chain holds: Uk − · · · − X− Y1 − · · ·−Yk − Z.
Further, it suffices to have |Uj| ≤ Bc
(|Uj+1|)(|X |+2j−1), where Bc(|A|) is the upper-
bound of the cardinality of the set A and Bc(|Uk+1|) , 1.
The previous theorem generalizes the joint-strong secrecy capacity region of the de-
graded two-receiver DM-WBC given by Corollary 4.1. In order to prove the achievabil-
ity of the rate region in (4.16), we first show that the two-receiver rate region in (4.11)
is achievable. We then argue that by extending the coding scheme from two receivers
to k receivers, the rate region in (4.16) follows accordingly. We already showed in Sec-
tion 2.4.4 that a coding scheme that combines the principles of superposition encoding
and wiretap random coding can be used to establish the achievability of the rate region
in (4.11) for the two-receiver DM-WBC under the joint-weak secrecy criterion. Thus,
we only need to show that the constraints on the randomization rates in Eq. (2.89)
derived under the weak secrecy analysis are enough to assure strong secrecy as well.
This can be done by applying the strong secrecy techniques discussed in Section 2.2.3
and will be shown in details for a more complex coding scheme in Section 4.3.2.
For the converse, we present a simpler proof than the one given in [75]. This proof
will help us in establishing the converse proof for the individual secrecy criterion. Our
proof is based on the standard converse techniques in addition to the properties of the
degraded multi-receiver DM-WBC, in particular the Markov chain in (4.15).
Now, let (R1, . . . , Rk) be an achievable joint-strong secrecy rate tuple for the degraded
multi-receiver DM-WBC. Furthermore, for j ∈ J1, kK, let τj > 0 and λ > 0, then
assume that for a sufficiently large n ∈ N, there exists a (2nR1 , . . . , 2nRk , n) code C of
Definition 4.1 such that:
nRj = H(Mj|C), (4.17a)
P¯e(C) ≤ λn = 2−nλ (4.17b)
I(Mj; Zn|M¨j+1C) ≤ τjn = 2−nτj , (4.17c)
where P¯e(C) is given by (3.7) and M¨j+1 , (Mj+1, . . . ,Mk). In order to simplify the
notation, the conditioning on the code C will be ignored in the upcoming steps. Using
the relations in (4.17), we can derive the following bound on the joint secrecy rate
intended for each legitimate receiver:
Rj
(a)
=
1
n
H(Mj|M¨j+1)
(b)
≤ 1
n
[
H(Mj|M¨j+1)−H(Mj|Ynj M¨j+1)
]
+ Γn(λn)
=
1
n
I(Mj; Ynj |M¨j+1) + Γn(λn)
(c)
≤ 1
n
[
I(Mj; Ynj |M¨j+1)− I(Mj; Zn|M¨j+1)
]
+ Γn(λn, τjn) (4.18)
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where Γn(λn) = 1/n H2(λn) + λn
∑k
j=1Rj and Γn(λn, τjn) = Γn(λn) + τjn/n. One can
easily show that Γn(λn, τjn) approaches 0 as n approaches infinity. Step (a) follows due
to the independence of the messages; (b) follows by applying Fano’s inequality along
with the fact that conditioning decreases entropy; while (c) follows from the secrecy
constraint in (4.17c). Next, we let Uij , (Mj,Yi−1j−1, Z˜i+1,Uij+1), where Yi−10 , Uik+1 ,
∅, Yi−1j = (Yj1, . . . ,Yji) and Z˜i+1 = (Zi+1, . . . ,Zn), then it follows that:
Rj
(a)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(Mj; Yji|M¨j+1Yi−1j Z˜i+1)− I(Mj; Zi|M¨j+1Yi−1j Z˜i+1)
]
+ Γn(λn, τjn)
(b)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(Mj; Yji|M¨j+1Y˙i−1j Z˜i+1)− I(Mj; Zi|M¨j+1Y˙i−1j Z˜i+1)
]
+ Γn(λn, τjn)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(Mj; Yji|Uij+1)− I(Mj; Zi|Uij+1)
]
+ Γn(λn, τjn)
(c)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(Uij; Yji|Uij+1)− I(Uij; Zi|Uij+1)
]
+ Γn(λn, τjn) (4.19)
where we use the following notation Y˙i−1j , (Yi−1j , . . . ,Yi−1k−1). Step (a) follows from
the Csisza´r sum identity [10, Lemma 7]; (b) follows from the Markov chain in (4.15)
which implies that (Yj+1, . . . ,Yk) are degraded from Yj; while (c) follows because Zi
is degraded from Yji, which implies that I(Yi−1j+1; Yji|Uij+1) ≥ I(Yi−1j+1; Zi|Uij+1).
Finally, for the bound in (4.19), we introduce a random variable T independent of
all others and uniformly distributed over J1;nK and let Uj = (UTj ,T), Yj = YjT and
Z = ZT for all j ∈ J1, kK. We then take the limit as n → ∞, which implies that
Γn(λn, τjn) → 0. This concludes our converse. It only remains to highlight that the
cardinality bounds follow from the Fenchel-Bunt strengthening of the Carathe´odory’s
theorem as in [35, Appendix C], while the validity of the Markov chain Uk−· · ·−U2−X
in the converse follows using the principle of functional dependence graph [145].
4.2.2 Individual-Strong Secrecy Capacity Region
Theorem 4.1 indicates that superposition wiretap encoding is optimal for the degraded
multi-receiver DM-WBC. According to the properties of superposition encoding, we
know that in order to decode the information encoded in the satellite codeword, one
needs to decode the information in the cloud center codeword as well. This implies
that for the degraded two-receiver DM-WBC, the first legitimate receiver (strong re-
ceiver) does not only decode its own confidential message M1 but it also decodes the
confidential message M2 intended for the second legitimate receiver (weak receiver).
This observation suggests that M2 can be interpreted in some sense as a secret key
shared between the transmitter and the first legitimate receiver. Thus, under the
individual secrecy measure, where the legitimate receivers trust each other, the first
legitimate receiver can achieve a higher secrecy rate. This idea motivated us to in-
vestigate secure communication over the degraded multi-receiver DM-WBC under the
individual secrecy constraint. We present the following result:
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Theorem 4.2. The individual-strong secrecy capacity region of the degraded multi-
receiver DM-WBC is given by the union over the set of all rate tuples (R1, . . . , Rk) ∈
Rk+ that satisfy
Rj ≤ I(Uj; Yj|Uj+1)− I(Uj; Z|Uj+1) +
k∑
l=j+1
Rl (4.20a)
Rj ≤ I(Uj; Yj|Uj+1) + I(Uj+1; Z) (4.20b)
k∑
l=j
Rl ≤
k∑
l=j
I(Ul; Yl|Ul+1) (4.20c)
for all possible choices of random variables (U1, . . . ,Uk+1) such that U1 = X, Uk+1 = ∅.
Additionally, the following Markov chain holds: Uk − · · · − X− Y1 − · · ·−Yk − Z.
Further, it suffices to have |Uj| ≤ Bc
(|Uj+1|)(|X |+2j−1), where Bc(|A|) is the upper-
bound of the cardinality of the set A and Bc(|Uk+1|) , 1.
In order to present an achievability proof for the previous coding theorem, we use the
following procedure: We start by showing that the for the degraded two-receiver DM-
WBC, the individual-strong secrecy capacity region given by Corollary 4.2 is achiev-
able. We then argue that by extending the coding scheme from two receivers to k
receivers, the rate region in Eq. (4.20) will follow accordingly. Thus, for now we limit
ourselves to the two-receiver channel model and present a coding scheme that can
achieve the rate region in (4.12):
Let n ∈ N be an arbitrary but fixed code block length and  > 0 be an arbitrary
constant. Moreover, let QUX ∈ P(U ×X ) be a fixed input probability distribution and
recall the probability transition matrix QY1Y2Z|X given in (4.1) that defines a degraded
two-receiver DM-WBC where X− Y1 − Y2 − Z forms a Markov chain.
1. Message Sets: We consider the following sets: two individual confidential message
sets M1 = J1, 2nR1K and M2 = J1, 2nR2K along with two randomization message sets
Mr1 = J1, 2nRr1 K and Mr2 = J1, 2nRr2 K. Furthermore, we assume that quantities of
the form 2nR, where R ∈ R+ are integers.
2. Rate Splitting: We start by dividing each individual message set Mj, for j ∈
{1, 2} into three independent parts Mjl = J1, 2nRjlK, for l ∈ {1, 2, 3}. In this division,
we force M11 and M21 to be of the same size and use them to construct M⊗1 =J1, 2nR⊗1 K by xoring their corresponding elements. We also make sure that M12 and
M22 are of the same size and use them to construct M⊗2 = J1, 2nR⊗2 K. The previous
rate splitting procedure implies the following rate constraints:
R⊗1 = R11 = R21 and R⊗2 = R12 = R22 (4.21a)
R11 +R12 ≤ R2. (4.21b)
3. Random Codebook C: Using the input distribution QUX, we generate the cloud
centers codewords un(m2,m⊗1 ,mr1) for m2 ∈M2, m⊗1 ∈M⊗1 and mr1 ∈Mr2 by gen-
erating the symbols ui(m2,m⊗1 ,mr1) with i ∈ J1, nK independently according to QU.
For every un(m2,m⊗1 ,mr1), we generate the satellite codewords x
n(m2,m⊗1 ,mr1 ,m13,
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m⊗2 ,mr2) for m13 ∈ M13, m⊗2 ∈ M⊗2 , and mr2 ∈ Mr2 by generating the symbols
xi(m2,m⊗1 ,mr1 ,m13,m⊗2 , mr2), independently at random according to QX|U(·|ui(m2,
m⊗1 ,mr1)).
4. Encoding E: Given a message pair (m1,m2) ∈M1×M2, the encoder deduces the
corresponding message triple (m13,m⊗1 ,m⊗2) then chooses a message pair (mr1 ,mr2)
uniformly at random from the sets Mr1 and Mr2 . Finally, it transmits the chosen
codeword xn(m2,m⊗1 ,mr1 ,m13,m⊗2 ,mr2).
5. First Legitimate Decoder ϕ1: Upon receiving y
n
1 , it outputs mˆ1 = (mˆ11, mˆ12,
mˆ13). First, it finds the unique pair of codewords messages
(
un(mˆ2, mˆ⊗1 , mˆr1), x
n(mˆ2,
mˆ⊗1 , mˆr1 , mˆ13, mˆ⊗2 , mˆr2)
)
which is jointly typical with yn1 . Next, it computes the pair
(mˆ11, mˆ12) by xoring (mˆ21, mˆ22) and (mˆ⊗1 , mˆ⊗2).
6. Second Decoder ϕ2: Given y
n
2 , it outputs m˜2 by finding the unique codeword
un(m˜2, m˜⊗1 , m˜r1) which is jointly typical with y
n
2 .
7. Reliability Analysis: In order to derive the rate constraints that assure that this
coding scheme satisfies the reliability constraint in (4.10b), we start by defining the
following average decoding error probability:
P¯e(C) , P
[
(Mˆ2, Mˆ⊗1 , Mˆr1 , Mˆ13, Mˆ⊗2 , Mˆr2) 6= (M2,M⊗1 ,Mr1 ,M13,M⊗2 ,Mr2)
or (M˜2, M˜⊗1 , M˜r1) 6= (M2,M⊗1 ,Mr1)
]
. (4.22)
We then observe that P¯e(C) ≥ P¯e(C), cf. (4.2) for k = 2. Using the standard joint-
typicality decoding arguments along with the fact that Y2 is degraded from Y1, we
can show that limn→∞ P¯e(C) = 0 as long as:
R2 +R⊗1 +Rr1 ≤ I(U; Y2)− δ2() (4.23a)
R13 +R⊗2 +Rr2 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− δ1(). (4.23b)
where  > 0 is the constant used during the typicality decoding. Moreover  can be
chosen in a way such that limn→∞ δ1(), δ2() = 0. In Section 4.3.3, we present a
detailed reliability analysis for a more complex coding scheme that include this coding
scheme as a special case.
8. Secrecy Analysis: In order to derive the rate constraints needed to assure that
our coding scheme satisfies the individual-strong secrecy constraint in (4.10c), we start
arguing that for a fixed code C the constraint in (4.10c) holds, if:
lim
n→∞
[
I(M2M13; Zn) + I(M11M12; Zn|M13)
]
= 0, (4.24)
where the previous formulation follows due to the rate splitting procedure used in our
coding scheme and the fact that the messages are independent. Based on the strong
secrecy analysis of wiretap random codes presented in Section 2.2, the first term in
Eq. (4.24) decays exponentially in n, if:
R⊗1 +Rr1 ≥ I(U; Z) + δ˜1(, γ) (4.25a)
R⊗2 +Rr2 ≥ I(X; Z|U) + δ˜2(, γ), (4.25b)
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where γ > 0 can be selected in a way such that limn→∞ δ˜1(, γ), δ˜2(, γ) = 0. On the
other hand, using the concept of secret key encoding, we can prove that the second
term in Eq. (4.24) vanishes as follows:
I(M11M12; Zn|M13) = H(M11M12|M13)−H(M11M12|ZnM13)
(a)
= H(M11M12)−H(M11M12|ZnM13)
(b)
≤ H(M11M12)−H(M11M12|M13M⊗1M⊗2Mr1Mr2)
(c)
= H(M11M12)−H(M11M12|M⊗1M⊗2)
(d)
= 0 (4.26)
where (a) follows because the messages are independent; (b) follows because (M2,M⊗1 ,
Mr1 ,M13,M⊗2 ,Mr2)−Xn− Zn forms a Markov chain and the fact that under the rate
constraint in (4.25), I(M2M13; Zn) decays exponentially in n, these two arguments im-
ply that given Zn and the message M13 the best decoder at the eavesdropper can at
most decode the messages (M⊗1 ,Mr1 ,M⊗2 ,Mr2) but not M2; (c) follows because only
M⊗1 and M⊗2 are related to M11 and M12; while (d) follows due to the secret key
encoding principle and the fact that the entropy of M21 and M22 is equivalent to the
entropy of M11 and M12 respectively. This equivalence follows because the random
variables that represent each secret key and the corresponding confidential message
are uniformly distributed over the same message set cf. Eq. (4.21).
The previous secrecy analysis shows that our coding scheme uses wiretap random cod-
ing to protect the confidential messages M2 and M13, while the confidential messages
M11 and M12 are protected using secret key encoding. Moreover, one can observe that
the secret key encoded message M⊗1 that contain the confidential message M11 is en-
coded in the cloud center codeword, while M⊗2 that contain the confidential message
M12 is encoded in the satellite codeword. This result is very interesting because both
message are only intended to the first legitimate receiver Y1 (stronger receiver) and in
superposition encoding the information intended for the stronger receiver are usually
encoded in the satellite codeword only.
9. Fourier-Motzkin Elimination: In order to finalize our achievability proof, we
need to confirm that the rate constraint established in (4.21), (4.23) and (4.25) leads
to the rate region in (4.12). We start by using the rate constraints in (4.25) with
equality and combine them with the rate constraints in (4.23). Thus, we have
R2 ≤ I(U; Y2)− I(U; Z)− δ´2(, γ) (4.27a)
R13 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U)− δ´1(, γ), (4.27b)
where δ´2(, γ) = δ2() + δ˜1(, γ) and δ´1(, γ) = δ1() + δ˜2(, γ). On the other hand,
using the rate constraints in (4.25) with equality along with the ones in (4.21a) directly
implies that:
R11 +R12 = R⊗1 +R⊗2 ≤ I(X; Z). (4.28)
Finally, we apply the Fourier-Motzkin elimination on the rate constraints in (4.27),
(4.28) and (4.21b) to solve for R2 and R1, while keeping in mind that R1 is the sum-
mation of R11, R12 and R13. We then take the limit as n → ∞, which implies that
δ´1(, γ), δ´2(, γ)→ 0. By doing so, we prove the achievability of any rate pair (R1, R2)
satisfying the bounds in (4.12).
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Now, in order to prove that the rate region given by Theorem 4.2 is achievable, we need
to extend the previous coding scheme to the multi-user case. The main approach is to
combine the principles of wiretap random coding and secret key encoding as follows:
First we divide each confidential message into k + 1 independent parts. Second we
use wiretap random coding only to protect the confidential message of the weakest
legitimate receiver Yk. For any other legitimate receiver Yj where j ∈ J1, k − 1K,
wiretap random coding is used to protect only one part of the confidential message
Mj. The remaining parts of Mj are protected using secret key encoding where the
messages of the weaker receivers are used as secret keys. Moreover, the secret key
encoded messages for the receiver Yj can be part of the randomization indexes in its
own superposition layer Uj and all lower layers as well. Following such coding scheme
establishes the achievability of the rate region in (4.20) because:
• The bounds in (4.20a) and (4.20b) result from the fact that the individual secrecy
rate of each legitimate receiver Yj for j ∈ J1, kK is bounded by the summation
of two rates:
1. The wiretap rate encoded in its layer Uj conditioned on the previous layer
Uj+1. This rate is given by:
I(Uj; Yj|Uj+1)− I(Uj; Z|Uj+1)
2. The secret key encoded rate, where the secret key encoded rate is bounded
by minimum of the secrecy rates of the weaker receivers
∑k
l=j+1 Rl or the
randomization rates that can be decoded by this receiver (randomization
rates in its layer and all lower layers):
k∑
l=j
I(Ul; Z|Ul+1) = I(Uj; Z|Uj+1) + I(Uj+1; Z). (4.29)
• For the degraded two-receiver DM-WBC, i.e. k = 2, the bounds in (4.20a) and
(4.20b) are enough as they directly lead to the rate region in (4.12). However,
for the multi-receiver case, we need the third bound in (4.20c) to assure two
different requirements:
1. Any randomization rate that is used to carry a secret key encoded message
for a certain user can only be used once. In other words, if the random-
ization rate I(Uj+2; Z|Uj+3) is used to carry part of the secret key encoded
message of the legitimate receiver Yj+1, it can not be used at the same
time to carry part of the secret key encoded message of Yj.
2. The total sum rate is bounded by the summation of the information en-
coded in each layer for the corresponding receiver. This constraint in
particular implies that although the individual secrecy rate for one of the
legitimate receiver might be larger than the corresponding public rate cf.
Theorem 2.6 and Corollary 4.4, the sum rate of the individual secrecy rates
can not exceed the sum rate of all public rates.
For the converse, we start by letting (R1, . . . , Rk) be an achievable individual-strong
secrecy rate tuple for the degraded multi-receiver DM-WBC. Further, for j ∈ J1, kK,
let τj > 0 and λ > 0, we assume that for a sufficiently large n ∈ N, there exists a
(2nR1 , . . . , 2nRK , n) code C of Definition 4.1 that satisfy the following:
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nRj = H(Mj|C), (4.30a)
P¯e(C) ≤ λn = 2−nλ (4.30b)
I(Mj; Zn|C) ≤ τjn = 2−nτj , (4.30c)
where P¯e(C) is given by (3.7). In order to simplify the notation, we ignore the con-
ditioning on the code C in the rest of the steps. Using the relations in (4.30), we can
derive the following bound on the individual secrecy rate intended for each legitimate
receiver as follows:
Rj
(a)
≤ 1
n
I(Mj; Ynj ) + Γn(λn)
(b)
≤ 1
n
[
I(Mj; Ynj )− I(Mj; Zn)
]
+ Γn(λn, τjn)
(c)
≤ 1
n
[
I(Mj; Ynj |M¨j+1)− I(Mj; Zn|M¨j+1) + I(M¨j+1; Zn|Mj)
]
+ Γn(λn, τjn)
(d)
≤ 1
n
[
I(Mj; Ynj |M¨j+1)− I(Mj; Zn|M¨j+1)
]
+
k∑
l=j+1
Rl + Γn(λn, τjn)
(e)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(Uij; Yji|Uij+1)− I(Uij; Zi|Uij+1)
]
+
k∑
l=j+1
Rl + Γn(λn, τjn), (4.31)
where Γn(λn), Γn(λn, τjn), M¨j+1 and U
i
j are as defined in Section 4.2.1. Step (a) follows
from Fano’s inequality; (b) follows from the individual secrecy constraint in (4.30c);
(c) follows due to the chain rule of mutual information which implies that I(Mj; Zn) ≥
I(Mj; Zn|M¨j+1)− I(M¨j+1; Zn|Mj); (d) follows because the messages are uniformly dis-
tributed over their respective sets, which implies that n
∑k
l=j+1Rl ≥ I(M¨j+1; Zn|Mj);
while (e) follows by applying the same steps in (4.19).
Next, if we only consider the reliability condition in (4.30b), we can derive another
bound for the rate intended to each legitimate receiver as follows:
Rj
(a)
≤ 1
n
[
I(Mj; Ynj |M¨j+1)
]
+ Γn(λn)
(b)
≤ 1
n
[
I(Mj; Ynj |M¨j+1) + I(M¨j+1; Zn)
]
+ Γn(λn)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(Mj; Yji|M¨j+1Yi−1j ) + I(M¨j+1; Zi|Z˜i+1)
]
+ Γn(λn)
(c)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(Mj; Yji|Uij+1) + I(M¨j+1; Zi|Z˜i+1) + I(Z˜i+1; Yji|M¨j+1Yi−1j )
]
+ Γn(λn)
(d)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(Mj; Yji|Uij+1) + I(M¨j+1Yi−1j ; Zi|Z˜i+1)
]
+ Γn(λn)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(Uij; Yji|Uij+1) + I(Uij+1; Zi)
]
+ Γn(λn), (4.32)
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality in addition to the independence of the mes-
sages; (b) follows due to the positivity of the mutual information; (c) follows from the
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chain rule of the mutual information; while (d) follows due to the Csisza´r sum iden-
tity [10, Lemma 7] which implies that I(Z˜i+1; Yji|M¨j+1Yi−1j ) = I(Yi−1j ; Zi|M¨j+1Z˜i+1).
Finally, we consider the sum of all the confidential rates and derive the following
bound:
k∑
l=j
Rl
(a)
≤ 1
n
K∑
l=j
I(Ml; Ynl |M¨l+1) + k · Γn(λn)
(b)
≤ 1
n
[
I(Mj; Ynj |M¨j+1) +
k∑
l=j+1
[
I(Ml; Ynl |M¨l+1)− I(Ml; Zn|M¨l+1)
]
+ I(M¨j+1; Zn)
]
+ k · Γn(λn)
(c)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(Uij; Yji|Uij+1) +
k∑
l=j+1
[
I(Uil; Yli|Uil+1)− I(Uil; Zi|Uil+1)
]
+ I(Uij+1; Zi)
]
+ k · Γn(λn)
(d)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
k∑
l=j
I(Uil; Yli|Uil+1) + k · Γn(λn) (4.33)
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality in addition to the independence of the mes-
sages; (b) follows due to the chain rule of the mutual information which implies that
I(M¨j+1; Zn) =
∑k
l=j+1 I(Ml; Zn|M¨l+1); (c) follows by applying the same steps in (4.19)
and (4.32); while (d) follows again due to the mutual information chain rule which
implies that
∑k
l=j+1 I(Uil; Zi|Uil+1) = I(Uij+1; Zi).
Next, we introduce a random variable T independent of all others and uniformly
distributed over J1;nK to the rate bounds in (4.31), (4.32) and (4.33) then let Uj =
(UTj ,T), Yj = YjT and Z = ZT for all j ∈ J1, kK. Finally, if we take the limit as
n→∞, which implies that Γn(λn, τjn),Γn(λn)→ 0, our converse is complete. Again,
we highlight that the cardinality bounds follow by the Fenchel-Bunt strengthening of
the Carathe´odory’s theorem.
4.2.3 Eavesdropper Degradedness Order
Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 were derived for the degraded multi-receiver DM-WBC in which
the eavesdropper is the weakest receiver as illustrated by the Markov chain in (4.15).
In general, any degraded multi-receiver DM-WBC –whether it is physically or statisti-
cally degraded– is characterized by a Markov chain with a certain degradedness order
among the legitimate receivers and the eavesdropper. This degradedness order plays
an important role in establishing both the joint and individual secrecy capacity regions
as highlighted in Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.2.2.
In the previous chapter particularly in Section 3.4.2, we argued that changing this order
affects the individual-strong secrecy capacity region of the two-receive DM-WBC with
degraded message sets and message cognition. In fact, we showed that although we
can establish the individual secrecy capacity for the two extreme scenarios (eavesdrop-
per is the weakest receiver and eavesdropper is the strongest receiver), the individual
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secrecy capacity of the intermediate scenario is still unknown. Thus, it is important
to investigate how changing the degradedness order of the eavesdropper affects the
joint and individual secrecy capacity regions established in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 re-
spectively. This investigation is important because it indicates whether the capacity
regions in (4.16) and (4.20) can be used to describe the capacity region of practical
multi-receiver degraded DM-WBCs, such as the multi-receiver Gaussian SISO WBC.
We start by dividing the k legitimate receivers into two groups. The first group con-
tains the legitimate receivers degraded from the eavesdropper, i.e. the eavesdropper is
stronger than those receivers. This group contains the legitimate receivers numbered
from d to k, where 1 ≤ d ≤ k. On the other hand, the second group contains the re-
maining legitimate receivers from which the eavesdropper is degraded. The legitimate
receivers of this group are numbered from 1 to d− 1.
1. Joint-Strong Secrecy Capacity Region (Theorem 4.1):
Although this region was established under the condition of having the eavesdropper
as the weakest receiver, it can be shown that it is valid for the other scenarios as well.
• Achievability: For a general degradedness order, the randomization rate needed
to confuse the eavesdropper is bigger than the decoding capability of the legitimate
receivers of the first group. In other words, for j ∈ Jd; kK, we have
I(Uj; Yj|Uj+1) ≤ I(Uj; Z|Uj+1). (4.34)
Thus, it follows that the achievable joint-strong secrecy rates for the legitimate re-
ceivers in this group vanish. Contrarily, nothing changes for the legitimate receivers
that belong to the second group of receivers. These two arguments imply that the
achievable rate region in (4.16) simplifies to:
0 ≤ Rj ≤
{
0 for j ∈ Jd; kK
I(Uj; Yj|Uj+1)− I(Uj; Z|Uj+1) for j ∈ J1; d− 1K.
• Converse: It was shown in [16, Proposition 3.4] that the joint secrecy capacity
vanishes if the legitimate receiver is degraded from the eavesdropper. In Section 3.4.2,
we extended this result to the less noisy case. This implies that, the confidential rate
of any legitimate receiver that belongs to the first group is upper bounded by zero. On
the other hand, the converse proof for the confidential rates of the legitimate receivers
that belong to the second group follows exactly as in (4.18) and (4.18), where k is
replaced by d− 1.
2. Individual-Strong Secrecy Capacity Region (Theorem 4.2):
Like the joint secrecy case, this region was established under the condition of having the
eavesdropper as the weakest receiver. The main challenge is that, based on the results
established in the previous chapter, the optimal coding scheme for the degraded two-
receiver DM-WBC with message cognition under the individual secrecy criterion varies
with the degradedness order of the eavesdropper. However, we show that this result is
a unique feature for the degraded two-receiver DM-WBC with message cognition and
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does not apply to the current scenario. In doing so, we show that the individual-strong
secrecy capacity region in (4.20) is valid for all degraded multi-receiver DM-WBC
regardless of the degradedness order of the eavesdropper.
• Achievability: Since for j ∈ Jd; kK, the condition in (4.34) is a property of the
channel and is independent of the investigated secrecy criterion, then it follows from
(4.20a) that the individual-strong secrecy rates intended for the legitimate receivers
that belong to the first group vanish, i.e. Rj = 0 for j ∈ Jd; kK. On the other
hand, the legitimate receivers of the second group along with the eavesdropper can be
interpreted as a degraded d-receiver DM-WBC where the eavesdropper is the weakest
receiver. Thus, for j ∈ J1; d− 1K, the following region is achievable:
Rj ≤ I(Uj; Yj|Uj+1)− I(Uj; Z|Uj+1) +
d−1∑
l=j+1
Rl
Rj ≤ I(Uj; Yj|Uj+1) + I(Uj+1; Z)
d−1∑
l=j
Rl ≤
d−1∑
l=j
I(Ul; Yl|Ul+1).
• Converse: We start by the legitimate receivers which belong to the first group.
The properties of degraded channel implies that if Y is degraded from Z, then Z is
also less noisy than Y. Based on Lemma A.8 and the previous argument, it follows
that for j ∈ Jd, kK, I(Mj; Ynj ) ≤ I(Mj; Zn). Since the subtraction of these two terms is
the first step in deriving an upper bound on Rj as shown in Eq. (4.31), then it follows
that Rj is upper-bounded by zero for j ∈ Jd, kK. On the other hand, the converse of
the confidential rates of the legitimate receivers of the second group follows exactly as
in Eqs. (4.31), (4.32) and (4.33), where k is replaced by d− 1.
The previous two arguments assure that Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 establish the charac-
terization of the joint and individual strong secrecy capacity regions for any degraded
multi-receiver DM-WBC regardless of the degradedness order of the eavesdropper.
4.2.4 Multi-Receiver Gaussian SISO WBC
The multi-receiver Gaussian SISO WBC is one of the most famous examples for a
degraded multi-receiver DM-WBC. The channel model follows directly from the model
of the two-receiver Gaussian SISO WBC introduced in Section 2.4.7 as follows:
Yj = X + Nj Z = X + NZ , (4.35)
where j ∈ J1, kK. The channel input X is subject to a power constraint, such that
E[X2] ≤ P . On the other hand, the channel noises (N1, . . . ,Nk) and NZ are zero-
mean Gaussian random variables, whose variances are given by (σ21, . . . , σ
2
k) and σ
2
Z
respectively. The relation between these variances defines the degradedness order of
the channel in the following sense:
if σ21 ≤ · · · ≤ σ2k ≤ σ2Z , (4.36)
then X− Y1 − · · · − Yk − Z forms a Markov chain.
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Based on the results established in the previous subsection, we can use Theorem 4.1
and Theorem 4.2 to evaluate the joint and individual strong secrecy capacity region
of the multi-receiver Gaussian SISO WBC for any order among the noises’ variances.
To do so, we only need to find the optimal joint distribution on the random variables
(X,U2, . . . ,Uk) that trace the boundaries of the capacity regions in (4.16) and (4.20).
With this in mind, we present the following result:
Theorem 4.3. The joint-strong secrecy capacity region of the multi-receiver Gaussian
SISO WBC is given by the union over the set of all rate tuples (R1, . . . , Rk) ∈ Rk+ that
satisfy
Rj ≤ f
(
αjP∑j−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
j
)
− f
(
αjP∑j−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
Z
)
. (4.37)
On the other hand, the individual-strong secrecy capacity region of the same channel
is given by the union over the set of all rate tuples (R1, . . . , Rk) ∈ Rk+ that satisfy
Rj ≤f
(
αjP∑j−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
j
)
− f
(
αjP∑j−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
Z
)
+
k∑
l=j+1
Rl (4.38a)
Rj ≤f
(
αjP∑j−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
j
)
+ f
( ∑k
i=j+1 αiP∑j
i=1 αiP + σ
2
Z
)
(4.38b)
k∑
l=j
Rl ≤
k∑
l=j
f
(
αlP∑l−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
l
)
(4.38c)
where j ∈ J1, KK and the unions are taken over all values of αj ∈ [0, 1] such that∑k
i=1 αi ≤ 1. Moreover, the function f(a) is defined as follows: f(a) , 12 log(1 + a).
The achievability of the two capacity regions in Theorem 4.3 follows by choosing the
random variables (Uk, . . . ,U2,X) in (4.16) and (4.20) respectively to be jointly Gaus-
sian. In particular, for every j ∈ J1, kK, we let Uj = Uj+1 + Vj, where Uk+1 = 0 and
Vj is an independent Gaussian random variable with variance αj. The decoder at a
certain receiver Yi, where i ∈ J1, kK, can decode all the random variables Vj for j ≥ i
because of the order of the variances in (4.36). Additionally the remaining Vj for j < i
are interpreted as interfering noise. This scheme will directly lead to the achievability
of the rates in (4.37) and (4.38).
Now, for the converse, we only focus on the individual secrecy case as the joint secrecy
converse can be established using the same steps. We start with the bound in (4.38a)
and consider the kth receiver. We have
Rk ≤ I(Uk; Yk)− I(Uk; Z)
(a)
=
[
I(X; Yk)− I(X; Z)
]
−
[
I(X; Yk|Uk)− I(X; Z|Uk)
]
(b)
≤
[
f
(
P
σ2k
)
− f
(
P
σ2Z
)]
−
[
I(X; Yk|Uk)− I(X; Z|Uk)
]
(c)
=
[
f
(
P
σ2k
)
− f
(
P
σ2Z
)]
−
[
f
(
α¯kP
σ2k
)
− f
(
α¯kP
σ2Z
)]
(d)
= f
(
αkP∑k−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
k
)
− f
(
αkP∑k−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
Z
)
, (4.39)
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where (a) follows by using the chain rule along with the fact that Uk−X−(Yk,Z) forms
a Markov chain; (b) follows because for a Gaussian SISO WBC the term I(X; Yk) −
I(X; Z) is maximized by a Gaussian signaling for the random variable X [11]; while (c)
follows because
0 ≤ I(X; Yk|Uk)− I(X; Z|Uk) ≤ f
(
P
σ2k
)
− f
(
P
σ2Z
)
.
This implies that for any pair (Uk,X), there exists an α¯k ∈ [0, 1], such that the equality
in (c) holds. On the other hand, (d) follows by letting αk = 1− α¯k and α¯k =
∑k−1
i=1 αi.
Now, we consider the (k − 1)th receiver under the same bound, we have
Rk−1 ≤ I(Uk−1; Yk−1|Uk)− I(Uk−1; Z|Uk) +Rk
(a)
=
[
I(X; Yk−1|Uk)− I(X; Z|Uk)
]
−
[
I(X; Yk−1|Uk−1)− I(X; Z|Uk−1)
]
+Rk
(b)
≤
[
f
(
α¯kP
σ2k−1
)
− f
(
α¯kP
σ2Z
)]
−
[
I(X; Yk−1|Uk−1)− I(X; Z|Uk−1)
]
+Rk
(c)
=
[
f
(
α¯kP
σ2k−1
)
− f
(
α¯kP
σ2Z
)]
−
[
f
(
α¯k−1P
σ2k
)
− f
(
α¯k−1P
σ2Z
)]
+Rk
(d)
= f
(
αk−1P∑k−2
i=1 αiP + σ
2
k
)
− f
(
αk−1P∑k−2
i=1 αiP + σ
2
Z
)
+Rk, (4.40)
where (a) follows from the mutual information chain rule and the fact that Uk−Uk−1−
X − (Yk−1,Z) forms a Markov chain; (b) follows because from step (c) in Eq. (4.39),
we have:
I(X; Yk|Uk)− I(X; Z|Uk) = f
(
α¯kP
σ2k
)
− f
(
α¯kP
σ2Z
)
.
We know from [94] that under this condition, the expression I(X; Yk−1|Uk)−I(X; Z|Uk)
is maximized by a joint Gaussian distribution on the pair (Uk,X); (c) follows based
on the same arguments used to establish step (c) in Eq. (4.39); while (d) follows by
letting αk−1 = α¯k − α¯k−1 and α¯k−1 =
∑k−2
i=1 αi.
Now, if we apply the same steps used to establish (4.40) to the remaining legitimate
receivers, we can show that the bound in (4.38a) holds. These calculations establish
two additional constraints: the first is
∑k
i=1 αi = 1, while the second is the following
bound:
I(Uj; Yj|Uj+1)− I(Uj; Z|Uj+1) ≤ f
(
αjP∑j−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
j
)
− f
(
αjP∑j−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
Z
)
.
(4.41)
The two previous constraints along with Lemma A.9 directly imply that the following
power constraint: E[U2j ] ≤
∑k
i=j αiP is true for all j ∈ J1, kK. We now focus on the
rate constraint in (4.38b) and derive it as follows:
Rj ≤ I(Uj; Yj|Uj+1) + I(Uj+1; Z)
(a)
= I(Uj; Yj|Uj+1)− I(Uj; Z|Uj+1) + I(Uj; Z)
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(b)
≤ f
(
αjP∑j−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
j
)
− f
(
αjP∑j−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
Z
)
+ I(Uj; Z)
(c)
≤ f
(
αjP∑j−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
j
)
− f
(
αjP∑j−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
Z
)
+ f
( ∑k
i=j αiP∑j−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
Z
)
= f
(
αjP∑j−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
j
)
+ f
( ∑k
i=j+1 αiP∑j
i=1 αiP + σ
2
Z
)
, (4.42)
where (a) follows from the the chain rule of the mutual information and the fact that
Uj+1 − Uj − Z forms a Markov chain; (b) follows based on the same arguments used
to establish the rate constraint in (4.38a); while (c) follows because under the power
constraints on Uj and X, in addition to the following Markov chain Uj − X − Z, the
mutual information term I(Uj; Z) is maximized by a joint Gaussian distribution on the
pair (Uj,X). Finally, we establish the rate constraint in (4.38c) as follows:
k∑
l=j
Rl ≤
k∑
l=j
I(Ul; Yl|Ul+1)
(a)
=
k∑
l=j
[
I(Ul; Yl|Ul+1)− I(Ul; Z|Ul+1)
]
+ I(Uj; Z)
(b)
≤
k∑
l=j
[
f
(
αlP∑l−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
l
)
− f
(
αlP∑l−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
Z
)]
+ I(Uj; Z)
(c)
≤
k∑
l=j
[
f
(
αlP∑l−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
l
)
− f
(
αlP∑l−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
Z
)]
+ f
( ∑k
i=j αiP∑j−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
Z
)
=
k∑
l=j
f
(
αlP∑l−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
l
)
, (4.43)
where (a) follows by using the chain rule of the mutual information and the fact that
Uk−Uk−1− · · ·−Uj −Z forms a Markov chain; while (b) and (c) follows based on the
same arguments used to derive Eq. (4.42). This completes our converse proof.
It is important to point out that comparing the joint-strong secrecy capacity region
established in Theorem 4.3 and the joint-weak secrecy capacity established in [94]
implies that for the multi-receiver Gaussian SISO WBC strengthening the secrecy
criteria from weak secrecy to strong secrecy comes at no cost with respect to the
capacity region. However, our results implies that this does not hold, when moving
from the strict constraints of the joint secrecy to the loose constraints of individual
secrecy.
4.2.5 Multi-Receiver Degraded Gaussian MIMO WBC
In this section, we extend the secrecy capacity results established for the Gaussian SISO
WBC to the class of degraded Gaussian MIMO WBC. This class is also a practical
example for degraded DM-WBCs. The channel model follows directly from the model
of the two-receiver Gaussian MIMO WBC introduced in Section 2.4.7 as follows:
Yj = X + Nj Z = X + NZ , (4.44)
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for j ∈ J1, kK. The channel input X is subject to a covariance constraint, such that:
E[XX>]  S, where S  0. On the other hand, the noise vectors (N1, . . . ,Nk,NZ)
are zero-mean Gaussian random vectors, whose covariance matrices are given by
(Σ1, . . . ,Σk,ΣZ). Similar to the Gaussian SISO WBC, the relation between these
covariance matrices defines the degradedness order of the channel as follows:
if 0 ≺ Σ1  Σ2  · · ·  Σk  ΣZ , (4.45)
then X− Y1 − · · · − Yk − Z forms a Markov chain.
Although it is more common in literature and practically meaningful to consider a
sum power constraint, we use a covariance constraint instead because it eases the
derivation of the capacity region. Nevertheless, it was shown in [102], that once the
capacity region is obtained under a covariance constraint, the capacity region under
the sum power constraint follows easily. Now, based on the results established in
Section 4.2.3 along with the secrecy capacity regions given in Theorem 4.1 and 4.2, we
present the following coding theorem.
Theorem 4.4. The joint-strong secrecy capacity region of the degraded multi-receiver
Gaussian MIMO WBC is given by the union over the set of all rate tuples (R1, . . . , Rk) ∈
Rk+ that satisfy
Rj ≤ 1
2
log
∣∣∣∑ji=1 Ki + Σj∣∣∣∣∣∣∑j−1i=1 Ki + Σj∣∣∣ −
1
2
log
∣∣∣∑ji=1 Ki + ΣZ∣∣∣∣∣∣∑j−1i=1 Ki + ΣZ∣∣∣ . (4.46)
On the other hand, the individual-strong secrecy capacity region of the same channel
is given by the union over the set of all rate tuples (R1, . . . , Rk) ∈ Rk+ that satisfy
Rj ≤ 1
2
log
∣∣∣∑ji=1 Ki + Σj∣∣∣∣∣∣∑j−1i=1 Ki + Σj∣∣∣ −
1
2
log
∣∣∣∑ji=1 Ki + ΣZ∣∣∣∣∣∣∑j−1i=1 Ki + ΣZ∣∣∣ +
k∑
l=j+1
Rl (4.47a)
Rj ≤ 1
2
log
∣∣∣∑ji=1 Ki + Σj∣∣∣∣∣∣∑j−1i=1 Ki + Σj∣∣∣ +
1
2
log
∣∣∣∑ki=1 Ki + ΣZ∣∣∣∣∣∣∑ji=1 Ki + ΣZ∣∣∣ (4.47b)
k∑
l=j
Rl ≤
k∑
l=j
1
2
log
∣∣∣∑li=1 Ki + Σl∣∣∣∣∣∣∑l−1i=1 Ki + Σl∣∣∣ (4.47c)
where j ∈ J1, kK and the unions are taken over all possible positive semi-definite ma-
trices Kj  0, such that
∑k
i=1 Ki  S. Moreover, the function |A| is simply the
determinant of the matrix A.
The two secrecy capacity regions in Theorem 4.4 can be achieved using a Gaussian
random vector realization for the auxiliary random variables (Uk, . . . ,U2,X) in The-
orem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 respectively. The vectors are constructed recursively as
follows: Uj = Uj+1 + Vj, where Vj is a Gaussian random vector with covariance ma-
trices Kj and is independent of Uj+1. Moreover, Uk+1 is assumed to be a zero vector.
This means that for every j ∈ J1, kK, the vector Vj contains information about the
confidential message Mj. The decoder at a certain receiver Yi can decode all vectors
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Vj for j ≥ i, while handling the remaining Vj for j < i as noise. This follows due to
the order of the covariance matrices of the noise vectors in (4.45).
Now, for the converse, we only focus on the individual secrecy case as the joint secrecy
converse can be established by applying similar steps. We start by highlighting an
important upper-bound established in [94] for the multi-receiver degraded Gaussian
MIMO WBC as follows:
I(Uj; Yj|Uj+1)− I(Uj; Z|Uj+1) ≤ 1
2
log
∣∣∣∑ji=1 Ki + Σj∣∣∣∣∣∣∑j−1i=1 Ki + Σj∣∣∣ −
1
2
log
∣∣∣∑ji=1 Ki + ΣZ∣∣∣∣∣∣∑j−1i=1 Ki + ΣZ∣∣∣ ,
(4.48)
where Uk − · · · − U2 − X − Y1 − · · · − Yk − Z forms a Markov chain and Kj  0
are positive semi-definite matrices, such that
∑k
i=1 Ki = S, where E[XX>]  S. The
establishment of the previous bound uses similar steps to the one used to establish
the bound in (4.41) for the Gaussian SISO case, along with the properties of Fisher
information matrix. Eq. 4.48 directly implies that the bound in (4.20a) simplifies to
the one in (4.47a) for the multi-receiver degraded Gaussian MIMO WBC. Thus, we
only need to derive the bounds in (4.47b) and (4.47c). From Eq. (4.20b), we have
Rj
(a)
≤ I(Uj; Yj|Uj+1)− I(Uj; Z|Uj+1) + I(Uj; Z)
(b)
≤ 1
2
log
∣∣∣∑ji=1 Ki + Σj∣∣∣∣∣∣∑j−1i=1 Ki + Σj∣∣∣ −
1
2
log
∣∣∣∑ji=1 Ki + ΣZ∣∣∣∣∣∣∑j−1i=1 Ki + ΣZ∣∣∣ + I(Uj; Z)
(c)
≤ 1
2
log
∣∣∣∑ji=1 Ki + Σj∣∣∣∣∣∣∑j−1i=1 Ki + Σj∣∣∣ −
1
2
log
∣∣∣∑ji=1 Ki + ΣZ∣∣∣∣∣∣∑j−1i=1 Ki + ΣZ∣∣∣ +
1
2
log
∣∣∣∑ki=1 Ki + ΣZ∣∣∣∣∣∣∑j−1i=1 Ki + ΣZ∣∣∣
=
1
2
log
∣∣∣∑ji=1 Ki + Σj∣∣∣∣∣∣∑j−1i=1 Ki + Σj∣∣∣ +
1
2
log
∣∣∣∑ki=1 Ki + ΣZ∣∣∣∣∣∣∑ji=1 Ki + ΣZ∣∣∣ , (4.49)
where (a) follows from the the chain rule of the mutual information and the fact that
Uj+1 − Uj − Z forms a Markov chain; (b) follows from (4.48) and the fact that for
a degraded Gaussian MIMO BC with the following Markov chain Uj − X − Z, the
expression I(Uj; Z) is maximized by a vector realization Uj for the auxiliary random
variable Uj, such that Uj and X are jointly Gaussian. On the other hand, (c) follows
from the covariance constraint on Uj enforced by Lemma A.10. Now, it only remains
to derive the bound in (4.47c). From Eq. (4.20c), we have
k∑
l=j
Rl
(a)
≤
k∑
l=j
[
I(Ul; Yl|Ul+1)− I(Ul; Z|Ul+1)
]
+ I(Uj; Z)
(b)
≤
k∑
l=j
1
2
log
∣∣∣∑li=1 Ki + Σl∣∣∣∣∣∣∑l−1i=1 Ki + Σl∣∣∣ −
1
2
log
∣∣∣∑li=1 Ki + ΣZ∣∣∣∣∣∣∑l−1i=1 Ki + ΣZ∣∣∣
+ 1
2
log
∣∣∣∑ki=1 Ki + ΣZ∣∣∣∣∣∣∑j−1i=1 Ki + ΣZ∣∣∣
=
k∑
l=j
1
2
log
∣∣∣∑li=1 Ki + Σl∣∣∣∣∣∣∑l−1i=1 Ki + Σl∣∣∣ , (4.50)
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where (a) follows by using the chain rule of the mutual information and the fact that
Uk − Uk−1 − · · · − Uj − Z forms a Markov chain; while (b) follows based on the same
arguments used to establish the bound in (4.49). This completes our converse.
It is important to point out that the joint-strong secrecy capacity region established
in Theorem 4.4 can be used to establish the joint-strong secrecy capacity region of the
general multi-receiver Gaussian MIMO WBC. This can be done by following the same
ideas used in [94], which shows that dirty-paper coding with stochastic encoding is
the optimal coding scheme. However, this optimality can not be established under the
individual secrecy criterion. This implies that the individual-strong secrecy capacity
of the general multi-receiver Gaussian MIMO WBC is still unknown.
4.3 Achievable Rate Regions for the Two-Receiver
DM-WBC
In this section, we limit our investigation to the problem of secure communication over
a general two-receiver DM-WBC. At first, we derive a general achievable rate region
that fulfills the joint-strong secrecy criterion. This region does not only strengthen
the region established in [73] to the strong secrecy measure, but it can also be used
to recover the joint-strong secrecy capacity region of the degraded two-receiver DM-
WBC. Moreover, we modify our coding scheme to adhere to the individual-strong
secrecy criterion and establish a general achievable rate region that can also be used to
derive the achievability of the individual-strong secrecy capacity region of the degraded
two-receiver DM-WBC. Our results have some intuition that even for the general two-
receiver DM-WBC, relaxing the secrecy requirement from joint to individual can lead
to a larger achievable rate region.
4.3.1 Motivation and Main Results
The general two-receiver DM-WBC was first investigated under the joint-weak secrecy
constraint in [73], where an achievable rate region that utilizes the classical wiretap
Marton coding was established. The main issue of the region given therein is that it
fails to recover the joint-weak secrecy capacity region of the degraded two-receiver DM-
WBC, where the optimal coding strategy is a simple superposition wiretap random
code. This is because Marton coding is in general not optimal without a superposition
variable as highlighted in [35]. This observation encouraged us to derive the following
achievable rate region:
Theorem 4.5. An achievable joint-strong secrecy rate region for the two-receiver DM-
WBC is given by the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ that satisfy
R1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|T)− I(V0V1; Z|T) (4.51a)
R2 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2|T)− I(V0V2; Z|T) (4.51b)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|T) + I(V2; Y2|V0T)−Re (4.51c)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|V0T) + I(V0V2; Y2|T)−Re (4.51d)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|T) + I(V0V2; Y2|T)− I(V0; Z|T)−Re, (4.51e)
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where Re , I(V0V1V2; Z|T) + I(V1; V2|V0T). The random variables that define the
previous rate region are characterized by the following joint probability distribution:
QT QV0|T QV1V2|V0 QX|V0V1V2 QY1Y2Z|X, such that T− V0 − (V1,V2)− X− (Y1,Y2,Z)
forms a Markov chain.
The achievability proof of Theorem 4.5 is based on a coding scheme that utilizes a
wiretap Marton code with a superposition variable along with the principles of rate
splitting and time sharing. If we let V0 = ∅, the rate region in Theorem 4.5 simplifies
to the one established in [73] under the joint-weak secrecy constraint. Moreover, if we
let V0 = V2 = U and V1 = X, the rate region in Theorem 4.5 recover the joint-strong
secrecy capacity region of the degraded two-receiver DM-WBC given in Corollary 4.1.
This implies that our rate region given by (4.51) is a more general rate region.
In Section 3.4, we showed that for a class of less noisy DM-WBC with message cognition
the individual-strong secrecy capacity region is bigger than the joint one. The same
result was also established in Section 4.2 for the degraded, Gaussian SISO and degraded
Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver WBC. These two observations might suggest that the
individual-strong secrecy criterion can in general provide a larger rate region compared
to the joint-strong secrecy criterion. On the other hand, one might claim that the
increase in the individual secrecy capacity region is a unique feature for these two
scenarios. Specially, because for the DM-WBC with message cognition the increase
in the individual secrecy capacity originated from the availability of the receiver side
information. Similarly, the larger individual capacity regions presented in Section 4.2
are due to the statistical advantage possessed by the legitimate receivers over each
other. Thus, in order to show that individual secrecy can outperform joint secrecy for
a DM-WBC, where neither receiver side information nor a certain order among the
legitimate receivers decoding capabilities exists, we present the following rate region:
Theorem 4.6. An achievable individual-strong secrecy rate region for the two-receiver
DM-WBC is given by the set of all rate pairs (R1 = R11 +R12, R2 = R21 +R22) ∈ R2+
that satisfy
R1 +R21 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|T)− I(V0V1; Z|T) + min
[
I(V0V1; Z|T), R21
]
(4.52a)
R2 +R11 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2|T)− I(V0V2; Z|T) + min
[
I(V0V2; Z|T), R11
]
(4.52b)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|T) + I(V2; Y2|V0T)−Re +Rs (4.52c)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|V0T) + I(V0V2; Y2|T)−Re +Rs (4.52d)
R1 +R2 +R11 +R21 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|T) + I(V0V2; Y2|T)− I(V0; Z|T)−Re +Rs,
(4.52e)
where Re , I(V0V1V2; Z|T) + I(V1; V2|V0T), while Rs , min
[
I(V0V1V2; Z|T), R11 +
R21
]
. The random variables that define the previous rate region are characterized by
the following joint probability distribution: QT QV0|T QV1V2|V0 QX|V0V1V2 QY1Y2Z|X,
such that the following Markov chain holds: T− V0 − (V1,V2)− X− (Y1,Y2,Z).
Besides the coding techniques used to prove Theorem 4.5, the achievability proof of
Theorem 4.6 utilizes the concept of secret key encoding as well. This is because un-
der the individual secrecy criterion, the legitimate receivers trust each other which
allows the usage of the whole or a part of the confidential message of one receiver as
a secret key for the other one. However, in order for this coding technique to work,
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each receiver must find a way to acquire a full knowledge about the part of the other
receiver’s confidential message used as a secret key. This can be done by possessing
a prior knowledge about the second user’s message as in the DM-WBC with message
cognition discussed in Chapter 3 or by obtaining this information from its channel ob-
servation as in our case. The detailed achievability proof of this theorem is presented
in Section 4.3.3.
It is important to point out that the rate region in Theorem 4.6 recovers the individual-
strong secrecy capacity region of the degraded two-receiver DM-WBC given by Corol-
lary 4.2. In order to show this, we start by letting R11 = 0, R21 = R2, V0 = V2 = U,
V1 = X and T = ∅. We then observe that under these substitutions, the rate region
in (4.52) simplifies to:
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X; Y1)− I(X; Z) + min
[
I(X; Z), R2
]
(4.53a)
R2 ≤ I(U; Y2)− I(U; Z) (4.53b)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X; Y1|U) + I(U; Y2)− I(X; Z) + min
[
I(X; Z), R2
]
(4.53c)
R1 + 2R2 ≤ I(X; Y1) + I(U; Y2)− I(U; Z)− I(X; Z) + min
[
I(X; Z), R2
]
, (4.53d)
where the rate constraints in (4.52a) and (4.52c) simplify to the one in (4.53a). More-
over, we notice that under these substitutions, the rate constraint in (4.53d) is simply
the addition of (4.53a) and (4.53b). Next, we expand each bound in (4.53) that contain
a minimization into two bounds and make use of the rate constraint on R2 given by
(4.53b) to modify all the bounds on the sum rate (R1 + R2) to a bound on R1 only.
By doing so, we reach the following:
R1 ≤ I(X; Y1)− I(U; Y2) + I(U; Z) (4.54a)
R1 ≤ I(X; Y1)− I(X; Z) (4.54b)
R2 ≤ I(U; Y2)− I(U; Z) (4.54c)
R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U) + I(U; Z) (4.54d)
R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U) + I(U; Y2)− I(X; Z). (4.54e)
We finally use the fact that we are only interested in the degraded two-receiver WBC,
i.e. U− X− Y1 − Y2 − Z forms a Markov chain. This implies that I(U; Y1) ≥ I(U; Y2).
Using this relation along with the fact that I(X; Y1) = I(X; Y1|U) + I(U; Y1), we can
show that the bound in (4.54e) is tighter than the one in (4.54b). This is also true for
the bound in (4.54d) and (4.54a). Thus, the rate region in (4.54) simplifies to:
R2 ≤ I(U; Y2)− I(U; Z) (4.55a)
R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U) + I(U; Z) (4.55b)
R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U) +R2, (4.55c)
where the bound in (4.55c) follows by using the fact that I(X; Z) = I(X; Z|U) + I(U; Z)
along with the bound on R2 in Eq. (4.55b). The rate region in (4.55) is identical to
the individual-strong secrecy capacity region of the degraded two-receiver DM-WBC
given by Corollary 4.2.
One of the motivations that encouraged us to derive the achievable secrecy rate region
in Theorem 4.6 is to compare it with the one in Theorem 4.5. The aim of this compari-
son is to investigate whether individual secrecy can outperform the joint secrecy or not
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for the general two-receiver DM-WBC. However, it is not easy to answer this question
using a direct comparison between the rate regions in Theorems 4.5 and 4.6. Thus, we
only consider a special case, where the input distribution QTV0V1V2X has the following
properties: T = ∅, R11 ≤ I(V0V1; Z), R21 ≤ I(V0V2; Z) and R11 +R21 ≤ I(V0V1V2; Z).
For such input distribution the achievable joint-strong secrecy rate region in (4.51)
simplifies to:
R1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1)− I(V0V1; Z) (4.56a)
R2 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2)− I(V0V2; Z) (4.56b)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1) + I(V2; Y2|V0)−Re (4.56c)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|V0) + I(V0V2; Y2)−Re (4.56d)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1) + I(V0V2; Y2)− I(V0; Z)−Re, (4.56e)
where Re , I(V0V1V2; Z) + I(V1; V2|V0). On the other hand, under the same assump-
tions on the input distribution, the achievable individual-strong secrecy rate region in
(4.52) simplifies to:
R1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1)− I(V0V1; Z) (4.57a)
R2 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2)− I(V0V2; Z) (4.57b)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1) + I(V2; Y2|V0)−Re +R11 +R21 (4.57c)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|V0) + I(V0V2; Y2)−Re +R11 +R21 (4.57d)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1) + I(V0V2; Y2)− I(V0; Z)−Re. (4.57e)
It is obvious that the joint secrecy rate constraints in (4.56a), (4.56b) and (4.56e) are
identical to the individual ones in (4.57a), (4.57b) and (4.57e). However, the joint
secrecy rate constraints in (4.56c) and (4.56d) are tighter than their corresponding
individual ones in (4.57c) and (4.57d), unless R11 = R21 = 0. This implies that there
exists some scenarios where even for the general two-receiver DM-WBC the individual
secrecy rate region can be bigger than the joint one.
4.3.2 Wiretap Marton-Coding with a Superposition Variable
In this section, we present the coding scheme required to establish the achievable
rate region given by Theorem 4.5. Our coding scheme utilizes the same approach
used in Chapter 3 to prove the validity of Theorem 3.1. Thus, in order to prove
the achievability of the rate region in (4.51), we start by validating the following
proposition:
Proposition 4.1. An achievable joint-strong secrecy rate region for the two-receiver
DM-WBC is given by the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ that satisfy
R1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1)− I(V0V1; Z) (4.58a)
R2 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2)− I(V0; Z)− I(V2; V1Z|V0) (4.58b)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1) + I(V2; Y2|V0)− I(V0V1V2; Z)− I(V1; V2|V0) (4.58c)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|V0) + I(V0V2; Y2)− I(V0V1V2; Z)− I(V1; V2|V0) (4.58d)
for random variables with joint distribution: QV0 QV1V2|V0 QX|V0V1V2 QY1Y2Z|X, such
that V0 − (V1,V2)− X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain.
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By adapting the discussion given in Section 3.2.1 to the rate regions given by Theo-
rem 4.5 and the previous proposition, we can argue that the rate region in (4.58) is a
sub-region of the full rate region in (4.51). In fact, the rate region in (4.58) is optimal
for the first legitimate receiver in the sense that it achieves the same bounds on the
confidential rate R1 as the one in (4.51). We now present a random coding scheme with
random variable C1 that satisfies the reliability and joint-strong secrecy requirements
in (4.8) for k = 2, such that the confidential rates R1 and R2 are bounded as given by
Proposition 4.1.
Let n ∈ N be an arbitrary but fixed code block length and  > 0 be an arbitrary
constant. Moreover, let QV0V1V2X ∈ P(V0 × V1 × V2 × X ) be a fixed input probabil-
ity distribution and recall the probability transition matrix QY1Y2Z|X given in (2.73)
that defines the two-receiver DM-WBC. Furthermore, we assume that quantities of
the form 2nR, where R ∈ R+ are integers.
1. Message sets: We assume that any message set is of the form: Ma = J1, 2nRaK.
For our coding scheme, we have the following message sets: two confidential messages
setsM1 andM2, three randomization messages setsMr,Mr1 andMr2 , along with an
additional message setMt needed for the construction of the Marton code. Addition-
ally we divide each confidential message into two parts as follows: M1 =M11 ×M12
and M2 = M21 ×M22. We then use M11 and M21 to construct a virtual common
confidential message: M0 ,M11 ×M21. Thus, we have
R1 = R11 +R12
R2 = R21 +R22
R0 = R11 +R21 (4.59)
2. Random Codebook C1: Let C10 , {Vn0 (m0,mr)}, where m0 ∈M0 and mr ∈Mr
be a random codebook for the virtual common confidential message m0 = (m11,m21).
This codebook consists of 2n(R11+R21+Rr) conditionally independent random codewords
Vn0 (m0,mr), where each codeword is constructed by generating the symbols V0i(m0,mr)
independently at random according to QV0 . A realization of C
1
0 is denoted by C10 ,
{vn0 (m0,mr)}.
For a fixed codebook C10 and for every m0 ∈ M0 and mr ∈ Mr, let C11(m0,mr) ,
{Vn1 (m0,mr,m12,mr1)}, where m12 ∈ M12 and mr1 ∈ Mr1 be a confidential random
codebook that consists of 2n(R12+Rr1 ) conditionally independent random codewords
Vn1 (m0,mr,m12,mr1), where each codeword is constructed by generating the symbols
V1i(m0,mr,m12,mr1) independently at random according to QV1|V0(·|v0i(m0,mr)).
Similarly, for a fixed codebook C10 and for every m0 ∈ M0 and mr ∈ Mr, let
C12(m0,mr) , {Vn2 (m0,mr,m22,mr2 ,mt)} be a confidential random codebook that con-
sists of 2n(R22+Rr2+Rt) conditionally independent random codewords Vn2 (m0,mr,m22,
mr2 ,mt), where each codeword is constructed by generating the symbols V2i(m0,mr,
m22,mr2 ,mt) independently at random according to QV2|V0(·|v0i(m0,mr)).
The total random codebook is denoted by C1 = {C10,C11,C12}, while C1 = {C10 , C11 , C12}
denotes one possible realization of this codebook selected from the total set of code-
books given by C1. The probability of generating a certain realization C1 ∈ C1 is given
by:
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G(C1) =
∏
(m20,m
2
r,m22,mr2 ,mt)∈M0×Mr×M22×Mr2×Mt
QnV2|V0
(
vn2 (m
2
0,m
2
r,m22,mr2 ,mt)|vn0 (m20,m2r)
)
∏
(m10,m
1
r,m12,mr1 )∈M0×Mr×M12×Mr1
QnV1|V0
(
vn1 (m
1
0,m
1
r,m12,mr1)|vn0 (m10,m1r)
)
∏
(m0,mr)∈
M0×Mr
QnV0
(
vn0 (m0,mr)
)
(4.60)
3. Encoder E: For a fixed codebook realization C1, given a message triple (m0,m12,
m22), where m0 = (m11,m21), the transmitter chooses three randomization messages
mr, mr1 and mr2 uniformly at random from the sets Mr, Mr1 and Mr2 respectively.
Then, it chooses an index mt ∈Mt based on the following likelihood encoder:
E(LE)
(
mt|mr2 , vn0 (m0,mr), vn1 (m0,mr,m12,mr1)
)
=
QnV1|V0,V2
(
vn1 (m0,mr,m12,mr1)|vn0 (m0,mr), vn2 (m0,mr,m22,mr2 ,mt)
)∑
j∈Mt Q
n
V1|V0,V2
(
vn1 (m0,mr,m12,mr1)|vn0 (m0,mr), vn2 (m0,mr,m22,mr2 , j)
) .
(4.61)
Finally, for the selected triple vn0 (m0,mr), v
n
1 (m0,mr,m12,mr1), and v
n
2 (m0,mr,m22,
mr2 ,mt), the encoder generates a codeword x
n independently at random according to
the conditional distribution
∏n
i=1 Q
n
X|V0,V1,V2(·|vn0 (m0,mr), vn1 (m0,mr,m12,mr1), vn2 (m0,
mr,m22,mr2 ,mt)) and transmits it.
4. First Legitimate Decoder ϕ1: Given y
n
1 , the decoder searches for the unique
quadruple (mˆ0, mˆr, mˆ12, mˆr1) ∈M0 ×Mr ×M12 ×Mr1 ; such that:(
vn0 (mˆ0, mˆr), v
n
1 (mˆ0, mˆr, mˆ12, mˆr1), y
n
1
)
∈ T n (QV0V1Y1),
where mˆ0 = (mˆ11, mˆ21). If such unique quadruple exists, the decoder outputs the
message mˆ1 = (mˆ11, mˆ12). Otherwise, the decoder outputs an error message (?).
5. Second Legitimate Decoder ϕ2: Given y
n
2 , the decoder searches for the unique
quadruple (m˜0, m˜r, m˜22, m˜r2) ∈M0×Mr×M22×Mr2 ; for which there exist an index
m˜t ∈Mt such that:(
vn0 (m˜0, m˜r), v
n
2 (m˜0, m˜r, m˜22, m˜r2 , m˜t), y
n
2
)
∈ T n (QV0V2Y2),
where m˜0 = (m˜11, m˜21). If such unique quadruple exists, the decoder outputs the
message m˜2 = (m˜21, m˜22). If not, it outputs an error message (?).
6. Induced Joint Distribution: The encoding function E along with the decod-
ing functions (ϕ1, ϕ2) defined with respect to the codebook C1 ∈ C1 compose a
(2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) code of Definition1 4.1. For every codebook C1, the following joint
probability distribution is induced:
1We slightly abuse the notation by using C1 to denote both the codebook and the whole code
which includes the codebook itself along with the encoding and decoding functions. We favor this
notation for its simplicity and remind the reader that the codebook uniquely defines the code
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PC
1
(
m0,m12,m22,mr,mr1 ,mr2 , v
n
0 , v
n
1 ,mt, v
n
2 , x
n, yn1 , y
n
2 , z
n, mˆ1, m˜2
)
= 2−n(R0+R12+R22+Rr+Rr1+Rr2 )1{vn0 =vn0 (m0,mr)}1{vn1 =vn1 (m0,mr,m12,mr1 )}
× E(LE)(mt|mr2 , vn0 (m0,mr), vn1 (m0,mr,m12,mr1))
×QnX|V0V1V2(xn|vn0 , vn1 , vn2 )QnY1Y2Z|X(yn1 , yn2 , zn|xn)1{mˆ1=ϕ1(yn1 )}
× 1{m˜2=ϕ2(yn2 )}1{vn2 =vn2 (m0,mr,m22,mr2 ,mt)} (4.62)
Additionally, if we take the random codebook generation process into our considera-
tion, we end up with the subsequent distribution: P = G(C1) · PC1 , where G(C1) is
the probability of obtaining a certain codebook C1 given by (4.60).
7. Reliability Analysis: We start by defining the average decoding error probability
for a given code realization C1 ∈ C1 as follows:
P¯e(C1) ,P
[
(Mˆ0, Mˆ12, Mˆr, Mˆr1) 6= (M0,M12,Mr,Mr1) or (M˜0, M˜22, M˜r, M˜r2)
6= (M0,M22,Mr,Mr2)
]
. (4.63)
We then observe that the previous error probability is greater than or equal the one
in (4.2) for k = 2, i.e. P¯e(C1) ≥ P¯e(C1). Thus, in order to show that our cod-
ing scheme satisfies the reliability constraint in (4.8b), it is enough to show that
limn→∞ EC1
[
P¯e(C1)
]
= 0.
Based on the definitions of our encoding function and decoding functions, we need to
consider two classes of errors:
A- Encoding Error: This error occurs if the codeword vn2 chosen by the likelihood en-
coder and the codewords (vn0 , v
n
1 ) selected uniformly at random are not jointly typical.
For this error, we define the following event:
E =
{(
Vn0 (M0,Mr),V
n
1 (M0,Mr,M12,Mr1),V
n
2 (M0,M1,M22,Mr2 ,Mt)
)
/∈ T n¯,inp
}
,
where T n¯,inp , T n¯ (QV0V1V2), ¯ ∈ (0, ) and  > 0 is the typicality constant used by the
decoding functions. By adapting the reliability analysis in Section 3.2.3 to our coding
scheme, we can show that limn→∞ EC1
[
PP(E)
]
= 0, as long as:
Rt ≥ I(V1; V2|V0) + δ0(, β), (4.64)
where δ0(, β) =  log
(|V0| · |V1| · |V2|)+ 5β for β > 0.
B- Decoding Error: This error occurs if the decoders decide on a set of messages differ-
ent from the ones which were originally transmitted. Let us denote this class of errors
by the event D. Based on the standard joint-typicality decoding argument along with
the reliability analysis in Section 3.2.3, we can show that limn→∞ EC1
[
PP(D|Ec)
]
= 0,
as long as:
R12 +Rr1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|V0)− δ1() (4.65a)
R0 +R12 +Rr +Rr1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1)− δ1() (4.65b)
R22 +Rr2 +Rt ≤ I(V2; Y2|V0)− δ2() (4.65c)
R0 +R22 +Rr +Rr2 +Rt ≤ I(V0V2; Y2)− δ2(), (4.65d)
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where δ1() = 2 log
(|V0| · |V1| · |Y1|) and δ2() = 2 log (|V0| · |V2| · |Y2|). The previous
analysis implies that under the rate constraints in (4.65) and (4.64), our coding scheme
satisfies the reliability constraint in (4.8b) because:
lim
n→∞
EC1
[
P¯e(C1)
] ≤ lim
n→∞
EC1
[
PP(E)
]
+ EC1
[
PP(D|Ec)
]
= 0. (4.66)
8. Secrecy Analysis: Our secrecy analysis adheres to the one used in Section 3.2.4
which inherits the strong secrecy analysis of Marton code presented in [127] along with
the strong secrecy results for superposition encoding presented in [29, 31] which were
highlighted in Section 2.2.3 and Section 2.2.4. We start by bounding the joint-strong
secrecy constraint in (4.8c) for k = 2 as follows:
EC1
[
I(M1M2; Zn|C1)
] (a)≤ α · EC1[∥∥PM1M2Zn|C1 − PM1M2|C1 × PZn|C1∥∥]
(b)
≤ 2α · EC1
[∥∥PZn|M1,M2,C1 −QnZ∥∥], (4.67)
where (a) follows from the relation between the mutual information and the total
variation distance given in Lemma A.6, such that α > 0 is a constant that does not
depend on n; while (b) follows because M1 and M2 are uniformly distributed on their
respective sets. Moreover, QnZ is given by:
QnZ(z
n) ,
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
yn1 ∈Yn1
∑
yn2 ∈Yn2
QnX(x
n) QnY1Y2Z|X(y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n|xn). (4.68)
QnZ can be interpreted as the probability distribution observed by the eavesdropper
when the no useful information is transmitted over the channel. Before we proceed
with our secrecy analysis, we need to introduce two additional joint distributions that
are very useful in bounding the expression in (4.67). The first one is P¨ , G(C1) · P¨C1 ,
where G(C1) is the codebook generating distribution given by (4.60), while P¨C1 is
defined as:
P¨C
1(
m0,mr, v
n
0 ,m12,mr1 , v
n
1 , z
n
)
= 2−n(R0+Rr)1{vn0 =vn0 (m0,mr)} 2
−n(R12+Rr1 )
× 1{vn1 =vn1 (m0,mr,m12,mr1 )}Q
n
Z|V0V1(z
n|vn0 , vn1 ). (4.69)
The definition of P¨C
1
utilizes the same analogy used to define the distribution in Eq.
(3.68), where QnZ|V0V1 is the DMC given by (3.66). The second distribution needed is
defined as: Pˆ , G(C1) · PˆC1 , where PˆC1 is given by:
PˆC
1(
m0,mr, v
n
0 , z
n
)
= 2−n(R0+Rr)1{vn0 =vn0 (m0,mr)}Q
n
Z|V0(z
n|vn0 ). (4.70)
Similarly, the previous definition is based on the same analogy used to define the
probability distribution in Eq. (3.72), where QnZ|V0 is the DMC given by (3.70). Now,
let us denote the total variation distance term in (4.67) by L, then based on the triangle
inequality and the three distributions defined in (4.68), (4.69) and (4.70), it follows
that:
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EC1
[L] ≤ EC1[∥∥PZn|M1,M2,C1 − P¨Zn|M1,M2,C1∥∥+ ∥∥P¨Zn|M1,M2,C1 − PˆZn|M1,M2,C1∥∥
+
∥∥PˆZn|M1,M2,C1 −QnZ∥∥]
(a)
= EC
[∥∥PZn|M0=1,M12=1,M22=1,C1 − P¨Zn|M0=1,M12=1,C1∥∥
+
∥∥P¨Zn|M0=1,M12=1,C1 − PˆZn|M0=1,C1∥∥+ ∥∥PˆZn|M0=1,C1 −QnZ∥∥], (4.71)
where (a) follows from the definition of the messages as: (M1,M2) = (M0,M12,M22),
along with the fact that P¨Zn|C1 only depends on (M0,M12) and is independent of M22,
while PˆZn|C1 only depends on M0. Additionally, we make use of the fact that the three
distributions PZn|C1 , P¨Zn|C1 and PˆZn|C1 are symmetric with respect to the corresponding
messages.
Finally, we modify the secrecy analysis derived in Section 3.2.4 to support the structure
of our coding scheme. In particular, we apply the same techniques used to bound the
RHS of Eq. (3.73), aiming to bound the RHS of Eq. (4.71). By doing so, we can show
that EC1
[L] decays exponentially in n, as long as the following rate constraints hold:
Rt ≥ I(V1; V2|V0) + δ0(, β) (4.72a)
Rr2 +Rt ≥ I(V2; V1Z|V0) + δ3(, γ) (4.72b)
Rr1 ≥ I(V1; Z|V0) + δ3(, γ) (4.72c)
Rr ≥ I(V0; Z) + δ3(, γ), (4.72d)
where γ > 0 and δ3(, γ) = 2 log
(|V0| · |V1| · |V2| · |Z|)+ 5γ. The previous result along
with Eq. (4.67) imply that under the rate constraints in (4.72), our coding scheme
satisfies the joint-strong secrecy constraint in (4.8c) for k = 2.
9. Fourier-Motzkin Elimination: We now combine the rate splitting equations in
(4.59), along with the reliability rate constraints in (4.64) and (4.65), in addition to
the secrecy rate constraints in (4.72), then apply the Fourier-Motzkin Elimination pro-
cedure and solve for the confidential rates R1 and R2. Moreover, we took the limit as
n→∞ and choose the constants , β, γ > 0, such that their corresponding δ−functions
approach zero as n approaches infinity. With this analysis, we prove that any rate pair
(R1, R2) that satisfy the rate constraints in (4.58) is achievable under the joint-strong
secrecy criterion; establishing Proposition 4.1.
The previous achievability proof directly suggests that there exists an alternative ran-
dom coding scheme C2 which also satisfies the reliability and secrecy constraints given
by (4.8b) and (4.8c) respectively, while its rates are bounded according to the following
proposition:
Proposition 4.2. An achievable joint-strong secrecy rate region for the two-receiver
DM-WBC is given by the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ that satisfy
R1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1)− I(V0; Z)− I(V1; V2Z|V0) (4.73a)
R2 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2)− I(V0V2; Z) (4.73b)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1) + I(V2; Y2|V0)− I(V0V1V2; Z)− I(V1; V2|V0) (4.73c)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|V0) + I(V0V2; Y2)− I(V0V1V2; Z)− I(V1; V2|V0) (4.73d)
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for random variables with joint distribution: QV0 QV1V2|V0 QX|V0V1V2 QY1Y2Z|X, such
that V0 − (V1,V2)− X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain.
It is obvious that Proposition 4.2 is a direct consequence of Proposition 4.1, as it fol-
lows by interchanging the construction procedure of the random codewords Vn1 and
Vn2 along with modifying the decoding functions at the first and the second legitimate
receivers accordingly.
The last step in the proof of Theorem 4.5 is to use the principles of rate splitting and
time sharing to construct a coding scheme similar to the one introduced in Section
3.2.5 to combine the two achievable rate regions given by (4.58) and (4.73). For a time
sharing parameter pi ∈ [0, 1], we can show that the following rate region is achievable:
R1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|T)− I(V0V1; Z|T)− (1− pi) · I(V1; V2|V0ZT) (4.74a)
R2 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2|T)− I(V0V2; Z|T)− pi · I(V1; V2|V0ZT) (4.74b)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|T) + I(V2; Y2|V0T)−Re (4.74c)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|V0T) + I(V0V2; Y2|T)−Re (4.74d)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|T) + I(V0V2; Y2|T)− I(V0; Z|T)−Re, (4.74e)
where Re , I(V0V1V2; Z|T) + I(V1; V2|V0T). The achievability of the rate region in
(4.74) directly implies the validity of Theorem 4.5. This is because for any rate pair
(R1, R2) ∈ R2+ that satisfies the rate constraints in (4.51), there exists a certain value
for the time sharing parameter pi such that the given rate pair is included in the rate
region in (4.74).
The usage of Marton coding with a superposition variable was first introduced in
[146, 147] to establish an achievable rate region for the two-receiver DM-BC with a
common message (M0) and two individual private messages (M1,M2). The idea was
to encode the common message M0 in the superposition variable V0, while the two
private messages M1 and M2 are encoded in the classical Marton coding variables V1
and V2 respectively. It was then argued in [35, 148] that even for the two-receiver
DM-BC without a common message, Marton coding is optimal in the sense that it
is tight for all classes of two-receiver DM-BCs for which the transmission capacity is
known only in the presence of the superposition variable V0. This observation seems
to be valid for the two-receiver DM-WBC as well. In fact, without the superposition
variable V0, we can not show that the rate region established in Theorem 4.5 recovers
the joint-strong secrecy capacity region of the degraded two-receiver DM-WBC given
by Corollary 4.1.
The previous discussion was the reason that our coding scheme is based on a Marton
wiretap random code with a superposition variable instead of the classical Marton
wiretap random code presented in [73], cf. Theorem 2.7. The main issue was to come
up with a technique that allows us to include the superposition variable V0 in our
coding scheme without having an actual common confidential message. In order to
over come this issue, we thought about two solutions: The first was to modify our
model such that we have a real common confidential message M0, then after we derive
our achievable rate region, we can let R0 = 0. This idea is similar to the one used
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in [35] for the two-receiver DM-BC without an eavesdropper. The second solution was
to utilize the concept of rate splitting to create a virtual common confidential message
M0 = M11 ×M21 and construct our coding scheme accordingly. Although the second
solution forces each legitimate receiver to decode some unneeded information, i.e. Y1
decodes M12 and Y2 decodes M11, we found that both solutions lead to the same
achievable region at the end. Nevertheless, we preferred the second solution because
it will be very helpful for the individual secrecy scenario.
4.3.3 Marton Wiretap Coding Under Individual Secrecy
The main feature of the individual secrecy criterion is that the legitimate receivers can
cooperate to protect their message against eavesdropping based on the idea of mutual
trust. This mutual trust allows us to use the confidential message of one receiver as
a secret key for the other one. Thus, we can combine normal wiretap encoding and
secret key encoding leading to a larger achievable rate region compared to the joint
secrecy criterion where only wiretap encoding is used. However, in order to be able
to use secret key encoding, the key must be secretly shared between the transmitter
and the respective receiver. Since in our case the key is simply part of the confidential
message of another receiver, there must be away for each receiver to acquire a full
knowledge about the part of the message of the other receiver used as secret key.
Up until this point, we have seen two ways to acquire this knowledge: The first one
was discussed in Section 3.3 for the DM-WBC with message cognition, where each
legitimate receiver is fully cognizant of the confidential message of the other receiver
prior to the transmission. The second approach was discussed in Section 4.2 for the de-
graded DM-WBC, where the degradedness property allows each receiver to be able to
decode the confidential messages of the weaker receivers. For the general two-receiver
DM-WBC, there is no prior knowledge about the confidential messages available at the
opposite receiver, neither do the channels of the legitimate receivers exhibit a certain
statistical ordering (degradedness or less noisy). Thus, we need another technique to
establish a shared secret key.
We start by recalling the discussion at the end of Section 4.3.2. We can notice that
the coding scheme used to establish Proposition 4.1 allows each legitimate receiver to
acquire some information about part of the confidential message intended to the other
receiver. In particular, Y1 was able to decode M21 reliably, Y2 was able to decode M11.
This implies that M21 can be used as a secret key for the first legitimate receiver and
the same holds for M11 and the second legitimate receiver. In this section, we utilize
this idea along with the coding scheme introduced in the previous subsection to prove
the achievability of the individual-strong secrecy rate region given by Theorem 4.6.
We start by validating the following proposition:
Proposition 4.3. An achievable individual-strong secrecy rate region for the two-
receiver DM-WBC is given by the set of all rate pairs (R1 = R11 + R12, R2 = R21 +
R22) ∈ R2+ that satisfy
R1 +R21 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1)− I(V0V1; Z) + min
[
I(V0V1; Z),R21
]
(4.75a)
R2 +R11 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2)− I(V0V2; Z)− I(V2; V1|V0Z)
+ min
[
I(V0V2; Z) + I(V1; V2|V0Z)− I(V1; V2|V0), R11
]
(4.75b)
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R1 +R2 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1) + I(V2; Y2|V0)−Re +Rs (4.75c)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|V0) + I(V0V2; Y2)−Re +Rs (4.75d)
R1 +R2 +R11 +R21 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1) + I(V0V2; Y2)− I(V0; Z)−Re +Rs (4.75e)
where Re , I(V0V1V2; Z) + I(V1; V2|V0), while Rs , min
[
I(V0V1V2; Z), R11 + R21
]
.
The random variables that define the previous rate region are characterized by the
following joint probability distribution: QV0 QV1V2|V0 QX|V0V1V2 QY1Y2Z|X, such that
the following Markov chain holds: V0 − (V1,V2)− X− (Y1,Y2,Z).
1. Message sets: We assume that any message set is of the form: Ma = J1, 2nRaK.
We consider the same message sets used in the proof of Proposition 4.1, with some
minor modifications: We divide each confidential message into three parts instead of
two as follows: M1 =M11×M12×M13 andM2 =M21×M22×M23. This division
implies the following rate constraints:
R1 = R11 +R12 +R13
R2 = R21 +R22 +R23 (4.76)
Moreover, in this division we forceM13 and M21 to be of the same size and use them to
construct a new message set M⊗1 by xoring the corresponding elements of both sets.
Similarly, we forceM23 and M11 to be of the same size and use them to construct a new
message set M⊗2 in the exact same way. Moreover, we divide the two xored message
sets into two parts as follows: M⊗1 = M⊗11 ×M⊗12 and M⊗2 = M⊗21 ×M⊗22 .
Based on the structure of these message sets, we have
R13 = R21 = R⊗1 = R⊗11 +R⊗12
R23 = R11 = R⊗2 = R⊗21 +R⊗22 . (4.77)
Finally, we letM0 , (M11×M21×Mr×M⊗11 ×M⊗21), which consequently means
that m0 = (m11,m21,mr,m⊗11 ,m⊗21). It also implies the following:
R0 = R11 +R21 +Rr +R⊗11 +R⊗21 (4.78)
2. Random Codebook C1: Let C10 , {Vn0 (m0)}, be a confidential random code-
book that consists of 2nR0 conditionally independent random codewords, where each
codeword is constructed by generating the symbols V0i(m0) independently at random
according to QV0 . A realization of C
1
0 is denoted by C10 , {vn0 (m0)}.
For a fixed codebook realization C10 and for every m0 ∈M0, let C11(m0) , {Vn1 (m0,m12,
mr1 , m⊗12)} be a confidential random codebook that consists of 2n(R12+Rr1+R⊗12 ) con-
ditionally independent random codewords, where each codeword is constructed by
generating the symbols V1i(m0,m12, mr1 ,m⊗12) independently at random according
to QV1|V0(·|v0i(m0)).
Similarly, for a fixed codebook realization C10 and for every m0 ∈ M0, let C12(m0) ,
{Vn2 (m0, m22,mr2 ,m⊗22 ,mt)} be a confidential random codebook that consists of
2n(R22+Rr2+R⊗22+Rt) conditionally independent random codewords, where each code-
word is constructed by generating the symbols V2i(m0,m22,mr2 ,m⊗22 ,mt) indepen-
dently at random according to QV2|V0(·|v0i(m0)).
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The total random codebook is denoted by C1 = {C10,C11,C12}, while C1 = {C10 , C11 , C12}
denotes one possible realization of this codebook. The probability of generating a
certain realization C1 ∈ C1 is given by:
G(C1) =
∏
(m20,m22,mr2 ,m⊗22 ,mt)∈M0×M22×Mr2×M⊗22×Mt
QnV2|V0
(
vn2 (m
2
0,m22,mr2 ,m⊗22 ,mt)|vn0 (m20)
)
∏
(m10,m12,mr1 ,m⊗12 )∈M0×M12×Mr1×M⊗12
QnV1|V0
(
vn1 (m
1
0,m12,mr1 ,m⊗12)|vn0 (m10)
) ∏
m0∈M0
QnV0
(
vn0 (m0)
)
(4.79)
3. Encoder E: For a fixed codebook realization C1, given a message pair (m1,m2),
where m1 = (m11,m12,m13) and m2 = (m21,m22,m23), the transmitter first calculates
the xored messages m⊗1 = (m⊗11 ,m⊗12) and m⊗2 = (m⊗21 ,m⊗22). Then, it chooses
three randomization messages mr, mr1 and mr2 uniformly at random from the sets
Mr, Mr1 and Mr2 respectively. The encoder then chooses an index mt ∈ Mt based
on the following likelihood encoder:
E(LE)
(
mt|mr2 , vn0 (m0), vn1 (m0,m12,mr1 ,m⊗12)
)
=
QnV1|V0,V2
(
vn1 (m0,m12,mr1 ,m⊗12)|vn0 (m0), vn2 (m0,m22,mr2 ,m⊗22 ,mt)
)∑
j∈Mt Q
n
V1|V0,V2
(
vn1 (m0,m12,mr1 ,m⊗12)|vn0 (m0), vn2 (m0,m22,mr2 ,m⊗22 , j)
) .
(4.80)
Finally, for the selected triple: vn0 (m0), v
n
1 (m0,m12, mr1 ,m⊗12), and v
n
2 (m0,m22,mr2 ,
m⊗22 ,mt), the encoder generates a codeword x
n independently at random according to
the conditional distribution
∏n
i=1 Q
n
X|V0,V1,V2(·|vn0 (m0), vn1 (m0,m12,mr1 , m⊗12), vn2 (m0,
m22,mr2 ,m⊗22 ,mt)) and transmits it.
4. First Legitimate Decoder ϕ1: Given y
n
1 , it outputs mˆ1 = (mˆ11, mˆ12, mˆ13) using
the following procedure: First, it searches for the unique quadruple (mˆ0, mˆ12, mˆr1 , mˆ⊗12)
∈M0 ×M12 ×Mr1 ×M⊗12 ; such that:(
vn0 (mˆ0), v
n
1 (mˆ0, mˆ12, mˆr1 , mˆ⊗12), y
n
1
)
∈ T n (QV0V1Y1),
where mˆ0 = (mˆ11, mˆ21, mˆr, mˆ⊗11 , mˆ⊗21). The decoder then estimates mˆ13 by xoring
the messages mˆ21 and mˆ⊗1 = (mˆ⊗11 , mˆ⊗12). If the decoder fails to execute one of the
previous two steps, it outputs an error message (?).
5. Second Legitimate Decoder ϕ2: Given y
n
2 , the decoder outputs m˜2 = (m˜21, m˜22,
m˜23) based on the following procedure: First, it searches for the unique quadruple
(m˜0, m˜22, m˜r2 , m˜⊗22) ∈ M0 × M22 × Mr2 × M⊗22 ; for which there exist an index
m˜t ∈Mt such that:(
vn0 (m˜0), v
n
2 (m˜0, m˜22, m˜r2 , m˜⊗22 , m˜t), y
n
2
)
∈ T n (QV0V2Y2),
where m˜0 = (m˜11, m˜21, m˜r, m˜⊗11 , m˜⊗21). The decoder then estimates m˜23 by xoring
the messages m˜11 and m˜⊗2 = (m˜⊗21 , m˜⊗22). If the decoder fails to execute any of the
previous two steps, it outputs an error message (?).
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6. Reliability Analysis: We start by defining the average decoding error probability
for a given code realization C1 ∈ C1 as follows:
P¯e(C1) ,P
[
(Mˆ0, Mˆ12, Mˆr1 , Mˆ⊗12) 6= (M0,M12,Mr1 ,M⊗12) or (M˜0, M˜22, M˜r2 , M˜⊗22)
6= (M0,M22,Mr2 ,M⊗22)
]
. (4.81)
We then observe that the previous error probability is greater than or equal to the
one in (4.2) for k = 2, i.e. P¯e(C1) ≥ P¯e(C1). Thus, in order to show that our
coding scheme satisfies the reliability constraint in (4.10b), it is enough to show that
limn→∞ EC1
[
P¯e(C1)
]
= 0.
Based on the same arguments used in the reliability analysis of the coding scheme
that establishes Proposition 4.1, we can show that the expectation of the encoding
and decoding errors for the underlying coding scheme vanishes as n → ∞, as long as
the following rate constraints holds:
Rt ≥ I(V1; V2|V0) + δ0(, β), (4.82a)
R12 +Rr1 +R⊗12 ≤ I(V1; Y1|V0)− δ1() (4.82b)
R0 +R12 +Rr1 +R⊗12 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1)− δ1() (4.82c)
R22 +Rr2 +R⊗22 +Rt ≤ I(V2; Y2|V0)− δ2() (4.82d)
R0 +R22 +Rr2 +R⊗22 +Rt ≤ I(V0V2; Y2)− δ2(), (4.82e)
where the δ-functions are as defined in Section 4.3.2, for the typicality constant  and
an additional constant β > 0.
7. Secrecy Analysis: Because of the way used to divide the confidential message
sets, the random variable M1 is now identified as the product of three independent and
uniformly distributed random variables: M11, M12 and M13. This feature also applies to
M2 which is the product of the three independent and uniformly distributed random
variables M21, M22 and M23. Based on the previous argument, we can bound the
individual-strong secrecy constraint in (4.10c) for k = 2 after dropping the conditioning
on C1 as follows:
EC1
[
I(M1; Zn) + I(M2; Zn)
]
= EC1
[
I(M11M12M13; Zn) + I(M21M22M23; Zn)
]
(a)
≤ EC1
[
I(M11M12M21M22; Zn) + I(M13; Zn|M11M12)
+ I(M23; Zn|M21M22)
]
, (4.83)
where (a) follows from the chain rule of the mutual information in addition to the
independence of the messages. Based on the secrecy analysis of the coding scheme
used to establish Proposition 4.1, it follows that EC1
[
I(M11M12M21M22; Zn)
]
decays
exponentially in n as long as the following rate constraints holds:
Rt ≥ I(V1; V2|V0) + δ0(, β) (4.84a)
Rr2 +R⊗22 +Rt ≥ I(V2; V1Z|V0) + δ3(, γ) (4.84b)
Rr1 +R⊗12 ≥ I(V1; Z|V0) + δ3(, γ) (4.84c)
Rr +R⊗11 +R⊗21 ≥ I(V0; Z) + δ3(, γ), (4.84d)
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where γ > 0 and the δ-functions are as defined in the previous subsection. The
previous constraints indicate that the xored messages are considered as a part of the
randomization indexes used to confuse the eavesdropper. On the other hand, for a
certain realization C1 ∈ C1, we have
I(M13; Zn|M11M12) (a)= H(M13)−H(M13|ZnM11M12)
(b)
≤ H(M13)−H(M13|M11M12MrMr1Mr2M⊗1M⊗2Mt)
(c)
= H(M13)−H(M13|M⊗1)
(d)
= 0, (4.85)
where (a) follows from the independence of the messages; (b) follows because (M11,M21,
M12,M22,Mr,Mr1 ,Mr2 ,M⊗1 ,M⊗2 ,Mt)−Xn−Zn forms a Markov chain along with the
fact that under the rate constraints in (4.84), there exists a code realization C1 such
that I(M21M22; Zn|M11M12) decays exponentially in n. These two arguments imply
that given Zn and the messages (M11,M12), the best decoder at the eavesdropper can
at most decode the messages (Mr,Mr1 ,Mr2 ,M⊗1 ,M⊗2 , Mt) but neither M21 nor M22.
Step (c) follows because M13 is only related to the xored message M⊗1 ; while (d) follows
due to the secret key encoding principle and the fact that H(M13) = H(M21), cf. (4.77).
Based on similar arguments, we can show that for a certain realization C1 ∈ C1 the
following holds:
I(M23; Zn|M21M22) = 0. (4.86)
The previous secrecy analysis implies that under the rate constraints in (4.84), our
coding scheme satisfies the individual-strong secrecy constraint in (4.10c) for k = 2.
8. Fourier-Motzkin Elimination: We now combine the reliability rate constraints
in (4.82) and the secrecy rate constraints in (4.84), then apply the Fourier-Motzkin
Elimination procedure and solve for the confidential rates R11 + R12 and R21 + R22.
Finally, we take the limit as n → ∞ and choose the constants , β, γ > 0, such that
their corresponding δ−functions approach zero as n approaches infinity. We reach the
following:
R11 +R12 +R21 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1)− I(V0V1; Z) (4.87a)
R21 +R22 +R11 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2)− I(V0; Z)− I(V2; V1Z|V0) (4.87b)
R11 +R12 +R21 +R22 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1) + I(V2; Y2|V0)−Re (4.87c)
R11 +R12 +R21 +R22 ≤ I(V1; Y1|V0) + I(V0V2; Y2)−Re (4.87d)
2R11 +R12 + 2R21 +R22 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1) + I(V0V2; Y2)− I(V0; Z)−Re (4.87e)
where Re , I(V0V1V2; Z) + I(V1; V2|V0). Next, we let Rr = Rr1 = Rr2 = 0 and use
the rate constraints in (4.84) with equality to bound the xored rates R⊗1 and R⊗2
which consequently implies bounding R13 and R23, cf. (4.77). Thus, we have:
R13 = R⊗1 ≤ min
[
I(V0V1; Z),R21
]
(4.88a)
R23 = R⊗2 ≤ min
[
I(V0; Z) + I(V2; V1Z|V0)− I(V1; V2|V0), R11
]
(4.88b)
R13 +R23 = R⊗1 +R⊗2 ≤ min
[
I(V0V1V2; Z), R11 +R21
]
(4.88c)
Finally, if we combine the rate constraints in (4.87) and (4.88) along with the rate split-
ting relation in (4.76), we prove the achievability of any rate pair (R1 = R11+R21, R2 =
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R21 + R22) that satisfy the rate constraints in (4.75) under the individual-strong se-
crecy criterion; establishing Proposition 4.3.
The previous achievability proof directly suggests that there exists an alternative ran-
dom coding scheme C2 which also satisfies the reliability and secrecy constraints given
by (4.10b) and (4.10c) respectively, while its rates are bounded according to the fol-
lowing proposition:
Proposition 4.4. An achievable individual-strong secrecy rate region for the two-
receiver DM-WBC is given by the set of all rate pairs (R1 = R11 + R12, R2 = R21 +
R22) ∈ R2+ that satisfy
R1 +R21 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1)− I(V0V1; Z)− I(V1; V2|V0Z) (4.89a)
+ min
[
I(V0V1; Z) + I(V1; V2|V0Z)− I(V1; V2|V0), R21
]
R2 +R11 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2)− I(V0V2; Z) + min
[
I(V0V1; Z), R11
]
(4.89b)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1) + I(V2; Y2|V0)−Re +Rs (4.89c)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|V0) + I(V0V2; Y2)−Re +Rs (4.89d)
R1 +R2 +R11 +R21 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1) + I(V0V2; Y2)− I(V0; Z)−Re +Rs (4.89e)
where Re , I(V0V1V2; Z) + I(V1; V2|V0), while Rs , min
[
I(V0V1V2; Z), R11 + R21
]
.
The random variables that define the previous rate region are characterized by the
following joint probability distribution: QV0 QV1V2|V0 QX|V0V1V2 QY1Y2Z|X, such that
V0 − (V1,V2)− X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain.
The previous proposition is a direct consequence of Proposition 4.3, as it follows by
interchanging the construction procedure of the random codewords Vn1 and V
n
2 along
with modifying the decoding functions at the first and the second legitimate receivers
accordingly. In order to finalize the proof of Theorem 4.6, we use the rate splitting
and time sharing technique introduced in Section 3.2.5 to construct a coding scheme
that combines the two achievable rate regions in (4.75) and (4.89).
Chapter 5
Wiretap Channels With Active
Adversaries
This chapter considers a communication scenario in which the channel undergoes two
different classes of attacks at the same time: a passive eavesdropper and an active
jammer. This scenario can be modelled as a secure communication problem over a
wiretap channel with imperfect CSI. In particular, we focus our investigation to the
class of arbitrarily varying wiretap channels (AVWCs). This class of channels simulate
a wiretap channel in which the channel state is manipulated by an active adversary
causing it to vary from one channel use to the other in an unknown and arbitrary
manner. First, we introduce the attributes of an AVWC and discuss the two main
coding schemes (deterministic and correlated random) used in previous literature to
establish a reliable and secure communication over AVWCs. We then highlight the
drawbacks of these schemes and foster an alternative coding scheme based on the
principle of list decoding. We derive a full characterization of the list secrecy capacity
of the AVWC, showing that list codes can over come the drawbacks of the earlier
coding schemes and simultaneously provide the same secrecy capacity. Moreover, we
establish some interesting results for the continuity and additivity behaviour of the
list secrecy capacity of AVWCs. Finally, we extend our investigation to a scenario
that combines the transmission of public and confidential messages over AVWCs. For
this scenario, we derive a multi-letter description for the deterministic and correlated
random capacity regions showing the optimality of superposition encoding.
5.1 Channel Models With Imperfect CSI
The previous three chapters of this thesis addressed the problem of secure commu-
nication under the following assumption: Perfect channel state information (CSI) is
available at the beginning of the transmission and not only for the legitimate channel
but for the eavesdropper channel as well. In real life communication scenarios and in
particular wireless communication scenarios, it is not an easy task to acquire a perfect
CSI. This is because the channel usually varies rapidly over time. The imperfection in
the CSI can also originate from inaccurate channel estimation techniques or insufficient
feedback schemes [149].
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5.1.1 Motivation: Active Jamming
In the secrecy-domain, the acquisition of perfect CSI is more a challenging task. This
is because for many wiretap channels, the eavesdropper is an intruder node that does
not belong to the network and will consequently deny to share any information about
its state [150]. This is not the only reason because: Even under the assumption of per-
fect cooperation of the eavesdropping node, secure communication suffers from other
factors that can lead to an uncertainty in the CSI of the channel. Among these factors
is the presence of active adversaries in the network who can maliciously manipulate the
channel state. These two reasons motivated a lot of researchers to study the impact
of dealing with imperfect CSI on the secrecy capacity of wiretap channels [151,152].
The model of the wiretap channel introduced in Section 2.1.2 considers a communi-
cation scenario in which the channel only suffers from passive attacks. In particular,
the confidential message is transmitted over a channel where a non-legitimate receiver
eavesdrop over the transmission and aims to extract any information about the con-
fidential message. In real life scenario, there exists other classes of attacks such as
active jamming, where an active adversary threatens the secrecy of the communica-
tion by maliciously manipulating the channel state from time to time [153]. This
observation motivates us to investigate secure communication under a combination of
the two classes of attacks at the same time: passive eavesdropping and an active jam-
ming. This scenario is identical to the concept of wiretap channels with imperfect CSI.
In previous literature, two main channel classes have been used to simulate and model
a channel with imperfect CSI: Compound channels [72] and Arbitrary varying channels
[154]. The main concept behind these two classes is that: Instead of assuming that
the exact channel realization is perfectly known, we assume that the actual channel
state belongs to a specific uncertainty set of channels known as the channel states set.
The basic definitions and characteristics of these two channel classes are addressed in
the next sections.
5.1.2 Compound Wiretap Channels
Compound channels are among the simplest non-trivial channels that models a channel
with imperfect CSI. The concept of compound channels was first introduced for the
broadcast channel in [72, 155] as follows: Let S be a finite state set, while X and Y
represent finite input and output alphabets respectively. For every state s ∈ S, the
channel between the transmitter and the receiver is given by the stochastic matrix
Ws : X → P(Y). The compound broadcast channel is defined in terms of the families
of all possible channel states as follows: W = {Ws : s ∈ S}. Now, for an input sequence
xn ∈ X n produced by the transmitter, an output sequence yn ∈ Yn observed by the
receiver and a certain channel state s, the discrete memoryless compound broadcast
channel is given by:
W ns (y
n|xn) =
n∏
i=1
Ws(yi|xi) (5.1)
The previous equation reveals the most important feature of a compound channel:
Although the channel can take any state from the state set S, the selected state s
remains fixed throughout the whole transmission. Moreover, it is assumed that the
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transmitter and the receiver know the channel states set S but possess no information
about the exact channel state s used during the transmission. Furthermore, there is
not any prior distribution on the channel state set S that govern the selection of the
channel states. It was shown in [72,155] that the capacity of the compound broadcast
channel is given by:
C(W) = max
PX
min
s∈S
I(X; Ys), (5.2)
where Ys is the output of the channel when the channel state s is selected. One can
easily show that C(W) is in general less than the transmission capacity of all the
DMCs in W , i.e. C(W) ≤ mins∈S C(Ws). This implies that the imperfection in the
CSI has reduced the transmission capacity of the system. This is because the used
coding scheme needs be universal in the sense that it works for all possible channel
states.
In [152], the compound wiretap channel was introduced by combining the concepts
of compound channels and the classical wiretap channel as follows: Let S1 and S2
be two finite state sets, then for the finite input and output alphabets X , Y and Z,
the stochastic matrices Ws1 : X → P(Y) and Vs2 : X → P(Z) define the legitimate
and eavesdropper channels at a channel state pair (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2. One can define
a combined channel state S = S1 × S2, such that any state s ∈ S is given by the
corresponding pair (s1, s2). The compound wiretap channel can then be defined in
terms of the families of all possible channel states s as follows:
Q = (W ,V) = {(Ws, Vs) : s ∈ S}
=
{
(Ws1 , Vs2) : s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2
}
. (5.3)
The discrete memoryless compound wiretap channel is defined by following the same
procedure in Eq. (5.1). Now, to transmit a confidential message mc ∈ Mc, we need
to define a coding scheme Cs with a stochastic encoder E : Mc → P(X n) and a
deterministic decoder ϕ : Yn →M. The encoder and decoder of this coding scheme
should be universal in the sense that they work for all possible channel states s ∈ S.
In order to evaluate the reliability performance of Cs, we define the average decoding
error probability for the compound wiretap channel as follows:
P¯e(Cs) = max
s∈S
1
|Mc|
∑
mc∈Mc
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
yn:ϕ(yn)6=mc
Ws(y
n|xn)E(xn|mc). (5.4)
The coding scheme Cs is considered reliable, if it assures a small average decoding
error probability for all channel states. It is important to highlight here that the
results established under the average decoding error probability constraint might not
be valid for the maximum decoding error probability [54]. On the other hand, the
secrecy performance of Cs is granted by satisfying the strong secrecy criterion with
respect to the information leakage as follows:
max
s∈S
I(M; Zns ) ≤ τn, (5.5)
where limn→∞ τn = 0, while Zns is a random variable associated with the output se-
quence at the eavesdropper when the channel Vs is selected.
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The secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap channel was investigated in various
works cf. [30, 152, 156, 157]. Despite these tremendous efforts, finding a single-letter
characterization for the secrecy capacity of the general compound wiretap channel has
remained an unanswered question. This might be expected because the compound
wiretap channel can be interpreted as a normal wiretap channel were a common con-
fidential message is transmitted to multiple receivers and needs to be protected from
multiple eavesdroppers. We already highlighted in Chapter 3, that even for the wire-
tap channel with multiple legitimate receivers and a single eavesdropper, a single-letter
characterization for the secrecy capacity is still unknown. Nevertheless, in [30, Propo-
sition 3.8] a multi-letter characterization for the secrecy capacity was established.
Theorem 5.1. [30] The strong secrecy capacity of the general compound wiretap
channel Q = (W ,V) is given by:
C(Q) = lim
n→∞
1
n
max
PUXn
[
min
s∈S
I(U; Yns )−max
s∈S
I(U; Zns )
]
, (5.6)
where the maximum is taken over all possible input distributions PUXn defined over the
random variables U,Xn.
Moreover, it was shown in [30, 152] that for the degraded compound wiretap channel
where all channel realization to the eavesdropper are degraded with respect to any
channel realization to the legitimate receiver, the multi-letter expression in Theorem
5.1 can be further simplified to establish a single-letter characterization for the secrecy
capacity of this class of compound wiretap channels.
Theorem 5.2. [30,152] The strong secrecy capacity of the degraded compound wiretap
channel is given by:
C(Q) = max
PX
[
min
s∈S
I(X; Ys)−max
s∈S
I(X; Zs)
]
, (5.7)
where the maximum is taken over all possible input distributions PX such that X −
Ys − Zs forms a Markov chain.
The previous theorem reflects the effect of the imperfection in the CSI on the secrecy ca-
pacity as follows: In order to guarantee a reliable link between the transmitter and the
legitimate receiver for all channel states s ∈ S, the maximum transmission rate should
be bounded by the smallest rate among all the channel states, i.e. mins∈S I(X; Ys). On
the other hand, in order to make sure that the eavesdropper is not capable of inferring
any information about the transmitted message, we need to randomize our encoding
process to confuse the eavesdropper. This is done by using a randomization message
with rate roughly equal to the best channel resources available at the eavesdropper,
i.e. maxs∈S I(X; Zs).
5.1.3 Arbitrary Varying Wiretap Channels
An arbitrary varying channel (AVC) models a sophisticated and more complex class of
channels with imperfect CSI. It extends the concept of compound channels by allowing
the channel state s to alternate through the transmission. In particular, the channel
state of an AVC can vary from one time to another in an arbitrarily manner during
the transmission. This behavior simulates a lot of real life communication channels
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such as fast fading channels. The concept of arbitrary varying channels was first in-
troduced in [154, 158] as follows: Let S be a finite state set, X and Y be two finite
input and output alphabets, such that for a channel state s ∈ S, the stochastic matrix
Ws : X → P(Y) defines the relation between the input alphabet X and the output
alphabet Y . In some literature, a different notation was used to define the stochastic
matrix that guides the relation between the inputs an outputs of an AVC as follows:
W : X × S → P(Y). The difference between the previous two notations lies in the
interpretation of the channel state set S. The first notation considers s as a constraint
enforced by the channel, while the second notation considers s as an additional input
to the channel. Nevertheless, one can easily show that the two notation are equivalent.
Although the previous definition seems similar to the definition of compound channels,
the extension to the block length channel model clearly mark the difference as follows:
The discrete memoryless transition matrix with dimension n that guides the relation
between the input sequence xn ∈ X n and the output sequence yn ∈ Yn of an AVC is
given by:
W nsn(y
n|xn) =
n∏
i=1
Wsi(yi|xi), (5.8)
where sn ∈ Sn is the channel state sequence selected by the channel. The discrete
memoryless (AVC) is defined in terms of the families of all possible channel state se-
quences for different values of n as follows W = {W n(·|·, sn) : sn ∈ Sn, n = 1, 2, . . . }.
Similar to the model of compound channels, it is assumed that the transmitter and
the receiver only know the channel states set S but possess no information about the
actual channel state sequence sn selected for the transmission. The model of an AVC
can be interpreted from a secrecy perspective as a normal DMC but with an additional
active jammer. This jammer aims to disturb the communication on the channel by
choosing a certain channel state sequence sn [159].
Eq. (5.8) implies that response of an AVC depends on the channel state sequence sn
selected by the jammer. Nevertheless, one can argue that the behavior of an AVC
should only depend on the number of times each channel state s ∈ S is imposed, and
not on the order of these states. This argument is due to the memoryless property of
the channel and it means that different state sequences might have the same channel
response. This observation motivates the introduction of the average channel notation
defined as follows: For any probability distribution q ∈ P(S), the average channel is
given by:
Wq(y|x) =
∑
s∈S
q(s)Ws(y|x) (5.9)
In some literature, the average channel is defined over a block length n, such that for
any probability distribution q˜ ∈ P(Sn), we have
W nq˜ (y
n|xn) =
∑
sn∈Sn
q˜(sn)W nsn(y
n|xn) (5.10)
The notation of the average channel establishes some sort of a link between AVCs and
compound channels. This is because an AVC with a state sequence sn ∈ Sn can be
viewed as a compound channel with a channel state q˜, where q˜ is the average channel
for sn.
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Despite the previous argument, it was shown in [160–162] that establishing a reliable
communication over an AVC is not as easy as the compound channel. In fact, it was
shown in [160] that the classical deterministic codes with a fixed encoder-decoder pair
used to establish reliable communication over compound channels fails to achieve this
target for a class of AVC known as symmetrizable AVC. For this class of channels, more
sophisticated coding schemes like correlated random codes are needed. In correlated
random codes, the transmitter and the receiver agree on a family of encoder-decoder
pairs before the transmission. Then for every communication on the channel, the
transmitter and the receiver coordinate their choice of an encoder-decoder pair based
on the outcome of a random experiment shared between them. In [154, 160], the
correlated random public transmission capacity of the AVC was established:
Cpran(W) = max
PX
min
q∈P(S)
I(X; Y¯q), (5.11)
where Y¯q is a random variable that represents the output of the averaged channel
W¯q(y|x) given by (5.9). In [163], it was shown that deterministic capacity of AVCs
exhibits a dichotomy that it is either equivalent to the correlated random capacity or
it vanishes. However, the exact condition for a vanishing deterministic capacity was
not answered in [163]. In [164], Ericson came up with a sufficient which was shown to
be necessary in [165]. This condition is known as the symmetrizablity condition of an
AVC.
The previous results implies that one of the main properties that plays an important
role in the investigation of reliable communication over AVCs is the concept of sym-
metrizability. This property describes the ability of an AVC to emulate a valid channel
input making it impossible for the decoder to make a correct decision for the actual
transmitted codeword. It was first introduced in [164,165] as follows:
Definition 5.1. An AVC W is symmetrizable if there exists an auxiliary channel
σ : X → P(S) such that∑
s∈S
Ws(y|x)σ(s|x˜) =
∑
s∈S
Ws(y|x˜)σ(s|x) (5.12)
holds for every x, x˜ ∈ X and y ∈ Y .
The condition in (5.12) implies that for a symmetrizable AVC, the jammer can select
a certain jamming strategy, i.e. a channel state sequence sn ∈ Sn, such that the
decoder is confused. In order to understand this concept, the following example for a
symmetrizable AVC was given [166]: Consider an AVC, where S = X = {1, 2}, while
Y = {1, 2, 3}. For  ∈ [0, 1], our AVC W is defined by the following two stochastic
matrices:
W1 :=
 0 1−  0
1−  
 W2 :=
1−  0 1− 
0 
 .
One can easily show that for every  ∈ [0, 0.5], there exists an auxiliary channel
σ : X → P(S), such that the symmetrizability condition in (5.12) is satisfied. This is
because the condition in (5.12) implies the following system of equations:
W1(·|1)σ(1|2) +W2(·|1)σ(2|2) = W1(·|2)σ(1|1) +W2(·|2)σ(2|1)
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This system of linear equations leads to the following auxiliary channel σ: σ(1|1) ,
/(1 − ) and σ(1|2) , (1 − 2)/(1 − ). This implies that for this AVC, the receiver
can not decide whether the channel input was x = 1 at a channel state s = 2 or the
channel input was x = 2 at a channel state s = 1.
Transmitter
DM-AVWC
Q = (W,V)
Wnsn(y
n|xn) ∈W
V nsn(z
n|yn) ∈ V
Legitimate
Receiver
Eavesdropper
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Figure 5.1: Discrete memoryless arbitrary varying wiretap channel
In [13], the concept of AVC was extended to the secrecy domain leading to the arbitrary
varying wiretap channel (AVWC). The AVWC can be interpreted as a channel that
undergoes two different classes of attacks at the same time: A passive eavesdropper
that threatens the secrecy of the communication by eavesdropping upon the transmit-
ted signal and an active jammer that threatens the reliability of the communication
by maliciously manipulating the channel state. The model of the AVWC is shown in
Fig. 5.1 and is defined as follows: Let S be a finite state set, while X , Y and Z repre-
sent finite input and output alphabets. For every state s ∈ S, the legitimate receiver
channel is given by the stochastic matrix Ws : X → P(Y), while the eavesdropper
channel is given by the stochastic matrix Vs : X → P(Z). Thus, for a state sequence
sn ∈ Sn of length n produced by the active jammer, the following discrete memoryless
channels can be defined
W nsn(y
n|xn) =
n∏
i=1
Wsi(yi|xi) and V nsn(zn|xn) =
n∏
i=1
Vsi(zi|xi). (5.13)
where xn ∈ X n is the input sequence of the channel, while yn ∈ Yn and zn ∈ Zn
are output sequences at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper respectively. An
AVWC is given by the collection of all channels in (5.13) for all possible state sequences
sn as follows:
Definition 5.2. The discrete memoryless AVWC Q is denoted by the pair (W,V)
and is given by the family of pairs with common input as
Q = (W,V) =
{
(W nsn , V
n
sn) : s
n ∈ Sn, n = 1, 2, . . .}, (5.14)
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where W represents the AVC between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver,
while V represents the AVC between the transmitter and the eavesdropper.
An AVWC models a very challenging communication scenario, yet it is of high impor-
tance. This is because the model of an AVWC combines various features at the same
time:
1. It mimic a very realistic and typical situation for wireless communication where
the channel varies rapidly over time.
2. It simulates the most two common attacks in secure communication: passive
eavesdropping and active jamming.
3. It includes other important channel models such as compound wiretap channels
or classical wiretap channels as special cases.
In the next sections, we will discuss the different coding techniques used to establish
a reliable and secure communication over AVWCs. In particular, we will address
the secrecy capacity provided by each coding scheme along with the advantages and
disadvantages of this scheme.
5.2 Deterministic and Correlated Random Secrecy
Capacity for AVWCs
In this section, we highlight the main results established in previous literature for
secure communication over AVWCs. We start by introducing a formal definition for
the two commonly used coding schemes: deterministic and correlated random codes.
We then present the secrecy capacities provided by both coding schemes and discuss
their strengths and weaknesses. Finally, we discuss some of the analytical properties
of the established capacity functions.
5.2.1 Coding Schemes: Basic Definitions
Consider a communication scenario in which a confidential message Mc is transmitted
over an AVWC Q as shown in Fig. 5.1. For a given message mc ∈Mc, the transmitter
produces a sequence xn ∈ X n and transmits it. In the mean time, the active jammer
chooses a channel state sequence sn ∈ Sn independently from both mc and xn. The le-
gitimate receiver observes the sequence yn ∈ Yn and uses it to predict the transmitted
confidential message mc. On the other hand, the eavesdropper observes the sequence
zn ∈ Zn which should carry no information about the confidential message mc.
The investigation of the previous communication scenario has captured a lot of atten-
tion in the last few years, cf. [167] and references therein. Researchers aimed to develop
coding schemes that can deliver two main tasks: It can overcome the different jamming
strategies induced by the jammer establishing a reliable communication between the
transmitter and the legitimate receiver. It should be able to keep the eavesdropper
completely ignorant about the information transmitted. Two main coding techniques
have been used to provide these two tasks. The first technique is based on determin-
istic codes, in which a predefined (fixed) encoder-decoder pair is used through out the
whole transmission. The second technique is known as correlated random codes, in
which an encoder-decoder pair is selected based on some sort of common randomness
shared between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver.
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Definition 5.3. A deterministic secrecy code Csdet for the AVWC:Q = (W,V) consists
of: a set of confidential messages Mc, a fixed stochastic encoder
E :Mc → P(X n) (5.15)
that maps a confidential message mc ∈ Mc to a codeword xn(mc) ∈ X n according to
the conditional probability E(xn|mc), and a fixed deterministic decoder
ϕ : Yn →Mc ∪ {?} (5.16)
that maps each channel observation at the legitimate receiver to the corresponding
intended message or an error message.
In order to measure the reliability performance of a deterministic secrecy code Csdet, we
can use the average decoding error probability given by:
P¯e(Csdet) = max
sn∈Sn
P¯e(s
n|Csdet)
= max
sn∈Sn
1
|Mc|
∑
mc
∑
xn
∑
yn:ϕ(yn)6=mc
W nsn(y
n|xn)E(xn|mc). (5.17)
Alternatively, we can also used the maximum decoding error probability where the
expectation over the message set Mc is replaced by a maximization as follows:
Pmaxe (Csdet) = max
sn∈Sn
max
mc∈Mc
∑
xn
∑
yn:ϕ(yn) 6=mc
W nsn(y
n|xn)E(xn|mc). (5.18)
On the other hand, the secrecy performance of Csdet is measured by investigating the
information leakage of the confidential message to the eavesdropper for every state
sequence sn ∈ Sn with respect to the strong secrecy criterion as follows:
L(Csdet) = max
sn∈Sn
L(sn|Csdet)
= max
sn∈Sn
I(Mc; Znsn|Csdet), (5.19)
where Mc represents a uniformly distributed random variable over the confidential
messages set Mc, while Znsn is a random variable for the channel observation at the
eavesdropper for state sequence sn.
Definition 5.4. A non-negative number Rc is an achievable strong secrecy rate for
the AVWC: Q = (W,V) with respect to the average decoding error criterion, if for
all δ, λ, τ > 0 there is an n(δ, λ, τ) ∈ N, such that for all n > n(τ, λ, δ), there exists a
sequence of deterministic codes (Csdet)n that satisfies the following constraints:
1
n
log |Mc| ≥ Rc − δ, (5.20)
P¯e(Csdet) ≤ λ, (5.21)
L(Csdet) ≤ τ. (5.22)
The deterministic strong secrecy capacity Csdet,avg(Q) with respect to the average de-
coding error criterion is given by the supremum of all achievable rates Rc.
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Based on the previous definition, we can use Pmaxe to define the deterministic strong
secrecy capacity Csd,max(Q) with respect to the maximum decoding error probability.
Unlike the classical wiretap channel where these two capacities are equivalent, it was
shown in [163] that for AVC and consequently for AVWC as well, Csdet,avg(Q) and
Csdet,max(Q) might not be the same. In fact, although the deterministic transmission
capacity Cpdet,avg(W) of AVCs with respect to the average decoding error probability
was established in [165], the capacity of AVCs under the maximum decoding error
probability criterion Cpdet,max(W) is still unknown.
In [14], it was shown that the incapability of deterministic codes to deal with some
class of AVCs extends to AVWCs as well. It was shown that deterministic codes might
not be sufficient to establish reliable communication over all AVWCs. In particular,
if the AVC W between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver is symmetrizable,
no reliable communication can be achieved using deterministic codes. Unfortunately,
a lot of channels of practical relevance fall into the class of symmetrizable AVCs [168].
For these channels, more sophisticated coding techniques such as correlated random
codes are needed.
Definition 5.5. A correlated random secrecy code Csran for the AVWC: Q = (W,V)
consists of: a set of confidential messages Mc, a set G of values for the common ran-
domness, a probability distribution PΓ that guides the selection of a certain realization
of the common randomness γ ∈ G, a set of stochastic encoders
Eγ :Mc → P(X n), (5.23)
that maps a confidential message mc ∈ Mc to a codeword xn(mc) ∈ X n according to
the conditional probability Eγ(xn|mc) and a set of deterministic decoders
ϕγ : Yn →Mc ∪ {?}, (5.24)
that maps each channel observation at the legitimate receiver to the corresponding
intended message or an error message.
The previous definition implies that any correlated random code Csran can be interpreted
as a family of deterministic codes of Definition 5.3 as follows:
Csran = {Csdet(γ) : γ ∈ G}. (5.25)
Similar to deterministic codes, we can evaluate the reliability performance of a cor-
related random code Csran using either the average or the maximum decoding error
probability. For the average decoding error, we have:
P¯e(Csran) = max
sn∈Sn
P¯e(s
n|Csran)
= max
sn∈Sn
1
|Mc|
∑
mc
∑
γ
∑
xn
∑
yn:ϕγ(yn) 6=mc
W nsn(y
n|xn)Eγ(xn|mc)PΓ(γ). (5.26)
On the other hand, the secrecy performance of Csran can be evaluated with respect
to two secrecy criteria. The first criterion is called the mean secrecy criterion and
is measured by the investigating the average information leakage of the confidential
message to the eavesdropper with respect to the strong secrecy criterion, for every
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state sequence sn ∈ Sn over all realizations of the shared common randomness γ ∈ G
as follows:
Lmean(Csran) = max
sn∈Sn
I(Mc; Znsn|ΓCsran)
= max
sn∈Sn
∑
γ
I(Mc; Znsn(γ)|Csran)PΓ(γ), (5.27)
where Znsn(γ) is the channel output at the eavesdropper for a state sequence s
n, when
the encoder Eγ is used. The second criterion is a more conservative criterion known
as the maximum secrecy criterion and is given by
Lmax(Csran) = max
sn∈Sn
Lmax(sn|Csran)
= max
sn∈Sn
max
γ∈G
I(Mc; Znsn(γ)|Csran). (5.28)
It is important to highlight that both secrecy criteria assume that the eavesdropper
has an access to the common randomness shared between the transmitter and the
legitimate receiver. However, the mean secrecy criterion puts the distribution PΓ into
consideration, while the maximum secrecy criterion considers the information leakage
for every realization γ. It is also fair to assume that the eavesdropper has access to
the shared common randomness because otherwise the transmitter and the legitimate
receiver can use this common randomness to implement alternative secure encoding
schemes such as one time pad, where the common randomness is used to create a
shared secret key [169,170].
Definition 5.6. A non-negative number Rc is an achievable strong secrecy rate for
the AVWC: Q = (W,V) with respect to the average decoding error criterion and the
mean strong secrecy criterion, if for all δ, λ, τ > 0 there is an n(δ, λ, τ) ∈ N, such that
for all n > n(τ, λ, δ), there exists a sequence of correlated random codes (Csran)n that
satisfies the following constraints:
1
n
log |Mc| ≥ Rc − δ, (5.29)
P¯e(Csran) ≤ λ, (5.30)
Lmean(Csran) ≤ τ. (5.31)
The correlated random strong mean secrecy capacity Cs,meanran,avg(Q) with respect to the
average decoding error criterion is given by the supremum of all achievable mean strong
secrecy rates Rc.
The previous definition can be used in combination with the other reliability and se-
crecy constraints to define the following secrecy capacities: Cs,maxran,avg(Q), C
s,mean
ran,max(Q)
and Cs,maxran,max(Q). For these capacities, the following convention is used: The super-
script is used to identify the selected secrecy criterion, while the subscript is used to
identify the selected reliability criterion. From this point, we will mainly focus on the
average decoding error probability. Thus, we will omit the subscript that identify the
reliability measure used unless we want to stress that a certain result is valid for the
maximum decoding error probability.
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5.2.2 Correlated Random Secrecy Capacity: Robustification
Technique
One of the main tools that was introduced to facilitate the construction of correlated
random code for AVWCs is the robustification technique introduced by Ahlswede in
[171]. Ahlswede used this technique to derive the correlated random transmission
capacity of AVCs by establishing a link between correlated random codes for AVCs and
deterministic codes for compound channels. This technique is based on the following
lemma:
Lemma 5.1. [171] For a given finite set S and an integer n, if a function f : Sn →
[0, 1] satisfies ∑
sn∈Sn
f(sn)q(s1) . . . q(sn) ≥ 1−  (5.32)
for all q ∈ Pn0 (S) and some  ∈ [0, 1], then for all sequences sn ∈ Sn, the following
holds:
1
n!
∑
pi∈Πn
f
(
pi(sn)
)
> 1− 3(n+ 1)|S|, (5.33)
where Πn is the set of all permutations over the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, such that pi(sn) is a
new arrangement of the sequence sn based on the permutation pi as follows: pi(sn) =
(spi(1), . . . , spi(n)).
In [14], the usage of the robustification technique was extended to the secrecy domain.
It provided a way to establish an achievable correlated random secrecy rate for AVWCs
based on the deterministic achievable secrecy rate for the compound wiretap channel
presented in [30]. The first step in this investigation was to use the average channel
notation in (5.10) to define the following discrete memoryless AVWC:
Q = (W,V) =
{
(W nq , V
n
q ) : q ∈ P(Sn), n = 1, 2, . . .
}
. (5.34)
Without loss of generality, the channel state q is usually restricted to the set of all
types over the alphabet S with length n, i.e. q ∈ Pn0 (Sn). One should notice that
for a fixed block length n, the AVWC Q simplifies to a compound wiretap channel Q,
where the channel state set is given by the set of all types of length n on the state set
S of the corresponding AVWC Q as follows:
Q = Q(n) = {(W nq , V nq ) : q ∈ Pn0 (Sn)}. (5.35)
It was shown in [14, Lemma 3.7] that under the average decoding error probability
and the strong secrecy criteria, the secrecy capacity of the AVWC Q and Q are equiv-
alent, regardless of the coding scheme used. This result along with the robustification
technique and the achievable deterministic secrecy rate of compound wiretap channel
established in [30] were used to derive an achievable correlated random secrecy rate
for the AVWC Q as follows:
Theorem 5.3. [14] For an AVWC: Q = (W,V), if there exists a best channel to
the eavesdropper, a lower-bound for the correlated random strong secrecy capacity with
respect to the average decoding error probability and the mean secrecy criterion is given
by
Cs,meanran,avg(Q) ≥ max
PUX
[
min
q∈P(S)
I(U; Yq)− max
q∈P(S)
I(U; Zq)
]
. (5.36)
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where Yq and Zq are the random variables associated with the output of the averaged
channels Wq and Vq respectively, while the maximum is taken over all possible input
distributions PUX defined over the random variables U and X.
One can notice that the previous theorem did not provide an achievable secrecy rate
for the general AVWC. This is because, it enforces an additional constraint on the AVC
V between the transmitter and the eavesdropper. This constraint is the existence of
a best channel to the eavesdropper. The concept of a best channel was defined as
follows:
Definition 5.7. An AVWC: Q = (W,V) is said to have a best channel to the eaves-
dropper, if there exist a channel Vq∗ ∈ V, such that all other channels inV are degraded
versions of Vq∗ . In other words, if the output of any channel Vq ∈ V is denoted by Zq,
then it holds that X− Zq∗ − Zq forms a Markov chain for all q ∈ P(S).
In order to understand the role played by the best channel constraint, we need to
go through the proof of Theorem 5.3. The proof consists of two main steps: In the
first step, the result established in [14, Lemma 3.7] is used to transform the coding
problem from the AVWC: Q to the corresponding AVWC: Q defined with respect
to the averaged channels. For an arbitrary but fixed block length n, the problem
of secure communication over the AVWC: Q simplifies to a secure communication
problem over a compound wiretap channel Q as highlighted by Eq. (5.35). It was
shown in [30, Theorem 3.6] that for the compound wiretap channel Q a deterministic
wiretap coding scheme can achieve secrecy rates up to:
R ≤ min
q∈P(S)
I(U; Yq)− max
q∈P(S)
I(U; Zq). (5.37)
One can observe that the previous rate is equivalent to the one given in Theorem 5.3
and this concludes the first part of the achievability proof. The second part of the
proof aims to transform the deterministic code constructed for the compound wiretap
channel Q to a correlated random code for the AVWC: Q. This is done by applying
the robustification technique given by Lemma 5.1 to the reliability and secrecy con-
straints. This step lead to two main constraints: The first is the existence of a best
channel to the eavesdropper which is a consequence of using the compound component
V to simulate the effect of the original eavesdropper’s AVC V. The second constraint
is that the amount of shared correlated random between the transmitter and the re-
ceiving nodes is n! which corresponds to the number of all possible permutation in
the set Πn. It was then showed in [14, Lemma 3.11] that the amount of correlated
randomness can be reduced to the order of O(n2).
In [153, Theorem 3], it was shown that the achievable secrecy rate given by Theorem
5.3 establishes the capacity function Cs,meanran,avg(Q) if the AVWC is strongly degraded with
independent states and a best channel to the eavesdropper exists. This implies that
Theorem 5.3 is an important step in investigating the problem of secure communication
over AVWCs. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that Theorem 5.3 suffered from
three main drawbacks:
1. Instead of presenting a full characterization for the correlated random secrecy
capacity of AVWCs, Theorem 5.3 only presented an achievable secrecy rate
which serves as a lower bound for the capacity.
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2. Theorem 5.3 only provided an achievable correlated random coding scheme for
the average decoding error probability and the mean information leakage. The
possibility of extending the coding scheme to the other reliability and secrecy
constraints is not obvious.
3. The last drawback of Theorem 5.3 is that the established achievable secrecy
rate is not achievable in general as it requires the availability of a best channel
to the eavesdropper.
One might argue that the first and second drawbacks are acceptable. This is because
even for the simpler case of the compound wiretap channel a single-letter character-
ization of the secrecy capacity is still open. However, the last drawback is a serious
issue because it raises a lot of speculations about the existence of a universal coding
scheme for the AVWC. These drawbacks motivates Wiese, No¨tzel and Boche in [159]
to present the following result:
Theorem 5.4. [159] For an AVWC: Q = (W,V), the correlated random strong
secrecy capacity with respect to the average decoding error probability and the mean
secrecy criterion is given by:
Cs,meanran,avg(Q) = lim
n→∞
1
n
max
PUXn
[
min
q∈P(Sn)
I(U; Ynq )− max
sn∈Sn
I(U; Znsn)
]
. (5.38)
where Znsn is the random variable associated with the output of the channel V
n
sn, while
Ynq is the random variable associated with the output of the averaged channel W
n
q .
Moreover, the maximum is taken over all possible input distributions PUXn defined
over the random variables U and Xn.
The main idea of the proof of the previous theorem was the introduction of the auxil-
iary channel known as: the compound arbitrary varying wiretap channel (CAVWC).
This channel consists of a compound channel W = {Wq : q ∈ P(Sn)} from the trans-
mitter to the legitimate receiver and an AVC V between the transmitter and the
eavesdropper. Similar to the proof of Theorem 5.3, the proof of Theorem 5.4 also
consists of two steps. The first step is to establish the deterministic secrecy capacity
of the CAVWC (W ,V). This is done by applying the reliability analysis techniques
used for the compound channel as in [30]. On the other hand, the secrecy analysis is
performed by extending the strong secrecy techniques introduced in Section 2.2.3 to
the setup of AVC. The next step of the proof is to apply the robustification technique
to transform the constructed deterministic code into a correlated random code for the
corresponding AVWC. In Section 5.4, a more general version of the proof will be given
in details.
The work in [159] did not only provide the result established in Theorem 5.4, but it also
showed that the correlated random secrecy capacity with respect to the mean infor-
mation leakage is equivalent to the maximum one, i.e. Cs,meanran,avg(Q) = C
s,max
ran,avg(Q)
1 [159,
Theorem 6]. Additionally, it was shown in the proof of [166, Theorem 1] that the
expression of the correlated random secrecy capacity in Theorem 5.4 does not change
if the sets over which the minimum and the maximum are taken in (5.38) are replaced
by different, but related ones. In particular, it was shown that maxsn∈Sn I(U; Znsn)
1From this point, we will refer to the correlated random secrecy capacity of an AVWC as Csran(Q),
where it is intuitively implied that the average decoding error probability was used as the reliability
measure along with the fact that the exact secrecy criterion used has no effect on the capacity.
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can be replaced by maxq∈P(Sn) I(U; Znq ), while minq∈P(Sn) I(U; Ynq ) can be replaced by
minq˜∈P(S) I(U; Ynq˜ ). This equality follows from the convexity of the mutual information
along with the converse proof of [159, Thoerem 6].
Although Theorem 5.4 can be considered as a very promising solution for the prob-
lem of secure communication over AVWC, it still suffer from the normal drawbacks of
correlated random codes. In particular, correlated random codes can only be used if
there exists a shared randomness between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver,
where the amount of this randomness grows with the code block length n. In many
practical situation, it might be impossible to provide such amount of correlated ran-
domness. Moreover, the reliability analysis of correlated random codes for AVWC is
only valid under the assumption of restricted communication between the jammer and
the eavesdropper. This assumption is not always true because in some AVWCs the
jammer and the eavesdropper are in fact one node.
5.2.3 Coding Techniques for Deterministic Codes
The previous section clearly pointed out that if no common randomness is available, the
construction of correlated random codes fails. This implies that in order to establish a
secure communication over an AVWC for these scenarios, alternative coding schemes
are needed. In [14], deterministic secrecy codes prevailed as an appropriate solution.
In particular, it was shown that deterministic codes can achieve the same secrecy rates
provided by correlated random codes under some restrictions on the AVC W between
the transmitter and the legitimate receiver. This result was generalized in [166] leading
to the establishment of the deterministic secrecy capacity of AVWCs as follows:
Theorem 5.5. For an AVWC: Q = (W,V), the deterministic strong secrecy capacity
with respect to the average decoding error probability is given by:
Csdet(Q) =
{
0 if W is symmetrizable
Csran(Q) otherwise,
(5.39)
where W is the AVC between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver, while Csran(Q)
is the correlated random strong secrecy capacity.
The previous theorem implies that the dichotomy behavior of the deterministic trans-
mission capacity of AVCs established in [163] extends to the secrecy domain as well.
However, the vanishing condition does not depend on the full AVWC: Q = (W,V).
Instead, it only depends on the legitimate AVC W. This result is convenient in some
sense because as highlighted by [165, Lemma 1], it is impossible to establish a reli-
able communication over a symmetrizable AVC using deterministic code. Since the
problem of secure communication over AVWCs involves the same reliability constraint
required for AVCs, one should expect the symmetrizability of the AVC W to be an
important factor in characterizing the deterministic secrecy capacity of the AVWC:
Q = (W,V). On the other hand, the eavesdropper AVC V only contributes to the
secrecy condition and plays no role in defining the reliability requirement of the system.
Two main coding approaches have been used to establish the achievability of the se-
crecy capacity given by Theorem 5.5. The first approach is based on the concept of
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elimination of correlation introduced by Ahlswede in [163]. Ahlswede use this tech-
nique to provide a deterministic coding scheme that can be used to establish a reliable
communication over an AVC. The idea of this technique is based on transforming a cor-
related random code to a deterministic code using the principle of code concatenation.
We already know that the main ingredient of a correlated random code is the avail-
ability of a random experiment whose output is shared by both the transmitter and
the receiving nodes. The output of this random experiment simply inform the receiver
about the exact code realization that was used in the encoding process. Thus, if we
want to use a correlated random code in the absence of common randomness, we only
need to develop an alternative technique to inform the receiver about this information.
Ahlswede used this idea to build the elimination of correlation technique. He suggested
to add a short prefix to the actual codeword produced by the correlated random code
encoder. This prefix should carry information about the exact code realization used
for encoding. Since the number of code realization needed |G| = O(n2) as shown
in [163, Corollary 1], the usage of a prefix code to represent an element γ ∈ G causes
no essential loss to the actual transmitted rate. However, the previous technique only
works if the receiver is able to decode the transmitted prefix correctly. According to the
results established in [165], this is only possible if the AVC: W is not symmetrizable.
In [166], this approach was extended to the AVWC leading to a simple achievability
proof for Theorem 5.5. A more detailed achievability proof that utilizes this technique
will be presented in Section 5.3.4 for a more general scenario.
Although the previous approach managed to solve one of the drawbacks of correlated
random codes which is the availability of a common randomness, it raises another
issue. In Section 5.2.2, it was mentioned that the reliability analysis of correlated
random codes is only valid under the assumption that the jammer has no information
about the exact encoder-decoder pair used for the transmission. This assumption has
led to the enforcement of some restrictions on the communication link between the
jammer and the eavesdropper because it was assumed that the eavesdropper knows
the exact encoder-decoder pair and is not allowed to share this information with the
jammer. Since the elimination of correlation approach utilizes a correlated random
code, we need to make sure that the jammer is still unable to acquire any information
about the exact code realization used. Unfortunately, the restricted communication
assumption is not enough for this case and a stronger assumption is needed. This is
because the transmitter encodes the information about the code realization used in
the prefix of each transmitted codeword and transmits it over the channel. Thus, in
order to make sure that the jammer possesses no information about the selected code
realization, it is assumed that the jammer can not decode any received signal whether
this signal came from the eavesdropper or from the transmitter.
The previous discussion implied that the elimination of correlation technique is not the
optimum way to construct deterministic codes for both AVCs and AVWCs. In [165]
Csisza´r and Naryan suggested an alternative approach which can be used directly to
construct deterministic codes for AVCs. Their approach is based on two main pillars:
The first pillar is the generation of some codewords that satisfies a set of typicality
properties given in [165, Lemma 3]. Csisza´r and Naryan showed that any randomly
generated group of codewords will possess the required properties with an arbitrary
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probability close to 1. The second pillar of Csisza´r and Naryan’s technique is a decod-
ing role [165, Definition 3] that assure an unambiguous (unique) output, if the AVC
W between the transmitter and the receiver is not symmetrizable. In [166], No¨tzel,
Boche and Wiese managed to extend this approach to the secrecy domain and pre-
sented a direct proof for Theorem 5.5. In doing so, they presented [166, Lemma 2]
which is an extended version of [165, Lemma 3]. They showed that under some rate
constraints, the a randomly selected set of codewords will satisfy the strong secrecy
constraint in (5.19) and the original typicality constraints in [165, Lemma 3]. Beside
the establishment of [166, Lemma 2], the authors had to deal with other issues related
to the constraints that define the vanishing condition of the capacity. In Section 5.3.3,
we will present a coding scheme that utilizes the same coding techniques introduced
in [166] but for a more general problem.
It is important to highlight that the deterministic coding scheme presented in [166]
to prove the achievability of the deterministic secrecy rate in Theorem 5.5 does not
enforce any restrictions on the information shared between the eavesdropper and the
jammer. In particular, the eavesdropper is allowed to know the jamming strategy
used to manipulate the channel state or even the exact channel state selected by the
jammer. At the same time, the jammer is allowed to know any information possessed
by the eavesdropper. This result implies that this coding scheme managed to overcome
the main drawbacks of the correlated random techniques highlighted in Section 5.2.2.
Nevertheless, this coding scheme suffers from the usual drawback of deterministic codes
which is the inadequacy of dealing with symmetrizable AVWCs.
5.2.4 Analytical Properties of the Capacity Functions
Over the last decade, there has been a huge controversy in the information theory com-
munity about the usability of multi-letter capacity descriptions. In particular, many
researchers claimed that multi-letter capacity descriptions are useless because they are
inefficiently computable: One might notice that in order to calculate the correlated
random secrecy capacity Csran(Q) given by (5.38), the limit of a series of convex opti-
mization problems need to be computed. Although this is true, it has turned out that
multi-letter capacity descriptions like the one in Theorem 5.4 can be incredibly useful.
In particular, it was shown in [172] that multi-letter capacity descriptions can be used
to describe some of the analytical properties such as continuity and additivity of the
capacity functions. These properties are of high importance as they play an impor-
tant role in determining the performance of the communication system and its stability.
The investigation of the analytical properties of the Shannon’s capacity of a DMC
has been widely addressed. In particular, it has been shown that for a DMC: W , the
capacity function C(W ) with respect to the average and maximum decoding error are
continuous and additive [173]. Continuity means that any small change in the channel
transition matrix W , only leads to a small change in the capacity. On the other hand,
additivity means that for two parallel DMCs W1 and W2, the capacity of the overall
system W1 ⊗W2 satisfies the following:
C(W1 ⊗W2) = C(W1) + C(W2). (5.40)
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The investigation of the continuity and the additivity of a capacity function is very
crucial for any communication system. This is because the continuity property guar-
antees a certain level of stability to the transmission rate of the system [174]. On
the other hand, the additivity property indicates that using a joint encoder-decoder
pair for two parallel channels does not provide any gain in the capacity compared to
individual encoding [175]. However, the investigation of continuity and additivity in
classical information theory did not capture a lot of attention in previous literature.
This because aside from DMCs, the investigation of these properties appears to be a
very difficult task.
In [176], Shannon tried to investigate the additivity of the zero-error capacity of a
DMC: C0(W ). He conjectured that the C0(W ) possess the same property of the
average and maximum error capacities, i.e. C0(W ) is also additive and satisfy the
relation in (5.40). This conjecture was disproved by Haermers in [177], where he
managed to construct a counter example for which the bound in (5.40) does not hold.
In [178], Alon gave a stronger counterexample showing that the discrepancy between
the overall capacity and the sum of the individual capacities can be arbitrarily large.
The previous examples implied that the zero-error capacity is super-additive and there
exist channels such that
C0(W1 ⊗W2) > C0(W1) + C0(W2). (5.41)
Although Alon and Haermers managed to construct explicit examples for which the
zero-error capacity is super-additive, a general characterization of the additivity prop-
erty remains unknown. Moreover, in [178] Alon raised a more interesting question as
follow: By how much can the additivity of the zero-error capacity be violated. In
particular, given two parallel DMCs W1 and W2, where C
0(Wi) ≤  for i = 1, 2, what
bounds do we have on the normalized zero-error capacity C¯0(W ) given by:
C¯0(W ) =
C0(W )
log2(min(|X |, |Y|))
, (5.42)
where W = W1 ⊗ W2. Alon conjectured that the zero-error capacity is violated in
a strong form in the sense that C¯0(W ) is close to 1, i.e. C¯0(W ) > 1 − . However,
it was recently shown in [179] that the normalized zero-error capacity of two parallel
channels is close to 1/2, i.e. C¯0(W ) > 1/2 − . This implied that additivity of the
zero-error capacity is not violated in a strong form.
The investigation of the continuity and additivity of the capacity functions of AVCs
and AVWCs has recently captured the attention of some researchers for the following
reasons: The capacity functions of AVCs and AVWCs depends on the channel states
set S, which is controlled by an active adversary. Thus, it is important to investi-
gate whether the jammer has the ability to affect the capacity function severely by
a simple manipulation to the channel states set S. The investigation of the continu-
ity behavior is not only related to the stability of the capacity function, but it also
plays an important role in determining the computability of the capacity function on
Turing’s machines [180, 181]. The second reason is related to the argument presented
by Ahlswede in [182], where he showed that the characterization of the zero-error ca-
pacity is included as a special case in the problem of determining the uncorrelated
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deterministic transmission capacity of the AVC under the maximal decoding error cri-
terion. Thus, characterizing the additivity behavior of this capacity function will give
an answer to the questions raised by Shannon in [176] and Lovasz in [183] In next few
lines, a brief summary about the continuity and additivity properties of the correlated
random capacity for AVCs and AVWCs is given.
Before these results are presented, a formal definition for the continuity and additivity
behavior of a given capacity function is presented as follows:
Definition 5.8. For a finite AVWC: Q, a given capacity function C(Q) is said to be
continuous in all finite AVWCs: Q, if for all sequences of finite AVWCs: {Qn}∞n=1 such
that:
lim
n→∞
D(Qn,Q) = 0, (5.43)
where D(·, ·) is a distance measure used to describe how well one AVWC can be
approximated by the other one, the following holds:
lim
n→∞
C(Qn) = C(Q). (5.44)
In order to lay out a mathematical definition for the distance measure D(·, ·), the
concept of total variation distance between the transition probability matrices of two
DMCs W1,W2 ∈ P(Y|X ) given by the next equation was used.
d(W1,W2) = max
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
∣∣W1(y|x)−W2(y|x)∣∣. (5.45)
This measure was then extend to define the following measure between two AVCs
W1 and W2 defined with respect to the channel states sets S1 and S2 respectively as
follows:
G(W1,W2) = max
s1∈S1
max
s2∈S2
d(W1(·|·, s1),W2(·|·, s2)). (5.46)
Although one might argue that G is not symmetric, we can still use it to define the
following symmetric distance measure between W1 and W2 as follows:
D(W1,W2) = max
{
G(W1,W2), G(W2,W1)
}
. (5.47)
It worth mentioning that S1 and S2 can be any arbitrary finite state sets and it is not
necessarily to have |S1| = |S2|. Now using the same concept, the distance measure
D(·, ·) between two AVWCs: Q1 = (W1,V1) and Q2 = (W2,V2) is defined as follows:
D(Q1,Q2) = max
{
D(W1,W2), D(V1,V2)
}
. (5.48)
On the other hand, in order to investigate the additivity behaviour of a given capacity
function, the concept of parallel AVCs was introduced. Given two AVCs W1 and W2,
let W be their parallel combination defined as follows:
W = W1 ⊗W2 =
{
W1(·|·, s1)}s1∈S1 ⊗ {W2(·|·, s2)
}
s2∈S2 . (5.49)
This implies that W can be interpreted as an AVC with an input alphabet X1×X2 and
an output alphabet Y1 × Y2 such that W is characterized by the following transition
matrix:
W (y1, y2|x1, x2, s1, s2) = W1(y1|x1, s1)W2(y2|x2, s2), (5.50)
where xi ∈ Xi, yi ∈ Yi and si ∈ Si, for i = 1, 2. The concept of parallel AVCs can be
easily extended to the secrecy domain to define parallel AVWCs as well.
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Definition 5.9. Let Q1 and Q2 be two finite AVWCs and Q = Q1 ⊗ Q2 be their
parallel combination defined using Eqs. (5.49) and (5.50). Then, a given capacity
function for these AVWCs is said to be additive if
C(Q) = C(Q1) + C(Q2), (5.51)
while it is said to be super-additive if
C(Q) > C(Q1) + C(Q2), (5.52)
We are now ready to present the main continuity and additivity results established in
previous literature for the correlated random capacity function of AVCs and AVWCs.
Theorem 5.6. [172] The correlated random secrecy capacity of the AVWC: Q =
(W,V) with respect to the average decoding error probability and the maximum secrecy
criterion Cs,maxran,avg(Q) is continuous in the two finite AVCs (W,V).
The previous theorem was established although a single-letter description for Cs,maxran,avg(Q)
is still unknown. This result reflects the importance of multi-letter capacity descrip-
tion. To the best of our knowledge, the continuity of the correlated random public
capacity of AVCs was not investigated in previous literature despite the fact that a
single-letter description was established in [154, 158]. Nevertheless, one can use the
result established in Theorem 5.6 to prove the following behavior: computable.
Corollary 5.1. The correlated random public capacity of the AVC W under the aver-
age decoding error probability Cpran,avg(W) is continuous in the finite AVC W.
It was also surprising to discover that the additivity behavior of the correlated random
capacity of parallel AVCs was only investigated recently leading the following result.
Theorem 5.7. [184] Let W1 and W2 be two parallel AVCs. Then the correlated
random public capacity under the average decoding error probability is additive, i.e.
Cpran(W1 ⊗W2) = Cpran(W1) + Cpran(W2).
Unfortunately, the additivity behavior of the correlated random secrecy capacity for
AVWCs is still an open problem. In section 5.3.6, the analytical properties of the
deterministic capacity for AVCs and AVWCs established in [185] will be derived as a
special case from a more general scenario. In fact, we will show that the deterministic
secrecy capacity of AVWCs exhibits an extreme super-additivity behavior known as
super-activation. This behavior indicates that the joint encoding-decoding for two
parallel AVWCs each with vanishing capacity can lead to a capacity greater than zero.
Super-activation has been investigated in the field of quantum information theory
in [186] and was believed to be a distinct phenomena for quantum information theory.
However, the recent results established in [184, 187] showed that this behavior can
occur in the classical domain but it seems to be a unique feature for AVWCs.
5.3 The Secrecy Capacity of AVWCs Under List
Decoding
In this section, we present a full characterization for the list secrecy capacity of AVWCs.
We start by stating the main concepts of list decoding along with some of the main
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results established in previous literature. We then present our main coding theorem
and derive its achievability using two different coding schemes. We discuss and compare
the two coding schemes, showing that although they both lead to the same list secrecy
capacity, each coding scheme has its own preferences. We then derive a special result
for the secrecy capacity of AVWCs under the class of list codes with finite list size.
Finally, we establish the continuity and additivity behavior for the capacity functions
of AVCs and AVWCs under list decoding. The results established in this section was
published in [188–192].
5.3.1 List Decoding for AVWCs: Basic Definitions
List codes are a special class of deterministic codes, in which the decoder outputs a
list of L possible messages, instead of deciding on exactly one message. The principle
of list decoding was first introduced in [193] in order to minimize the gap between
upper and lower bounds of the decoding error probability. This idea suggested that
list codes can be used for the AVC to overcome the symmetrizability issue. It was then
shown in [194–197] that list codes are a very good coding alternative for AVCs as it
can overcome the drawbacks of correlated random codes and the classical deterministic
codes. We start by presenting the following definition.
Definition 5.10. A public list code Cplist with list size L for the AVC: W consists of:
a set of public messages Mp, a deterministic encoder
E :Mp → X n
that maps a message mp ∈Mp into a codeword xn(mp) ∈ X n and a deterministic list
decoder given by:
ϕL : Yn → PL(Mp) ∪ {?}
that maps each channel observation at the receiver to a list of up to L messages or an
error message, where PL(Mp) is the set of all subsets ofMp with cardinality at most
L.
The reliability performance of Cplist is measured in terms of its average decoding error
probability given by:
P¯e(Cplist) = max
sn∈Sn
P¯e(s
n|Cplist)
= max
sn∈Sn
1
|Mp|
∑
mp
∑
yn:ϕL(yn)63mp
W nsn(y
n|xn(mp)). (5.53)
Definition 5.11. A non-negative number Rp is an achievable public list rate for the
AVC: W; if for all δ, λ > 0 there is an n(δ, λ) ∈ N, such that for all n > n(δ, λ), there
exists a sequence of public list codes (Cplist)n, such that the following holds:
1
n
log
|Mp|
L
≥ Rp − δ, (5.54)
P¯e(Cplist) ≤ λ. (5.55)
The public list capacity Cplist(W, L) with respect to the average decoding error proba-
bility is given by the supremum of all achievable rates Rp.
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It was shown in [194, 195] that the public list capacity of an AVC W exhibits a di-
chotomy similar to the deterministic capacity of AVCs but with respect to a generalized
symmetrizability condition known as L-symmetrizable as follows:
Theorem 5.8. For an AVC: (W), the public list capacity with respect to the average
decoding error probability is characterized by the following:
Cplist(W, L) =
{
0 if W is L-symmetrizable
Cpran(W) otherwise.
The concept of L-symmetrizability extends the symmetrizability condition introduced
in Definition 5.1. It characterizes the ability of an AVC to emulate not only one valid
channel input, but up to L valid channel inputs as follows:
Definition 5.12. An AVCW is said to be L-symmetrizable, if there exists an auxiliary
channel σ : X L → P(S), such that for every permutation pi of the sequence (1, . . . , L+
1) ∑
s∈S
Ws(y|x1)σ(s|x2, . . . , xL+1) =
∑
s∈S
Ws(y|xpi(1))σ(s|xpi(2), . . . , xpi(L+1)) (5.56)
holds for every xL+1 ∈ X L+1 and y ∈ Y .
Similar to the implication of the symmetrizability condition in (5.12), the condition
in (5.56) implies that an L-symmetrizable AVC can emulate L valid replicas of the
channel input. This implies that for a given observation at the receiver yn, there exists
L+1 input sequences that might have been sent. For a given AVC:W, the largest L for
which this AVC is L-symmetrizable is called the order of symmetrizability and is de-
noted by L(W). An example for L-symmetrizable AVC was given in [194, Theorem 3].
It is worth mentioning that the condition in (5.56) implies that any L-symmetrizable
AVC is an L′-symmetrizable one as well, for all 0 ≤ L′ ≤ L.
In order to extend the concept of list decoding to fit the model of secure communication
over an AVWC, we modify Definition 5.10 as follows:
Definition 5.13. A secrecy list code Cslist with list size L for the AVWC: Q = (W,V)
consists of: a set of confidential messages Mc, a stochastic encoder
E :Mc → P(X n) (5.57)
that maps a confidential message mc ∈ Mc to a codeword xn ∈ X n according to the
conditional probability E(xn|mc), and a deterministic list decoder with list size L
ϕL : Yn → PL(Mc) ∪ {?}
that maps a channel observation at the legitimate receiver into a list of up to Lmessages
or an error message, where PL(Mc) is the set of all subsets ofMc with cardinality at
most L.
One can notice that the main difference between the previous definition and Definition
5.10 is the usage of a stochastic encoder instead of the deterministic one. This is a
necessary step for secrecy codes because as highlighted in Section 2.2, secrecy can not
Section 5.3  The Secrecy Capacity of AVWCs Under List Decoding 175
be achieved using normal deterministic encoders. In order to evaluate the reliability
performance of Cslist, we use the average decoding error probability as follows:
P¯e(Cslist) = max
sn∈Sn
P¯e(s
n|Cslist)
= max
sn∈Sn
1
|Mc|
∑
mc
∑
xn
∑
yn:ϕL(yn) 63mc
W nsn(y
n|xn)E(xn|mc). (5.58)
One the other hand, we use the information leakage of the confidential message Mc to
the eavesdropper with respect to the strong secrecy criterion to investigate the secrecy
performance of the list code Cslist as follows:
L(Cslist) = max
sn∈Sn
L(sn|Cslist)
= max
sn∈Sn
I(Mc; Znsn|Cslist). (5.59)
Definition 5.14. A non-negative number Rc is an achievable list secrecy rate for the
AVWC: Q = (W,V), if for all δ, λ, τ > 0 there is an n(δ, λ, τ) ∈ N, such that for all
n > n(τ, λ, δ), there exists a sequence of secrecy list codes (Cslist)n with list size L that
satisfies the following constraints:
1
n
log
|Mc|
L
≥ Rc − δ, (5.60)
P¯e(Cslist) ≤ λ, (5.61)
L(Cslist) ≤ τ. (5.62)
The list secrecy capacity Cslist(W,V, L) is given by the supremum of all achievable
secrecy list rates Rc.
5.3.2 Coding Theorem and Important Results
In this section, we present one of the main contribution of this chapter, which is a
full characterization of the list secrecy capacity of AVWCs. This result generalizes the
deterministic secrecy capacity of AVWCs given by Theorem 5.5.
Theorem 5.9. For an AVWC: Q = (W,V), the list strong secrecy capacity with
respect to the average decoding error probability is characterized by the following:
Cslist(Q, L) =
{
0 if W is L-symmetrizable
Csran(Q) otherwise,
where W is the AVC between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver, while Csran(Q)
is the correlated random strong secrecy capacity given by (5.38).
The previous capacity characterization implies that for an AVWC: Q where the order
of symmetrizability of the legitimate AVC: W is given by L(W), a list code with
list size L ≥ L(W) + 1 can provide a reliable and secure communication at the rate
equivalent to the correlated random secrecy capacity. Theorem 5.9 also implies that
list codes can overcome the drawbacks of both uncorrelated and correlated random
codes as follows: Given an AVWC Q = (W,V) where:
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1. W is symmetrizable with an order of symmetrizability L(W) = 1, which directly
implies that Csdet(Q) = 0.
2. No common randomness is shared between the transmitter and the legitimate
receiver, which implies that correlated random codes can not be utilized and
consequently it follows that Csran(Q) = 0.
For this AVWC, we can still achieve a positive secrecy rate equivalent to the corre-
lated random secrecy capacity using list decoding with list size L ≥ 2 = L(W) + 1.
The previous argument implies that we can always overcome the different jamming
strategies induced by the jammer to disturb reliable communication over an AVWC
by using list codes with list size L ≥ L(W) + 1.
Although the previous argument advocates the usage of list codes as the best coding
scheme for AVWCs, it was shown in [194, Theorem 3] that even for simple AVWCs,
where |X | = |Y| = |S| = 2, there exist some jamming strategies that lead to an ar-
bitrarily large order of symmetrizability L(W). This implies that, for these AVWCs,
we need to construct list codes with an arbitrarily large list size, which is not always
feasible. Nevertheless, Theorem 5.9 implies that list codes are a very powerful and
useful tool for reliable and secure communication over AVWCs.
In order to prove Theorem 5.9, we need an achievability proof and a converse proof. In
this section, we will mainly focus on the converse proof and postpone the achievability
proof to the following sections. For the converse, we start by presenting a lemma that
shows that reliable communication can not be established over an L-symmetrizable
AVC using list codes with list size L as follows:
Lemma 5.2. [194, Lemma 1] [195, Lemma 4] For an AVC:W, ifW is L-symmetrizable,
then the public list capacity with list size L vanishes, i.e. Cplist(W, L) = 0.
This lemma generalizes the result established in [165, Lemma 1] for deterministic codes
which can be interpreted as list codes with list size L = 1. The proof of Lemma 5.2
is based on showing that if the AVC: W is L-symmetrizable, then for any public list
code Cplist with list size L, there exists a state sequence sn ∈ Sn such that the average
decoding error probability is bounded away from zero as n approaches infinity. In
particular, it follows that:
lim sup
n→∞
P¯e(Cplist) ≥ lim infn→∞ maxsn∈Sn P¯e(s
n|Cplist) ≥
1
L+ 1
. (5.63)
One can easily show that the previous equation is bounded away from zero as long as
the list size L is finite. This implies that no list code with list size L exists, such that
the average decoding error probability vanishes as n→∞, which consequently means
a zero capacity. The previous argument establishes only one part of the converse proof
of Theorem 5.9, which is the vanishing capacity if W is L-symmetrizable.
For the second part of the converse, we start by pointing out that the average de-
coding error probability of any secrecy list code P¯e(Cslist) is an affine function in the
channel. This implies that P¯e(Cslist) does not change if it is calculated with respect to
the generalized channel state space P(Sn). Thus for q ∈ P(Sn), we have
P¯e(Cslist) = max
sn∈Sn
1
|Mc|
∑
mc
∑
xn
∑
yn:ϕL(yn)63mc
W nsn(y
n|xn)E(xn|mc)
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= max
q∈P(Sn)
1
|Mc|
∑
mc
∑
xn
∑
yn:ϕL(yn)63mc
W nq (y
n|xn)E(xn|mc)
(a)
≤ λ, (5.64)
where (a) follows from Eq. (5.61). If we use Eq. (5.64) along with Fano’s inequality,
then for every q ∈ P(Sn), the following holds: H(Mc|Ynq ) ≤ 1 + λ log |Mc|. Now, from
Eq. (5.60), it follows that:
Rc ≤ 1
n
[
log |Mc| − logL
]
+ δ
=
1
n
[
H(Mc)− logL
]
+ δ
(a)
≤ 1
n
[
min
q∈P(Sn)
I(Mc; Ynq ) + 1 + λ log |Mc| − logL
]
+ δ
(b)
≤ 1
n
[
min
q∈P(Sn)
I(Mc; Ynq )− max
sn∈Sn
I(Mc; Znsn)
]
+ 
(c)
≤ 1
n
[
min
q∈P(Sn)
I(U; Ynq )− max
sn∈Sn
I(U; Znsn)
]
+  (5.65)
where (a) follows by adding and subtracting the two sides of the previous inequal-
ity; (b) follows similarly by applying the inequality in (5.62), where  = 1/n(τ + 1 +
λ log |Mc| − logL) + δ; while (c) by defining the auxiliary channel F :Mc → U . Now,
if we take the limit as n → ∞, which implies that  → 0, the bound in (5.65) sim-
plifies to the expression of the correlated random secrecy capacity in (5.38) and this
completes our converse.
Before we move to the achievability proof of our coding theorem, we need to highlight
some of results established in previous literature for AVCs and AVWCs. In particular,
we need to highlight the main tools used to define the encoding and decoding functions
for a list code Cslist of Definition 5.13. We start by the encoding function and notice
that Cslist requires a stochastic encoder as shown in (5.57). We transform this stochastic
encoder to a deterministic one using a randomization message set Mr as follows:
E :Mc ×Mr → X n.
This implies that for a confidential message mc ∈ Mc, the encoder chooses a ran-
domization message mr ∈Mr uniformly at random then transmits the corresponding
codeword xn(mc,mr). The generation of the codewords x
n(mc,mr) ∈ X n that define
the codebook of our list code Cslist is guided by the following lemma:
Lemma 5.3. For any L ≥ 1,  > 0 and β > 0, there exists an n0(, L), such that for
all n ≥ n0(, L), all message sets Mc, Mr satisfying |Mc||Mr| ≥ L · 2n and all types
PX ∈ Pn0 (X ) satisfying minx:PX(x)>0 PX(x) ≥ β, there exist codewords xn(mc,mr) ∈
T n (PX) ⊂ X n, for mc ∈Mc and mr ∈Mr, such that upon setting R = 1n log |Mc||Mr|L ,
we have for all xn ∈ T n (PX), sn ∈ Sn and the joint type PXXLS∣∣∣{(mc,mr) : (xn(mc,mr), sn) ∈ T n (PXS)}∣∣∣ ≤ |Mc||Mr|2−n2 ,
if I(X, S) ≥  (5.66a)∣∣∣{(mc,mr) : (xn, xn(mc,mr), sn) ∈ T n (PXXkS)}∣∣∣ ≤ 2n(|R−I(Xk;XS)|++) (5.66b)
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∣∣∣{(mc,mr) : (xn(mc,mr), xn(mˆc, mˆr), sn) ∈ T n (PXXkS)}∣∣∣ ≤ |Mc||Mr|2−n2 ,
if I(X; XkS) ≥ |R− I(Xk; S)|+ +  (5.66c)
for k = 1, . . . , L and (mˆc, mˆr) 6= (mc,mr). Moreover, if R < mink I(Xk; S), then for
mc ∈Mc and mr ∈Mr the codewords xn(mc,mr) can be selected to further satisfy∣∣∣{J : (xn, xnJ , sn) ∈ T n (PXXLS)}∣∣∣ ≤ 2n (5.67a)∣∣∣{(mc,mr) : (xn(mc,mr), xnJ , sn) ∈ T n (PXXLS), (mc,mr) /∈ J }∣∣∣ ≤ |Mc||Mr|2−n2 ,
if I(X; XLS) ≥  (5.67b)
where J ∈ PL(Mc ×Mr) is a set with cardinality L that contains pairs of messages
(mc,mr), while x
n
J denotes the ordered L-tuple
(
xn(mc1 ,mr1), . . . , x
n(mcL ,mrL)
)
.
The previous lemma can be viewed as a generalization to the result established in [165,
Lemma 3] for deterministic codes of AVC, i.e. L = 1. It is also an extension of [195,
Lemma 1] used to establish public list codes for AVCs. In order to understand the
role played by the Lemma 5.3 in the encoding process of Cslist, we need to analyze the
statement of the Lemma as follows:
Assumptions: Lemma 5.3 starts by defining a list size L ≥ 1 that will be used dur-
ing the decoding process. Then, for some constant  > 0, it defines the code block
length n to be sufficiently large, i.e. n ≥ n0(, L). Next, Lemma 5.3 addresses the
messages needed to be transmitted from the sets Mc and Mr, where a constraint on
the product of the cardinality of the message sets must be fulfilled. Finally, Lemma 5.3
defines a probability distribution PX on X , such that PX belongs to the set of types on
X n and the minimum non-zero probability of an element x should be greater than or
equal β > 0. This probability distribution is used to generate the random codewords
xn(mc,mr) ∈ X n
Results: For any sequence xn ∈ T n (PX), a given sequence sn ∈ Sn, a fixed type
PXXLS and under the previous assumptions, Lemma 5.3 claims that using the proba-
bility distribution PX, we can generate a random codebook {xn(mc,mr) ∈ T n (PX) :
(mc,mr) ∈Mc×Mr} ⊂ X n such that the conditions in (5.66) and (5.67) are satisfied.
The conditions in (5.66) are simple joint typicality constraints and are identical to the
ones in [165, Lemma 3], for L = 1. On the other hand, the conditions in (5.67) are an
extension of the joint typicality arguments to the principle of list decoding.
It was shown in [195] that any randomly generated set of codewords will satisfy the
conditions in (5.66) and (5.67) of Lemma 5.3 with probability that approaches one
exponentially fast as n→∞.
Beside Lemma 5.3, we need to define the decoding algorithm for the list code Cslist. To
do so, we use the list decoder introduced in [195, Definition 4] as follows:
Definition 5.15. Given a received sequence yn and the set of codewords xn(mc,mr),
for mc ∈Mc and mr ∈Mr, we let (mc,mr) ∈ ϕL(yn), if and only if for an η ≥ 0, the
following holds:
1. There exists an sn ∈ Sn such that: DKL(PYXS‖W × PX × PS) ≤ η, where
PYXS is the joint type of (y
n, xn(mc,mr), s
n), while PX and PS are the types of
xn(mc,mr) and s
n respectively. Additionally, we have
(W × PX × PS)(y, x, s) = Ws(y|x)PX(x)PS(s).
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2. For every choice of L other distinct codewords: xn(mc1 ,mr1), . . . , x
n(mcL ,mrL),
where (mci ,mri) ∈Mc×Mr, such that each of them satisfies: DKL(PYXiSi‖W×
PXi × PSi) ≤ η, for some sni ∈ Sn, it holds that:
I(XY; XL|S) ≤ η, (5.68)
where PYXiSi is the joint type of (y
n, xn(mci ,mri), s
n
i ), while PXi and PSi are
the types of xn(mci ,mri) and s
n
i respectively,
The mutual information in (5.68) is calculated with respect to the joint distribution
PXYXLS given by the joint type of
(
xn(mc,mr), y
n, xn(mc1 ,mr1), . . . , x
n(mcL ,mrL), s
n
)
.
The previous list decoder generalizes the decoder introduced in [165, Definition 3] for
deterministic codes. It was shown in [195] that the previous decoding role is unam-
biguous (unique), if η is sufficiently small. In particular, it was shown that if the AVC
W is not L-symmetrizable, no set of random variables (X,XL,Y, S, SL) can satisfy the
decoding roles in Definition 5.15. With Lemma 5.3 and Definition 5.15, we possess
the main pillars needed to realize an encoder-decoder pair for a list code Cslist given by
Definition 5.13.
We now present some of the results established in previous literature for reliable com-
munication over AVCs using list codes. We start by a lemma that shows that reliable
communication at a non-zero rate is possible over an AVC:W with order of symmetriz-
ability L(W) using a list code with list size L ≥ L(W) + 1.
Lemma 5.4. [194, Lemma 3] For an AVC: W with an order of symmetrizability
L(W), let L ≥ L(W) + 1. Then there exists σ > 0, such that for all rates Rp ∈ (0, σ),
there exists a public list code Cplist with list size L and a public rate Rp, such that for
ζ > 0, we have
P¯e(Cplist) = max
sn∈Sn
P¯e(s
n|Cplist) ≤ 2−nζ . (5.69)
The main key to the proof of Lemma 5.4 is to show that for a sufficiently small rate Rp
and a decoding parameter η, the list decoder in Definition 5.15 can not produce more
than L values for any yn ∈ Yn as long as the AVC W is not L-symmetrizable. In [195,
Lemma 3], the result in Lemma 5.4 was extended showing that reliable communication
is possible as long as the rate is bounded by the minimum mutual information between
the channel input X and the average channel output Yq. The result established in [195,
Lemma 3] can be easily extended to AVWCs as follows:
Lemma 5.5. For an AVWC: Q = (W,V), where the legitimate AVC: W is charac-
terized by an order of symmetrizability L(W), let L ≥ L(W) + 1 and β > 0. Then for
any δ > 0, n ≥ n0(β, δ) and any type PX ∈ Pn0 (X ) such that minx:PX(x)>0 PX(x) ≥ β,
there exists a secrecy list code Cslist with list size L such that for ζ > 0, we have:
min
q∈P(S)
I(X; Yq)− 2δ/3 ≥ 1
n
log
|Mc||Mr|
L
≥ min
q∈P(S)
I(X; Yq)− δ,
P¯e(Cslist) = max
sn∈Sn
P¯e(s
n|Cslist) ≤ 2−nζ .
The proof of the previous lemma follows by using a secrecy list code Cslist given by the
set of codewords xn(mc,mr), for mc ∈ Mc and mr ∈ Mr that satisfy the constraints
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in Lemma 5.3 along with the list decoder in Definition 5.15. The proof is based on the
original steps used to establish [195, Lemma 3] using a simplified version of Lemma 5.3
and Definition 5.15 that only consider one message setM. The extension of the proof
to our setup is straight forward because the proof technique is independent from the
way used to enumerate the codewords Xn. In other words, it makes no difference to
enumerate the codewords by one index taken from a message setM or by two indices
taken from Mc ×Mr.
The final result that we need to highlight is an extension of the strong secrecy results
discussed in Section 2.2.3 to the problem of secure communication over AVWCs. The
following lemma gives a lower bound on the amount of randomization needed to confuse
the eavesdropper of an AVWC.
Lemma 5.6. [166, Lemma 2] For an AVWC: Q = (W,V) and any τ, β,  > 0, there
exists a function δ(τ) > 0 and an integer n0(τ), such that for all n ≥ n0(τ) and type
PX ∈ Pn0 (X ) satisfying minx:PX(x)>0 PX(x) ≥ β, there exist codewords xn(mc,mr) ∈
T n (PX) ⊂ X n, where mc ∈Mc and mr ∈Mr, such that for all sn ∈ Sn and mc ∈Mc,
the following holds:
if
log |Mr|
n
≥ max
q∈P(S)
I(X; Zq) + τ , then∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1|Mr|
|Mr|∑
mr=1
Vsn(·|xn(mc,mr))− E
[
Vsn(·|Xn)
]∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2−nδ(τ) (5.70)
where E[·] is the expectation, Xn is distributed according to P(Xn = xn) := 1|TX| 1TX(xn)
and limτ→0 δ(τ) = 0.
The proof of the previous lemma follows from the strong secrecy analysis introduced
in Section 2.2.3. Using the triangle inequality along with the relation between the
total variation distance and the mutual information established in Lemma A.6, one
can easily show that the condition in (5.70) assures that the information leakage of
the confidential message to the eavesdropper with respect to the strong secrecy decays
exponentially as follows:
max
sn∈Sn
I(Mc; Znsn) ≤ 2−nδ(τ).
5.3.3 Direct Coding Approach
In this section, we present a detailed achievability proof for Theorem 5.9. The first
case of Theorem 5.9 states that if W is L-symmetrizable, then Cslist(Q, L) = 0, so
there is nothing to prove. For the second case, we need to show that if W is not
L-symmetrizable then Csran(Q) is achievable. To do so, we will present a direct coding
approach that utilizes a secrecy list code of Definition 5.13. Our coding scheme com-
bines the principles used to establish the public list capacity of AVCs in [195] along
with the techniques used to establish the deterministic secrecy capacity of AVWCs
in [166].
Before we jump to our analysis, we need to introduce a couple of notations at first.
For the conditional distributions PA|B ∈ P(A|B) and PB|C ∈ P(B|C), we define PA|C =
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PA|B ◦ PB|C ∈ P(A|C) as follows: PA|C(a|c) =
∑
b∈B PA|B(a|b)PB|C(b|c). Moreover, for
the distributions PA ∈ P(A) and PB ∈ P(B), we define PA,B = PA ⊗ PB ∈ P(A× B)
as follows: PA,B(a, b) = PA(a)PB(b). Finally, for an alphabet A, we define the condi-
tional distribution PA|AId ∈ P(A|A), such that PA|AId(a|a¯) = 1 if and only if a = a¯.
Now, We start our analysis by pointing out the main challenge of using a direct coding
approach to establish Theorem 5.9.
Coding Problem: Theorem 5.9 shows that the list secrecy capacity of an AVWC: Q
exhibits a certain dichotomy, where the capacity is either equivalent to the correlated
random secrecy capacity Csran(Q), or it is zero. Although this might seems like a normal
behavior, it has an alarming consequence. In order to understand such consequence,
we need to highlight the following points:
• The condition that guides the dichotomy behavior of the capacity is the order
of symmetrizability of the AVC W between the transmitter and the legitimate
receiver.
• The expression of the correlated random secrecy capacity Csran(Q) in (5.38) is
calculated with respect to the auxiliary AVWC Q˜ = (W˜, V˜) instead of the
original AVWC Q. Thus, we have to keep in mind that the AVC that guides
the communication between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver is given
by: W˜ = (W ◦ PXn|U). This AVC arises from combining the prefix channel
PXn|U ∈ P(X n|U) and the original AVC W.
• It was shown in [166, Example 1] that applying a prefix channel can change a
non-symmetrizable AVC to a symmetrizable one. This implies that, although
W is not L-symmetrizable, W˜ might be L-symmetrizable.
The previous discussion summarizes the main challenge of using a direct coding ap-
proach to establish Theorem 5.9. This is because all the reliable encoding-decoding
techniques introduced in the previous section for list codes are only valid if the AVC
between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver is not L-symmetrizable. In other
words, in order to use the techniques introduced in the previous section, we have to
make sure that W˜ is not L-symmetrizable.
In order to overcome this issue, we used an approach that redefines the optimization
problem used to calculate the expression of the correlated random secrecy capacity
in (5.38). We start by transforming the auxiliary random variable U to another one
Un defined over the alphabet Un = X n. We then restrict the calculation of Csran(Q)
to certain class of prefix channels of the form PˆXn|Un = P
Id
X|X ⊗ PˇXn−1|Un−1 . We then
show that using this restricted class of prefix channels to calculate Csran(Q) is asymp-
totically as good as using the full set of prefix channels P(X n|Un). The reason for
choosing this restricted class of prefix channels is that it assures that the resultant
AVC: W˜ = (W◦ PˆXn|Un) is not L-symmetrizable as long as W is not L-symmetrizable.
We now present our coding scheme that consists of 4 main steps:
1) Prefix Channel Optimization: We start by considering the input distributions
PUn and the conditional distributions PXn|Un arising from the optimization problem
in (5.38). Without loss of generality, for every r ∈ N, let Ur = X r and define the
following:
Cr := max
PUr∈P(Ur)
max
PXr |Ur∈P(X r|Ur)
(
min
q∈P(Sr)
I(Ur; Yrq)− max
sr∈Sr
I(Ur; Zrsr)
)
, (5.71)
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where W rq (y
r|xr) = ∑sr q(sr)W rsr(yr|xr). Then, for an arbitrary but fixed r ∈ N and
an arbitrary  ≥ 0, let P∗Ur ∈ P(Ur) and P∗Xr|Ur ∈ P(X r|Ur) be such that
Cr −  = min
q∈P(Sr)
I(U∗r; Yrq)− max
sr∈Sr
I(U∗r; Zrsr). (5.72)
We further let P˜Ur+1 ∈ P(Ur+1), be such that P˜Ur+1 := P∗Ur ⊗ pi, where pi ∈ P(X ) is
defined as pi(x) := |X |−1 and P˜Xr+1|Ur+1 ∈ P(X r+1|Ur+1), be such that P˜Xr+1|Ur+1 :=
P∗Xr|Ur ⊗ σ, where σ ∈ P(X|X ) is defined as σ(x|x¯) = 1 if and only if x = x¯. Then,
from (5.71), it holds that
Cr+1 ≥ min
q∈P(Sr+1)
I(U˜r+1; Yr+1q )− max
sr+1∈Sr+1
I(U˜r+1; Zr+1sr+1)
(a)
= min
q∈P(Sr+1)
I(U∗rXpi; Yr+1q )− max
sr+1∈Sr+1
I(U∗rXpi; Zr+1sr+1)
(b)
= min
q∈P(Sr+1)
I(U∗rXpi; Yr+1q )− max
sr∈Sr
I(U∗r; Zrsr)−max
s∈S
I(Xpi; Zsr+1)
(c)
≥ min
q∈P(Sr)
I(U∗r; Yrq)− max
sr∈Sr
I(U∗r; Zrsr)− log |X |
= Cr − − log |X | (5.73)
where (a) follows from the definition of P˜Ur+1 and P˜Xr+1|Ur+1 ; (b) follows from the
mutual information chain rule and the fact that U∗r and Zsr+1 are independent as well
as Xpi and Z
r
sr ; while (c) follows because I(Xpi; Zsr+1) ≤ log |X |. Now, let us investigate
the effect of the prefix channel P˜Xr|Ur on the symmetrizability of the resultant channel
(W⊗r ◦ P˜Xr|Ur) as follows:
W⊗r ◦ P˜Xr|Ur = W⊗r ◦ (P∗Xr−1|Ur−1 ⊗ σ)
= (W⊗r−1 ◦ P∗Xr−1|Ur−1)⊗ (W ◦ σ)
= (W⊗r−1 ◦ P∗Xr−1|Ur−1)⊗W, (5.74)
where the previous relation follows due to the properties of the operators ◦ and ⊗
along with the definition of the conditional distribution σ. Since the AVC: W is not
L-symmetrizable, then for every r ≥ 2, it follows that the AVC: (W⊗r ◦ P˜Xr|Ur) is not
L-symmetrizable as well, even if (W⊗r−1 ◦ P∗Xr−1|Ur−1) is L-symmetrizable.
2) Block Coding: In this point, we describe the construction of a list code Cslist ac-
cording to Definition 5.13, for the AVWC (W⊗r ◦ P˜Xr|Ur ,V⊗r ◦ P˜Xr|Ur). We start by
generating our codebook as follows: For a code block length t ∈ N and r ∈ N\{1}, let
PUr ∈ P t0(Ur) and use it to generate the set of codewords utr(mc,mr) ∈ T t (PUr) ⊂ U tr,
for (mc,mr) ∈ Mc ×Mr and a typicality constant  > 0. Using the union bound,
we can show that the produced codewords satisfy the constraints in Lemma 5.3 and
Lemma 5.6 with probability approaches one as t→∞.
Next, we define our encoding and decoding functions as follows: Given a confidential
message mc ∈Mc, the encoder chooses a randomization message mr ∈Mr uniformly
at random then outputs the codeword utr(mc,mr). At the legitimate receiver, we use
a list decoder ϕL similar to the one given by Definition 5.15, that takes the received
sequence yn and outputs a list of message pairs J ∈ PL(Mc ×Mr).
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3) Reliability and secrecy analysis: Lemma 5.5 implies that for an AVWC, whose
legitimate channel is not L-symmetrizable, there exists a list code Cslist with list size L
and block length t constructed as described in the previous point which can be used
to transmit the messages (mc,mr) reliably over the channel (W
⊗r ◦ P˜Xr|Ur) as long as:
min
q∈P(Sr)
I(Ur; Yrq)− 2δ/3 ≥
1
t
log
|Mc||Mr|
L
≥ min
q∈P(Sr)
I(Ur; Yrq)− δ, (5.75)
where δ > 0. The previous result is only valid if the AVC (W⊗r ◦ P˜Xr|Ur) is not L-
symmetrizable. Moreover, we mean by reliably transmitted that the average decoding
error probability of Cslist decays exponentially fast. Thus, for ζ > 0 we have
P¯e(Cslist) = max
sr·t∈Sr·t
P¯e(s
r·t|Cslist) ≤ 2−tζ . (5.76)
On the other hand, based on the secrecy analysis in [166] that relates the strong
secrecy constraint in (5.59) to variations distance in Lemma 5.6, we can show that the
constructed list code is asymptotically secure in the strong sense, as long as
max
sr∈Sr
I(Ur; Zrsr) + δ ≤ lim inf
t→∞
1
t
log |Mr| ≤ max
sr∈Sr
I(Ur; Zrsr) + 2δ. (5.77)
It is worth mentioning that by asymptotically secure in the strong sense, we mean
that the information leakage of the confidential message to the eavesdropper decays
exponentially fast. Thus, for τ > 0, we have
max
sr·t∈Sr·t
I(M; Zr·tsr·t) ≤ 2−tτ . (5.78)
Now, let PUr ∈ P t0(Ur) converges to P˜Ur ∈ P(Ur) as t→∞, such that P˜Ur = P˜ ∗Ur−1⊗pi,
where pi is as defined before and P∗Ur−1 ∈ P(Ur−1) being an optimal choice for the
optimization problem in (5.71), then from (5.73), (5.75) and (5.77) we have
lim inf
t→∞
1
t
log
|Mc|
L
≥ min
q∈P(Sr)
I(U˜r; Yrq)− max
sr∈Sr
I(U˜r; Zrsr)− 3δ.
≥ Cr−1 − log |X | − 3δ. (5.79)
4) Code Transformation: Up until this point, we have shown that we can construct
a list code Cslist that can be used to establish a reliable and secure communication over
the AVWC (W⊗r ◦ P˜Xr|Ur ,V⊗r ◦ P˜Xr|Ur). Now, we want to use this code to establish
a reliable and secure communication over the original AVWC: Q = (W,V).
Let t˜ ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}, such that for every n ∈ N, we define n = t · r + t˜. Since
we assumed without loss of generality that Ur = X r, we can transform any codeword
utr(mc,mr) into a codeword x
t·r(mc,mr). Next, we generate the codewords xn(mc,mr)
for mc ∈Mc and mr ∈Mr by concatenating a dummy codeword xt˜ to the transformed
codeword xt·r(mc,mr). Using this technique, we are able to transform the list code
Cslist constructed on the alphabet Ur and with block length t into a new list code C¯slist
constructed on the alphabet X and with block length n.
One can easily show that under this transformation mechanism, the newly constructed
code C¯slist will have the same reliability and secrecy performance of the original code
Cslist. This implies that we have constructed a list code C¯slist with list size L that can
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be used to establish a reliable and secure communication over the original AVWC: Q,
where the rate of this code is given by:
Rc = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
|Mc|
L
= lim inf
t→∞
1
t · r + t˜ log
|Mc|
L
≥ lim inf
t→∞
1
r
· 1
t
log
|Mc|
L
=
1
r
(Cr−1 − log |X | − 3δ). (5.80)
Finally, since limr→∞ r−1r = 1, it follows that C
s
list(Q, L) ≥ limr→∞ 1rCr = Csran(Q),
where we replaced the random variable Un by a random variable U that takes values
in an alphabet U = X n. This argument completes our achievability proof.
It is important to point out that the previous coding scheme establishes the achiev-
ability of Theorem 5.9 without imposing any restriction on the information shared
between the jammer and the eavesdropper. This feature is a consequence of using a
pure secrecy list code of Definition 5.13.
5.3.4 Elimination of Correlation Approach
In this section, we present an alternative achievability proof for Theorem 5.9. Our
proof is based on the principle of elimination of correlation introduced by Ahlswede
in [163]. Similar to the previous section, we will only show that if the AVC W between
the transmitter and the legitimate receiver is not L-symmetrizable, then one can use
list codes to achieve the correlated random secrecy capacity Csran(Q). We consider a
coding scheme that combines the techniques used to derive the public list capacity of
AVCs in [194] along with the results established in [159] for correlated random secrecy
codes.
1- Code Structure: We construct a secrecy list code Cslist of Definition 5.13 with list
size L and block length n = nˆ+ n˜ by concatenating a public list code Cplist of Definition
5.10 with list size L and block length nˆ and a correlated random secrecy code Csran of
Definition 5.5 with block length n˜. The idea is to use the public list code Cplist to en-
code a helper public messageMp that will be used to establish some sort of correlated
randomness between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver. On the other hand,
the correlated random code Csran is used to encode the actual confidential messageMc.
In order for this coding scheme to work, we have to make the set of public messages
Mp transmitted by Cplist identical to the set of values of the common randomness G
used by Csran, i.e. Mp = G.
2- Encoding: Given a confidential message mc ∈ Mc, the encoder chooses an index
γ ∈ G uniformly at random and encodes it using the public list code Cplist producing a
codeword xnˆ(γ). After that mc and γ are then given to the encoder of the correlated
random secrecy code Csran which outputs a codeword xn˜γ(mc). Finally the encoder con-
catenates the two codewords producing xn(γ,mc) =
(
xnˆ(γ), xn˜γ(mc)
)
and transmits it.
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3- Decoding: Having received yn = (ynˆ, yn˜), the decoder works as follows: First it
uses ynˆ and the decoder of the public list code Cplist to produce a list of size L, i.e.
Gˆ = ϕL(ynˆ) ∈ PL(G). Next, for every γˆ ∈ Gˆ, we use yn˜ along with the decoder
ϕγˆ of the correlated random code Csran to find a corresponding confidential message
mˆc ∈Mc. Thus, the final decoding output is a list of size L as follows:{
mˆc ∈Mc : mˆc = ϕγˆ(yn˜) ∀γˆ ∈ ϕL(ynˆ)
}
.
4- Reliability Analysis: Based on our coding scheme, we can bound the average
decoding error probability of our code Cslist in terms of the average decoding error
probability of Cplist given by (5.53) and the average decoding error probability of Csran
given by (5.26) as follows:
P¯e(Cslist) ≤ P¯e(Cplist) + P¯e(Csran). (5.81)
Based on the results presented in Section 5.2.2, we can construct a correlated random
secrecy code whose rate Rc is close to C
s
ran(Q), such that P¯e(Csran) decays exponentially
fast. The amount of common randomness required to construct such code is quadratic
in the block length as highlighted by [14, Lemma 6], i.e. |G| = O(n˜2). This implies
that the public rate Rp needed to be reliably transmitted by the public list code Cplist
is given by:
Rp =
1
nˆ
log |G| = 2
nˆ
logO(n˜). (5.82)
Since the AVC W is not L-symmetrizable, Lemma 5.4 implies that P¯e(Cplist) decays
exponentially fast as long as Rp is small enough. According to (5.82), as n → ∞,
Rp vanishes. This implies that P¯e(Cslist) decays exponentially fast as long as Rc ≤
limn→∞ n˜nC
s
ran(Q) = C
s
ran(Q).
5- Secrecy Analysis: Let Γ be a uniformly distributed random variable over the set
G. Then, based on the structure of our coding scheme, the secrecy constraint in (5.59)
can be bounded as follows:
max
sn∈Sn
I(Mc; Znsn|Cslist)
(a)
≤ max
sn∈Sn
I(Mc; Znsn|MpCslist)
(b)
= max
snˆ∈Snˆ
I(Mc; Znˆsnˆ|MpCslist) + max
sn˜∈Sn˜
I(Mc; Zn˜sn˜|ZnˆsnˆMpCslist)
(c)
= max
sn˜∈Sn˜
I(Mc; Zn˜sn˜|MpCslist)
(d)
= max
sn˜∈Sn˜
I(Mc; Zn˜sn˜|ΓCsran)
≤ max
sn˜∈Sn˜
max
γ∈G
I(Mc; Zn˜sn˜(γ)|Csran)
(e)
≤ e−n˜, (5.83)
where (a) follows due to the independence of the messages Mp and Mc; (b) follows from
the mutual information chain rule; (c) follows because Mc and Z
nˆ
snˆ
are independent
along with the fact that Mp −Xnˆ − Znˆsnˆ forms a Markov chain; d) follows because Γ is
identical to Mp and the fact that Mc is only encoded using Csran; (e) follows from the
secrecy analysis of the correlated random codes in [159], where  > 0.
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The previous coding scheme shows that for an AVWC: Q = (W,V), where the AVC
W is not L-symmetrizable, there exists a secrecy list code Cslist with list size L with a
confidential rate Rc = C
s
ran(Q). This completes our achievability proof. It is important
to highlight that the coding scheme introduced in this section is only valid under the
assumption of restricted communication between the eavesdropper and the jammer.
This is because the code concept used in this section inherits the characteristics of
the sub-codes used to construct it and in particular the correlated random codes of
Definition 5.5.
5.3.5 List Codes With Finite List Size
Theorem 5.9 shows that in order to achieve a reliable and secure communication over
an AVWC, using a list code Cslist that satisfies the following requirements:
1. The average decoding error probability P¯e(Cslist) given by (5.58) decays expo-
nentially fast with the code block length n.
2. The information leakage of the confidential message Mc with respect to the
strong secrecy criteria L(Cslist) given by (5.59) also decays exponentially fast
with the code block length n.
We need a list code with list size L that depends on the order of symmetrizability of
the AVC: W between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver, i.e. L ≥ L(W) + 1.
This implies that the capability of list codes to overcome the different jamming strate-
gies induced by the jammer depends on the order of symmetrizability of the AVC W.
This observation raised some speculations about the usability of list codes for AVWCs.
The reason for that originates from the results established in [194, Theorem 3], which
showed that even for simple AVCs, the order of symmetrizability L(W) might be ar-
bitrarily large. This implies that, for their corresponding AVWCs, we need list codes
with an arbitrarily large list size, which is not always feasible.
The previous issue motivated us to investigate the following problem: Does relaxing the
reliability and secrecy constraints affect the value of the list size. In order to answer
this question, we consider the following scenario: Given an AVWC Q = (W,V),
where we allow for a small but non-vanishing probability of error λ and a small but
non-vanishing information leakage τ , what is the maximum rate that we can achieve
using list codes and what is the smallest list size required to achieve such rate. We
formalize our investigation using the following definition:
Definition 5.16. For an arbitrary but fixed λ, τ > 0, a non negative number Rc is a
(λ, τ)-achievable list secrecy rate with list size L for the AVWC: Q = (W,V), if for
all δ > 0, there is an n(δ) ∈ N, such that for all n ≥ n(δ), there exists a sequence of
secrecy list codes (Cslist)n, that satisfy the following:
1
n
log
|Mc|
L
≥ Rc − δ, (5.84)
P¯e(Cslist) ≤ λ, (5.85)
L(Cslist) ≤ τ. (5.86)
The supremum of all (λ, τ)-achievable list secrecy rates Rc with list size L is denoted
by Cslist(Q, λ, τ, L).
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It is important to highlight the difference between this definition and Definition 5.14.
In Definition 5.14, we need to find list codes that satisfy the reliability and secrecy
constraints in (5.61) and (5.62) for all values of λ, τ > 0, while in the previous definition
we need to satisfy the reliability and secrecy constraints for certain values of λ and τ .
We now present the following result:
Theorem 5.10. For an AVWC: Q = (W,V) with correlated random secrecy capacity
Csran(Q), let λ, τ > 0 be arbitrary but fixed. Then for every secrecy rate Rc < C
s
ran(Q),
there exists a finite list size L, such that
Rc < C
s
list(Q, λ, τ, L).
The proof of the previous theorem consists of two main steps. In the first step, we
show that there exists a correlated random code C˜sran that can achieve the correlated
random capacity Csran(Q) by utilizing a finite amount of shared common randomness
|G˜| such that its average error probability P¯e(C˜scr) given by (5.26) is less than or equal
to λ, while its maximum information leakage Lmax(C˜sran) given by (5.28) is less than or
equal to τ . In the second step, we show how the constructed correlated random code
C˜scr can be transformed to a list code using the concept of correlation elimination as
shown in Section 5.3.4.
Corollary 5.2. For an AVWC: Q = (W,V), every secrecy rate Rc < C
s
ran(Q) is a
(λ, τ)-achievable secrecy rate using a list code with list size L(λ) given by the smallest
natural number that satisfy:
L(λ) >
1
λ
ln |S|,
for some constant  > 0 and λ ∈ (0, 1), where S is the channel state set. Additionally,
the information leakage parameter τ can be selected, such that limn→∞ τ = 0.
Theorem 5.10 and Corollary 5.2 provide an answer for the two questions raised at the
beginning of this section as follows: Theorem 5.10 implies that we can construct list
codes that achieve secrecy rates up to the correlated random secrecy capacity, if we
allow for a small but non-vanishing probability of error and information leakage. On
the other hand, Corollary 5.2 specifies a sufficient condition for the list size L required
for the construction of such codes, which interestingly only depends on the reliability
parameter λ and is independent of the secrecy parameter τ .
We now derive the first step required to prove Theorem 5.10. In particular, we con-
struct a correlated random secrecy code C˜sran that only utilizes a finite amount of shared
common randomness |G˜|. We then show that the constructed code can provide a se-
cure communication over the AVWC: Q at a rate equivalent to the correlated random
secrecy capacity Csran(Q) under the following constraints:
1. The maximum information leakage of the confidential message to the eaves-
dropper given by (5.28) vanishes.
2. The average decoding error probability P¯e(C˜srsn) given by (5.26) does not exceed
an arbitrary but fixed value λ ∈ (0, 1).
For this step, we present a lemma that extends the result established in [198, Theorem
3] for correlated random codes with finite resources under the mean information leakage
of the confidential message with respect to the weak secrecy criterion.
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Lemma 5.7. For an AVWC: Q = (W,V), let λ ∈ (0, 1) be arbitrary but fixed. There
exists a correlated random code C˜sran that can achieve secrecy rates equivalent to the
correlated random secrecy capacity Csran(Q) using a finite set G˜ of values of a shared
common randomness, such that:
P¯e(C˜sran) ≤ λ (5.87)
lim
n→∞
Lmax(C˜sran) = 0. (5.88)
For an AVWC: Q, we know from Theorem 5.4 that there exists a correlated random
code Csran that can achieve the correlated random capacity Csran(Q) given by (5.38)
using a correlated randomness source Γ, where cardinality of the set of values of this
source G grows quadratic in the block length n, i.e. |G| = O(n2). We also know that
for this code, both the average decoding error probability P¯e(Csran) given by (5.26) and
the maximum information leakage Lmax(C˜sran) given by (5.28) decays exponentially fast
as highlighted by the reliability and secrecy analysis in [159].
Now, Consider a correlated random code C˜sran constructed by selecting |G˜| deterministic
codes from the original correlated random code Csran used to prove the achievability of
Theorem 5.4, where G˜ ⊂ G is a finite set whose cardinality is independent of n. Now,
let α > 0 be arbitrary but fixed, then for a fixed channel state sequence sn ∈ Sn, we
have
P
 1
|G˜|
∑
γ∈G˜
P¯e(s
n|Csdet(γ)) ≥ λ
 = P
exp(α∑
γ∈G˜
P¯e
(
sn|Csdet(γ)
)) ≥ exp(αλ|G˜|)

(a)
≤ exp
(
− αλ|G˜|
)
E
exp(α∑
γ∈G˜
P¯e
(
sn|Csdet(γ)
))
= exp
(
− αλ|G˜|
)∏
γ∈G˜
E
[
exp
(
αP¯e
(
sn|Csdet(γ)
))]
(5.89)
where (a) follows using the Markov inequality. If we let  > 0 and use the Taylor
expansion of exp(t), we can bound the expectation term in (5.89) as follows:
E
[
exp
(
αP¯e
(
sn|Csdet(γ)
))]
= E
 ∞∑
k=0
(
αP¯e
(
sn|Csdet(γ)
))k
k!

(a)
≤ E
[
1 +
∞∑
k=1
αk
k!
P¯e
(
sn|Csdet(γ)
)]
(b)
≤ 1 +
∞∑
k=1
αk
k!
exp(−n)
≤ 1 + exp(−n+ α) (5.90)
where (a) follows because P¯e
(
sn|Csdet(γ)
) ≤ 1; while (b) follows as for a fixed channel
state sequence sn the expectation of P¯e
(
sn|Csdet(γ)
)
is a negative exponential in n [166].
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Now, if we take all the state sequences sn ∈ Sn into consideration, we reach
P
[
1
|G˜|
∑
γ∈G˜
P¯e
(
sn|Csdet(γ)
) ≥ λ, ∀sn ∈ Sn]
(a)
≤ exp
(
− αλ|G˜|
)
·
(
1 + exp(−n+ α)
)|G˜|
· |S|n
(b)
≤ exp
(
− nλ|G˜|+ |G˜| ln 2 + n ln |S|
)
(5.91)
where (a) follows due to (5.89) and (5.90); while (b) follows by choosing α = n. Now,
if we make sure that:
|G˜| > 1
λ
ln |S|, (5.92)
then by (5.91) the average decoding error probability of C˜sran is smaller than λ with
a probability that approaches one exponentially fast. We now turn to the secrecy
performance of C˜sran. Due to the way C˜sran was constructed, we have
max
sn∈Sn
max
γ∈G˜
I
(
Mc; Z
n
sn(γ)|C˜sran
) ≤ max
sn∈Sn
max
γ∈G
I
(
Mc; Z
n
sn(γ)|Csran
)
≤ e−n˜, (5.93)
where ˜ > 0. The last step follows from the achievability proof of Theorem 5.4. This
implies that for an AVWC: Q, we can construct a correlated random secrecy code that
only utilizes a finite set G˜ of values for a correlated randomness, where the cardinality
of G˜ is given by (5.92), such that the constraints in (5.87) and (5.88) are satisfied with
high probability. This completes our proof for Lemma 5.7.
We now move to the second step required to prove Theorem 5.10, where we use the
correlated random secrecy code with finite resources C˜sran constructed in the previous
lines to construct a secrecy list code. This construction is based on the concept of
elimination of correlation and follows similar steps to one used in Section 5.3.4. We
present the following a coding scheme:
1- Code Structure: We construct a list code Cslist of Definition 5.13 with list size L
and block length n = nˆ+ n˜ by concatenating a public list code Cplist of Definition 5.10
with list size L and block length nˆ and a finite coordination correlated random secrecy
code C˜sran with block length n˜. In our construction, we let the set of public messages
Mp encoded by the public list code Cplist to be identical to the set of values of the
correlated randomness G˜ used by C˜sran, i.e. Mp = G˜. Additionally, we set the list size
L as follows: L = |G˜| = |Mp|.
2- Encoding: Given a confidential message mc ∈ Mc, the encoder chooses an index
γ ∈ G˜ =Mp uniformly at random and encodes it using the public list code Cplist pro-
ducing a codeword xnˆ(γ). After that mc and γ are then given to the encoder of the
correlated random code C˜sran which outputs a codeword xn˜γ(mc). Finally the encoder
concatenates the two codewords producing xn(γ,mc) = (x
nˆ(γ), xn˜γ(mc)) and transmits
it.
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3- Decoding: Having received yn = (ynˆ, yn˜), the decoding process is sequential as
follows: First ynˆ is given to the decoder of the list code Cplist to produce a list of size
L, i.e. ϕL(y
nˆ) = Jˆ ∈ PL(G˜). Then for every γˆ ∈ Jˆ , we use yn˜ along with the decoder
ϕ˜γˆ of the correlated random code C˜sran to find a corresponding confidential message
mˆc ∈Mc. Thus, our decoder can be expressed as follows:
ϕL(y
n) =
{
mˆc ∈Mc : mˆc = ϕ˜γˆ(yn˜) ∀γˆ ∈ ϕL(ynˆ)
}
.
4- Reliability Analysis: Based on our coding scheme, we can bound the average
decoding error probability of Cslist given by (5.58) in terms of the average decoding
error probability of Cplist given by (5.53) and the average decoding error probability of
C˜sran given by (5.26) as follows:
P¯e(Cslist) ≤ P¯e(Clist) + P¯e(C˜scr). (5.94)
Cplist is a public list code with list size L used to transmit the public message γ ∈ G˜
where L = |G˜|. This implies that Cplist always makes a correct decoding decision. Thus,
the first term in (5.94) vanishes, i.e. P¯e(Cplist) = 0. On the other hand, according to
the proof of Lemma 5.7 if we choose the amount of shared randomness G˜ utilized by
the correlated random secrecy code C˜sran such that |G˜| satisfies the constraint in (5.92),
then the second term in (5.94) is less than λ with a probability that goes exponentially
to one. Thus, we have
P
[
P¯e(Cslist) ≤ λ] −→
n→∞
1. (5.95)
5- Secrecy Analysis: Let Γ˜ be a uniformly distributed random variable over the set
G˜. Then, based on the structure of our coding scheme, the secrecy constraint in (5.59)
can be bounded as follows:
max
sn∈Sn
I(Mc; Znsn|Cslist)
(a)
≤ max
sn∈Sn
I(Mc; Znsn|MpCslist)
(b)
= max
snˆ∈Snˆ
I(Mc; Znˆsnˆ|MpCslist) + max
sn˜∈Sn˜
I(Mc; Zn˜sn˜|ZnˆsnˆMpCslist)
(c)
= max
sn˜∈Sn˜
I(Mc; Zn˜sn˜|MpCslist)
(d)
= max
sn˜∈Sn˜
I(Mc; Zn˜sn˜|Γ˜C˜scr)
= max
sn˜∈Sn˜
1
|G˜|
∑
γ∈G˜
I(Mc; Zn˜sn˜,γ|C˜scr)
≤ max
sn˜∈Sn˜
max
γ∈G˜
I(Mc; Zn˜sn˜,γ|C˜scr)
(e)
≤e−n˜, (5.96)
where (a) follows because Mc and Mp are independent; (b) follows from the mutual
information chain rule; (c) follows because Mc and Z
nˆ
snˆ
are independent along with the
fact that Mp − Xnˆ − Znˆsnˆ forms a Markov chain; (d) follows because Γ˜ is identical to
Mp and the fact that Mc is only encoded using C˜sran; while (e) follows from the secrecy
analysis of the correlated random code C˜sran as in (5.93), where  > 0.
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In order to finalize our proof, we need to show that the overall transmission rate of
the constructed list code Cslist is equivalent to the transmission rate of the correlated
random code C˜sran. Since nˆ = O(logL) where L is given by (5.92). This implies that
nˆ+n→ n as n→∞, which means that using the public list code Cplist as a prefix code
on the top of the correlated random secrecy code C˜scr does not affect its transmission
rate.
5.3.6 Continuity, Additivity and Super-Activation
In this section, we investigate and discuss the continuity and additivity behavior of
the public list capacity for AVCs and the list secrecy capacity of AVWCs. For this
investigation, we need introduce some basic tools that play an important role in de-
scribing the continuity and additivity behavior of the capacity functions. We start by
introducing the function FL(W) : W→ R+ as follows:
FL(W) = inf
σ∈CH(XL,S)
max
xL+1∈XL+1
max
pi∈ΠL+1∑
y∈Y
∣∣∣∑
s∈S
W (y|x1, s)σ(s|x2, . . . , xL+1)−
∑
s∈S
W (y|xpi(1), s)σ(s|xpi(2), . . . , xpi(L+1))
∣∣∣,
(5.97)
where CH(X L;S) denotes the set of all stochastic matrices X L → P(S), while ΠL+1
denotes the set of all permutations on {1, 2, . . . , L+ 1}. One can notice that FL(W) is
somehow related to the L-symmetrizability property of the AVC: W. In fact, one can
easily show thatW is L-symmetrizable if and only if FL(W) = 0, otherwise FL(W) > 0.
To see this let us consider the case where L = 1, Eq. (5.97) simplifies to
F1(W) = min
σ∈CH(X ,S)
[
max
(x,x˜)∈X 2
∑
y∈Y
∑
s∈S
W(y|x˜, s)σ(s|x)−W(y|x, s)σ(s|x˜)

]
. (5.98)
Now by comparing the symmetrizability condition in (5.12) to Eq. (5.98), we can see
that F1(W) = 0 if and only if W is symmetrizable. It is important to highlight that
the function FL does not only describe whether or not an AVC W is symmetrizable,
but it also quantifies how “far away” a non-symmetrizable AVC is from the extreme
case of being symmetrizable.
In the next few lines, we will use the definition of FL(W) given by Eq. (5.97) along
with the concept of a distance measure between two AVCs and the principle of parallel
AVCs introduced in Section 5.2.4 to introduce some basic lemmas. These lemmas play
an important role in characterizing the continuity and additivity behaviour of the
public list capacity of AVCs and the secrecy list capacity of AVWCs.
Lemma 5.8. Let W1 and W2 be two finite AVCs. Then the following inequalities
hold:
FL(W2) ≤ 2G(W1,W2) + FL(W1) (5.99)
FL(W1) ≤ 2G(W2,W1) + FL(W2) (5.100)∣∣FL(W1 − FL(W2)∣∣ ≤ 2D(W1,W2) (5.101)
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One can easily notice that it is enough to prove the first inequality only as the second
inequality follows by interchanging the indices of the first inequality, while the third
inequality follows by combining the first and the second one. The detailed proof of the
first inequality was given in [199,200] by exploiting the definitions of the LHS and the
RHS of the inequality.
Lemma 5.9. [200] Let W˜ be an arbitrary finite AVC and let {Wn}∞n=1 be a sequence
of finite AVCs.
If lim
n→∞
D(Wn, W˜) = 0, then lim
n→∞
FL(Wn) = FL(W˜).
The proof follows immediately from Lemma 5.8. It is important to highlight that
Lemma 5.9 implies that FL(W) is continuous function in W as long as the state set S
is finite. We need to highlight one last result related to the concept of parallel AVCs.
Lemma 5.10. [200] Let W1 and W2 be two AVCs and W = W1⊗W2 be their parallel
combination. Then the following chain of inequalities holds:
max{FL(W1);FL(W2)} ≤ FL(W) ≤ FL(W1) + FL(W2). (5.102)
We are now ready to discuss the continuity behaviour of the public and secrecy ca-
pacity functions of AVCs and AVWCs under list decoding, Theorem 5.8 and Theorem
5.9 show that the public list capacity of an AVC W and the list secrecy capacity of
an AVWC: Q = (W,V) depend on the L-symmetrizability property of the AVC W
between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver. One can notice from Definition
5.12 that the symmetrizability of any AVC depends on the channel state set S. This
implies that changing the channel state set S can turn a non-symmetrizable AVC
into a symmetrizable one, which will consequently affects the list capacity. However,
the crucial question is whether small variations in the channel state set S can cause
such effect or only major changes can. The answer to this question determines the
continuity behaviour as follows: If small variations in the channel state set S cannot
turn a non-symmetrizable AVC into a symmetrizable one, then the list capacity is a
continuous function in the AVC W, and vise verse.
From a mathematical point of view, Definition 5.8 implies that the public list capacity
of an AVC Cplist(W, L) is discontinuous in W if and only if there exists a sequence
{Wn}∞n=1 of finite AVCs satisfying (5.43), while simultaneously the following condition
holds:
lim
n→∞
supCplist(Wn, L) > limn→∞
inf Cplist(Wn, L). (5.103)
Using the same formulation, we can define the discontinuity condition for the list
secrecy capacity of an AVWC Cslist(Q, L). In [199, 200], a complete characterization
of the discontinuity points of the public list capacity of an AVC was established as
follows:
Theorem 5.11. The public list capacity of the AVC with respect to average decoding
error probability constraint Cplist(W, L) is discontinuous in the finite AVC W if and
only if the following conditions hold:
1. Cpran(W) > 0.
2. FL(W) = 0 and for every  > 0 there exists a finite AVC W˜ with D(W, W˜) < 
and FL(W˜) > 0.
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The previous theorem interestingly characterizes the discontinuity behavior of the
public list capacity in terms of two continuous functions: the correlated random public
capacity Cpran(W), cf. Corollary 5.1 and the function FL(W). A discontinuity point
occurs if W is L-symmetrizable, while Cpran(W) is greater than zero. In addition, there
must be another AVC W˜ which is not L-symmetrizable, such that the distance between
W and W˜ is small. These two conditions implies that although W and W˜ are close
to each other, Cplist(W, L) = 0 while C
p
list(W˜, L) > 0. That is why W in that case is
a discontinuity point. Next, we present a result that establishes a certain robustness
property for the public list capacity as follows:
Theorem 5.12. [200] Let W be a finite AVC with FL(W) > 0. Then there exists
an  > 0 such that all finite AVCs W˜ with D(W˜,W) <  are continuity points of
Cplist(W, L).
The previous result implies that as long as the AVC W is not L-symmetrizable, then
the public list capacity is continuous within a certain neighborhood. This result follows
due to the continuity of correlated random public capacity Cpran(W) and the function
FL(W). Although Theorem 5.11 identifies the necessary conditions at which a discon-
tinuity point occurs, Theorem 5.12 indicates the continuity of the public list capacity
in a certain neighborhood. These two theorems raise an important question about
the existence of an AVC that satisfies the discontinuity conditions in Theorem 5.11.
In [200], the authors managed to show that for AVCs where the cardinality of the
input and output alphabets is greater than or equal 4, i.e. |X |, |Y| ≥ 4, there exists
AVCs that satisfy the discontinuity conditions in Theorem 5.11. This implies that the
set of discontinuity points of Cplist(W, L) is a non-empty set.
Corollary 5.3. [166] For an AVC: W the deterministic public capacity with respect
to the average decoding error probability Cpdet(W) is discontinuous in the finite AVC
W if and only if the following conditions hold:
1. Cpran(W) > 0.
2. F1(W) = 0 and for every  > 0 there exists a finite AVC W˜ with D(W, W˜) < 
and F1(W˜) > 0.
The previous result follows due to the relation between public list codes and public
deterministic codes: A public deterministic code Cpdet is in fact a public list code Cplist
with list size L = 1. This implies that Theorem 5.11 generalizes the result established
in Corollary 5.3. Theorem 5.11 also has a direct consequence on the continuity of the
list secrecy capacity of AVWCs as follows:
Corollary 5.4. For an AVWC: Q = (W,V), the list secrecy capacity Cslist(Q, L) with
respect to the average decoding error probability has the following characteristics:
1. The function Cslist(Q, L) is discontinuous at the point (W,V) if and only if the
following holds: First Csran(Q) > 0 and second FL(W) = 0 such that for all
 > 0 there is W˜ where D(W, W˜) <  and FL(W˜) > 0.
2. If Cslist(Q, L) is discontinuous at the point (W,V), then it is discontinuous at
all points (W, V˜) for which Csran(Q) > 0.
3. For every W, Cslist(Q, L) is continuous in the AVC V between the transmitter
and the eavesdropper.
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The previous result implies that the discontinuity in the list secrecy capacity only
originates form the legitimate link W, while changing the eavesdropper link V does
not affect the discontinuity behavior. The only role played by the eavesdropper link V
in determining the discontinuity point is that the correlated random secrecy capacity
at such V has to be greater than zero. Corollary 5.4 indirectly indicates that the es-
tablishment of a stable reliable communication over an AVC is much more challenging
than the assurance of the secrecy of such communication over an AVWC.
We now turn to the investigation of the additivity property of the public and secrecy
capacity functions for AVCs and AVWCs under list decoding. The additivity property
mainly allows us to decide whether to use a simple individual encoder-decoder pair for
each parallel AVC or to use a joint encoder-decoder pair for the whole system. This is
because if the capacity function under list decoding is super-additive, joint encoding
and decoding will lead to a higher capacity results. We now present the main results
that describes how the public list capacity of parallel AVCs behaves. We start by the
following super-additivity result:
Theorem 5.13. [199] Let W1 and W2 be two parallel AVCs, such that W = W1⊗W2.
Then
Cplist(W, L) > C
p
list(W1, L) + C
p
list(W2, L)
if and only if
min{FL(W1), FL(W2)} = 0, (5.104a)
max{FL(W1), FL(W2)} > 0, (5.104b)
min{Cplist(W1), Cplist(W2)} > 0. (5.104c)
The previous theorem defines the necessary and sufficient conditions for the super-
additivity of the public list capacity of parallel AVCs. The conditions in (5.104a) and
(5.104b) are related to the characteristics of the public list capacity of the two parallel
AVCsW1 andW2 as follows: One of the two AVCs must be L-symmetrizable, while the
other one is not. On the other hand, the condition in (5.104c) implies that correlated
random public capacity of both channels is greater than zero. It is important to point
out that the additivity result of the correlated random public capacity established in
Theorem 5.7 plays an important role in the proof of Theorem 5.13.
Corollary 5.5. [200] Let W1 and W2 be two parallel AVCs, such that W = W1⊗W2.
Then
Cplist(W, L) = 0, (5.105)
if and only if
Cplist(W1, L) = C
p
list(W2, L) = 0. (5.106)
The previous corollary shows that super-activation is not possible for parallel AVCs
under list decoding. In fact, this result follows as a consequence of Theorem 5.13,
because in order for super-activation to happen, the public list capacity needs to be
super-additive and at the same time the public list capacity of the two AVCs W1 and
W2 must be zero. However, if C
p
list(W1, L) = C
p
list(W2, L) = 0, then either the con-
dition in (5.104b) or the one in (5.104c) is violated, which directly implies that the
public list capacity of W1 ⊗W2 is not super-additive.
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Theorem 5.13 implies that public list capacity of parallel AVCs is super-additive, yet
it remains to investigate by how much is the additivity violated. This is similar to the
question raised by Alon in [178] for the zero-error capacity. To answer this question,
the normalized public list capacity of parallel AVCs that satisfies the supper-additivity
constraints given by Theorem 5.13 was investigated. It was shown in [200], that the
normalized public list capacity approaches zero as the list size L → ∞. This implied
that the additivity of the public list capacity is not violated in a strong form.
Next, we extend our investigation to the secrecy domain and aim to characterize the
additivity behavior of the list secrecy capacity for parallel AVWCs. The problem
with such investigation is that we do not know whether the correlated random secrecy
capacity of parallel AVWCs is additive or super-additive. As highlighted in the proof
of Theorem 5.13 that such result is usually crucial and without it, one can find it really
difficult to characterize the behaviour under list decoding. Nevertheless, we were able
to establish the following very interesting result:
Theorem 5.14. Let Q1 and Q2 be two parallel AVWCs and let Q be their parallel
combination, then the following holds:
1. If Cslist(Q1, L) = C
s
list(Q2, L) = 0, then C
s
list(Q, L) > 0 is true if and only if W
is not L-symmetrizable and Csran(Q) > 0.
2. If Csran(Q) shows super-activation, then C
s
list(Q, L) shows super-activation as
well, if and only if W is not L-symmetrizable.
3. If Csran(Q) shows no super-activation, then super-activation of C
s
list(Q, L) can
only happen if W1 is not L-symmetrizable and W2 is L-symmetrizable, in ad-
dition Csran(Q1) = 0, while C
s
ran(Q2) > 0. The statement is independent of the
specific labeling.
The previous theorem is a generalization of the result established in [166, Theorem
5] for the deterministic secrecy capacity of parallel AVWCs Csdet(Q). It was shown
in [166] that there exists AVWCs that exhibit the behavior in the first statement of
Theorem 5.14. In [200], an example for AVWCs that satisfy the third statement was
constructed. This result is of a great impact as it shows that super-activation is not
a unique feature for the field of quantum information theory. Moreover, Corollary
5.5 and Theorem 5.14 implies that super-activation is still a unique feature of secure
communication over parallel AVWCs and is not possible for public communication. It
is important to point out that the results established in this section are only valid for
finite AVCs and finite AVWCs, i.e. |S| < ∞. The extension of these results to the
situation where S is infinite extremely difficult, specially because the characterization
of the list capacity for infinite AVCs is still an open problem.
5.4 Public-Confidential Capacity Regions for AVWCs
In this section, we consider a communication scenario that involves the integration
of public and confidential communication services simultaneously over an AVWC. In
the beginning, we introduce our communication model along with an extension of
the deterministic and correlated random coding techniques to the problem at hand.
We then present a full characterization of the public-confidential capacity region for
AVWCs under both coding techniques. The result established in this section were
published in [201].
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5.4.1 Motivation and Basic Definitions
Most of the literature that addressed the problem of secure communication over
AVWCs considered the following communication scenario: A confidential message
mc ∈ Mc is sent over an AVWC, such that the legitimate receiver can reliably de-
code the message regardless of the jammer attack sn while keeping the eavesdropper
completely ignorant about the transmitted message. Real life communication scenar-
ios usually involve more complex setups like a combination of public and confidential
services or multi-user services as discussed in Chapter 3. To the best of our knowledge,
the investigation of a public-confidential communication setup over a wiretap channel
with imperfect CSI was only done in [202] for the compound wiretap channel and was
never investigated for AVWCs.
Transmitter
DM-AVWC
Q = (W,V)
Wnsn(y
n|xn) ∈W
V nsn(z
n|yn) ∈ V
Legitimate
Receiver
Eavesdropper
Jammer sn ∈ Sn
I(Mc; Znsn)→ 0
xn
yn
zn
sn
sn
Mp,Mc
Mˆp, Mˆc
M˜p
∀snSn
Figure 5.2: Public-Confidential communication scenario over an AVWC
Consider the communication scenario illustrated in Fig. 5.2, where a common pub-
lic message mp ∈ Mp and a confidential message mc ∈ Mc are transmitted over an
AVWC Q = (W,V). The public message needs to be reliably decoded by both the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. On the other hand, the confidential message
needs to be only decoded by the legitimate receiver, while keeping the eavesdropper
completely ignorant about it. These two requirements need to be fulfilled for all possi-
ble channel state sequences sn ∈ Sn produced by the jammer. We will investigate this
communication scenario using two coding schemes: deterministic codes and correlated
random codes as follows:
Definition 5.17. A public-confidential deterministic code Cpcdet for the AVWC: Q =
(W,V) consists of: a set of public messagesMp, a set of confidential messagesMc, a
stochastic encoder:
E :Mp ×Mc → P(X n),
that maps a public-confidential message pair (mp,mc) ∈ Mp ×Mc to a codeword
xn(mp,mc) ∈ X n according to the conditional probability E(xn|mp,mc) and two de-
terministic decoders:
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ϕ1 : Yn →Mp ×Mc ∪ {?}
ϕ2 : Zn →Mp ∪ {?},
where each decoder maps the channel observation at its respective receiving node to
the corresponding required messages or an error message.
In order to measure the reliability performance of Cpcdet, we define the following average
decoding error probabilities for sn ∈ Sn:
P¯e1(s
n|Cpcdet) =
1
|Mp||Mc|
∑
mp,mc
∑
xn
∑
yn:ϕ1(yn)6=(mp,mc)
W nsn(y
n|xn)E(xn|mp,mc) (5.107)
P¯e2(s
n|Cpcdet) =
1
|Mp|
∑
mp
∑
xn
∑
zn:ϕ2(zn)6=mp
V nsn(z
n|xn)E(xn|mp, ·). (5.108)
On the other hand, the secrecy performance of Cpcdet is evaluated with respect to the
strong secrecy criterion which considers the information leakage of the confidential
message to the eavesdropper for every channel state sn as follows:
L(Cpcdet) = max
sn∈Sn
I(Mc; Znsn|Cpcdet), (5.109)
where Mc represents a uniformly distributed random variable over the message setMc,
while Znsn is the channel output at the eavesdropper for a state sequence s
n.
Definition 5.18. A rate pair (Rp, Rc) ∈ R2+ is an achievable deterministic public-
confidential rate pair for the AVWC: Q = (W,V) if for all δ, λ, τ > 0 there is an
n(δ, λ, τ) ∈ N, such that for all n > n(δ, λ, τ), there exists a sequence of deterministic
codes (Cpcdet)n that satisfies the following constraints:
1
n
log |Mp| ≥ Rp − δ, 1
n
log |Mc| ≥ Rc − δ, (5.110)
max
sn∈Sn
P¯e1(s
n|Cpcdet) + max
sn∈Sn
P¯e2(s
n|Cpcdet) ≤ λ, (5.111)
L(Cpcdet) ≤ τ. (5.112)
The public-confidential deterministic strong secrecy capacity region Cpcdet(Q) is given
by the set of all achievable rate pairs (Rp, Rc).
Definition 5.19. A public-confidential correlated random code Cpcran for the AVWC:
Q = (W,V) is given by a family of public-confidential deterministic codes of Defini-
tion 5.17 as follows:
Cpcran = {Cpcdet(γ) : γ ∈ G}
together with a random variable Γ that takes values γ ∈ G according to PΓ(γ).
In order to measure the reliability performance of Cpcran, we build on the average decod-
ing errors of a deterministic code in (5.107) and (5.108). Thus, we have
P¯ei(s
n|Cpcran) =
∑
γ
P¯ei
(
sn|Cpcdet(γ)
)
PΓ(γ), i ∈ {1, 2}. (5.113)
On the other hand, the secrecy performance of Cpcran is evaluated with respect to the
maximum strong secrecy criterion which considers the maximum information leakage
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of the confidential message to the eavesdropper for every channel state sn and every
realization of the common randomness γ as follows:
Lmax(Cpcran) = max
sn∈Sn
max
γ
I(Mc; Znsn(γ)|Cpcran), (5.114)
where Znsn(γ) is the channel output at the eavesdropper for a state sequence s
n, when
the realization of the common randomness is Γ = γ.
Definition 5.20. A rate pair (Rp, Rc) ∈ R2+ is an achievable public-confidential cor-
related random rate pair for the AVWC: Q = (W,V) if for all δ, λ, τ > 0 there is an
n(δ, λ, τ) ∈ N, such that for all n > n(δ, λ, τ), there exists a sequence of correlated
random codes (Cpcran)n that satisfies the following constraints:
1
n
log |Mp| ≥ Rp − δ, 1
n
log |Mc| ≥ Rc − δ, (5.115)
max
sn∈Sn
P¯e1(s
n|Cpcran) + max
sn∈Sn
P¯e2(s
n|Cpcran) ≤ λ, (5.116)
Lmax(Cpcran) ≤ τ. (5.117)
The public-confidential correlated random maximum strong secrecy capacity region
Cpcran(Q) is given by the set of all achievable rate pairs (Rp, Rc).
5.4.2 An Auxiliary Channel Model
In order to investigate the capacity regions acknowledged by Definitions 5.18 and 5.20,
we need to introduce an auxiliary channel model that will facilitate our investigation.
Consider a channel model that consists of one transmitting node TX and three receiving
nodes RX1 , RX2 , RX3 such that: the channels from TX to RX1 and from TX to RX2 are
compound channels, while the channel from TX to RX3 is an AVC. For n channel uses,
two finite channel state sets R and S, finite input alphabet X and two finite output
alphabets Y and Z, our discrete memoryless channel model is given by the following
transition matrices:
W nr (y
n|xn) =
n∏
i=1
Wr(yi|xi), V nr (zn|xn) =
n∏
i=1
Vr(zi|xi), (5.118)
V nsn(z
n|xn) =
n∏
i=1
Vsi(zi|xi). (5.119)
The previous equation indicates that the transition matrix V nr (z
n|xn) describes a com-
pound channel from the input alphabet X to the output alphabet Z. This is because
the channel state r remains constant for all the n uses of the channel. On the other
hand, the transition matrix Vnsn(z
n|xn) describe an AVC where the channel state s
varies for every channel use. We will call this model the compound broadcast channel
with an arbitrarily varying wiretapper (CBAVWC) and denote it as follows:
(W ,V ,V) = {(W nr , V nr , V nsn) : r ∈ R, sn ∈ Sn, n = 1, 2, . . .}, (5.120)
Now consider a communication scenario in which a common public message mp ∈Mp
and a confidential message mc ∈ Mc are transmitted over the CBAVWC (W ,V ,V)
such that: The public message needs to be reliably decoded by nodes RX1 and RX2 ,
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i.e. the compound components (5.118) of the CBAVWC. On the other hand, the con-
fidential message only needs to be decoded by node RX1 , while keeping node RX3 - AV
component (5.119) - completely ignorant about it. Of course, these two requirements
need to be fulfilled for all possible compound states r ∈ R and AV state sequences
sn ∈ Sn.
In order to achieve this task, we extend Definition 5.17 to define a public-confidential
deterministic code Cpcdet for our CBAVWC. In order to measure the reliability perfor-
mance of Cpcdet, we modify the average decoding error probabilities in (5.107) and (5.108)
such that W nsn and V
n
sn are replaced by their corresponding compound channels W
n
r
and Vnr . Moreover, the decoding error probabilities are defined with respect to the
states r ∈ R instead of sn ∈ Sn. On the other hand, the secrecy performance of Cpcdet
is evaluated with respect to the strong secrecy criterion as in (5.109).
Definition 5.21. A rate pair (Rp, Rc) ∈ R2+ is an achievable public-confidential rate
pair for the CBAVWC: (W ,V ,V) if for all δ, λ, τ > 0 there is an n(δ, λ, τ) ∈ N, such
that for all n > n(δ, λ, τ), there exists a sequence of deterministic codes (Cpcdet)n that
satisfies the following constraints:
1
n
log |Mp| ≥ Rp − δ, 1
n
log |Mc| ≥ Rc − δ, (5.121)
max
r∈R
P¯e1(r|Cpcdet) + max
r∈R
P¯e2(r|Cpcdet) ≤ λ, (5.122)
L(Cpcdet) ≤ τ. (5.123)
The public-confidential deterministic strong secrecy capacity region Cpcdet(W ,V ,V) is
given by the set of all achievable rate pairs (Rp, Rc).
We introduced the model of CBAVWC because it serves as an intermediate step in the
establishment of the public-confidential correlated random secrecy capacity of AVWCs.
This technique was used in [159], where an auxiliary channel called the compound ar-
bitrary varying wiretap channel was introduced to facilitate the establishment of the
correlated random secrecy capacity of an AVWC.
Before, we present our coding theorem, we need to define the following multi-letter
expressions. For an arbitrary but fixed n ∈ N, a CBAVWC (W ,V ,V) and two random
variables (U,V) that can take values in the finite alphabets (U ,V) such that PUVXn
denotes a joint probability distribution over the random variables (U,V,Xn), we let
RPn(W ,V ,V) be a public-confidential rate region that contains the set of rate pairs
(Rp, Rc) ∈ R2+ that satisfy the following constraints:
Rp ≤ 1
n
min
r∈R
min
[
I(U; Ynr ), I(U; Znr )
]
(5.124a)
Rc ≤ 1
n
[
min
r∈R
I(V; Ynr |U)− max
sn∈Sn
I(V; Znsn|U)
]
. (5.124b)
Further, we use RPn(W ,V ,V) to define two additional rate regions for the CBAVWC
(W ,V ,V) as follows:
R∗n(W ,V ,V) =
⋃
PUVXn
RPn(W ,V ,V), (5.125)
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R∗(W ,V ,V) =
∞⋃
n=1
R∗n(W ,V ,V). (5.126)
We are now ready to present our coding theorem for the deterministic public-confidential
capacity region of our auxiliary channel (W ,V ,V) as follows:
Theorem 5.15. For the CBAVWC (W ,V ,V), we have
Cpcdet(W ,V ,V) = R∗(W ,V ,V).
The achievability of the previous theorem is based on the results established in [202]
for the compound broadcast channel with common and confidential message along
with the strong secrecy results established for AVWC in [159, 166]. In order to prove
that R∗(W ,V ,V) is achievable, we need to show that the rate region RP˜n˜(W ,V ,V)
is achievable for any n˜ ∈ N and any distribution P˜UVXn˜ . Based on standard channel
prefixing arguments, cf. [159, Appendix D] along with the concept of block coding
cf. [166, Section IV-F], it is enough to show that:
R0 ≤ min
r∈R
min
[
I(U; Yr), I(U; Zr)
]
(5.127a)
R1 ≤ min
r∈R
I(X; Yr|U)− max
q∈P(S)
I(X; Zq|U) (5.127b)
is achievable. In order to do so, we present the following coding scheme:
1) Codebook Generation: For a fixed block length t and a given probability distribution
PUX ∈ P(U × X ), we define a probability measure PˆUtXt ∈ P(U t ×X t) as follows:
PˆUtXt(u
t, xt) , P
t
UX(u
t, xt)
PtUX
(T t (PUX)) (5.128)
if (ut, xt) ∈ T t (PUX) and PˆUtXt(ut, xt) = 0 otherwise, for some typicality constant
 > 0. Next, we generate the codewords ut(mp) for mp ∈Mp by using PˆUt . Then, for
every ut(mp), we generate the codewords x
t(mp,mc,mk) for mc ∈ Mp and mk ∈ Mk
according to PˆXt|Ut , where Mk is a randomization set used for the realization of our
stochastic encoder.
2) Encoding and Decoding: Given a message pair (mp,mc), the encoder E choose a
message mk uniformly at random from the set Mk and transmit the corresponding
codeword xt(mp,mc,mk). At the legitimate receiver, the decoder ϕ1 searches for the
unique message triple (m¨p, m¨c, m¨k) such that the received sequence y
n
r is jointly typi-
cal with the codewords ut(m¨p) and x
t(m¨p, m¨c, m¨k). Similarly, at the eavesdropper, the
decoder ϕ2 searches for the unique message mˇp such that the received sequence z
t
r is
jointly typical with the codeword ut(mˇp).
3) Reliability and Secrecy Analysis: Based on the results established in [202, Lemma
1] along with the standard joint-typicality decoding arguments in [34,35], we can show
that the average decoding error probability of our coding scheme decays exponentially
in t as long as:
Rp ≤ min
r∈R
min
[
I(U; Yr), I(U; Zr)
]
(5.129a)
Section 5.4  Public-Confidential Capacity Regions for AVWCs 201
Rc +Rk ≤ min
r∈R
I(X; Yr|U). (5.129b)
On the other hand, by adapting the results established in [166, Lemma 2] and [159,
Corollary 2] along with the strong secrecy techniques discussed in Section 2.2.3, keeping
in mind that the codewords Xt were generated conditioned on the random variable Ut,
we can show that limt→∞maxst∈St I(M1; Ztst) = 0 as long as:
Rk > max
q∈P(S)
I(X; Zq|U). (5.130)
By combining the rate constraints in (5.129) and (5.130), it directly follows that the
rate region in (5.127) is achievable for the CBAVWC (W ,V ,V). This concludes our
achievability proof for Theorem 5.15. On the other hand, the converse proof follows
easily by combining the techniques used in [202] along with the concepts used in Sec-
tion 5.3.2.
The establishment of the capacity region in Theorem 5.15 is only the first step in our
analysis. Next, we need to consider a stronger notion for the secrecy capacity of the
CBAVWC known as the permutation invariant secrecy capacity defined as follows:
Given a public-confidential deterministic code Cpcdet and a permutation pi ∈ Πn where
Πn is the set of all permutations over {1, 2, . . . , n}, we define the set of permuted codes
Cpcdet(pi), where each code in this set has a stochastic encoder Epi and two deterministic
decoders (ϕpi1 , ϕ
pi
2 ) given by:
Epi
(
xn|mp,mc
)
, E
(
pi−1(xn)|mp,mc
)
,
ϕpi1 (y
n) , ϕ1
(
pi−1(yn)
)
,
ϕpi2 (z
n) , ϕ2
(
pi−1(zn)
)
,
where for a sequence an, pi(an) =
(
api(1), api(2), . . . , api(n)
)
. Accordingly, we present the
following definition:
Definition 5.22. A rate pair (Rp, Rc) ∈ R2+ is an achievable public-confidential per-
mutation invariant rate pair for the CBAVWC: (W ,V ,V) if for all δ, λ, τ > 0 there is an
n(δ, λ, τ) ∈ N, such that for all n > n(δ, λ, τ), there exists a sequence of deterministic
codes (Cpcdet)n that satisfies the following constraints:
1
n
log |Mp| ≥ Rp − δ, 1
n
log |Mc| ≥ Rc − δ, (5.131)
max
pi∈Πn
[
max
r∈R
P¯e1
(
r|Cpcdet(pi)
)
+ max
r∈R
P¯e2
(
r|Cpcdet(pi)
)] ≤ λ, (5.132)
max
sn∈Sn
max
pi∈Πn
I
(
Mc; Z
n
sn(pi)|Cpcdet(pi)
) ≤ τ. (5.133)
The public-confidential permutation invariant strong secrecy capacity region Cpcper(W ,V ,
V) is given by the set of all achievable permutation invariant rate pairs (Rp, Rc).
In [171], it was shown that the average decoding error probability is independent of
the value of the permutation pi ∈ Πn. In particular it was shown that for any pi ∈ Πn:
P¯ei
(
r|Cpcdet(pi)
)
= P¯ei
(
r|Cpcdet(id)
)
= P¯ei
(
r|Cpcdet
)
, (5.134)
202 Chapter 5  Secrecy Capacity Regions for AVWCs
for i = 1, 2 and (id) denotes the identity permutation. Moreover, it was shown in [159,
Lemma 13] that if there exists an  > 0 such that maxsn I
(
Mc; Z
n
sn(id)|Cpcdet(id)
) ≤ ,
then it directly follows that:
max
pi∈Πn
max
sn∈Sn
I
(
Mc; Z
n
sn(pi)|Cpcdet(pi)
) ≤ . (5.135)
The two results in (5.134) and (5.135) directly imply that Theorem 5.15 does not only
establish the public-confidential deterministic capacity region of our CBAVWC, but it
also establishes the permutation invariant capacity region. In particular, we have
Cpcper(W ,V ,V) = Cpcdet(W ,V ,V). (5.136)
5.4.3 Coding Theorems: Achievability and Converse
In this section, we will use the result established in Theorem 5.15 to derive the public-
confidential correlated random capacity regions of AVWCs by using Ahlswede’s robus-
tification technique [171]. We will then use the elimination of correlation approach [163]
to derive the corresponding public-confidential deterministic capacity region. Before,
we present our coding theorem, we need to define some multi-letter expressions similar
to the ones in (5.124).
For an arbitrary but fixed n ∈ N, an AVWC: Q = (W ,V) and two random variables
(U,V) that can take values in the finite alphabets (U ,V) such that PUVXn denotes a
joint probability distribution over the random variables (U,V,Xn), we let RPn(Q) be a
public-confidential rate region that contains the set of rate pairs (Rp, Rc) ∈ R2+ which
satisfy the following constraints:
Rp ≤ 1
n
min
q∈P(S)
min
[
I(U; Ynq ), I(U; Znq )
]
(5.137a)
Rc ≤ 1
n
[
min
q∈P(S)
I(V; Ynq |U)− max
sn∈Sn
I(V; Znsn|U)
]
. (5.137b)
We then use RPn(Q) to define the two rate regions: R∗n(Q) and R∗(Q) accordingly as
in (5.125) and (5.126). Moreover, for an AVWC: Q and the joint distribution PVXn ,
we let RPc,n(Q) be the set of confidential rates pairs Rc ∈ R+ that satisfy:
Rc ≤ 1
n
[
min
q∈P(S)
I(V; Ynq )− max
sn∈Sn
I(V; Znsn)
]
. (5.138)
We then use it to define R∗c,n(Q) and R∗c(Q) in the same manner as in (5.125) and
(5.126). We now present the main result of this section as follows:
Theorem 5.16. For the AVWC: Q = (W,V), it follows that:
Cpccr (Q) = R∗(Q). (5.139)
Cpcdet(Q) =

R∗(Q) if A(
0,R∗c(Q)
)
if B
(0, 0) otherwise
(5.140)
where the event A occurs when both W and V are not symmetrizable, while the event
B occurs when W is not symmetrizable but V is symmetrizable.
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For the achievability proof of the previous theorem, we need to recall the notation of
average channel for an AVWC: Q = (W,V) given in (5.10) and use it to define the fol-
lowing families: W , {Wnq : q ∈ P(Sn), n = 1, 2, . . . } and V , {Vnq : q ∈ P(Sn), n =
1, 2, . . . }. Next, we observe that for an arbitrary but fixed number of channel uses n,
the AVWCs W and V simplify to their corresponding compound channels W and V
as highlighted in Section 5.2.2. This implies that for a fixed n, W, V and V define a
CBAVWC (W,V,V).
Based on Theorem 5.15, it follows that for a fixed n ∈ N, λ, τ > 0, we can construct a
deterministic code Cpcdet such that for every permutation pi ∈ Πn:
max
pi∈Πn
[
max
q∈P(Sn)
P¯e1
(
q|Cpcdet(pi)
)
+ max
q∈P(Sn)
P¯e2
(
q|Cpcdet(pi)
)] ≤ 2−nλ (5.141)
max
sn∈Sn
max
pi∈Πn
I
(
Mc; Z
n
sn(pi)|Cpcdet(pi)
) ≤ 2−nτ , (5.142)
while the rate pair (Rp, Rc) satisfies the constraints of the region R∗n(W,V,V) in
(5.125) after replacing r with q and R with P(Sn) in (5.127). Our next step is to
transform the different permutations of the deterministic code Cpcdet constructed for the
CBAVWC (W,V,V) into a correlated random code Cpcran for our AVWC: Q = (W,V).
This is done by letting Γ –the random variable that represents the correlated random-
ness of a correlated random code– to be uniformly distributed over the permutations
set Πn. Based on this strategy, the average decoding error probability of Cpcran is given
by:
2∑
i=1
P¯ei(Cpcran) =
2∑
i=1
max
sn∈Sn
1
n!
∑
pi∈Πn
P¯ei(s
n|Cpcdet(pi)), (5.143)
where n! is the total number of permutations in the set Πn = G. In order to derive an
upper-bound for this decoding error probability, we use the robustification lemma, cf.
Lemma 5.1 which implies that if (5.141) holds then there exists λ˜ > 0 such that the
term in (5.143) is less than or equal 2−nλ˜. On the other hand, the bound in (5.142)
directly implies that:
max
sn∈Sn
max
γ∈Πn
I(M; Znsn(γ)|Cpcran) ≤ 2−nτ . (5.144)
The previous two steps show that for an arbitrary but fixed number of channel uses n,
there exists a public-confidential correlated random code Cpcran for the AVWC (Q) that
satisfies the reliability and secrecy constraints in Definition 5.20 as long as the rate
pair (Rp, Rc) are bounded as in R∗n(Q). Finally, if we generalized our coding scheme
for all n ∈ N, it follows that the rate region R∗(Q) is an achievable public-confidential
correlated rate region for the AVWC: Q and this completes the achievability proof of
the first statement in Theorem 5.16.
Now, for the second statement in Theorem 5.16, we start by recalling the result estab-
lished in [165, Theorem 1] and generalized in Lemma 5.2 which states that: if the AVC
between the transmitter and the respective receiver is symmetrizable, then no reliable
communication can be established over this AVC using deterministic codes. This im-
plies that if W is symmetrizable, then neither the public message mp ∈ Mp nor the
confidential message mc ∈ Mc can be reliably transmitted to the legitimate receiver.
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This directly implies that for this class of channels it follows that: Cpcdet(Q) = (0, 0).
Moreover, the same argument implies that if only V is symmetrizable, then the public
message mp ∈ Mp can not be reliably transmitted to the eavesdropper. This means
that our problem simplifies to the characterization of the deterministic secrecy capac-
ity of the AVWC Q = (W,V) when the legitimate AVC W is not symmetrizable.
Based on Theorem 5.5, it follows that Cpcdet(Q) = (0,R∗c(Q)). Thus, it only remains
to prove that if both W and V are not symmetrizable, then R∗(Q) can be achieved
using a public-confidential deterministic code.
In order to prove this last case, we need to recall an important result regarding the
amount of correlated randomness needed to construct the correlated random code Cpcran
that establish the achievability of the first statement of Theorem 5.16. According to
our proof, it is sufficient to have Γ be uniformly distributed over a set G such that
|G| = n!. Nevertheless, it was shown in [14, 159] as highlighted in Section 5.2.3 that
this amount can be considerably reduced and in fact |G| = O(n2) is sufficient. Based
on this result, we can use the elimination of correlation principle to construct a public-
confidential deterministic code Cpcdet by concatenating a public deterministic code Cpdet
and the public-confidential correlated random code Cpcran. In this concatenation, Cpdet
acts as a prefix code and is used to transmit a public message m ∈M = G˜.
Now, it only remains to show two small points: The first point is that if both W and
V are not symmetrizable, then both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper can
decode the prefix message m ∈M. The second point is to show that adding the prefix
code Cpdet on top of the correlated random code Cpcran has no effect on the total rate
of the system. Based on the results established in [163, 165], we know that both the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are able to decode a message m ∈M as long
as R is small enough. Since M = G˜ = O(n2), we have
R = lim
n→∞
1
n
log |G˜| → 0. (5.145)
The previous relation directly implies that the two previous requirements are satisfied,
i.e. decoding error of m at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper van-
ishes, the rates (Rp, Rc) of Cpcdet are identical to the ones of Cpcran. This concludes the
achievability proof of the first condition in the second statement of Theorem 5.16. It
is important to highlight that the procedure used to prove this condition is related to
the one used in Section 5.3.4 to provide an achievability proof for Theorem 5.9.
We now turn to the last part in the proof of Theorem 5.16 which is the converse
proof. We will only focus on the converse of the public-confidential correlated random
secrecy capacity Cpcran(Q) as the converse of the deterministic capacity C
pc
det(Q) follow
accordingly using the same concepts. For the AVWC: Q = (W,V), assume that there
exists a public-confidential correlated random code Cpcran of Definition 5.19, such that
for  > 0 and a sufficiently large code block length n the following holds:
nRj = H(Mj|Cpcran) j ∈ {p, c} (5.146a)
max
sn∈Sn
P¯ei(s
n|Cpcran) ≤  i ∈ {1, 2} (5.146b)
max
sn∈Sn
max
γ
I(Mc; Znsn(γ)|Cpcran) ≤ . (5.146c)
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Since the average decoding error probability of the correlated random code is affine in
the channel, it follows that e¯i(Cpcran) does not change if one passes to the generalized
channel state space P(Sn). Thus, we have:
max
q∈P(S)
P¯ei(q|Cpcran) ≤ max
q˜∈P(Sn)
P¯ei(q˜|Cpcran) = max
sn∈Sn
P¯ei(s
n|Cpcran) ≤ , (5.147)
for i ∈ {1, 2}. Now, if we apply Fano’s inequality cf. Lemma A.2 to the previous
bounds, we can show that:
max
q∈P(S)
H(Mp|Znq ) ≤ max
sn∈Sn
H(Mp|Znsn) ≤ 1 + nRp (5.148)
max
q∈P(S)
H(MpMc|Ynq ) ≤ max
sn∈Sn
H(MpMc|Ynsn) ≤ 1 + n(Rp +Rc). (5.149)
Based on these relations together with Eq. (5.146a), we can derive an upper-bound
on the common rate Rp as follows:
Rp ≤ 1
n(1− )
(
min
q∈P(S)
min
[
I(M0; Ynq ), I(M0; Znq )
]
+ 1
)
(a)
≤ 1
n(1− ) minq∈P(S) min
[
I(U; Ynq ), I(U; Znq )
]
+ , (5.150)
where (a) follows by defining the mapping function Fp : Mp → U and the fact that
for sufficiently large n, 1
n(1−) ≤ . Next, we use [122, Lemma 2] and the bound in
(5.146c) to show that:
max
sn∈Sn
I(Mc; Znsn|Mp) = max
sn∈Sn
∑
γ∈G
I(Mc; Znsn(γ)|Mp)PΓ(γ)
≤ max
sn∈Sn
max
γ
I(Mc; Znsn(γ)|Mp) ≤ 2. (5.151)
Now, we can use the previous bound along with the bounds in (5.146a) and (5.149) to
bound the confidential rate Rc as follows:
Rc
(a)
≤ 1
n(1− )
(
min
q∈P(S)
I(M1; Ynq |U)− max
sn∈Sn
I(M1; Znsn|U) + 1 + 2
)
(b)
≤ 1
n(1− )
[
min
q∈P(S)
I(V; Ynq |U)− max
sn∈Sn
I(V; Znsn|U)
]
+ 2 (5.152)
where (a) follows by using the same argument used in (5.150) along with the bound in
(5.151), while (b) follows by defining the auxiliary function Fc :Mc ×U → V and the
fact that for sufficiently large n, 1+2
n(1−) ≤ 2. Finally, since we are only interested in the
rates as → 0, it follows from Eqs. (5.150) and (5.152) that for any achievable rate pair
(Rp, Rc), there exists an n˜ ∈ N and a distribution P˜UVXn˜ such that (Rp, Rc) ∈ RP˜n˜(Q).
This consequently implies that Cpcran(Q) ⊆ R∗(Q) which completes our converse.
5.5 Discussion
The model of AVCs was first introduced to capture the uncertainty of the channel
state during transmission and to model channels with imperfect CSI. Nevertheless, it
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has become a very valuable and resourceful model specially in the secrecy domain.
This is because the model of an AVWC can be interpreted as channel that undergoes
two classes of attacks: A passive eavesdropper that only listen to the transmitted
signal and tries to infer any information about the transmission along with an active
jammer that threatens the communication by maliciously manipulating the channel
state. Moreover, the model of AVWCs can be considered as a generalization to other
important channel models like the multi-user wiretap channel and the compound wire-
tap channel. In this chapter, we discussed some of the major results established in
previous literature for AVCs and AVWCs. We also presented some very interesting
new results. These results allowed us to gain a better understanding to the problem
of secure communication over AVWCs as highlighted by the following points:
1. One of the major issues of communication over AVCs is the symmetrizability phe-
nomena. This phenomena captures the ability of AVCs to emulate a valid channel input
making the design of an encoding-decoding rule for such channels a very challenging
task. In particular, deterministic codes with a fixed encoder-decoder pair through
the whole transmission fails to establish reliable communication over symmetrizable
AVWCs, despite being useful for wiretap channels where perfect CSI is available. This
observation implies that the development of coding schemes that works against passive
eavesdropping is much easier than those who can overcome active jamming strategies.
2. Although correlated random codes manage to overcome the problem of symmetriz-
able AVWCs, the usage of correlated random codes in most practical scenarios is still
questionable. This because as highlighted by Definition 5.5, correlated random codes
require some sort of a pre-established coordination between the transmitter and the
receiving nodes which might not always be feasible. Moreover, the reliability analysis
of correlated random codes is derived under the assumption that the jammer possesses
no information about this coordination. This assumption directly enforces some re-
strictions on the communication link between the eavesdropper and the jammer. In
particular, the jammer is allowed to inform the eavesdropper about the jamming strat-
egy used or even the exact channel state selected, but the eavesdropper is not allowed
to inform the jammer about the exact realization of the common randomness.
3. The concept of list decoding appeared to be a promising solution for secure com-
munication over AVWCs for two reasons: It provide an alternative coding solution
if no common randomness is shared between the transmitting and receiving nodes.
It can overcome the symmetrizability issue by using a list size L which is greater
than the order of symmetrizability of the AVC between the transmitter and the legiti-
mate receiver. Moreover, there exists some list encoding schemes that does not enforce
any restrictions on the communication link between the jammer and the eavesdropper.
4. In Section 5.3, we introduced two coding scheme to derive the achievability of The-
orem 5.9: A direct coding approach whose reliability analysis works for any AVWC
and an indirect approach that utilizes the principle of elimination of correlation whose
reliability analysis is only valid under the assumption that the jammer possesses no
information about the messages transmitted over the channel. Although this argument
might implies that the direct coding approach is better than the indirect one, there
are some situations where the indirect approach is preferable. This is because the
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indirect approach allows the integration of some public services like synchronization
and channel estimation that do not need to be protected against eavesdropping and
at the same time only utilizes negligible transmission rate. Thus, for communication
scenario where a combination of these public services along with the usual confidential
services is required, it is more advantageous to use the indirect approach.
5. One of the main limitations of the secrecy capacity results established in this chap-
ter and for AVWCs in general is that no single-letter capacity description exists for
the general AVWC and only multi-letter descriptions have been established. The dis-
pute between single-letter and multi-letter capacity descriptions is a major issue that
does not only occur in the classical information theory domain but its shadow has
been casted to the quantum domain as well. In particular, for the class of classical-
quantum channels (CQC), it was shown that although a single-letter characterization
of the capacity in terms of mutual information is unknown, a multi-letter description
is possible. This observation motivated Holevo to tackle the capacity characterization
problem using a different information quantity other than the mutual information. He
introduced the Holevo quantity in [203] and used it to establish a single-letter descrip-
tion of the CQC capacity in [204].
6. Despite the previous argument, we have shown in this chapter that multi-letter
capacity descriptions can still be useful even in the absence of single-letter charac-
terization. We used them to establish some properties regarding the continuity and
the additivity behavior of the list capacity function for AVCs and AVWCs as well.
We even showed that the list secrecy capacity of parallel AVWCs can endorse an ex-
treme super-additivity feature known as super-activation, where joint decoding of two
parallel AVWCs with a vanishing list secrecy capacity can achieve a non-zero secrecy
rate.

Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
With the recent growth in the field of communication systems and data transmission,
it has become more crucial to guarantee a certain level of secrecy. However, the task
of securing communication networks is becoming more challenging due to the rapid
increase and the variability of the demands required to be achieved by these networks.
In general, the term secure communication implies a list of various requirements. In
this thesis, we limited our investigation to the confidentiality of the information trans-
mitted over discrete memoryless channels from an information theoretic perspective.
We started our investigation in Chapter 2 by presenting the problem of secure com-
munication over the wiretap channel introduced by Wyner in [2]. We then highlighted
the different concepts used to define an information theoretic secrecy measure. These
measures started with the weak secrecy notation introduced by Wyner, followed by the
notation of strong secrecy [38] and more recently the concept of effective secrecy [31]
and semantic secrecy [205]. We then discussed the different wiretap random coding
techniques and the corresponding secrecy analysis used to establish secure communi-
cation over wiretap channels with respect to the required secrecy measure.
The topics discussed in the beginning of Chapter 2 were necessary to explore the main
target of this thesis. Our aim was to investigate the problem of secure communica-
tion over two setups of wiretap channels with respect to the strong secrecy measure.
The first setup considered wiretap channels with multiple legitimate receivers. Dur-
ing investigating this setup, we focused on the case where perfect CSI is available
non-causally at the transmitting node. The second setup considered wiretap channels
that suffers from another class of attacks beside passive eavesdropping known as ac-
tive jamming. As an example of this setup we investigated secure communication over
AVWCs which was originally introduced to model wiretap channels with imperfect CSI.
In previous literature, different channel models have been used to address the problem
of secure communication over multi-receiver wiretap channels. However, all of these
works only considered a conservative secrecy criterion known as joint secrecy with
respect to the weak secrecy measure. In Section 2.4, we gave a brief summary for the
achievable secrecy rate regions established for the two-receiver WBC. The presented
results indicated that the development of coding schemes for the multi-receiver wiretap
channel is not an easy task. This is because, despite the tremendous efforts conducted
on this problem, the secrecy capacity of the simplest communication scenario, where a
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common confidential message is transmitted over a two-receiver WBC is still unknown.
Nevertheless, the integration of secure transmission over multi-user networks seems to
be an inevitable requirement in all future communication system.
Bearing the previous argument in mind, we decided to uncover the potential advan-
tages of introducing an additional legitimate receiver to the wiretap channel model.
In [119], secure communication over a two-receiver WBC with receiver side information
was investigated. We noticed that one of the coding schemes proposed therein did not
fulfill the conservative joint secrecy criterion. Instead, it satisfied a weaker notation of
secrecy that was only considered for MAWC known as the individual secrecy criterion.
This criterion is based on the concept of mutual trust between the legitimate receivers.
This implies that it is a unique feature for secure communication over wiretap chan-
nels with more than one legitimate receiver. This observation motivated us to examine
how the individual secrecy criterion can affect the previous results established for the
two-receiver DM-WBC.
Beside the concept of individual secrecy, there was another motive for us to con-
sider secure communication over multi-receiver wiretap channels. Most of the coding
schemes established for this class of channels were derived under the weak secrecy mea-
sure. This is because multi-user communication scenarios over BCs require complex
codebook structures such as Marton coding. Differently from superposition encoding,
where secrecy analysis techniques are available for both weak and strong secrecy
measures, the secrecy analysis developed for Marton wiretap random codes in [12] is
only valid for the weak secrecy notation. The only work that considered Marton wire-
tap codes under the strong secrecy notation was [127], yet it did not establish a full
Marton coding region in the conventional sense.
The previous two reasons motivated us to study the communication scenario intro-
duced in Chapter 3. In this scenario, a common public message, a common confidential
message and two individual confidential messages are transmitted over a two-receiver
DM-WBC. The model has a very interesting feature; as each legitimate receiver is only
interested in one of the individual confidential messages, while being fully cognizant of
the other one. At first, we investigated this scenario under the joint-strong secrecy
criterion. We derived one of the main results of this thesis which is a full Matron
coding achievable region that adhere to the strong secrecy measure. In particular, we
showed that the strong secrecy analysis introduced in [127] can be adapted to a full
Marton coding region using the concepts of time sharing and rate splitting. Beside
Marton coding, our coding scheme utilized the principles of superposition encoding
and indirect decoding. The combination of these various techniques appeared to be
optimal in the sense that our achievable region is tight for all classes of the two-receiver
DM-WBC where the joint secrecy capacity region is known. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first result to demonstrate the optimality of indirect decoding for a
secure communication scenario.
Next, we extended our investigation to the individual-strong secrecy criterion.
We derived a general achievable rate region that utilized the principle of secret key
encoding in addition to the coding techniques used for the joint secrecy criterion (su-
perposition encoding, Marton coding and indirect decoding). We showed that the
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usage of secret key encoding is possible because each legitimate receiver knows the in-
dividual confidential message of the other one. However, this usage is only valid under
the individual secrecy criterion, where a mutual trust exists between the legitimate
receivers. Moreover, we established the individual secrecy capacity of some classes of
the less noisy two-receiver DM-WBCs by showing the optimality of using superposi-
tion encoding and secret key encoding only. Our results showed that the individual
secrecy criterion allows a larger capacity region compared to the joint one.
The results established in Chapter 3 raised a very interesting question about the us-
ability of the individual secrecy criterion for general multi-receiver WBCs, where no
receiver side information is available. This question was motivated by the fact that
individual secrecy managed to provide a larger capacity region compared to joint se-
crecy by applying the concept of secret key encoding. This utilization was based on
the fact that in the communication scenario investigated in Chapter 3, each legitimate
receiver is cognizant of the individual confidential message of the other one. Thus,
it is not clear how individual secrecy coding schemes can be constructed, if such in-
formation is not available. In order to answer this question, we investigated another
communication scenario in Chapter 4, where two individual confidential messages are
transmitted over a two-receiver DM-WBC without any receiver side information. This
scenario have been previously investigated in previous literature but only under the
joint-weak secrecy criterion, cf. [73, 84].
In Chapter 4, we showed that the results established for this communication scenario
under the joint-weak secrecy criterion are also valid for the joint-strong secrecy crite-
rion. In doing so, we derived a general achievable rate region using a coding scheme
that combined the principle of superposition encoding and Marton encoding, where
the strong secrecy analysis is based on the techniques developed in Chapter 3. We no-
ticed that in our coding scheme the information encoded in the superposition variable
(cloud center of our total coding scheme) can be decoded by both legitimate receivers.
Thus, by encoding part of the confidential message of the first legitimate receiver in
the superposition variable, we can allow the second legitimate receiver to create some
sort of receiver side information and vice versa. This implies that we can use secret
key encoding to encode confidential messages on higher layers.
The previous observation was the main key in investigating the broadcasting of individ-
ual confidential messages over the two-receiver DM-WBC without message cognition
under the individual-strong secrecy criterion. With that in mind, we derived a general
achievable rate region that combined the techniques used for joint secrecy along with
secret key encoding. We then extended our investigation to the multi-receiver degraded
DM-WBC. For this class of channels, we established the joint and individual-strong
secrecy capacity regions. Our results indicated that even in the absence of receiver
message cognition, the individual secrecy criterion can provide a larger capacity region
compared to the joint one. Finally, we showed that our results can be used to derive
the joint and individual secrecy capacity regions of the multi-receiver Gaussian SISO
WBCs and the degraded multi-receiver Gaussian MIMO WBCs.
In Chapter 5, we investigated our second setup which considers secure communication
over a channel that undergoes two different classes of attacks at the same time: A
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passive eavesdropper that threatens the secrecy of the communication by eavesdrop-
ping upon the transmitted signal and an active jammer that threatens the reliability
of the communication by maliciously manipulating the channel state. This setup has
been addressed in previous literature from a different perspective by investigating se-
cure communication over wiretap channels with imperfect CSI. Nevertheless, the two
problems are equivalent. In previous literature, two main classes of channels have
been used to model the behaviour of a wiretap channel with imperfect CSI: Com-
pound wiretap channels and arbitrary varying wiretap channels (AVWCs). The main
difference between these two classes lies in the rate at which the channel state varies
as follows: An AVWC models a scenario where the channel state can vary from one
time to another during a single transmission; while in a compound wiretap channel,
the channel state remains constant for the transmission of each codeword. We limited
our investigation to the class of AVWCs because they simulate a more general scenario
and they capture the behaviour of various real life communication channels.
We started our investigation by introducing the two main coding schemes that have
been used to establish a reliable and secure communication over AVWCs: Deterministic
codes, in which a fixed encoder-decoder pair is used through out the whole transmis-
sion and correlated random codes, in which an encoder-decoder pair is selected based
on some sort of common randomness shared between the transmitter and the receiving
nodes. Unfortunately, both schemes suffer from various drawbacks as there exist some
scenarios where neither of the two schemes can provide a secure communication over
an AVWC at a non-vanishing rate. In particular, for an AVWC where the channel
between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver is symmetrizable and the amount
of common randomness is less than O(n2), both coding schemes fails to establish a
reliable transmission link. The previous result motivated us to use the principle of list
decoding to develop an alternative coding scheme that can overcome the limitations
of both deterministic and correlated random codes.
In Section 5.3, we derived a full characterization of the secrecy capacity of the AVWC
under list decoding, showing that the list secrecy capacity is equivalent to the cor-
related random secrecy capacity, as long as the list size L is greater than the order
of symmetrizability of the AVC between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver.
Our result implies that even in the absence of a correlated randomness, we can still
achieve the maximum secrecy rate for an AVWC by using an appropriate list size L.
Moreover, we showed that even if we used a smaller list size L, we can still achieve rate
closer to the capacity at the cost of a non-vanishing error probability. Surprisingly,
such modification did not have any consequences on the secrecy constraints and a van-
ishing information leakage is still possible under a smaller list size. Furthermore, we
used the established capacity characterization to investigate the analytical properties
of the capacity function such as: continuity and additivity of parallel AVWCs. In par-
ticular, we derived the conditions that define a discontinuity point for the list secrecy
capacity of an AVWC and showed that such points do exist. We also showed that
there exists some scenarios for which the list secrecy capacity of an AVWC exhibits
super-activation.
Although the investigation of secure communication over AVWC is not a new topic,
most of the work presented in previous literature only considered one communication
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scenario in which only one confidential message is transmitted over the channel. In
Section 5.4, we considered a communication scenario in which we integrated both pub-
lic and confidential services over an AVWC. We established both the deterministic and
correlated random capacities for transmitting a common public message to both the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper and a confidential message to the legitimate
receiver. Our result aimed to be the first step in combining the two communication sce-
narios considered in this thesis by investigating the problem of secure communication
over an AVWC with multiple legitimate receivers.
Future Research Directions
Through out this thesis, we extended the investigation of secure communication over
wiretap channels to a more realistic and general scenarios. In the first half of the thesis,
we considered secure communication over wiretap channels with multiple legitimate
receivers, while in the second half, we considered the problem of active jamming and
wiretap channels with imperfect CSI. A common observation for the two scenarios
is that we only managed to establish a single-letter characterization for the secrecy
capacity of some special cases, while for the general setup a single-letter expression for
the secrecy capacity has remained unknown. However, in both setups, we were able
to derive a multi-letter description for the secrecy capacity. We also showed that al-
though multi-letter capacity descriptions are not efficiently computable, they can still
play an important role in deriving some of the analytical properties of the capacity
function and provide further useful insights. Nevertheless, we believe that there might
be an alternative solution to tackle this problem.
Our belief originates from the work of Holevo in [206, 207] on the classical-quantum
channel (CQC), where the channel input is a classical random variable, while the
channel output is a quantum state. For such channel, a single-letter characterization
of the capacity in terms of the mutual information is unknown, while a multi-letter de-
scription is possible. Holevo suggested to tackle the capacity characterization problem
using a different information quantity instead of the mutual information. He intro-
duced the Holevo quantity in [206] and used it to establish a single-letter description
for the capacity of the CQC in [207]. We believe that this result might motivate re-
searchers to investigate whether other information quantities can be used to establish
a single-letter description for the secrecy capacity, where the mutual information can
only provide a multi-letter description for the capacity. This argument was discussed
recently in [208] and it seems to be a very interesting extension for our work.
In Chapter 5, we investigate the problem of secure communication over AVWC, where
an active jammer manipulates the channel state s of the channel based on a certain dis-
tribution q(s) ∈ P(S). This setup is known as the AVWC with uncorrelated jamming
because the jammer selects a certain channel state sequence sn independently from
both the transmitted message m and the channel input sequence xn. In [209–211],
an alternative setup for AVC was investigated. In this setup, the jammer chooses a
certain channel state sequence sn based on the transmitted message m or the channel
input sequence xn as shown in Fig. 6.1. This class of AVCs is very interesting because
it captures a more sophisticated and challenging class of attacks.
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Figure 6.1: Arbitrarily varying channel with correlated jamming
In [209], Sarwate established the correlated random capacity of this channel using
some of the results established by of Ahlswede in [212] along with some list decoding
techniques [213]. The concept of correlated jamming was further investigated in [214]
but this time over a classical-quantum AVC. The authors established the correlated
random capacity for this channel using a different coding scheme from the one intro-
duced by Sarwate in [210]. Despite these various investigations, the problem of secure
communication over AVWC with correlated jamming is still an open problem and it
also might be an interesting extension for our work.
Appendix A
Fundamental Tools in Information
Theory
In this appendix, we discuss some of the basic and fundamental concepts of information
theory. We also introduce various mathematical tools that play an important role in
establishing the results presented in this thesis.
A.1 Entropy, Mutual Information and Divergence
Consider a discrete random variable X that can take values form the alphabet X
according to the probability distribution PX, such that PX(x) is the probability that
the random variable X takes the value x. In information theory, one of the most
important properties of a discrete random variable is entropy because it measures
the uncertainty of the random variable [215]. In general, entropy plays a huge role
in various applications such as astronomy, cryptography, signal processing, statistics,
physics, image analysis in neuron-science, network theory, and bio-informatics [216]. In
information theory, the term entropy usually refers to the Shannon entropy introduced
by Claude E. Shannon in [217].
Definition A.1. For a discrete a random variable X, the entropy is denoted by H(X)
and is defined as follows:
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
PX(x) · logb PX(x), (A.1)
with the convention that 0 logb 0 = 0.
Throughout this thesis, base b of the logarithm is taken to be 2, unless specified
otherwise. This implies that entropy is measured in bits. Now, consider another
discrete random variable Y with probability distribution PY and let PXY be the joint
probability distribution for two discrete random variables X and Y. The conditional
entropy of Y given X is defined as follows:
H(Y|X) = −
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
PXY(x, y) logb PY|X(y|x). (A.2)
The next theorem highlights some of the main properties of the entropy of discrete
random variables.
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Theorem A.1. [215, 218] For a discrete random variable X, H(X) has the following
properties:
1. 0 ≤ H(X) ≤ logb |X |, where the lower-bound is achieved if X is deterministic,
while the upper-bound is achieved if X is uniformly distributed over the whole
alphabet X .
2. Conditioning reduces entropy: for a discrete random variable Y, it follows that
H(X|Y) ≤ H(X), where the equality occurs if and only if X and Y are indepen-
dent.
3. For a group of random variables, the following chain rule holds:
H(X1, . . .Xn) =
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|X1 . . .Xi−1). (A.3)
Entropy is also used to calculate the mutual information between two random variables
X and Y denoted by I(X; Y). The mutual information is a measure of the statistical
dependence between those two random variables [215,219] and is given by the following
relation:
I(X; Y) = H(X)−H(X|Y). (A.4)
The mutual information is also related to the Kullback-Leibler divergence [215], be-
cause I(X; Y) is equivalent to the divergence between the joint distribution PXY and
the product of the marginal distributions PX and PY as follows:
I(X; Y) = DKL(PXY‖PXPY)
=
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
PXY(x, y) log
PXY(x, y)
PX(x)PY(y)
. (A.5)
The next theorem highlights some of the main properties of the mutual information.
Theorem A.2. [215,218] For the discrete random variables X,Y and Z, I(X; Y) has
the following properties:
1. 0 ≤ I(X; Y) ≤ min[H(X),H(Y)], where the lower-bound is achieved if and only
if X and Y are independent.
2. Unlike the entropy conditioning does not necessarily decrease the mutual infor-
mation. However, if Z− X− Y forms a Markov chain, then conditioning can
decrease the mutual information as follows: I(X; Y|Z) ≤ I(X; Y).
3. For a group of random variables, the following chain rule holds:
I(X1, . . .Xn; Y) =
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Y|X1 . . .Xi−1). (A.6)
A.2 Discrete Memoryless Channels
In his seminal paper “A mathematical theory of communication” [217] Claude E.
Shannon stated that the problem of communication is to be able to reproduce at one
point either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point. In order
to do this reproduction, some amount of information must be transmitted over the
physical channel between these two points. Based on this principle, Shannon proposed
a general model for the point-to-point communication as shown in Fig.A.1, which is
referred to as the discrete memoryless channel. The model of a discrete memoryless
channel consists of:
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Figure A.1: Discrete memoryless channel model
• An information source that produces a message m ∈ M according to a certain
probability distribution PM. All of the information sources considered in this
thesis are assumed to have a uniform output distribution unless stated otherwise.
• A transmitter that transforms the produced message into a signal to be trans-
mitted over the channel. In order to do so, an encoder E :M→ X n is used to
map each message m into a codeword xn, where n is the length of the codeword.
• A discrete memoryless channel (DMC) W : X → P(Y) that maps an input
symbol x into an output symbol y according to the conditional probability dis-
tribution WY|X. Since the channel input is a codeword of length n, the channel
is used n times producing the output sequence yn. The memoryless property
indicates that the output of the channel at a certain instant only depends on the
input at that instant and is conditionally independent of the previous channel
inputs or outputs [220].
• A receiver that aims to reconstruct the transmitted message based on his obser-
vation. This is done by using a decoder ϕ : Yn →M∪{?} that maps maps the
received sequence yn into a message mˆ ∈M or an error message.
In order to establish a reliable communication over a given DMC, one need to define an
encoding-decoding strategy such that the reconstructed message mˆ is most probably
equivalent to the transmitted message m. In order to make things more abstract, the
following definition is introduced:
Definition A.2. [221] A (2nR, n) code C for the DMC (W ) consists of a message set
M = J1, 2nRK, an encoder E :M→ X n and a decoder ϕ : Yn →M∪ {?}.
R is defined as the rate of the code, the set of codewords {xn(m) ∈ X n : m ∈ M}
is called the codebook of the code. Now, it remains to define a measure for the
reliability performance of a given code C. In general, two reliability measures have
been used [222,223]. The first is the average probability of error given by:
P¯e(C) = 1|M|
∑
m∈M
∑
yn:ϕ(yn)6=m
W (yn|xn(m))
= P(Mˆ 6= M|C), (A.7)
where Mˆ is a random variable that represents the estimated message at the receiver.
The second reliability measure used is the maximum error probability and is given by:
P˜e(C) = max
m∈M
∑
yn:ϕ(yn)6=m
W (yn|xn(m)). (A.8)
Definition A.3. A rate R is an achievable rate for the DMC (W ) with respect to the
average error probability measure, if for all η > 0 and λ > 0, there is an n(η, λ) ∈ N
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such that for all n > n(η, λ) there exists a sequence of (2nR, n) codes {C}n≥1 according
to Definition A.2 such that:
1
n
log |M| ≥ R− η, (A.9)
P¯e(C) ≤ λ. (A.10)
The channel capacity of the DMC (W ) is given by the supremum of all achievable
rates R and is denoted by C(W ).
Similarly, One can use the maximum error probability constraint to define the cor-
responding channel capacity and achievable rate. Nevertheless, most of the results
derived in this thesis only consider the average error probability constraint.
Information theory aims to characterize the capacity of different DMC in terms of
information-theoretic quantities that mainly depend only on the channel transmission
matrix W . This characterization is called a coding theorem. In order to establish a
coding theorem, one needs to proof two results. The first is called the direct result or
the achievability proof which confirms the existence of a code whose rate is equivalent
to the capacity expression. The second result is called the converse proof and it assures
that no code can have an achievable rate greater than the capacity expression. In [217],
Shannon presented the following coding theorem for DMCs,
Theorem A.3. [217] The capacity of the DMC (W ) is given by the following expres-
sion:
C(W ) = max
PX
I(X; Y). (A.11)
where the maximum is taken over all possible input distributions PX.
The previous theorem is called the channel coding theorem and it is considered as one
of the fundamental results in information theory [136]. In the following sections, some
of the mathematical tools needed to establish this coding theorem are introduced.
These tools are very important as they play an important role in confirming various
results in the field of information theory.
A.3 Channel Comparison and Basic Lemmas
In investigating the channel capacity of DMCs, the notation of channel comparison
always comes into play [224]. The notation of channel comparison identifies and com-
pare the decoding capabilities of each channel by measuring the statistical dependence
between a random variable that serves as a common input for all channels and the
random variables that represent the outputs of each channel. The concept of channel
comparison is extremely helpful for multi-user broadcasting scenarios because it is one
of the main factors that defines the optimum coding scheme for such scenarios [225].
Now, consider a DMC Q : X → P(Y ,Z) given by the probability transition matrix
QYZ|X and is characterized by the following marginal transition probabilities WY|X and
VZ|X. This implies that Q can be interpreted as two DMCs W : X → P(Y) and
V : X → P(Z). The next definition gathers the most common notations used to
compare DMCs.
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Definition A.4. [226] A DMC (V ) is said to be physically degraded with respect to
the DMC (W ) if
∀(x, y, z) ∈ X × Y × Z QYZ|X(y, z|x) = σZ|Y(z|y) ·WY|X(y|x), (A.12)
for some transition probability σZ|Y. In other words, physically degraded follows if
X− Y − Z forms a Markov chain. On the other hand, V is said to be stochastically
degraded with respect to W if there exists a DMC σ : Y → P(Z) such that
∀(x, z) ∈ X × Z VZ|X(z|x) =
∑
y∈Y
σZ|Y(z|y) ·WY|X(y|x). (A.13)
The DMC (W ) is said to be less noisy than the DMC (V ), if for every random variable
U such that U− X− YZ forms a Markov chain, the following holds:
I(U; Y) ≥ I(U; Z). (A.14)
The previous notation is sometimes expressed as Z is noisier than Y and is formulated
mathematically as Y  Z. Finally, the DMC (W ) is said to be more capable than the
DMC (V ), if for every distribution on X, the following holds:
I(X; Y) ≥ I(X; Z). (A.15)
Theorem A.4. [16, 226] Let W : X → P(Y) and V : X → P(Z) be two DMCs and
consider the following statements:
1. (V ) is physically degraded with respect to (W ).
2. (V ) is stochastically degraded with respect to (W ).
3. (W ) is less noisy than (V ).
4. (W ) is more capable than (V ).
Then, the following relation holds:
1⇒ 2⇒ 3⇒ 4. (A.16)
The previous theorem establishes a relation between the different classes of channel
introduced in Definition A.4. It clearly indicates that the class of more capable chan-
nels is strictly wider than the less noisy one. It also implies that the class of less noisy
channels contains the physically and stochastically degraded channels.
In addition to the concept of channel comparison, this section highlights some impor-
tant tools that are crucial to the characterization of the channel capacity for various
communication scenarios.
Lemma A.1. [227] Let X, Y and Z be three discrete random variables such that
X− Y − Z forms a Markov chain. Then, the following holds
I(X; Z) ≤ I(X; Y). (A.17)
220 Chapter A  Fundamental Tools in Information Theory
The previous result is knows as the data-processing inequality and it implies that on
average taking a processed version of the random variable Y which in our case is Z
can only lead to an increase in our uncertainty about the original random variable X.
Lemma A.2. [22] Let X be a discrete random variable on the alphabet X and Xˆ be
an estimate of X that takes values in the same alphabet. Then for Pe = P[X 6= Xˆ], we
have
H(X|Xˆ) ≤ H2(Pe) +Pe log2(|X | − 1), (A.18)
where H2(Pe) is the binary entropy function and is defined as H2(Pe) = −Pe log2Pe
−(1−Pe) log2(1−Pe).
The previous relation is known as Fano’s inequality and it is one of the most crucial
results for communication because it establishes a relation between an operational
quantity (decoding error probability) and an information-theoretic quantity (the con-
ditional entropy) [215]. One can easily show that if Pe approaches zero, then H(X|Xˆ)
also approaches zero.
Another important result is a bound that exploits the concentration of independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables around their expectation as follows:
Lemma A.3. [228] Let b > 0 and let Z1, . . . ,ZL be i.i.d. random variables with values
in [0, b]. Let µ = E[Z1] be the expectation of Z1. Then
P
[
1
L
L∑
i=1
Zi /∈ [(1± )µ]
]
≤ 2 exp
(
−L · 
2µ
2b ln 2
)
, (A.19)
where [(1± )µ] denotes the interval [(1− )µ, (1 + )µ].
The previous bound is known as the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound because it was intro-
duced by Hoeffding in [228] based on an adaptation to the Chernoff bound introduced
in [229]. Another, important result is the following lemma:
Lemma A.4. [16, Lemma 2.1] Let Xn be a random variable on the alphabet Xn and
let F be a finite set of functions f : Xn → R+ such that |F| does not depend on n.
Now, if
∀f ∈ F EXn [f(Xn)] ≤ δ(n), (A.20)
then there exists a specific realization xn of Xn such that
∀f ∈ F f(xn) ≤ δ(n). (A.21)
The previous lemma is known as the “selection lemma” because it implies that if a
random variable satisfies some constraints on average, then there must exist a real-
ization of this random variable that satisfies these constraints. This lemma directly
follows from the Markov’s inequality [230].
Lemma A.5. [231] Let PX and QX be two probability distribution for the discrete
random variable X that takes values in the finite alphabet X , then the following holds
DKL(PX‖QX) ≥ 1
2 ln 2
‖PX −QX‖2, (A.22)
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where DKL(PX‖QX) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence defined in the previous section,
while ‖PX −QX‖ is the total variation distance between PX and QX is defined as fol-
lows:
‖PX −QX‖ =
∑
a∈X
|PX(a)−QX(a)|. (A.23)
The previous result is known as Pinsker’s inequality and it is of high importance
because it establishes a relation between two fundamental measures for discrete prob-
ability distributions. A refinement of the constant in Pinsker’s inequality has been
addressed in [232]. It was shown in [233] that a general inverse for Pinsker’s inequality
cannot be established. This is because one can show that for a random variable X,
there exist distributions PX and QX such that for 0 <  ≤ 2, the following holds:
‖PX −QX‖ ≤ , while DKL(PX‖QX) =∞ (A.24)
Nevertheless, it was shown that for some special cases an inverse inequality does exist
cf. [234–236]. In particular, the bound established in the following lemma is og high
importance:
Lemma A.6. [237, Lemma 2.7] Let X and Y be two discrete random variables that
take values in the finite alphabets X and Y respectively. Next, let PXY be a joint distri-
bution on X and Y with marginal distributions PX and PY. Now, if ‖PXY − PXPy‖ ≤
 ≤ 1
2
, then
I(X; Y) = DKL(PXY‖PXPy) ≤ − log |X ||Y| . (A.25)
The proof of the previous lemma is based on the definition of the mutual information
along with the continuity of the entropy function.
A.4 Types and Typical Sequences
The principle of types and typical sequences is one of the main pillars of information
theory due to the asymptotic equipartition property. This property plays an impor-
tant role in establishing the direct part of a coding theorem [238]. There exists two
notation for typicality: weak typicality and strong typicality. In this thesis, only the
strong typicality notation is utilized.
Consider a discrete memoryless source (DMS) that outputs n symbols from a discrete
and finite alphabet X producing the sequence xn. The symbols are produced in an
i.d.d. manner according to the probability distribution PX. This implies that the
probability of a sequence xn to be produced by this DMS is given by:
PnX(x
n) =
n∏
i=1
PX(xi). (A.26)
Definition A.5. The type of a sequence xn ∈ X n is the empirical distribution induced
by the sequence xn over the alphabet X and is given by:
QX(a) =
1
n
N(a|xn) for every a ∈ X , (A.27)
N(a|xn) denotes the number of occurrences of the element a in xn.
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Although xn was generated according to the distribution PX, there is no guarantee that
the type of xn given by QX is identical to PX. That is why we present the following
definition:
Definition A.6. Consider a probability distribution PX on the finite alphabet X and
let  > 0. A sequence xn ∈ X n is said to be strongly -typical with respect to PX, if
the type of xn is close to PX as follows:∣∣∣∣N(a|xn)n − PX(a)
∣∣∣∣ ≤  · PX(a) for every a ∈ X . (A.28)
The set of sequences xn that satisfies the constraint in (A.28) is called the -strongly
typical set with respect to PX and is denoted by T n (PX).
The notation of strong typicality is also known in literature as letter typicality and can
only be applied to discrete random variables. Unlike the strong typicality, the weak
typicality notation can be used for both discrete and continuous random variables.
This is because the weak notation requires the empirical entropy of a sequence xn to
be close to the true entropy of the corresponding random variable. That is why the
weak typicality notation is also known as the entropy typicality [215].
Theorem A.5. [237,239] Consider a probability distribution PX on a finite alphabet
X and let Xn be a random variable that represents the produced sequences by the DMS
PX. Then for  > 0, we have
∀xn ∈ T n (PX) 2−n(1+)H(X) ≤ PnX(xn) ≤ 2−n(1−)H(X) (A.29)
1− δn() ≤ P[Xn ∈ T n (PX)] ≤ 1 (A.30)
(1− δn())2n(1−)H(X) ≤ |T n (PX)| ≤ 2n(1+)H(X), (A.31)
where δn() = 2|X | · e−2n2µ2X and µX = mina∈supp(PX) PX(a).
One can notice that limn→∞ δn() = 0. The previous theorem is known as the the
asymptotic equipartition property (AEP) and it implies that if n is sufficiently large,
then with a probability close to one the produced sequence xn belongs to the strongly
typical set. The proof of the inequality in (A.29) follows directly from the constraint
of strong typical sequences in (A.28). On the other hand, the inequality in (A.30)
follows by using the Chernoff bound and the constraint in (A.29) along with Pinsker’s
inequality. The last inequality in (A.31) follows directly from the first two inequalities.
The the notion of strong typicality can be easily generalized to jointly distributed
random variables as follows:
Definition A.7. Consider the joint probability distribution PXY on the finite alphabet
X × Y and let  > 0. The sequence xn ∈ X n and yn ∈ Yn are said to be -strongly
jointly typical with respect to PXY, if∣∣∣∣N(a, b|xn, yn)n − PXY(a, b)
∣∣∣∣ ≤  · PXY(a, b) for every (a, b) ∈ X × Y . (A.32)
The -strongly jointly typical set with respect to PXY is denoted by T n (PXY).
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One can easily show that if the sequences (xn, yn) ∈ T n (PXY) then xn ∈ T n (PX)
and yn ∈ T n (PY). This property is known as the consistency of joint typicality [16].
Another important generalization is the conditional typicality defined as follows:
Definition A.8. Consider the joint probability distribution PXY on the finite alphabet
X × Y and let  > 0. For a sequence xn ∈ T n (PX), the set
T n (PXY|xn) = {yn ∈ Yn : (xn, yn) ∈ T n (PXY)} (A.33)
is called the -strongly conditional typical set with respect to xn.
Theorem A.6. [237] Consider a joint probability distribution PXY on the finite al-
phabet X × Y and let (Xn,Yn) be the random variables that represent the sequences
produced by the DMS PXY. Then for 0 < 1 < 2 and a sequence x
n ∈ T n1 (PX), we
have
∀yn ∈ T n1 (PXY|xn) 2−n(1+1)H(Y|X) ≤ PnY|X(yn|xn) ≤ 2−n(1−1)H(Y|X) (A.34)
1− δn(1, 2) ≤ P[Yn ∈ T n2 (PXY|xn)|Xn = xn] ≤ 1 (A.35)
(1− δn(1, 2))2n(1−2)H(Y|X) ≤ |T n2 (PXY|xn)| ≤ 2n(1+2)H(Y|X), (A.36)
where δn(1, 2) = 2|X ||Y| exp
(
−2n
(
2−1
1+1
)2
µ2XY
)
and µXY = min(a,b)∈supp(PXY) PXY(a, b).
The previous theorem implies that for a typical sequence xn and a random sequence Yn
generated by the following distribution PnY(y
n) =
∏n
i=1 PY|X(yi|xi), then Yn is jointly
typical with xn with probability that approaches one as n approaches infinity. Next,
we consider scenarios where Xn and Yn are generated in a different way as follows:
Theorem A.7. [16,237] Consider the joint probability distribution PXY on the finite
alphabet X×Y and let Xn and Yn be two random variables that represent the sequences
generated by two independent DMS PX and PY respectively. Then for 0 < 1 < 2 and
a sequence xn ∈ T n1 (PX), we have
(1− δn(1))2−n[I(X;Y)+21γxy ] ≤ P
[
(Xn,Yn) ∈ T n1 (PXY)
] ≤ 2−n[I(X;Y)−21γxy ] (A.37)
(1− δn(1, 2))2−n[I(X;Y)+22γy ] ≤ P
[
Yn ∈ T n2 (PXY|xn)
] ≤ 2−n[I(X;Y)−22γy ], (A.38)
where γxy = log |X ||Y| and γy = log |Y|, while δn(1) and δn(1, 2) are as defined
before.
The previous theorem can be easily generalized to joint distributions with more than
two random variables. This generalization is used a lot throughout this thesis.
A.5 Useful Bounding Lemmas
In this section, we discuss some useful lemmas that play an important role in estab-
lishing some of the results presented in this thesis. Most of these lemmas are novel
results established by us to serve as a supporting arguments for our main results. We
now present these lemmas and prove their validity.
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Lemma A.7. [121, Lemma 2] Consider two independent random variables M and
W, such that H(W|Zn) ≤ α and I(M; Zn) ≤ β, where α, β > 0. Then, the following
relation holds: I(M; Zn|W) ≤ α + β.
Proof.
I(M; Zn|W) = H(M|W)−H(M|ZnW)
≤ H(M|W)−H(M|ZnW)−H(W|Zn) + α
(a)
= H(M)−H(WM|Zn) + α
= H(M)−H(M|Zn)−H(W|ZnM) + α
(b)
≤ I(M; Zn) + α ≤ α + β,
where (a) follows due to the chain rule of entropy along with the fact that M and W are
independent; while (b) follows from the properties of entropy, i.e. H(W|ZnM) ≥ 0. 
Lemma A.8. Let QY,Z|X be a discrete memoryless BC and assume that Y  Z. Con-
sider two independent random variables M and W, such that (M,W)−Xn − (Yn,Zn)
forms a Markov chain. Then the following holds:
I(M; Yn|W) ≥ I(M; Zn|W).
Proof. We define ∆ = 1
n
[I(M; Zn|W) − I(M; Yn|W)] and prove that if Y  Z, ∆ ≤ 0
and this directly implies our proposition. Let Ui , (W, Z˜i+1,Yi−1) and Vi , (M,Ui),
we have
∆ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(M; Zi|WZ˜i+1)− I(M; Yi|WYi−1)
]
(a)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(M; Zi|WZ˜i+1Yi−1)− I(M; Yi|WZ˜i+1Yi−1)
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(Vi; Zi|Ui)− I(Vi; Yi|Ui)
]
(b)
= I(V; Z|U)− I(V; Y|U)
= EU
[
I(V; Z|U)− I(V; Y|U)
]
(c)
≤ I(V; Z|U = u¯)− I(V; Y|U = u¯)
(d)
≤ I(V¯; Z)− I(V¯; Y)
(e)
≤ 0 (A.39)
where (a) follows from the Csisza´r sum identity [10, Lemma 7]; (b) follows by intro-
ducing a random variable T independent of all others and uniformly distributed overJ1, nK, then letting U = (UT,T), V = VT, Y = YT and Z = ZT; (c) follows as u¯ is
the realization of U that maximizes the difference; (d) follows as V¯ is distributed as
Q(v|u = u¯) cf. [5, Corollary 2.3] and (e) follows since V¯ − X− (Y,Z) forms a Markov
chain and Y  Z. 
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Lemma A.9. Consider a multi-receiver Gaussian SISO WBC as defined in (4.35),
where E[X2] ≤ P and the variances of the Gaussian noises satisfy the order in (4.36).
Moreover, assume that the following Markov chain Uk−· · ·−U2−X− Y1 − · · ·−Yk−Z
holds. Now, if the following inequality is true:
I(Uj; Yj|Uj+1)− I(Uj; Z|Uj+1) ≤ f
(
αjP∑j−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
j
)
− f
(
αjP∑j−1
i=1 αiP + σ
2
Z
)
,
(A.40)
for every j ∈ J1, kK and αj ∈ [0, 1], where Uk+1 = ∅, U1 = X, ∑ki=1 αi = 1 and
f(a) , 1
2
log(1 + a), then it follows directly that:
E[U2j ] ≤
k∑
i=j
αiP. (A.41)
Proof. We start by considering the random variable Uk, i.e. j = k. Based on the
results established in [94], we know that the LHS of Eq. (A.40) is maximized by
Gaussian signaling. Thus, we let Uk be a Gaussian random variable and assume that
E[U2k] = (αk +γ)P , where γ ≥ 0. Further, we let X = Uk +V¯k, where V¯k is a Gaussian
random variable independent from Uk. This implies that E[V¯2k] =
(
1− (αk + γ)
)
P =(∑k−1
i=1 αi − γ
)
P . Under the previous power assumptions, we have:
I(Uk; Yk)− I(Uk; Z) = f
 (αk + γ)P(∑k−1
i=1 αi − γ
)
P + σ2k
 f
 (αk + γ)P(∑k−1
i=1 αi − γ
)
P + σ2Z
 .
(A.42)
However, this condition contradicts the given constraint given in (A.40) at j = k,
unless γ ≤ 0 which consequently implies that E[U2k] ≤ αkP . Now, by repeating these
steps recursively for every random variable Uj, we can show that E[U2j ] ≤
∑k
i=j αiP
and this completes our proof. 
Lemma A.10. For the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel de-
fined in (4.44), where the Gaussian noise vectors’ covariance matrices satisfy the semi-
definite order in (4.45), if the bound in (4.48) holds with all its constraints, then the
vector realizations Uj of the auxiliary random variables Uj in (4.48) must satisfy the
following covariance constraint: E[UjU>j ] 
∑k
i=j Ki.
Proof. The proof follows by adapting the same techniques used to prove Lemma A.9 to
the vector nature of the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel. 
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